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PS21/14
Chapter 3
Financial Conduct Authority
A new authorised fund regime for investing in long term assets
contracts of insurance? What do you see as the main
obstacles to this and how would you resolve them?
Q17: Do you have any views on how permitted links might be
expanded to other fund structures or direct investments in
illiquid assets?
3.15 Most respondents advocated wider use of the LTAF as a permitted link or conditional
permitted link to long-term contracts of insurance. Several respondents said that the
current proposal to restrict LTAF distribution to DC defaults is overly restrictive. They
pointed out that outside the DC default landscape, there are other balanced managed
investment arrangements where the provider designs and governs the portfolio on
the investor’s behalf. These look much like default arrangements but lack the formal
designation of a default because they are not part of workplace pension products.
These respondents felt that investors in these strategies (which could be found in
non-workplace pension products, for example) could also benefit from exposure to
LTAFs. More generally, where investors in a long-term unit-linked product have either
professional support on fund selection or are guided through an appropriate choice
architecture, they should be able to invest in an LTAF and the distribution rules should
reflect this.
3.16 Respondents therefore recommended that in the unit-linked market, the rules should
allow insurers to include the LTAF alongside other permitted links and conditional
permitted links in constructing managed multi-asset portfolios where the investor
is not required to make any investment decision. They suggested that, as with the
default in the proposed rules, such portfolios should not be constrained by the 35%
illiquid asset cap. Instead, they should be subject to the same rules on the insurer to
consider ongoing suitability and concentration risk. The rules should cater for the use
of LTAFs in such managed portfolios both within pension products (workplace and
non-workplace) and other long-term contracts of insurance.
3.17 These respondents made clear that they were not proposing LTAFs being made
available for standalone investment in a unit-linked wrapper without access to any
supporting guidance and choice architecture. For example, as a self-select fund option
in a pension product (workplace or non-workplace). However, looking at the potential
for wider retail distribution, they felt that investors in a long-term unit-linked product
who had either professional support on fund selection or are guided through an
appropriate choice architecture, should be able to invest in an LTAF. In their view, given
the degree of substitutability between authorised funds and unit-linked funds, if future
distribution rules allowed LTAFs to be sold to retail investors, they should also allow for
the distribution of unit-linked LTAFs to such investors. However, some acknowledged
that the practical implications could be challenging and that this could lead to complex
administration requirements.
3.18 Many respondents said that while our proposals for the LTAF would work well for unit-
linked DC default arrangements, the 35% cap remains a significant constraint within
the permitted links rules for structures other than LTAFs that seek to offer unit-linked
investors exposure to illiquid assets. It also meant the LTAF would have an advantage
over other fund structures, in particular the QIS and directly invested unit-linked funds,
because the cap would apply to these structures but not to a conditional permitted
LTAF. A more coherent regulatory approach would treat all fund structures the same
in this respect, and the proposals for the LTAF within the permitted links rules offered
a way forward for other structures as well. Some clarified that this might be achieved