National Academy of Public Administration
September 2021
Building for the Future:
Employee Engagement in the United
States Secret Service
A Report by a Panel of the
N
ATIONAL
A
CADEMY OF
P
UBLIC
A
DMINISTRATION
For the United States Secret Service
National Academy of Public Administration
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National Academy of Public Administration
September 2021
A Report by a Panel of the
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
for the United States Secret Service
Building for the Future:
Employee Engagement in the
United States Secret Service
PANEL OF ACADEMY FELLOWS
Ellen Tunstall (Chair)
Cynthia Heckmann
John Koskinen
Reginald Wells
David Williams
National Academy of Public Administration
Officers of the Academy
David Wennergren,* Chair of the Board
Norton Bonaparte,* Vice Chair
David Mader,* Treasurer
Jane Fountain,* Secretary
Teresa W. Gerton,* President and Chief Executive Officer
Study Team
Brenna Isman, Director of Academy Studies
Daniel Ginsberg, Project Director
Ginger Groeber, Senior Advisor
Adam Darr, Senior Research Analyst
Sean Smooke, Senior Research Associate
Richard Pezzella, Senior Research Associate
Jennifer Butler, Intern
National Academy of Public Administration
1600 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
www.napawash.org
September 2021
Printed in the United States of America
Academy Project Number: 102246
Cover Photo Sources:
The cover images on the top left and bottom right of the report are sourced from the Secret Service’s Twitter account.
The cover images on the bottom left and top right are sourced from the Secret Service’s Instagram account. All cover
images are in the public domain.
*Academy Fellow
National Academy of Public Administration
About the Academy
The National Academy of Public Administration is an independent, nonprofit, and non-partisan
organization established in 1967 and chartered by Congress in 1984. It provides expert advice to
government leaders in building more effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent
organizations. To carry out this mission, the Academy draws on the knowledge and experience of
its over 900 Fellows—including former cabinet officers, Members of Congress, governors, mayors,
and state legislators, as well as prominent scholars, career public administrators, and nonprofit
and business executives. The Academy helps public institutions address their most critical
governance and management challenges through in-depth studies and analyses, advisory services
and technical assistance, congressional testimony, forums and conferences, and online
stakeholder engagement. Learn more about the Academy and its work at www.NAPAwash.org.
National Academy of Public Administration
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National Academy of Public Administration
Foreword
“Mission First, People Always” is the motto that guides the U.S. Secret Service. More than 7,600
Special Agents, Uniformed Division Officers, Technical Law Enforcement personnel, and
Administrative Professionals carry out a complex and difficult mission to protect the President of
the United States, the Vice President, and other key dignitaries against ever-present and
increasingly complex threats. The Secret Service also investigates financial crimes that have
evolved from counterfeiting on a printing press to sophisticated online attacks. Ensuring the
Secret Service lives up to its people-focused slogan is vital for the Agency’s success and, in turn,
the country’s basic security.
In October 2019, the Secret Service engaged the National Academy of Public Administration (the
Academy) to analyze the results of the Federal Viewpoint Survey, obtain perspectives of agency
leaders, and to identify opportunities to improve employee morale and engagement. Building on
the research and analysis of the Academy’s 2016 report that provided recommendations to
improve organizational management at the Secret Service after high-profiled incidents, this
report identifies a series of findings and recommendations that address both division-specific
issues and enterprise-wide strategies for success.
An Academy Panel of Fellows with extensive backgrounds in leadership, human resources, and
management guided a professional study team which interviewed Secret Service leaders, officers,
and staff members; examined the agency’s policies and practices; and reviewed best practices in
federal law enforcement. The project unfolded against the challenging backdrop of a global
pandemic, a presidential election, and the transition of administrations.
This study intersects with one the Academy’s 12 Grand Challenges, Modernizing and
Reinvigorating Public Service, as it explores issues of morale and job satisfaction within this
critical sphere of public service. This effort also revealed how acutely mission support tools
(information technology, agile acquisition programs, and financial management tools) impact the
day-to-day work experience and satisfaction of employees.
We have appreciated the candor and cooperation of the Secret Service at every stage as the Agency
traversed these historically challenging times in our nation’s history. I am grateful for the
thoughtfulness, expertise, and leadership of the Panel of Academy Fellows and the Academy study
team. The Panel’s report is well positioned to serve as a blueprint from which the Secret Service
can build to further engage its workforce and ensure it can carry out its unique and vital missions
in decades to come.
Teresa W. Gerton
President and Chief Executive Officer
National Academy of Public Administration
National Academy of Public Administration
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National Academy of Public Administration
Table of Contents
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................. i
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................. i
Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. ii
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. v
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Scope of Work ................................................................................................................................ 2
Results in Brief ............................................................................................................................... 3
Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 4
Report Organization ...................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 2: Employee Engagement — A Critical Success Factor to Organizational
Health and Performance ....................................................................................................................... 7
Employee Engagement .................................................................................................................. 7
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) and Federal Perspectives on Employee
Engagement ............................................................................................................................... 8
The Secret Service and Engagement ...................................................................................... 10
Previous Studies’ Findings and Recommendations ................................................................ 11
A Framework for Secret Service Employee Engagement ........................................................... 12
Chapter 3: The Dueling Pressures of Operations Intensity and Inadequate
Staffing Levels ........................................................................................................................................ 17
Operations: An Increasingly Intense Environment .................................................................... 18
Staffing Level Challenges ............................................................................................................. 22
Position Vacancies and Hiring ............................................................................................... 23
Attrition and Retention ........................................................................................................... 27
Chapter 4: Work-Life Balance, Telework, Benefits, and Compensation ................... 31
The Desire for Work-Life Balance ............................................................................................... 31
Agency Reforms to Address Work-Life Imbalance ..................................................................... 33
The Role of Telework in Work-Life Balance ............................................................................... 34
Agency Actions to Improve Benefits and Compensation ........................................................... 36
Benefits ..................................................................................................................................... 36
Overtime ................................................................................................................................... 38
Portability of Benefits .............................................................................................................. 39
Phase 1 First Assignment Moving Costs ................................................................................. 39
Chapter 5: Developing the Next Generation of Secret Service Leadership ........... 41
Career Paths ................................................................................................................................. 41
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Special Agents .......................................................................................................................... 41
Uniformed Division Officers ................................................................................................... 44
Technical Law Enforcement.................................................................................................... 44
Administrative, Professional, and Technical (APT) Employees ........................................... 45
Training ........................................................................................................................................ 45
Leadership Development ............................................................................................................. 47
Chapter 6: Professionalism and Business Operations ................................................... 51
Professionalized, Balanced Leadership ....................................................................................... 51
Acquisition Improvements .......................................................................................................... 52
Customer Service and Business Process Improvement .............................................................. 54
Improving Information Technology Infrastructure ................................................................... 56
Chapter 7: Culture of Inclusion and Communication ...................................................... 61
Mission Demands Drive Workplace Culture .............................................................................. 61
Strategic Communications Impacting Organizational Culture .................................................. 62
Evolving Change Management Approach ................................................................................... 63
Acknowledge Contributions and Build Office Cohesion ............................................................ 65
Diversity and Inclusion as a Pillar of Secret Service’s Organizational Culture ......................... 65
Chapter 8: Uniformed Division .................................................................................................. 69
Overall Observation ..................................................................................................................... 69
Staffing Level Requirements ........................................................................................................ 71
An Officer Shortage .................................................................................................................. 71
Attrition and Turbulence ......................................................................................................... 73
Unpredictable Mission Demands ............................................................................................ 74
Work-Life Balance ....................................................................................................................... 77
A Crisis in UD Work-Life Balance .......................................................................................... 77
Compensatory Time Off and Sick Days .................................................................................. 78
Scheduling System ................................................................................................................... 78
Supplemental Federal Law Enforcement Assistance ........................................................... 80
Compensation .............................................................................................................................. 81
Leadership Development, Career Pathing, and Training ........................................................... 81
Leadership Development ......................................................................................................... 83
Career Pathing ......................................................................................................................... 84
Peer-to-Peer Mentoring........................................................................................................... 85
Training Coordination ............................................................................................................ 86
Communications .......................................................................................................................... 87
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Vision and Policy Changes ...................................................................................................... 87
Soliciting Feedback .................................................................................................................. 88
Survey Utilization .................................................................................................................... 88
Culture, Climate, and Professionalism ........................................................................................ 89
Unique Branch and Unit Issues ................................................................................................... 90
K-9 Unit .................................................................................................................................... 90
Foreign Mission Branch Vehicles ............................................................................................ 90
Chapter 9: Individual Organizational Challenges ............................................................. 93
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC) .................................................. 93
Overview .................................................................................................................................. 93
Observations ............................................................................................................................ 93
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) .............................................................................. 96
Overview .................................................................................................................................. 96
Observations ............................................................................................................................ 96
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) ................................................................................ 98
Overview .................................................................................................................................. 98
Observations ............................................................................................................................ 98
Office of Human Resources (HUM) .......................................................................................... 100
Overview ................................................................................................................................ 100
Observations .......................................................................................................................... 100
Field Offices within the Office of Investigations (INV) (Miami, Florida, and Phoenix, Arizona)
.................................................................................................................................................... 102
Overview ................................................................................................................................ 102
Observations .......................................................................................................................... 102
Chapter 10: Summary of Recommendations ....................................................................... 105
Focus Employee Engagement Efforts ....................................................................................... 105
Improve Hiring and Retention .................................................................................................. 106
Create a Better Work-Life Balance and Enhance Compensation ............................................. 107
Develop the Next Generation of Secret Service Employees ..................................................... 108
Operationalize for the Future .................................................................................................... 109
Reinvigorate the Uniformed Division ........................................................................................110
Overall .....................................................................................................................................110
Staffing Requirements ............................................................................................................110
Work-Life Balance .................................................................................................................. 111
Leadership Development, Career Pathing, and Training .................................................... 111
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Communications ..................................................................................................................... 112
Culture, Climate, and Professionalism .................................................................................. 112
Unique Branch and Unit Issues ............................................................................................. 112
Addressing Individual Office Matters ........................................................................................ 113
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC) ............................................. 113
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) ......................................................................... 113
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) .......................................................................... 114
Office of Human Resources (HUM) ....................................................................................... 114
Field Offices within the Office of Investigations (INV) ......................................................... 114
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 115
Appendix A: Panel and Study Team Member Biographies................................................... 115
Appendix B: Agency Structure ............................................................................................... 119
Appendix C: Cross-Report Recommendations Matrix ........................................................ 123
Appendix D: List of Organizations Interviewed ................................................................... 129
Appendix E: Works Cited ....................................................................................................... 131
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List of Tables
Table 1. Secret Service Attrition and Hiring FY 18–20 .................................................................. 23
Table 2. FEVS Results on Skills and Training ................................................................................ 82
Table 3. Employee Engagement Index Scores ................................................................................ 83
Table 4. FEVS Response Rate for UD ............................................................................................. 88
Table 5. Recommendations across Recent Secret Service Studies .............................................. 123
List of Figures
Figure 1. Excerpt from FEVS Engagement Index ............................................................................. 9
Figure 2. Secret Service Employee Engagement Score, 2003–2020 ............................................ 10
Figure 3. Core Elements and Key Drivers of Organizational Engagement ................................... 14
Figure 5. Secret Service protectees over time, FY 2010—2018 ...................................................... 20
Figure 6. Glassdoor at-a-glance pros/cons of Secret Service employment ................................... 33
Figure 7: Uniformed Division Overtime Hours .............................................................................. 70
Figure 8: Uniformed Division Officer Hires and Losses ................................................................ 73
Figure 9. Secret Service Organization Chart .................................................................................. 119
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym or Abbreviation
Academy
AD
ALIS
AOD
APT
CHCO
CIO
COO
CTO
COTS
COVID-19
DAD
DSAIC
DHS
EEI
EPS
ERB
ELAC
FBI
FERS
FEVS
FLETC
FY
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GAO
HBS
HOGR
HRP
HRR
HUM
IGL
INV
ISP
IT
OCFO
OCIO
OMB
OPM
OPO
OSP
PALMS
PMP
PPD
PSS
RES
ROTA
SAF
SAIC
SARC
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SII
SMD
SSA/SRA
SOD
TAD
TEC
TLE
TNG
TSD
VPD
VPN
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Executive Summary
The United States Secret Service is one of the most unique and critical law enforcement and
national security organizations, carrying out two distinct but integrated missions. The Agency
executes a no-fail mission to protect the President, Vice President, and dignitaries, ensuring for
the American people and foreign counterparts that their elected leaders will be safe. It also
conducts investigations of crimes against financial systems that threaten the basic workings of the
nation’s economy. The Secret Service brings to bear advanced technologies, tried and true
strategies and tactics, and a robust network of field offices. But it is the people—their energy, drive,
and determination—that make this organization work. Employee engagement—the ability to tie
people to mission, to ensure job satisfaction, and to drive commitment to getting the job done
every day—is vital to the Agency’s success in carrying out its complex, inextricably linked
missions.
The mission demands placed on the Secret Service are stressing the workforce, negatively
impacting employee focus, engagement, readiness, and effectiveness. Secret Service employees
are asked to do more than ever within tight resources. Threats against the President and other
protectees have grown in intensity and scale with the emergence of new technologies and the
heightened level of violence in the country. Financial crimes have migrated from the basement
counterfeiting press to the cyber domain with greater stealth and sophistication. Budget pressures
have grown, and the Agency has only in the last few years recovered from significant budgetary
reductions and personnel measures, like hiring freezes, instituted because of sequestration.
These workforce stresses contributed to some of the high-profile incidents that garnered negative
attention to the Secret Service during the past decade. The Agency has moved forward from these
challenges, implementing recommendations from such prominent outside reviews as the
Protective Mission Panel (PMP) and the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
(HOGR). Additionally, in 2016, the Secret Service engaged the National Academy of Public
Administration (the Academy) to review its progress in transforming the Agency and the
effectiveness of the business support and organizational management actions undertaken to
address concerns involving culture and leadership, personnel issues (staffing levels, morale,
engagement), budget, and technology.
In the Secret Service’s ongoing efforts to ensure a focused, engaged, ready, and effective workforce
in the face of burgeoning mission demands, the Agency again turned to the Academy in 2019 to
convene a Panel of experts to review employee engagement and suggest areas for improvement.
This Panel guided a professional study team in an effort lasting over 18 months and taking place
over two phases of work. The research included intensive employee and leadership interviews and
focus group discussions among employees located in selected field offices and all headquarters
divisions, as well as extensive document reviews and detailed data analysis.
The Panel found that the Secret Service remains dedicated and committed to its mission.
Additionally, it determined that overall employee engagement continues to improve from the low
point the Agency faced nearly a decade ago. However, employee satisfaction and morale plateaued
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or declined until 2019 in several important offices prompting the Service to ask the Academy for
a review in some specific areas.
The overall progress across the Agency is the result of the Secret Service’s commitment to
improving the organizational climate and employee satisfaction levels in key areas, such as
accelerating hiring, updating the information technology (IT) infrastructure to allow for wide-
scale employee telework, and implementing policies and programs to enhance diversity and
inclusion. These steps are a strong indication of the Agency’s intent to address the ongoing
challenges that hinder the focus and performance of the Agency’s employees.
Mission demands continue to increase, while staffing levels have not risen at the same pace,
requiring the workforce to work significant overtime. Longer hours mean more fatigue and an
increased sense of monotony on the job, along with less time to train, and less time at home spent
with family or pursuing outside interests. Along with more time to train and be with family, Secret
Service employees would like to have increased opportunities to develop professionally and
acquire the skills and experiences needed to advance in the organization.
Today’s Secret Service employees, more than ever, value having a work-life balance. The Agency’s
use of competitive compensation, robust retention programs, and targeted employee support
programs have yet to significantly prevent more than eight percent of the Agency’s workforce from
leaving every year. Attrition is especially problematic within the Uniformed Division (UD or the
Division), which has seen an average attrition rate of 13 percent over the past five years. Thirty
percent of UD has less than three years on the job, and sixteen percent of Special Agents have less
than three years on the job. This presents the Secret Service with the challenge of a large portion
of their law enforcement personnel possessing limited experience.
The Agency has made significant strides at enhancing how it operates as a business, especially in
its financial management, acquisition, and IT programs that provide essential administrative
underpinnings to Agency operations. Top-level communications provide information for the
workforce to understand the direction and issues impacting the Agency, thus allowing employees
to understand how their work fits into the overall mission. The Agency has come a long way from
a time when there was outright hostility among various categories of employees (UD, Special
Agent, Technical Law Enforcement [TLE], and Administrative, Professional, and Technical [APT]
employees), but some lingering differences remain, preventing the workforce from coming
together around the mission and central purpose of the Agency.
In addition, there are several unique issues affecting specific Agency organizations that impact
employee satisfaction. These include leadership opportunities within the Office of Technical
Development and Mission Support (TEC), fragmented IT systems within the Office of Human
Resources (HUM), leadership instability in the Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), and
generalized employee dissatisfaction within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO).
Of particular concern is the state of employee morale and engagement in UD. In recent years, UD
leadership has placed major emphasis on improving UD programs and operations, including
enhancements to the Officer merit promotion process and allowing UD Officers to participate in
senior level training such as the SES Candidate Development Program and military War Colleges.
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The Division is experiencing increased op-tempo with simultaneous staffing shortages and
attrition forcing Officers to work an unsustainable amount of overtime, taking away meaningful
time for employees to train or spend time with their families. Low staffing levels make it difficult
for UD leaders to develop their employees and to supervise and manage performance. UD Officers
have difficulty understanding how to further their careers as there are no clearly articulated career
paths to follow.
Recommendations
Building on progress made over recent years, the Secret Service can take several steps and
measures to deepen the focus of the workforce, improve engagement, and address the issues
found during this review. The Panel offers a series of 48 recommendations: 17 are Agency-wide
recommendations, while 31 are targeted recommendations to address challenges in particular
divisions, offices, or branches, including 18 within UD. Recommendations, with associated action
steps, are detailed throughout the report and summarized in Chapter 10.
The recommendations are grouped under seven categories of objectives that the Panel believes
the Secret Service should prioritize:
1) Focus Employee Engagement Efforts
2) Improve Hiring and Retention
3) Create a Better Work-Life Balance and Enhance Compensation
4) Develop the Next Generation of Secret Service Employees
5) Operationalize for the Future
6) Reinvigorate the Uniformed Division
7) Address Individual Office Matters
Focus Employee Engagement Efforts
The Secret Service should focus its many programs, initiatives, and actions to improve job
satisfaction around a new vision for employee engagement, aligned with the Agency’s broader
mission strategy. The vision should set forth the collaborative, driven, and professional work
climate it strives to create while detailing actionable and measurable steps to get there. Fostering
teamwork and creating a collaborative, open, and inclusive atmosphere should be a special
emphasis of that vision. The Secret Service has taken many actions to show that it follows the
motto “Mission First, People Always.” Creating and pursuing a new vision for employee
engagement will further ingrain and institutionalize the direction the Secret Service is heading.
The Agency should revitalize its communications to include both delivering strategic messaging
and soliciting employee feedback.
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Improve Hiring and Retention
The Secret Service should ensure it has sufficient personnel with the right skills and experience to
fill its ranks and execute the mission. The Secret Service should continue its ongoing hiring surge,
working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Congress to acquire the necessary
support and funding for staffing level increases. While there have been significant improvements
in data analytics and technology supporting growth, an increased emphasis on accelerating hiring
through greater capacity and process improvements within the organizations charged with talent
acquisition and background investigations is necessary. Given how long it takes to hire a new
employee and the high value of experience within the Agency, the Secret Service should place
renewed emphasis on retaining the experienced employees already within its ranks.
Create a Better Work-Life Balance and Enhance Compensation
While the hiring surge evolves and has time to take effect, the Secret Service should pursue new
initiatives to provide a valuable work-life balance, while ensuring that pay and benefits
appropriately compensate its hard-working employees. To improve work-life balance, the Agency
should codify and make permanent the widespread availability of telework that enabled the
Agency to continue operations so successfully through the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. The Secret Service should also more actively manage its overtime program to reduce
the time personnel are required to involuntarily work extra hours while avoiding repeatedly
tapping the same individuals for overtime hours. The Agency should focus its pay and benefits to
compensate for the inevitable long hours that hard-pressed Secret Service employees will work
and design ways to retain the personnel most likely to leave the Agency.
Develop the Next Generation of Secret Service Employees
The Secret Service should ensure all its employees can grow professionally and have concrete
career paths open to them to advance throughout the organization as they gain experience and
work to exceed performance expectations. The Agency should put in place leadership and
professional development programs for all employee categories, fully implementing recently
developed programs for APT personnel and UD Officers. Leadership should provide information
on career paths and the requirements for promotion, along with more mentorship and guidance
on how to manage their careers with the Agency.
Operationalize for the Future
The Secret Service should continue to enhance and upgrade the mission-support, business, and
administrative functions that serve as a critical backdrop to the mission and impact how
employees, including those performing administrative functions, feel about their work. The Secret
Service should solidify the role that career mission-support professionals have in leading such key
functions, such as human resource management, financial management, and other administrative
operations. The Agency should better communicate with employees its plans for upgrading key
IT systems and infrastructure while validating its current strategy for procuring key systems.
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Reinvigorate the Uniformed Division
The Secret Service should place more focused, prominent, and sustained emphasis on employee
engagement issues within UD, pursuing a multi-year strategy that boosts hiring and retention,
minimizes the turbulence in staffing levels, and implements new policies on compensatory (comp)
time and new schedules to help mitigate some of the worst effects of staffing shortfalls. In the
long-term, the Secret Service should explore new operational and recruiting approaches for the
Division to support a more sustainable model. The Secret Service should expand professional
opportunities and foster the development of UD Officers.
Address Individual Office Matters
The Secret Service should address the range of employee engagement challenges unique to the
various offices and divisions. These recommendations include providing greater promotion
opportunities within TEC, undertaking an intense employee recognition and engagement effort
within the OCFO, relocating policy development responsibilities within the HUM, moving RES to
a location outside of the headquarters building, and building more experience within the Office of
Investigations (INV) field offices through the promotion of individuals already assigned to an
office.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Since 1865, the United States Secret Service has been at the forefront of national security. Over
7,600 employees, spread across 162 field and resident offices in both the United States and
abroad, execute a demanding mission: protecting the President of the United States, Vice
President, Cabinet Officials, former presidents, their families, and visiting foreign leaders; and
investigating financial crimes like counterfeiting of currency, wire fraud, and money laundering.
Throughout its 155-year history, the Secret Service has carried out this mission through an
evolving and increasingly complicated environment, adapting to challenges and taking advantage
of new opportunities.
One of the most pronounced challenges the Secret Service has faced in recent years is the increase
in its protection responsibilities. The President’s family size and outside activities can vary from
presidency to presidency, leading to constantly changing protection requirements. Plans, budgets,
and staffing become stretched, depending on the Administration.
The Secret Service maintains physical protection of the White House and its adjacent buildings,
the Naval Observatory and the Vice Presidential Residence, and foreign diplomatic residences in
Washington, D.C.
1
These protective duties are set against a backdrop of an increasingly
sophisticated and diverse array of threats.
The protection mission of the Secret Service is “no-fail” and demands the highest level of
commitment of staff and resources. The consequences of a failure in protection could be
catastrophic. For the Secret Service, this means doing whatever it takes to get the job done and
using the resources available to their fullest capacity.
The investigative mission, though perhaps not as visible to the public, requires sophisticated
techniques that only an experienced, well-trained workforce can carry out. The responsibility to
investigate financial crimes stems from the Agency’s legacy in the Department of the Treasury,
which mostly centered around counterfeiting cases. Special Agents now undertake investigations
of a wide variety of financial infractions, like wire fraud, money laundering, and as new
technologies have emerged, associated cybercrimes.
Protection and investigation, the two mission areas of the Agency, are strongly linked. The
expertise and tools that Special Agents learn and acquire during their initial investigation
assignments are directly applicable in the following protection assignment. Agents return to
investigation assignments in field offices or staff assignments at the Washington, D.C.
headquarters more seasoned, skilled, and experienced. This mixture of protection and
investigation is critical to maintaining operational readiness, supporting its model for sustaining
its workforce, and is outlined in its Special Agent Career Progression Plan.
2
1
U.S. Secret Service Protection of Persons and Facilities, 7-5700, Congressional Research Service, October
2018
2
U.S. Secret Service Budget Request for FY 2018
2
The Secret Service cannot carry out its responsibilities without a highly skilled, dedicated, and
energetic workforce. The Agency requires the utmost commitment of some of the finest
individuals in law enforcement, in both time and focus. The rapid pace of work, complex operating
environment, and unique pressures of the integrated mission mean that Agency employees
confront challenges that are faced by few other federal personnel. Long working hours and
potentially weeks without breaks or seeing family are common and become routine during
election years. To maintain the Secret Service’s operational readiness, it is imperative that its
people are appropriately trained, provided with the necessary resources, satisfied with their work,
and committed to the mission, so that they can execute their responsibilities professionally and
effectively every day.
It is perhaps not a surprise that employee satisfaction and commitment, known as employee
engagement, at the Agency has been a challenge in recent years. Employee engagement is more
than simply looking at whether a workforce’s spirits are high, but instead is the sense of
dedication, outlook, and whether an individual’s work is valued. Part of the engagement
challenges of the Agency has come from the public scrutiny that followed some of the high-profile
incidents almost a decade ago, and part has come from the sheer relentlessness of the protection
and investigative missions and the never-ending scrutiny of an agency charged with a no-fail
mission. The Secret Service has made addressing employee engagement a high priority,
undertaking several initiatives to improve engagement, deepen the commitment of the workforce,
and drive even stronger dedication. Those efforts, whether enhancing benefits or ensuring its
Special Agents receive adequate overtime pay, among many others, are a result of external
recommendations and by the Secret Service’s own accord.
Scope of Work
As part of this ongoing focus on employee engagement, the Secret Service sought outside
expertise, turning to the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy). In October
2019, the Agency asked the Academy to undertake a study of the workplace climate and functions
in key organizations throughout the Agency and review efforts it has undertaken to improve
operations and provide additional recommendations where appropriate. This engagement
followed a 2016 effort to have the Academy review the Agency’s progress in implementing
recommendations on enhancements to mission support functions put forward by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (HOGR) and the Protective Mission Panel
(PMP).
For this latest study, the Scope of Work shifted in scale and focus as the study evolved. At the start,
the Agency charged the Academy to look at employee engagement within several key field offices
and such critical mission support offices as the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), Office
of Human Resources (HUM), and the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support
(TEC). The Secret Service subsequently requested the Academy broaden the focus by interviewing
leaders of every major office and Directorate of the Agency that make up the Executive Resources
Board (ERB) to gain perspective on employee engagement and areas of concern. From November
2020 through May 2021, the work moved into a new phase, as the Academy reviewed employee
engagement within the Uniformed Division (UD), including its four main branches. Thus, the
3
Academy was asked to examine employee engagement in the Secret Service from numerous angles
and vantage points. Deep-dives in some offices, and more high-level insights from others,
provided a broad picture of employee engagement, which resulted in a range of associated
recommendations to improve the workforce’s focus and job satisfaction.
Results in Brief
The Secret Service workforce remains highly dedicated and focused on carrying out a challenging
and complicated, integrated mission. The Agency’s continued success rests on the engagement of
its skilled and trained workforce that includes Special Agents, UD Officers, Technical Law
Enforcement (TLE) personnel, and administrative, professional, and technical (APT) employees.
The commitment level of the workforce faces several identifiable stresses, as it meets increasing
and more complicated mission demands without a commensurate increase in staffing levels. The
Agency’s size has rebounded after a precipitous fall in the early 2010s, though the recent growth
will not be enough to meet the ever-growing demand. Hiring to fill vacant positions remains a
challenge, as the Agency faces ongoing turnover of more than eight percent with employees
leaving for opportunities in other agencies or outside government. While eight percent turnover
is not egregious, the time to hire, train, and season new personnel creates a larger vacuum than
that figure alone suggests. The workforce wants time away from the office with family, along with
pay and benefits to compensate for the inevitable long hours and overtime. The Secret Service
workforce would like the opportunity to grow professionally and better understand what is
required to move up within the organization. The Agency’s business operations—financial
management, acquisition programs, and information technology (IT)—provide essential
underpinnings to the workforce and contribute directly to the sense of dedication and
commitment. The tenor, tone, and specific messages of communication from the Agency’s top
leadership create a work climate that holds the workforce together and affects whether its
employees feel like they belong and are a part of a highly functioning team. The Agency climate is
overall positive, but there are notable divisions.
The Agency has taken many specific actions to enhance engagement. The Secret Service is working
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and congressional staff to highlight its staffing
needs while accelerating recruiting. Work-life balance has become an open priority, as supervisors
are encouraged to find opportunities for staff to have more time at home. The Agency offers a
robust pay and compensation package to ensure the Special Agents and UD Officers, who receive
full overtime pay for their protection work, receive the pay they have earned and deserve. The
Agency has undertaken efforts to delineate career paths and provide information on the
assignments and promotions processes that historically have felt byzantine and inscrutable,
especially for newer members of the workforce. However, employees continue to have concerns
about work assignments and career advancements. The Agency has been drawing together a broad
development program for APT employees that has only been partially implemented. With a
number of professionalized leaders in place, starting with an experienced Chief Operating Officer
(COO), the Agency has laid out an extremely strong set of underlying business operations, marked
by streamlined acquisition programs, more efficient financial management systems, enhanced IT
resources, and human resources functions. There is a strong focus on efficiency and business
process improvement. The Agency has worked to end the tensions among the employee categories
4
and has enhanced the team-like spirit while encouraging greater diversity that provides staff of
all backgrounds the opportunity to contribute to the Agency’s critical mission.
Employee engagement is particularly challenging within the almost 1700-person UD that
provides physical protection to the White House, the Naval Observatory, and Foreign Missions,
along with special teams and capabilities. Insufficient staffing is driving significant overtime.
Officers routinely work days off, providing little work-life balance, and the limited opportunities
for concentrated skill refresher training. Officers look ahead and have difficulty understanding
how they can grow and develop. While dropping, attrition rates (including external and internal
attrition from UD) averaged 13 percent during Fiscal Years (FY) 2015-2020. During these same
years, UD experienced overall net growth of over 20%, but this has created an experience gap.
Agency and Division leadership have identified these issues and are working to increase staffing
and open new opportunities for Officers as they advance.
These initiatives, as well as the many others discussed in this report, have successfully raised
employee engagement and, as a result, Agency performance. Agency leadership should be
commended for making employee engagement a priority. As part of its dedication towards
employee engagement, the Secret Service should pursue a number of new initiatives discussed in
subsequent chapters. Through a continual focus and willingness to invest in its talented people,
the Agency should be able to build for the future and ensure it has an engaged workforce that is
essential for the success of the Secret Service and, in turn, our nation’s democracy.
Methodology
To accomplish the tasks set out in the Scope of Work, the Academy conducted interviews and
reviewed both qualitative and quantitative data derived from primary and secondary research.
The Academy team:
• Interviewed close to 300 Secret Service employees (including high-level agency
leadership) in over 90 interviews.
3
These interviews—individual, group, and follow-up
sessions used a structured question set provided to the interviewees in advance.
• Reviewed a wide range of Agency policy documents and internal memoranda obtained
from an extensive document request.
• Analyzed the results of multiple years of Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)
results and other assessments of Agency staff engagement and morale.
• Studied past reports on the Secret Service by the Academy, Eagle Hill, HOGR, PMP,
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service, and others.
• Examined existing best practices literature surrounding employee engagement at federal
law enforcement agencies.
Throughout the study, the Academy had frequent, detailed communication with the Secret Service
and worked closely with Agency leaders to arrange interviews and request data. The Academy
found the Secret Service to be welcoming and eager to share information when requested. As
3
See Appendix D for a selected list of organizations interviewed.
5
mission requirements permitted, Secret Service staff made themselves readily available for
interviews.
All Academy studies follow a unique model that brings together a professional study team and a
Panel of experts, drawn from the Academy’s more than 900 distinguished Fellows who come with
deep experience from long careers in academia, business, and government. The Panel for this
study has extensive government experience in managing diverse organizations, experience within
and evaluating the Secret Service, and broad human capital knowledge and experience. The study
team conducts interviews, analyzes key materials, and identifies major themes, while the Panel
provides insights and guidance. Ultimately, the final report is that of the Panel of experts. The
study team and Panel gathered on multiple occasions throughout the study, including several all-
day meetings.
The 2020 Presidential Election and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic created
some challenges throughout the study. While significant amounts of research were completed
before the onset of the pandemic, the response to the virus made travel for in-person interviews
at the Phoenix, Arizona Field Office impossible. Further, due to conditions imposed by the
pandemic and the election, staff in the New York Field Office were not available to be interviewed.
Though an intensive personal engagement would have been far more preferable, the Academy did
speak with Special Agents coming off recent New York assignments, along with headquarters staff
who could speak to the work environment and the challenges of operating at a high cost and in a
high tempo field office. In-person interviews in meetings and panel discussions turned to phone
calls and video-teleconference engagements. Other elements of the study were generally
unaffected by the situation, with both the Academy and Secret Service shifting to telework with
relative ease following an adjustment period.
Report Organization
This report focuses on employee engagement at the Secret Service. Chapters 1 through 7 cover
issues that affect all members of the Secret Service. Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the engagement-
impacting issues that are more specific, unique, and localized to divisions, offices, or branches.
This report breaks these component areas down into discrete discussions outlined below:
Chapter 1: Introduces the scope of work, methodology, organization, and results of the study.
Chapter 2: Discusses the concept of employee engagement within the federal government,
reviews recommendations of other recent blue-ribbon panels, and provides a framework to
understand the Agency’s employee engagement.
Chapter 3: Examines the state of staffing levels at the Agency relative to its mission demands,
looking at efforts to fill position vacancies and reduce turnover.
Chapter 4: Analyzes the effort to give greater work-life balance to the Secret Service workforce,
along with the benefits, pay, and compensation provided to mitigate the inevitable long-hours and
overtime that come with a no-fail mission.
6
Chapter 5: Reviews the desire of the workforce for ongoing training, transparency in
assignments and promotions, and the ability to grow and develop to be ready for new tasks and
responsibilities.
Chapter 6: Looks at the business process functions that affect every employee in the Agency,
ensuring they have the tools to do their jobs.
Chapter 7: Examines the overarching work climate and culture of the Agency; specifically, the
Agency’s communication efforts and the ongoing efforts to bring about a more closely-knit team
and enhanced diversity.
Chapter 8: Reviews and analyzes the employee engagement challenges and opportunities within
UD.
Chapter 9: Reviews and analyzes the employment engagement challenges and opportunities
within certain Secret Service field offices in the Office of Investigations (INV), the Office of
Professional Responsibility (RES), the OCFO, the Office of TEC, and HUM.
Chapter 10: Provides a comprehensive list of recommendations for the Agency and the
particular divisions and offices studied.
Appendix A: Includes the biographies of Panel members and the professional study team.
Appendix B: Provides an organizational chart of the Secret Service and a description of division
and office responsibilities.
Appendix C: Summarizes overlapping recommendations provided to the Secret Service through
various reviews over the past decade.
Appendix D: Lists the organizations and offices interviewed over the course of the study.
Appendix E: Details the works cited throughout the report and over the course of the study.
Interspersed within several chapters are sidebar discussions of the specific employee engagement
issues faced by several critical mission support organizations, including OCFO, RES, HUM, TEC,
and two key field offices: Miami, Florida, and Phoenix, Arizona.
7
Chapter 2: Employee Engagement — A Critical Success
Factor to Organizational Health and
Performance
This chapter reviews the concept of employee engagement as it is used and understood across the
federal government, highlights the recent state of employee engagement at the Secret Service, and
reviews some of the recommendations related to employee engagement from recent high-profile
congressional reports and blue-ribbon commissions. This chapter also provides a framework for
employee engagement within the Secret Service, highlighting the considerations that are most
important to employees and how those issues affect one another.
The years 2012 to 2015 saw a number of high-profile incidents that involved the Secret Service,
prompting questions from Congress, the press, and the broader public about the state of the
Agency. The workforce’s morale and level of engagement plummeted. The Secret Service ranked
last in the Partnership for Public Service’s 2015 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government
rankings among federal law enforcement agencies.
4
It also ranked, according to the Partnership’s
score, in the lowest quartile for employee engagement for the Government as a whole each year
from 2013 to 2020.
5
The deteriorating situation prompted multiple analyses and reports on the
Secret Service, which included several recommendations on how to specifically enhance employee
engagement.
Employee Engagement
Employee engagement is a critical enabler of individual and organizational performance.
Employee engagement manifests in the dedication, persistence, and effort employees commit to
their work or their overall attachment to their organization and mission. Multiple studies have
demonstrated the impact of employee engagement on workplace performance. In 2013, the
Harvard Business Review tied higher levels of reported employee engagement to higher
performance enterprise-wide.
6
A 2012 study published in the Journal of Applied Social
Psychology found that lower employee engagement was a predictive factor in lower overall
employee performance.
7
Indeed, in federal agencies, employee engagement is considered critical,
as a 2008 report published by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board stated:
“We have found evidence that a heightened connection, or engagement, between Federal
employees and their organization that surpasses job satisfaction is related to better organizational
outcomes. As Federal agencies face stiff competition for new talent, employee engagement
4
Partnership for Public Service, Employee Job and Workplace Satisfaction in the Law Enforcement
Community, Washington, D.C., May 2016
5
Partnership for Public Service, https://bestplacestowork.org/rankings/detail/?c=HS14
6
Harvard Business Review, The Impact of Employee Engagement on Organization Performance, June
2013. hbr_achievers_report_sep13.pdf
7
Dalal, et al. 2012
8
strategies may help them to attract the best new employees available and retain the talented
employees already on board. By fully engaging their employees as recommended, agencies can
improve their operations despite a highly competitive labor market.”
8
In the 12 years since that report, the federal government intensified its focus on employee
engagement as a key factor driving success among federal employees, with multiple initiatives
undertaken to both chart and enhance employee engagement throughout the federal government.
Among federal law enforcement agencies, employee engagement is especially important. For an
agency such as the Secret Service, low employee engagement contributes to workforce attrition
and reduces the ability of the law enforcement agency to keep pace with community demand.
9
As
described further in Chapter 3, this dynamic is reflected at the Secret Service, where low employee
engagement drives attrition, further reducing employee engagement, and fueling a cycle that only
increases the magnitude of the challenges facing the Agency.
In 2016, the Partnership for Public Service and Deloitte examined 12 federal law enforcement
agencies, “including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, Customs and Border
Protection, the Bureau of Prisons and Transportation Security Administration,” and held a
workshop with law enforcement officials from various federal law enforcement agencies. Their
analysis identified three critical workplace challenges that all 12 federal law enforcement agencies
face: (1) wellness in a demanding environment, (2) opening up communication in a ‘need to know’
atmosphere, and (3) the importance of employee satisfaction and commitment to accomplish the
mission.”
10
To address the three critical workplace challenges, the Partnership for Public Service
recommends making engagement issues a part of a “broader human capital strategy,” and
recommends agencies begin addressing problems by “starting small” at the office and unit level.
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) and Federal Perspectives on
Employee Engagement
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) began administering biennial government-wide
employee feedback surveys – the Federal Human Capital Survey – in 2002 and migrated to the
annually administered FEVS in 2010, with employee engagement measures being core elements
of those surveys.
11
OPM conducted regression analyses of 2013, 2014, and 2015 FEVS data,
identified key drivers of employee engagement among federal agencies, and correlated the impact
8
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, The Power of Federal Employee Engagement, September 2008, p.
i, https://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=379024&version=379721
9
Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium, RAND Corporation, 2010,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf
10
The Partnership for Public Service & Deloitte, Employee Job and Workplace Satisfaction in the Law
Enforcement Community, May 2016, p. 2, https://bestplacestowork.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2018/09/2015_Best_Places_to_Work_in_the_Federal_Government_reg__An
alysis__Employee_Job_and_Workplace_Satisfaction_in_the_Law_Enforcement_Community-
2016.05.11.pdf
11
For more information on the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, visit the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management’s website at www.opm.gov/fevs/about
9
of engagement on employee retention. The data led OPM to conclude that “Engagement Matters!”
(See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Excerpt from FEVS Engagement Index
Source: United States Office of Personnel Management, 2015
Employees who expressed the intent to leave their positions were found to rate an average of 47
percent on the EEI, whereas those intending to stay rated at 72 percent. Retention is contingent
largely on the level of engagement employees feel in their position. According to the same OPM
analysis, the key factors driving that engagement are:
• Performance Feedback
• Collaborative Management
• Merit System Principles
12
• Training and Development
• Work-Life Balance
Enhancing employee engagement was a governmental priority well before the FEVS more
consistently and rigorously measured progress in the area. One of the most notable recent
initiatives on employee engagement emerged as guidance from the President’s Management
Agenda, issued by OPM in October 2018.
13
This guidance calls upon all major department
12
Defined by OPM as: “support fairness and protect employees from arbitrary actions, favoritism, political
coercion, and reprisal”
13
Office of Personnel Management, President’s Management Agenda Cross-Agency Priority Goal 3:
Improve Performance Management and Engagement, Memorandum to federal Chief Human Capital
Officers, October 2018
10
components to identify the bottom 20 percent of scorers on the EEI and target a 20 percent
improvement by the end of 2020.
The Secret Service and Engagement
As reflected in the survey results, the working environment and climate of the Secret Service have
fluctuated significantly over the past decade. The scores have trended upwards after multiple
years of decline and plateaued between 2015 and 2017. The primary reason for the precipitous
decline of engagement after 2011 was the implementation of severe budget reductions, known as
Sequestration. The budget reductions led to reorganizations and reduced personnel levels. A
series of high-profile incidents in the following years led to public questioning of the Agency’s
effectiveness, leading to a further drop in engagement.
Figure 2. Secret Service Employee Engagement Score, 2003–2020
Data Source: Partnership for Public Service
14
While the Agency has shown improvement in the Partnership’s scores, engagement at the Secret
Service is below the sub-agency median as of 2020. Most of the Agency scores are in the lowest
25 percent of all sub-component federal agencies, except for the category of Pay, which is above
the median, and Effective Leadership (Senior Leaders) which is within the lower 50 percent.
Overall, the Agency ranks 347
th
out of 411 sub-component federal agencies, landing in the bottom
25 percent of sub-components. However, the Secret Service scores slightly higher than DHS’s
overall Employee Engagement Score.
14
In 2020, the Partnership for Public Service adjusted the Best Places to Work methodology used to
calculate engagement scores, resulting in slightly higher engagement scores for agencies than in previous
years. https://bestplacestowork.org/rankings/detail/HS14#trends
11
While the Panel requested details regarding the 2020 FEVS results for individual offices and
units, the Secret Service had not provided that information at the time this report was completed.
The Agency cited the delayed administration of the survey brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic
and the need to follow a methodical internal release of the results as reasons for not being able to
provide the detailed results.
Previous Studies’ Findings and Recommendations
The various studies, both internally directed efforts and externally commissioned reviews that
followed from the high-profile incidents of 2012 to 2015 included numerous findings and
recommendations on employee engagement. This study was able to draw on a number of other
efforts to develop findings and recommendations to help improve the performance at the Secret
Service, with employee engagement, climate, and job satisfaction a top focus. These reports
provided helpful data, history, and, when taken together, a comprehensive list of many of the
suggestions put to the Secret Service for improvement (See Appendix C for a summary of
overlapping recommendations provided to the Secret Service through various reviews over
time).
15
Four reports, in particular, formed the core of this background information.
First, DHS convened the PMP in 2014 to assess the organizational issues that contributed to a
White House perimeter breach earlier that year.
16
In addition to calling for such significant actions
as the construction of a new White House fence, the PMP emphasized the need for greater levels
of training for Special Agents and UD Officers with no less than “10 percent of their time” training.
The PMP noted that a staffing deficit prevented the Agency workforce to take the time for training.
These staffing shortfalls, the PMP further noted, were having negative effects on the morale, focus,
and readiness of the wider workforce.
In 2015, in response to some of the same incidents, HOGR issued a report entitled “United States
Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis.”
17
HOGR found, like the PMP, that the Agency was
experiencing a staffing crisis that started in 2011 as a consequence of the 2011 Sequestration
budget reductions. The difficulties in managing through such precipitous reductions created an
environment where employee morale was so low as to cause increased attrition. The environment
was observed to have deteriorated to the point that Agency employees had lost confidence in
Secret Service leadership and believed that there was no longer accountability in the organization.
As the external reviews of the PMP and HOGR were underway, the leadership of the Secret Service
brought in Eagle Hill Consulting to conduct a third-party assessment of work-life integration at
the Secret Service. Eagle Hill’s work was centered around surveys, focus groups, interviews
15
U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address
Protective Mission Panel Recommendations, May 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699267.pdf
16
United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, Report from the United States Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2014,
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/executive-summary-report-usss-protective-mission-panel
17
United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United
States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, December 2015,
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt385/CRPT-114hrpt385.pdf
12
conducted with Secret Service staff, data review from metrics like FEVS, and external
benchmarking and best practices research. Eagle Hill found that work-life integration was lacking
at the Agency and that Secret Service employees wanted to see the health of the organization
improve.
18
The report made multiple recommendations, with an emphasis on establishing
consistency in scheduling, maintaining effective communication between leaders and employees,
increasing transparency surrounding Agency policies, and enhancing employee support
functions.
In 2016, the Secret Service engaged the Academy to conduct a study on the Secret Service’s
implementation of reforms in response to recent events. This effort culminated in the report,
United States Secret Service: Review of Organizational Change Efforts.
19
Among many other
recommendations on how the Agency could lock in the progress made in putting the PMP and
HOGR recommendations in place, the report included several key recommendations centered
around employee engagement, work climate, and mission support functions including:
• The Secret Service should conduct a comprehensive assessment of human capital
functions and organizational structure, focusing on what is core to strategic human capital
management and practices and the efficient and effective delivery of human capital
services.
• Secret Service leadership should adopt an integrated strategic management approach,
applying a formal change management strategy and enterprise architecture to establish a
roadmap that will drive organizational change and institutionalize Agency transformation
efforts.
• The Secret Service should staff and build out the Agency’s enterprise architecture program
and establish an IT roadmap to support Agency transformation efforts.
• The Secret Service should conduct an organizational assessment of the OCFO.
A Framework for Secret Service Employee Engagement
Throughout this project, several themes regarding employee engagement began to emerge.
Employees repeated statements, with only slight variation, about the programs, policies, and
practices that allowed them to focus on their responsibilities. Similarly, issues and concerns that
hindered their efforts were repeated, whether by, for example, a Special Agent interviewed at a
field office or an APT at Headquarters. These areas of concern led to a framework that shows the
key elements and drivers of employee engagement at the Secret Service. The components of the
framework are largely in line with the factors of employee engagement at other federal agencies
18
Eagle Hill Consulting, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment, August 2016
19
National Academy of Public Administration, United States Secret Service: Review of Organizational
Change Efforts, Washington, D.C., October 2016,
https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/USSS-Final-Report-10.31.16.pdf
13
measured through the FEVS, though there are some considerations of more unique (business
processes) and greater concern (staffing levels) the framework brings to the fore.
As Figure 3 illustrates, employee engagement at the Secret Service reflects an interlocking set of
specially focused and cross-cutting issues that are of central concern to its workforce. The focused
areas, called core elements, include:
• Staffing Levels and Hiring: The extent to which the Secret Service has sufficient
trained and ready personnel focused on key mission areas, along with its efforts to retain
personnel and the pace at which it fills open positions.
• Work-Life Balance and Compensation: The ability of employees to have time away
from work for family and other outside pursuits, while providing sufficient pay and
benefits to attract and retain employees.
• Training and Career Development: The ability to take on additional skills and
improve in a chosen career specialty, to develop a broader understanding of the Secret
Service, and understand the requirements for promotion.
The cross-cutting areas, called key drivers, include:
• Professionalization of Mission-Support and Business Operations: The working
of mission-support functions, including business processes, associated IT, and decision-
making bodies and executive governance.
• Mission and Culture: Whether the work climate promotes teamwork, reduces
divisions, and fosters professionalism.
The latter drivers are often operating in the background, but are foundational, affecting employee
engagement and the Agency’s workings. Both the core elements and the key drivers need to be
addressed to enhance employee engagement.
14
Figure 3. Core Elements and Key Drivers of Organizational Engagement
Source: National Academy of Public Administration
The Secret Service, as this report details, has worked vigorously across all of these areas to
improve job satisfaction and employee engagement. Whether as part of follow-up from the PMP,
the 2016 NAPA study, or its basic effort to better support its workforce, a vast array of initiatives
are underway. The Agency has not brought these diverse activities together under a unifying
effort, like a broad vision and accompanying strategy, which would concentrate focus, avoid
overlap, and find synergies.
Recommendation
2.1 Develop, implement, and internally publicize a new vision and strategy for
healthy employee engagement that aligns with the Agency’s strategy,
including outcomes desired and steps needed to achieve the vision. Steps
include:
• Setting the ideal picture for healthy engagement, such as the work-life
balance, staffing levels, and access to developmental opportunities the
Secret Service strives to achieve;
• Detailing the type of inclusive work environment that the Secret
Service wishes to achieve in order to foster greater teamwork among
all personnel;
• Acknowledging the current state of engagement and setting forth
specific steps;
15
• Detailing assignment of office responsibilities to enact that strategy,
along with specific actions and timelines; and
• Evaluating desired outcomes and measuring concrete progress.
16
This page is left intentionally blank.
17
Chapter 3: The Dueling Pressures of Operations
Intensity and Inadequate Staffing Levels
Staffing to carry out the Secret Service’s no-fail mission emerged as the first core element of
employee engagement, a dominant issue that affects the workforce’s outlook and their sense of
connection to the mission. The Agency’s mission requirements continue to grow more intense and
complex. The Secret Service has significantly increased its recruiting efforts, which has alleviated
some of the challenges of taking on more and more responsibility without the trained, skilled,
experienced, and appropriately placed people.
This chapter examines the reasons for the increase in the Agency workload and potential options
to address mission expansion. It reviews the push to expand hiring over the past decade and
reviews some of the dynamics that have led to a diminished rate of staffing increases that do not
match the commitments the Agency is undertaking. The chapter further explores the state of
hiring, along with retention efforts. Figure 4 highlights the close connection between staffing
levels, attrition, and employee engagement, as there emerges a strong relationship between
increased staffing levels, decreased attrition, and higher engagement.
Figure 4. Engagement Scores correlated with Secret Service staffing and attrition, FY 2010–FY
2020
18
Source: National Academy of Public Administration
20
Operations: An Increasingly Intense Environment
There is a strong sense across the Agency that the intensity of operations has significantly
increased in recent years. All those interviewed in the course of the study, including experienced
Special Agents, UD Officers, and APT employees, reported that the Agency is busier than at any
point in their career. For Special Agents, the increased workload means more time traveling for
protection, less time to train, and less time at home. For UD Officers, mission demands translate
to canceled leave and vacation requests at the last minute, more frequent travel for special events,
and less time with family. For APT employees, high operation tempo means more late nights and
extensive travel for those who support the protective mission. The stresses of a relentless mission
ripple through every Division and office, according to those interviewed for this study. The
workforce grows fatigued, negatively affecting performance, and distracting managers and
supervisors.
The Agency’s responses to the 2019 FEVS illustrate the concerns of the Agency’s employees over
staffing levels and the workload imbalances that can be created. Among the OCFO, HUM, TEC,
and RES - the offices specifically targeted for review as part of this study - the FEVS results
revealed negative responses to the statements, “My workload is reasonable” and “My work unit is
able to recruit people with the right skills.” Looking at these two responses together provides
insights as to whether employees feel they are being asked to carry out a fair number of tasks and
whether they believe assistance and additional support are on the way. Several of the mission
support offices on which the study focused, such as the OCFO and TEC, scored extremely low in
both categories.
The Academy’s 2016 report highlighted the extreme pressures low staffing levels and high
workload create. Similar to the PMP and the HOGR report, the Academy report highlighted the
negative consequences of staffing shortfalls with high operational tempo. “Taken together with
increased turnover, the impact on the remaining workforce was a burgeoning workload leading
to increased overtime and travel, canceled leave, and declining morale,” the Academy wrote. An
internal work-life assessment completed by Eagle Hill reinforced the challenges of intense
operations without the right staffing levels and the right skills.
Analysis of the current state of the organization’s integrated mission underscores some of the
reasons that the workforce feels that the intensity has significantly increased. Under 18 U.S.C.
Section 3056(a), the Secret Service must provide protection for the following individuals:
21
20
In 2020, the Partnership for Public Service adjusted the Best Places to Work methodology used to
calculate engagement scores, resulting in slightly higher engagement scores for agencies than in previous
years. https://bestplacestowork.org/rankings/detail/HS14#trends
21
List quoted from Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Secret Service Protection of Persons and
Facilities,” In Focus 7-5700, October 2018, Washington, D.C.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IF10646.pdf
19
President, Vice President, President- and Vice President-elect; immediate families of those listed
above;
22
former presidents, their spouses, and their children under the age of 16; former Vice
Presidents, their spouses, and their children under the age 16; visiting foreign Heads of State or
Governments; distinguished foreign visitors and official United States representatives on special
missions abroad, as designated by Presidential memorandum; and major presidential and vice
presidential candidates within 120 days of the general presidential elections, and their spouses.
The President can designate additional individuals to receive protection. The Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of the DHS, along with several White House officials, have received
protection. Former President Trump authorized protection for family members and White House
Officials for the first six months of the new Administration, placing an unprecedented protection
burden on the Service. The number of White House Officials receiving protection can vary
between administrations based on external threats in certain portfolios. The protection
designation can last for a full administration or be time-limited, making it difficult for the Agency
to plan for, and fund, the required protective details.
The main reason cited by interviewees for the increase in pace is the growing complexity of the
Secret Service’s basic protection mission. The threats against the President and other protectees
have grown more intensive and complex, which has made the protection mission a more elaborate
undertaking, requiring not only the personnel immediately surrounding the protectee but also the
teams that provide intelligence, ongoing monitoring, and technical support.
In the realm of investigations, the Secret Service reports that the scale, scope, and complexity of
financial crimes has changed fundamentally in recent years, requiring cybersecurity experts who
can conduct elaborate and complicated computer forensics investigations. The two mission areas
are tightly intertwined, as the content of investigations and investigative techniques feed into the
protection mission. The Secret Service coordinates, directs, and holds ultimate responsibility for
National Security Special Events (NSSEs), such as political party Presidential nominating
conventions or Presidential Inaugurations. These events are complex operations, bringing
together multiple federal, state, and local agencies, as well as Secret Service’s two mission areas.
The second area cited for the increase in operational intensity is protectee travel. The Secret
Service draws on its Special Agents, UD Officers, Physical Security Specialists (PSS), and TLE
personnel to provide protection on travel visits. The extent of travel has consistently increased in
recent years (See Figure 5).
23
Presidential campaigns that occur every four years create an
additional dynamic that puts stress on the entire organization. The INV must support a great deal
of the additional workload as field offices provide the Special Agents to augment the various
protection details. The previous Secret Service Director, Randolph Alles, cited a 32 percent
22
The size and makeup of the immediate family changes drastically with each protectee and recently this
has been the major challenge. President Trump has a number of children who have careers in
international business and travel extensively while the President served in office.
23
The data in Figure 5 does not include Presidential Candidates/Nominees, Foreign Dignitaries, off the
record trips, or in-town travel stops, not requiring a seven-day advance. Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Secret Service Budget Overview for Fiscal Year 2020, p. 55,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0318_MGMT_CBJ-Secret-Service_0.pdf
20
increase in protection events during the 2016 presidential campaign over the 2008 campaign, the
last comparable campaign without an incumbent.
24
Figure 4. Secret Service protectees over time, FY 2010—2018
Source: National Academy of Public Administration
The third area cited for the noticeable increase in the pace of operations was the former
President’s family. By statute, the Secret Service must protect the President and his immediate
family. President Trump has a number of children with careers in international business who
traveled extensively. Closely related to this operational demand is the fact the Secret Service is
also providing protection for others beyond the occupants of the White House and their family.
The Panel made several requests for the total number of protectees for which the Secret Service is
responsible. However, the Secret Service has not provided the information before the submission
of the report citing safeguards to specific protective operational information, including threat
analysis requirements.
The Secret Service covers not only the already large number of elected officials and family
members associated with the incumbent Administration, but also former Presidents Trump,
Obama, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Carter. The Former Presidents Protection Act of 2012
rescinded a limitation implemented by a previous act of Congress in 1994, which would have
reduced protection to 10 years after leaving office for all presidents after 1997.
25
During campaign
seasons, such as 2016 and late-2019 into 2020, the protective slate expanded further to include
24
Alles, June 8, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/08/written-testimony-usss-director-house-
homeland-security-subcommittee-transportation
25
Pub. L. 112-257
21
presidential and vice-presidential candidates, further exacerbating the demand placed upon the
Agency.
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic created new stresses for an Agency facing relentless
operational pressures. The initial months of the pandemic response provided something of an
operational pause for the Agency, as the travel of protectees slowed to a trickle during the spring
and summer of 2020. The national political conventions moved to virtual and more limited
gatherings to varying extents, lessening the intensity of these NSSEs. It would be a stretch,
however, to call the pandemic response downtime, as the candidates began to travel more
extensively for campaign events towards the end of the summer. To prevent the spread of the
virus, the Agency significantly increased testing and the supply of Personal Protection Equipment
(PPE). It also instituted and implemented new procedures for travel to protection events and
provided for the quarantining and care for those who contract COVID-19. Despite these
countermeasures, several employees contracted the COVID-19 virus, which has placed a premium
on caring for and supporting these employees through a dangerous illness, while heightening
measures to protect individuals. Agency officials do not foresee the virus fundamentally changing
the nature and intensity of protection and investigations and believe the intensity of operations
will return to its usual high intensity as vaccination rates continue to increase and the nation
returns to some kind of normal work and travel pattern.
The Secret Service has addressed its increased commitments in a number of ways. With the
evolution of investigations—changing from short-term investigations of the past to current, long-
term, complex, transnational investigations—the INV has some flexibility to focus on key
investigative cases that have high impact. This includes deterring future criminal activity,
highlighting the capability of the Agency to crack down on newly emerging nefarious activities or
shut down financial crimes of a particularly high scale. The INV contributes field staff into a pool
of Special Agents available for protective assignments during the campaign, an arrangement
known as the Rotational Assignments (ROTA) onto protective assignments. At the time of this
report, the Secret Service goal is for 25 percent of available personnel to be part of the ROTA;
however, INV is consistently in excess of the goal. This leaves fewer Special Agents for
investigations, placing a premium on close management and balancing caseload.
Notably, the PMP and HOGR reports suggested that the Secret Service’s mission scope should be
reduced to enable the Agency to commit more resources to the no-fail protective mission.
However, in conversations with Secret Service frontline employees, the importance of
maintaining the investigative mission at its current scope was emphasized. Synergies in
investigative operations are frequently found, and while the protective mission is the most visible
face of the Agency, investigations are tied to the Agency’s core identity. Removal of that element
of the mission is liable to be deleterious to Agency morale and lead to a loss of critical talent.
The Agency is reluctant to advocate for a reduction in the number of protectees and residences it
covers. The Agency could work with the White House, in coordination with DHS, to request relief
on the number of individuals it protects. This should include identifying direct, indirect, and
opportunity costs associated with each additional protectee. The focus of the Secret Service’s
protective operations could also center exclusively around those required under statute. Cabinet
members or key White House staff currently receiving Secret Service protection could receive
22
protection from other federal law enforcement agencies that currently protect other cabinet
officials. This process of education and discussion could occur with a change of Administration
almost on an automatic basis.
The Panel understands the reluctance of the Secret Service to request a re-centering of its
protective operations, given its strong orientation and responsiveness to its protectees, and above
all the President. Requesting a reduction in protectees goes against the basic “ethos” of the Agency
that is very focused on supporting the President and carrying out its mission. The Agency,
understandably, does not want to give the impression that it is anything other than entirely
focused on supporting its protectees however possible. This is a sensitive and complex topic and
should be approached delicately. The Panel believes that it is critical for these discussions,
informed by cost data, to occur.
Recommendation
3.1 Stabilize the relative size of the protection portfolio, providing the Agency
more planning predictability for the protection and investigative missions.
Steps include:
• Identifying the historically standard protection portfolio that is in
addition to statutory protectees (Cabinet Members and White House
Officials).
• Identifying, and continually updating, the fully burdened cost per type
of protectee (e.g., young family member, adult family member, White
House Official) at various risk levels.
• Continuing to engage the DHS, White House and Congress to review
the impact of covering protectees beyond those required in statute,
including a threat-based requirement as a condition of providing or
extending protection.
Staffing Level Challenges
The main way that the Secret Service has sought to address the challenge of increasing mission
requirements is to increase staffing. An increase in staffing levels and associated hiring helps the
Agency carry out what is an extremely labor-intensive mission. After the high-profile incidents in
the early 2010s, Congress, DHS, and the Agency aligned themselves around the need for an
increase in funding to recruit Special Agents and UD Officers. Those significant increases
stabilized the situation, enabling the Agency to better balance mission demands.
The Agency received staffing increases of almost 300 positions each year beginning in FY 2015.
The Agency successfully fulfilled its human capital plan goals for additional staff for FY 2015-
2019, increasing staffing levels from a low point of 6,369 to 7,628 that included an increase of
more than 379 Special Agents, 291 UD Officers, and 652 APT employees, which includes TLE
personnel (see Table 1 for years FY 18—20).
23
Table 1. Secret Service Attrition and Hiring FY 18–20
Secret Service
Attrition and
Hiring FY18 –
FY20
Hires
(FY18)
Attrition
Rate
(FY18)
Total
Staff
(FY18)
Hires
(FY19)
Attrition
(FY19)
Total
Staff
(FY19)
Hires
(FY20)
Attrition
Rate
(FY20)
Total
Staff
(FY20)
Special Agents
458
6.89%
3611
350
6.82%
3708
174
6.88%
3632
Uniformed
Division
356
17.05%
1560
309
12.52%
1661
111
9.38%
1620
APT
36*
10.55%
2066
373
10.04%
1942
303
9.83%
2044
Technical Law
Enforcement
-
N/A**
N/A***
35
8.36%
311
35
4.21%
332
Agency Wide
990
7.57%
7237
951
7.42%
7622
544
7.05%
7628
* APT hires include TLE in FY 18.
** Attrition rate for TLE included in APT figures in FY 18.
*** TLE not a standalone job category until FY 19, with Total Staff figures included in APT counts in years prior.
The Agency has developed a new hiring plan considering changing mission demands. The Agency
foresees the need to reach a staffing level of 9,595 personnel by FY 2026 and 11,669 in the later
years. The Secret Service uses multiple Staffing Allocation Models to develop these requirements
reflecting different segments of the workforce, looking at considerations like protection and
investigation requirements, which are the dominant mission-based factors for the Agency. The
models also take into consideration training requirements and that sufficient personnel are
available to work to avoid excessive overtime. As indicated in interviews, DHS reviewed and
validated these models. Specific hiring targets have yet to be established, but it is understood that
the Agency will require an additional 300 people per year among its various employee categories—
Special Agent, UD Officer, APT, and TLE—to meet the staffing level goals.
The Agency, however, struggles to receive the support for funding to meet the staffing level
increases that are needed to reach the goal of an average of 300 new employees per year. Although
the Secret Service initially requested an increase of 300 employees in their FY 2021 budget, it was
reduced to 150 new employees before the release to Congress. Congress enacted an increase of
120 new employees in FY 2020 from FY 2019, as per the formal budget request. As the Agency
loses hiring momentum with fewer hires authorized than what the Agency needs, the Agency’s
leadership is greatly concerned that the Agency will not have sufficient personnel to carry out its
mission in a stable and balanced fashion unless its staffing levels can increase. Without the
funding for sustained increases to match the rising commitments and activity of the Agency, all
parts of the Agency will continue to be stretched thin, and continued overtime expenses will
increase personnel costs, decrease morale, and exhaust the workforce. Secret Service will always
meet its protective mission, but it will come at the expense of the investigative mission and
employee morale and engagement.
Position Vacancies and Hiring
Whatever the personnel levels, it is always incumbent on an organization to fill vacant positions
as soon as possible with candidates who have the right qualifications and background. A fully
staffed office allows employees to focus on their main responsibilities. Supervisors can supervise,
24
and employees can carry out the tasks for which they have trained and prepared. A fully-staffed
organization, even one that might require more positions in the longer term is healthier and more
functional, as productivity and quality of work increase along with job satisfaction. The pressure
to fill jobs and reduce vacancies will only increase if the Agency does not receive support for its
staffing increases.
Members of the offices interviewed discussed the
challenges position vacancies create. Employees are
required to fill more than one role, getting stretched
to the point where the quality of work suffers, or they
must work so much overtime that burn-out becomes a
threat. Given the sensitivity of its mission to protect
the President and other designated protectees, the
Agency has extremely high security requirements for
most of its positions. Most employees are required to
obtain a Top Secret clearance, and Special Agents, UD
Officers, TLE, and some APT employees, including
cyber and other law enforcement professionals, are
required to go through a polygraph screening. That
background/polygraph process comes on top of the
already complicated federal hiring process. The time
to fill a position is going to be substantial under the
best of circumstances, given the hiring and clearance
steps that have to be taken.
Many APT employees described a negative cycle
where the increased workload due to vacancies leads
to more departures, which only stretches individuals
further and leads to even more departures.
The current Special Agent and UD Officer hiring
targets are 192 calendar days and 132 business days.
The process has three main phases, qualification
evaluation, medical fitness, and security. During the
qualification evaluation phase, applicants are
evaluated against the requirements outlined in a job
vacancy announcement. The Agency evaluates
applicants’ initial qualifications, interviews the
candidates, and reevaluates their qualifications. The
Agency then issues a conditional job offer. The
medical phase involves a detailed physical, drug
screening, and an eye exam. In the security phase,
candidates complete a very detailed security questionnaire, participate in a security interview,
have an extensive background investigation conducted on them, and, for Special Agents, UD
Officers, TLE, and selected APT employees, participate in a polygraph examination.
A Partnership between
TEC and HUM to Fill
Vacancies Faster
Understaffing in the Office of TEC,
especially in the field, has a negative
and outsized impact on the morale
of the TEC workforce. The impact
on morale is felt across TLE, PSS,
and other APT employees within
TEC. The Chief Technology Officer
(CTO) and Chief Human Capital
Officer (CHCO) acknowledge the
impact understaffing has on the
TEC workforce, and have been
successful in obtaining a fairly
significant increase in the number of
funded positions. In an attempt to
increase the hiring tempo, the CTO
has provided three TEC-funded
positions to the CHCO to focus
specifically on filling positions
within TEC. This partnership is
promising; however, even when
TEC positions are filled, there is still
be a period of 18-24 months before
the new employees are capable of
contributing to TEC in a manner
that doesn’t require supervision by
others within the division.
For more on TEC organizational
challenges and recommendations,
see Chapter 9.
25
Special Agent and UD applicants experience a very high drop-out rate through the hiring and
security clearance process. During the latter phase, for example, the failure rate as characterized
by interviews is upwards of 70 percent. Anecdotally, interviewees claimed that to fill 50 vacancies,
around 400 candidates need to be selected. This number is pared down to 200 through the
background investigation checks and cut to 100 in the polygraph. For cost reasons, the Agency
takes a linear approach to fill each position. The Agency does not carry out simultaneous
background checks for alternates candidates; those checks only occur once the primary drops out.
Filling a Special Agent training class of 24 requires an average of 3775 candidates to apply at the
outset.
Because most APT employees do not have to complete a medical examination or polygraph test,
the timeline for hiring can be considerably less, often upwards of 40 fewer days, though the initial
qualification phase can be longer than that of Special Agents.
The 2016 Academy report highlighted some of the significant improvements the Secret Service
put in place to improve hiring timelines for Special Agents and UD Officers. The Agency leverages
Schedule B excepted service hiring authorities to narrow the pool of candidates and establish its
own exams. Experience requirements on job announcements were more clearly articulated, and
the resume review process was streamlined to speed review and improve scoring. An extensive
interview, known as SUPER interview, ensures a detailed, consistent interview of candidates
while providing a realistic understanding of the day-to-day requirements of the job. Those
enhancements remain in place.
Recent interviews, as well as the 2016 Academy study, highlighted the benefits for speeding
Special Agent and UD Officer hiring by holding a candidate screening event called an Entry Level
Assessment Center (ELACs). These events are typically held over a multiple-day period, and it
brings applicants together for an intensive round of tests, SUPER interviews, and security
interviews. This approach provides an effective means to expedite hiring and speed up timelines.
However, Special Agents and UD Officers are required for the events to conduct interviews and
background checks on candidates. Additionally, the shutdowns and stay-at-home orders as a
result of the COVID-19 pandemic have temporarily reduced the ability for ELACs to operate.
These sessions can be incredibly complex to schedule, as it requires strong participation from the
field offices that provide the Special Agents to conduct interviews. As a result, the Agency often
only carries out these ELACs during hiring pushes, instead of on a regular basis.
The hiring process can be fragmented within HUM, where hiring for Special Agent and UD Officer
positions is distributed among several of its constituent divisions. The Talent and Employee
Acquisition Division (TAD) focuses on the initial qualification phase and the Security
Management Division (SMD) focuses on the security phase. The Safety, Health, and
Environmental Programs Division (SAF) conducts required medical examinations. Outside of
HUM, the INV conducts the polygraph examination using trained Special Agents, UD Officers,
and re-employed annuitants. INV also conducts a very detailed review of all the factors – typically
about 23 – requested by SMD in the background investigations of applicants. There is a good
working relationship among these offices, and there is a regular standing meeting or group that
reviews progress on each part of the process and discusses areas of improvement.
26
The divisions of TAD and SMD also utilize separate personnel management software systems to
manage each part of the recruitment and personnel security process, and the systems are not
mapped to directly transfer data between one another. TAD utilizes a staffing application called
Secret Service Hire as its main hiring platform. Secret Service Hire is used to document the job
analysis, recruitment, and selection of candidates. This system interfaces with USAJOBS to
advertise the position and is the system that captures candidate applications. SMD uses the
Applicant Lifecycle Information System (ALIS), a software system developed in-house with
contract support, as its main platform for personnel security documentation gathering and
approval. ALIS and Secret Service Hire are not interfaced and candidate information from Secret
Service Hire must be manually keyed into ALIS. According to information provided by the Agency,
the ALIS database houses highly confidential Publicly Identifiable Information (PII), creating
numerous security issues if connected directly to Secret Service Hire that is interfaced with
USAJOBS.
The separation between ALIS and USAJOBS, while understandable, means the databases need to
be populated by hand to ensure a smooth transition between processes, in effect, introducing both
additional workload and the potential for entry errors. The creation of a new HUM IT office within
HUM, known as Human Resources Business Solutions, provides an opportunity to examine
options to smooth data transfer between ALIS and Secret Service Hire and to explore how to
address security issues to enable the use of one system instead of two can be used.
Finally, in 2017, the Agency began to use metrics to track progress and cycle times at the various
stages of the law enforcement hiring process to drive systemic improvements. More recently, this
data has fed hiring models that capture yield rates at each stage to more accurately project
performance against hiring goals. Continuing to gather this kind of data - and expanding the
analysis to include APT hiring - will help HUM determine where inefficiencies exist to continue
to improve the hiring process.
The hiring of APT employees has emerged as a lower priority within the Agency, though the
challenges are similar in scale with similar hiring timelines. Challenges in hiring APT employees
inevitably impact those Special Agents and UD Officers they support. The hiring of APT employees
did not come under the scrutiny of the PMP or the HOGR report and was beyond the scope of the
2016 Academy Study. The latter encouraged the Secret Service to review its processes of hiring
APT employees to see where they could streamline those processes, while looking at process
improvement, utilizing available flexibilities, and benchmarking against other federal agencies.
The Agency has engaged a federally funded research and development center to specifically
document hiring business processes.
The Secret Service has staffing level shortfalls in its talent acquisition unit, which slows down the
process of APT employee hiring. It can take upwards of 29 days to issue a certificate of eligible
applicants that provides hiring managers a list of the best-qualified candidates from which
managers make a selection. The standard duration, according to the OPM, for this period between
when a job announcement is closed and when this list of interview-eligible applicants is provided
is usually half that time. Similarly, the interview stage of Secret Service hiring often takes upwards
of 30 days, often a week longer than the federal average. Officials within the Agency say that the
timelines are extended in this manner because of the agency focus on UD and Special Agent hiring.
27
Hiring managers typically have many other responsibilities, and they balance their workload and
the hiring of new employees against the deadlines set by TAD for the return of the certificate of
eligible applicants. Reviewing and updating the timelines for issuing a certificate of eligible
applicants and the interview selection process would be a way to accelerate hiring. Because of
the rigorous security standards for most APT positions, many selected APTs do not pass the
background investigation, exacerbating the APT staffing challenges.
A July 2019 GAO report highlighted best practices that federal agencies can follow to improve
hiring.
26
One key element is using the flexibilities and authorities to expedite hiring and reduce
the steps necessary to hire a new employee. The Secret Service has identified areas to explore to
ask for relief or make changes to better meet its unique hiring needs. The Agency plans to engage
on this issue with OPM, which is responsible for the oversight of these authorities.
Attrition and Retention
The Agency’s staffing level and hiring challenges place a premium on holding onto the talent the
Agency already has in its ranks. Interviews and analysis point to attrition as a significant area of
concern. Departures of experienced personnel have created leadership and skills gaps that have
impacted readiness, taken on additional mission risk, and impacted morale and job satisfaction.
The retention issues of the Agency come in three different forms that require different tools and
approaches to address.
The Agency has experienced 1,811 non-retirement separations of Special Agents and Uniform
Division Officers since October 2012. Almost 50 percent of those separations come from Special
Agents and UD Officers with between four and 16 years of service. Sixteen percent of Special
Agents in the force have between zero and three years, as there has been an intense hiring surge
in recent years. This number would be higher if Secret Service was able to hire during the COVID-
19 pandemic. In the field, this trend in attrition can mean extremely flat field offices with many
Phase 1 field Special Agents. On the surface, high attrition means a less experienced workforce.
Less noticeably, but even more significant, is the loss of experience and the knowledge of how to
conduct a criminal investigation, administrative investigation, protective intelligence
investigation, background investigation, applicant interviews, and how to protect a visiting
dignitary or another protectee or assist with an NSSE.
The Secret Service’s exit surveys point to high workload, long hours, irregular schedules, and
inadequate staffing levels to carry out its mission as major reasons for these departures. It is also
easy for Special Agents to transfer to a less intense federal law enforcement position in another
agency at the same grade level while keeping their government retirement benefits wholly intact.
Along with this intangible loss are concrete costs, as it takes a significant amount to hire, train,
and season a new Agent to the point where they can fully integrate within a team. In a 2010 RAND
Corporation study, the costs associated with hiring and training new federal law enforcement
Officer were identified as a range of $58,000 - $250,000 depending upon hiring efforts and the
26
Government Accountability Office, “Improving Federal Recruiting and Hiring Efforts, GAO-19-696T”,
July 30, 2019, Washington, D.C.. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-696T
28
level of training needed.
27
The Agency estimates a $128 million cost from onboarding the
replacement Special Agents filling the positions of the non-retirement separations.
28
During the
time it takes to fill a vacancy, the rest of the workforce must take up the slack, increasing the work
stresses and taking time away from loved ones.
The Agency also faces particularly acute management challenges in retaining Special Agents who
are part of the Cyber Technical Agent Career Progression track, who are uniquely postured to
assist and conduct investigations of financial crimes. Often due to the relentless demands of
protection and other demands placed on Special Agents in a field office previously cited, Special
Agents who are trained in the field get drawn into protection assignments that take the Special
Agents away from their families for extended periods and do not permit them to utilize the
specialized skills they possess. Interviewees claimed that ten Special Agents who had completed
cybersecurity training recently left Secret Service for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI),
all in a short period of time. These Special Agents are also particularly prized by private sector
firms that offer attractive benefits and better hours without the requirement to carry out
additional duties away from home. The Agency has developed a specialized career track for Special
Agents with cybersecurity skills, which will provide the Special Agents a path to apply their
specialized skills at every point. However, there are limited opportunities to advance beyond the
GS-14 level in a cybersecurity career, according to those interviewed (see Chapter 5 for more on
the importance of career pathing).
The Agency reports that it is taking steps to monitor, track, and oversee the group to ensure it
addresses the unique issues more carefully. The Secret Service highlights how it is a
fundamentally different organization than the FBI with its 35,000 employees compartmentalized
in many branches and divisions to carry out its singular mission of investigations. FBI agents often
spend their entire career in only one field such as counterterrorism. Several Secret Service officials
said that creating separate career tracks and more specialization would detract from the
protection and investigations mission, as a smaller agent pool would be dedicated to both. Very
few Agents would choose the protection mission because it is too physically and mentally
demanding to do for more than a few years.
Another significant area where the Agency’s retention challenges have come to the forefront is
with APT employees. The interviews conducted in the course of this study revealed that the
departure of APT employees occurs for a variety of reasons, often because of a desire for
promotion, lack of recognition for one’s work and overall contribution, and what is seen as poor
communication with supervisors. The Agency captured many of these same justifications for
departures in the annual collation of exit surveys pulled together by HUM. It is not clear that this
type of survey is routinely conducted, and each office is often left to its own devices to conduct
surveys. The Agency has yet to make exit interviews more systematic, and it is not clear that senior
leaders track attrition and the issues that lead to APT employees departing Secret Service.
27
Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium, The State of Knowledge, Jeremy M. Wilson,
Erin Dalton, Charles Schear, Clifford A. Grammich, RAND Corporation, 2010
28
According to internal Secret Service analysis provided to the Academy.
29
The Agency is taking several steps to address retention, especially among Special Agents. These
initiatives, as well as others related to overtime and retirement, are covered in the next chapter
related to compensation, benefits, and work-life initiatives. Unsurprisingly, the same
considerations that make a member of the workforce engaged in the mission and committed to
their jobs are the same factors that make him or her question their decision to continue in the
workforce.
Recommendations
3.2 Pursue support from DHS, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
approval from Congress to accelerate and fund staffing increases consistent
with validated, manpower models. Steps include:
• Including messaging that points to how the conditions and challenges
that precipitated the last personnel size increase still exist, albeit less
severely, and it is those increases that have prevented high-profile
events from otherwise occurring and improving conditions.
3.3 Accelerate hiring for current, open positions among all personnel categories,
seeking to meet and exceed time standards at each hiring stage set by the
OPM. Steps include:
• Setting up a schedule to conduct regular ELACs sessions across the
country. The Agency, particularly HUM in partnership with the INV
field offices, should ensure the associated offices have the appropriate
staffing to carry out these sessions regularly.
• Conducting regular meetings among the various process owners for
hiring, ensuring regular communication, sharing best practices, and
documenting issues identification.
• Reducing time requirements for completing such key steps in the
hiring process as issuing a certificate of eligibles or conducting
interviews.
• Exploring consolidating hiring of Special Agent and UD Officers into a
single office, drawing on positions and personnel from the relevant
offices and branches.
3.4 Renew emphasis on retention, placing as much focus and energy on retaining
Agency talent as recruiting and training new personnel. Steps include:
• Conducting regular exit surveys across the workforce to identify
drivers for attrition.
• Analyzing and highlighting the drivers of attrition to senior leadership.
30
• Performing a formal study to document the fully burdened cost of
hiring and training new Special Agents and UD Officers.
31
Chapter 4: Work-Life Balance, Telework, Benefits, and
Compensation
The work demanded of Secret Service employees requires a significant amount of time and
commitment, and it often entails multiple moves to different geographic locations throughout a
career. Employees from every employee group (Special Agent, UD Officer, TLE, and APT
employees) expressed a willingness to go above and beyond in carrying out the Agency mission,
but employees did not want to sacrifice their home life. Issues related to work-life balance,
telework, benefits, and compensation consistently arose in interviews with all Secret Service
employees. These concerns impact employee engagement and are key factors for employees
considering staying with the Agency.
This chapter discusses this second core element of employee engagement at the Secret Service:
the important role that work-life balance, telework, benefits, and compensation play in employee
engagement and retention, within the Secret Service. The chapter highlights the strong desire
among all employees for greater time for personal activities. The chapter reviews the Agency’s
initiatives to provide greater work-life balance despite mission demands. Because the Agency
simply does not have the staff to cover all its mission areas, there are limits to how much time the
Agency can give back to its employees, and many Special Agents, TLE personnel, and UD Officers
work a great deal of overtime. The Agency works within the confines of statutes and regulated
pay-caps to provide overtime pay, as well as a range of other benefits.
The Desire for Work-Life Balance
During interviews with Secret Service personnel, it became apparent that work-life balance was a
significant concern. Ongoing mission demands—like protecting key individuals and guarding
critical facilities—take a considerable toll on personal time. Interviewees frequently reported that
Special Agents in the field may work for weeks at a time with few, if any, days off, and significant
time away from family due to the responsibilities associated with the protective mission. Though
travel is expected of Special Agents, particularly on protective details, this level of work is more
commonplace in key geographic areas due to the density of protectees and a heightened level of
protectee travel.
32
Special Agents, in the field, are tasked with conducting
investigative, protective, and human capital
operations (conducting SUPER and personnel
security interviews) as their region demands. In the
words of one interviewee, Special Agents may have a
“25-year career in which they are only available [to
their families] for a month [a year].” The stressors of
long working hours in Field Offices may be further
compounded by socioeconomic factors. In cities such
as New York City or San Francisco where the cost of
living is significant, Special Agents, particularly those
with families, may choose to live in the suburbs, or
outside of the main city. Depending on the region, this
can result in extremely long commutes, further
reducing the amount of time Special Agents spend at
home. Should Special Agents choose to live closer to
their workspace, they risk financial difficulties
associated with the significant cost of living.
The Agency’s FEVS scores tell the story in vivid detail:
the 2019 FEVS EEI scores show the Agency scoring in
the lower 25 percent for work-life balance, ranked at
number 356 out of 414 federal agencies.
29
Internal
separation surveys also reinforce this point, with
Special Agents and UD Officers reporting that
workload, work schedule, and overtime pay caps are
key pain points for those leaving the Agency.
Indeed, even in less formal evaluations of Secret
Service, employees across the Agency highlight the
struggle with establishing a healthy work-life balance.
The website Glassdoor has a page on the Secret Service
as an employer, which shows a 3.5 out of 5 aggregate
score.
30
A great many of the complaints are centered
on the Agency’s poor work-life balance and almost all
reviews since 2017 emphasize work-life difficulties as
a central issue. Figure 3 provides a sample of some of the pros and cons listed on the website for
working at the Secret Service.
29
Partnership for Public Service, 2019 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government,
https://bestplacestowork.org/rankings/detail/HS14#tab_category_tbl
30
Glassdoor is a company feedback and job-search site that gathers reviews on employers from current
and former staff members. The scores represent 1 being the lowest level of satisfaction and 5 the highest
level of satisfaction.
Investigation and
Protection
Responsibilities at the
Miami, Florida Field
Office
The Miami, Florida Field Office is
tasked with a high volume of
investigations associated with
crimes centered in Miami, Florida,
and dignitary travel from South
and Central America to Florida.
One of the office’s principal roles
was the protection of former
President Trump and his family,
who frequently visited the area.
This high operational tempo
required Special Agents to find an
effective balance of time between
protection assignments,
conducting criminal
investigations, and personal
time—a balance that, frequently,
is hard to attain without
sacrificing off-duty hours.
For more on field office
organizational challenges and
recommendations, see Chapter 9.
33
Figure 5. Glassdoor at-a-glance pros/cons of Secret Service employment
Source: Glassdoor, Screenshot taken on April 30, 2021, https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/US-Secret-Service-
Reviews-E131896.htm
Previous research and internal Secret Service documentation acknowledge the Agency’s struggles
with work-life balance. The HOGR, PMP, and 2016 Academy report all highlight work-life balance
and perceived overwork as key stressors for Agency employees and recommended multiple
solutions to address the situation. Common to all of them is the need for additional personnel and
the retention of the personnel already in the ranks as the ultimate solution to solving workload
concerns. The Agency’s FY 2018 – 2025 Human Capital Strategic Plan noted the importance of
additional personnel to reduce the workload burden on existing employees, with overtime as an
incidental but meaningful benefit to the Agency.
Agency Reforms to Address Work-Life Imbalance
Interviews highlighted that longstanding issues associated with work-life balance are well known
and acknowledged by Agency leaders at all levels, from frontline managers to the Agency’s
leadership C-suite. The Secret Service has taken several actions to address the need for additional
personnel, as described in Chapter 3. Staffing level increases would contribute substantially to
34
ending the cycle of attrition in the Agency, as much of the workload issues are directly linked to a
lack of staff capacity to handle the demands put upon the Agency. However, other reforms may
reduce employee attrition in the interim while Agency efforts to increase staffing levels continue.
The 2016 Eagle Hill report recommended that the Secret Service engage professional schedulers
to ensure that UD employees work overtime at the lowest extent possible within the bounds of the
mission’s demands and available resources. The UD contracted with at least one professional
scheduler, but the professional scheduler reportedly struggled with the complexity of Secret
Service’s scheduling requirements. The UD also tried appointing an APT employee with
scheduling, but it did not work. Further, Eagle Hill recommended that the Agency provide
predictability and consistency in scheduling to reduce the uncertainty employees may experience
with unscheduled overtime. The Secret Service did implement a new scheduling program, called
the Enterprise Personnel Scheduling) (EPS), that provides more predictability. EPS was built by
the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). The Eagle Hill report
concluded that both actions would help reduce the stress put on employees while additional
employees are hired.
The Secret Service has taken some actions to address aspects of the Agency’s culture driving work-
life imbalance, including pressing supervisors to encourage employees to take leave and work
from home when needed, as well as to communicate more openly with employees. Such openness
and employee actions have been well received.
Field offices particularly need relief from ongoing workload pressure. Staff at high-tempo field
offices, like New York City, New York, and Miami, Florida, expressed the desire for additional
support when there is a significant demand for Special Agents and Technical staff. Temporarily
moving staff from lower-tempo offices to these high-tempo offices during times of significant
demand grants relief to those employees stationed at the offices that see the most protection
assignments.
The Role of Telework in Work-Life Balance
One best practice among federal agencies to provide greater work-life balance is to provide
increased telework to as many employees as possible. During interviews, employees repeatedly
expressed the desire for expanded telework access, and a shift away from the Agency’s existing
telework policy, which is far more restrictive. The Agency’s telework policy, which was in place at
the beginning of this study, takes a one-size-fits-all approach and applies to every employee
category.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, telework was generally restricted. The prior telework policy
allowed for situational telework, such as in the case of inclement weather or other OPM-directed
closure, but restrictions applied (as in the case of a child being ill or other home situation, which
were cited as generally invalid reasons to telework). This inflexible telework policy, coupled with
a reluctant attitude among Agency leaders and managers, was a significant source of
dissatisfaction among employees. For APT employees, the inability to telework was seen as
needlessly restrictive. For Special Agents, not having the option to telework was seen as an
impediment to their reducing in-office hours and reclaiming some of their work-life balance.
35
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic forced the Secret Service to embrace Agency-wide telework
rapidly, with the entire staff, where possible, moving to work from home by the end of March
2020. This project was four months underway at that point. The Academy was able to see and
document the impact on employee attitudes as they transitioned to telework. Staff interviewed
after the move reported strong satisfaction with the arrangement, noting that the technical tools
and infrastructure went live without significant issues and that work was being completed at usual
speed and quality. Multiple interviewees, both line staff and Secret Service leaders, noted the
immediately apparent benefits of enabling staff to telework (acknowledging the unusual
circumstances surrounding that transition). These positive observations came from staff of all
categories and included increased time with family and around the home, more time and
flexibility to get work done, less stress associated with commuting, and less pressure associated
with working in the office. Some Secret Service leaders mentioned in interviews that before
COVID-19, they did not support telework but, as they began using it and could see its
effectiveness, their attitude completely changed.
After the transition to working from home, interviewees frequently remarked about the likelihood
of (and desire for) adopting a long-term, expanded telework policy. This new policy came about
in May 2020, when the Agency issued new guidelines for telework that allow staff to opt-in to
unconditional telework, pending supervisor permission. The key to the future of telework in the
Secret Service will be ensuring that it is used appropriately and for the right kind of jobs and
assignments.
The Secret Service is, of course, just one of many agencies moving from primarily in-office to
mostly telework in short-order. In addition to putting the basic technology necessary for remote
work in place and creating new policies to facilitate remote work, many federal organizations are
actively communicating to their employees that telework will be the new normal, even after the
COVID-19 pandemic is in the past. The Department of the Air Force leadership, for example, at a
September 2020 online conference underscored the positive results of telework, including
increased productivity and employee satisfaction. Many leaders proclaimed that the Air Force is
“not going back.”
31
Recommendation
4.1 Revise and update the use of telework in mission directives, policies, and
operations, to reflect recent trends in telework, while updating training to
allow supervisors to effectively oversee remote work, ensure continued high-
performance, and foster office and organizational cohesion. Steps include:
• Encouraging supervisors to be cognizant of the amount of travel, time
at post, or hours in-office an individual may log.
• Including messaging that employees can conduct duties from home
where possible and appropriate, especially given the expansion of the
31
Scott Maucione, “‘We’re not going back,’ Air Force leadership says telework is here to stay,” Federal
News Network, September 15, 2020. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/air-force/2020/09/were-not-
going-back-air-force-leadership-says-telework-is-here-to-stay/
36
Virtual Private Network (VPN) and the experience of teleworking
during COVID-19.
• Releasing strategic communications from the top leadership that
embrace telecommuting as a permanent feature of work.
Agency Actions to Improve Benefits and Compensation
While the Secret Service deploys some tools to address work-life balance, including better
scheduling and telework to give more home time back to its employees, work-life issues will
persist until the Agency can increase and fill its ranks or lower its turnover. Interviews and a
review of exit surveys reveal that employees recognize that reality and remain deeply committed
to the mission of the Agency; however, they desire full compensation for that extra time and that
commitment invested to get the job done. A heightened focus on pay and benefits has emerged as
a result.
One goal of this focus is to make up for the enormous time and energy commitment required of
employees; another goal is managing the workforce more broadly and retaining personnel. The
Agency recognizes that if employees are not adequately compensated for that extra time, they will
move to private-sector jobs or transfer to another federal agency. Other federal agencies can offer
the same pay with the employee’s full retirement benefits and with far less stress and required
work hours. While the Secret Service acknowledges that benefits are not a total solution to the
retention problem, the Agency views various packages as a salve. When used in combination with
other reforms like the expansion of telework, the Agency and its employees consider the benefit
packages as important retention tools.
Benefits
The Agency has rolled out many benefit programs to support the workforce and adequately
compensate employees for their efforts. Some measures were implemented for specific groups,
such as the UD, who are the beneficiaries of a Retention Payment Program. Other initiatives are
broader, such as programs for Tuition Assistance, Student Loan Repayment, and a new Child Care
Subsidy Program. Currently, the Secret Service focuses on providing the following benefits
programs to staff:
• Student Loan Repayment Program: Eligible employees may receive up to
$10,000/year for a maximum of $60,000.
• Tuition Assistance Program: Eligible employees may be reimbursed for the cost of
tuition for approved courses.
• Child Care Subsidy Benefit Program: Subsidies are provided to eligible, full-time
Agency employees whose total family income is under $170,000/year. These subsidies
may be up to $400/month, per household, to pay for eligible childcare fees.
• Uniformed Division (UD) Group Incentive Program: A new retention benefit
implemented for UD Officers offers a rank-specific bonus of 10 percent for employees at
or below the rank of Sergeant, with diminishing amounts as one rises in rank (7.5 percent
for Lieutenants, 5 percent for Captains, and 2.5 percent for Inspectors). Eligible Officers
37
that opt into the program commit to a one-year service obligation period (beginning on
January 1 and ending December 31 of the calendar year following enrollment).
• Cybersecurity Retention Incentive Program: Designed to boost Agency retention
of in-demand cybersecurity talent, eligible employees who maintain job-related
cybersecurity certifications may opt into the incentive. Those who opt-in must agree to
stay with the Agency for a specified time period, and, in turn, receive group incentive
payments up to 10 percent of basic pay, and individual payments of up to 25 percent of
base pay for eligible employees.
• Senior Special Agent/Senior Resident Agent (SSA/SRA) Program: Established
to recognize eligible non-supervisory Senior Special Agents who “embody expertise,
initiative, and consistent productivity,”
32
the SSA/SRA program offers a title promotion to
Senior Special/Resident Agent and an annual bonus to those selected.
Though not strictly by definition benefits, additional measures like family days, can be explored
that offer a morale boost for employees.
The tactical use of new and existing benefits can smooth out some of the sharper edges of the
Secret Service’s employee engagement challenges. Programs like Tuition Assistance and Student
Loan Repayment, for example, can prove fruitful as both are a source of economic assistance to
staff, and a way to encourage their growth as professionals. In addition to the traditional
Employee Assistance Program,
33
the Secret Service has established a Chaplain program to provide
employees avenues of communication and support.
34
These programs can help maintain stability
in a staff member’s home life and reduce stressors from outside of the office. When provided in
concert with other human capital program improvements, such as the addition of sufficient new
hires to reduce workloads or the adoption of flexible work schedules, these benefits may be
sufficient to alleviate remaining tensions and retain staff who may otherwise consider making a
lateral move.
Enrollment in the existing retention programs that require opting-in (such as Tuition Assistance)
is not yet widespread. This is a circumstance that Agency leadership is aware of and has made a
priority to rectify. Awareness campaigns and outreach surrounding available benefits, as well as
feedback gathering campaigns, are reportedly underway. These awareness campaigns could yield
greater enrollment and respond to the desire for more communication from leaders.
When employees do enroll, Agency benefit programs outlined above can increase employee
morale. It is important to note, however, in separation surveys, across all employee categories
(Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE, or APT employees) it was found that, while valued, these
benefits had a more limited effect on retention than work-life balance and overtime
32
Memo from the Chief Human Capital Officer on Retention Programs, Number 200.000, December 11,
2019
33
The Employee Assistance Program, like at other agencies and organizations, connects Secret Service
employees and their family with resources to address life situations.
34
The Chaplain Program offers discreet resources, assistance, and support to Secret Service employees in
personal and professional crises.
38
compensation. As discussed further below, the primary issue for those leaving the Agency is still
the total number of overtime hours worked, and, for those employees in the higher grade levels,
the unpaid overtime hours due to mandatory pay limits.
Despite the limitations of bonuses when individuals are stretched thin and have little work-life
balance, special pays and bonuses can still have an impact, influencing some and communicating
the Agency’s desire to hold on to its talent. The Secret Service can more carefully target its
retention incentives when it believes that the employee might leave the Agency. It could also
develop a program for Special Agents similar to the UD Group Incentive Program that targets low-
to mid-level ranks that do not typically max out their pay. While many employees might reach
overtime limits that put their combined pay above federal pay-cap restrictions, there are a large
number of new and mid-rank personnel who would not be maxing out their pay who might
consider receiving a retention incentive enough to keep them in the Secret Service. An agency may
pay a retention incentive to a current employee if the Agency determines that, given the Agency’s
mission requirements and the employee’s competencies, the employee would be likely to leave for
a different position in the Federal service in the absence of a retention incentive.
35
It is important to note that the Secret Service has not been able to fully utilize its ability to more
broadly offer traditional retention incentives. For FY 2021, the Agency requested $20.3 million.
DHS and OMB reduced the amount in the President’s budget to stay within guidance and
maintain the Agency’s $9.6 million budget base. In FY 2021, Congress adjusted the base funding
for this program to $17.4 million.
36
Overtime
Employees, particularly Special Agents, expressed in interviews that receiving overtime pay was
overwhelmingly the most important way that the Agency addressed the sheer commitment of time
and energy that they must make to do their jobs. On the flip side, exit surveys reveal that not
receiving the full compensation that a Special Agent feels she or he has earned is one of the most
common reasons to leave the Agency. While most claimed that their main salary was satisfactory
or extremely satisfactory, overtime compensation was given an average to a negative rating.
The more expansive protection mission in recent years has led the Agency to pay increased
amounts of overtime to Special Agents. There are statutory pay caps that prevent a federal
employee, including law enforcement Special Agents, from receiving more in overtime than a GS-
15, Step 10 equivalent.
37
The Secret Service reports that after Special Agents reach a grade and pay
level that would trigger their so-called pay Max-Out they often seek opportunities in other
agencies where one can get the same pay for fewer hours. In 2018, Public Law 115-383 amended
the Overtime Pay for Protective Services Act of 2016 from the limitation on premium pay (Max-
Out limits) elevating those limits, allowing Special Agents to receive $187,000 in FY 2019 and
35
Retention Incentives, 5 U.S.C. 5754; 5 CFR 575.315; 5 CFR Part 575, subpart C;
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/5/part-575/subpart-C
36
U.S. Secret Service FY 2021 Budget Request, Program Change 19,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/u.s._secret_service.pdf
37
Special Pay Authority, 5 U.S.C. 5305(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/5305
39
$197,300 in FY 2020.
38
The limits under this modification are the same as the pay of senior
political officials paid under Level 2 of the Executive Schedule. Congress provided authorization
for this temporary increase, known as the Super-Max, beyond FY 2020. The expectation from
Congress is that increased staffing levels will, over time reduce the reliance on overtime:
“The Secret Service received funding in FY 2020 to hire additional personnel and is
requesting funds in FY 2021 for additional staff. As the Secret Service continues to hire
and increase staffing, the Secret Service will see decreases in overtime in its Special Agents
and UD workforce, including the need for overtime in excess of annual pay.”
39
Even with the enhanced Max-Out cap provided to the Secret Service, employees working
protection often reach the limit. A January 2020 GAO report estimated that more than $1 million
in wages were lost due to earned-but-unpaid overtime among Special Agents from 2016 to 2018.
40
Portability of Benefits
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) in 1984, Special
Agents and UD Officers could be covered under the District of Columbia Police and Firefighter
Retirement and Disability System, which provided retirement compensation benefits beyond the
Civil Service Retirement System. Special Agents and UD Officers hired after January 1, 1984, were
required to be covered under FERS. With federal retirement funds readily portable to other
agencies under the FERS, it is easy for employees to move between agencies without sacrificing
any retirement benefits received from the Secret Service. Consequently, there is less of an
incentive for employees to stay exclusively with the Secret Service to keep their full government
retirement.
The Secret Service is exploring ways to retain Special Agents by asking for authority from
Congress to offer a supplement to its Agent retirement system. The supplement can lead to an
enhanced benefit particularly in the later years of a career but cannot transfer with them if they
move to a new agency. The Agency has briefed this proposal across the federal government,
including DHS. The Secret Service proposal would require congressional authorization. The
proposal, the Agency says, has several benefits, including addressing its Special Agent retention
challenges in a more cost-effective way.
Phase 1 First Assignment Moving Costs
One compensation matter that impacts Phase 1 Special Agents arose during many interviews in
the course of the project. Many new Special Agents spoke of the challenges of entering the Secret
Service workforce, going through training, and moving to their new assignments. They said they
are not paid for their initial move to their first field office assignment. New Special Agents must
38
Limitation on Premium Pay, 5 U.S.C. 5547, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/5547
39
Secret Service Budget Request for FY 2021, Program Change 13,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/u.s._secret_service.pdf
40
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but
Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources”, GAO-20-239, January 2020, Washington, D.C.,
pp. 31, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/703990.pdf
40
pay all of their moving expenses without any reimbursement from the Secret Service, which
creates financial hardship and difficulties for new Agents, particularly those with young families.
The Agency has recognized this problem and is considering implementing a new policy.
Recommendations
4.2 Undertake a detailed review to determine whether the Agency could more
cost-effectively manage the overtime program for Special Agents to ensure
fewer Special Agents reach overtime caps by leveling assignments across the
force.
4.3 Rebalance the bonus and benefit programs to encourage Agency mid-career
personnel to continue with the Secret Service through their entire career by
exploring, developing, and implementing a program that commits employees
to staying in the Agency for a specific period of years, such as
enhancement/supplement to the current government retirement solution, or
through a continuation pay/bonus solution.
4.4 Pay for the first move of Special Agents at the start of their careers.
41
Chapter 5: Developing the Next Generation of Secret
Service Leadership
This chapter discusses the importance of career pathing, training, and leadership development
within the Secret Service, the third core element of employee engagement at the Secret Service. A
RAND monograph study of law enforcement organizations, also cited in the Academy’s 2016
report, found that organizational characteristics such as (1) lack of career growth, (2) unmet job
expectations, and (3) a lack of training affect attrition and organizational health.
41
These
characteristics can be mitigated by career development plans, with defined career paths that allow
employees to understand what they need to accomplish to reach a certain position within the
Secret Service, and by providing employees with more opportunity to train. That same RAND
study found three additional organizational characteristics that result in attrition: (4) the negative
characteristics of their immediate supervisor, (5) inadequate feedback, and (6) insufficient
recognition. These three additional areas could be mitigated by developing the next generation of
Secret Service leaders in what many consider to be critical management skills, such as
communication, listening, delegation, employee recognition, and team building. Taken together,
the combination of career pathing, training, and leadership development could serve as a
powerful retention tool for the Secret Service.
Career Paths
Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE personnel, and APT employees all expressed frustration at what
they perceive to be limited promotion potential and an unclear understanding of what it takes to
reach higher levels at the Secret Service. Career paths demonstrate a commitment to employees
that they will be invested in and that homegrown leadership is valued. It provides employees with
the motivation to keep their skills current, to better themselves professionally and personally, and
to contribute to the mission in greater ways as they progress throughout their careers. The
establishment of career paths helps engage the workforce, reduce turnover, and therefore improve
employee retention. The Society for Human Resources Management cites several important
benefits that career paths provide an organization, including improved engagement, “morale,
career satisfaction, motivation, productivity, and responsiveness in meeting departmental and
organizational objectives.”
42
Special Agents
The typical career path for a Special Agent involves three phases. Phase 1 is an assignment to a
field office where Special Agents coming out of the Rowley Training Center (RTC) focus on the
investigative mission and are introduced to the protective mission by rotating on and off
protective mission assignments. Interviewees indicated that Phase 1 Special Agents are allowed
41
Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium, RAND Corporation, 2010,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf
42
Society for Human Resources Management, Developing Employee Career Paths and Ladders,
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-
samples/toolkits/pages/developingemployeecareerpathsandladders.aspx
42
to express interest in certain field offices for their initial job posting; however, they are provided
no guarantee on placement. INV indicates that it does what it can to accommodate a Special
Agent’s preference for initial job posting, but it must place Phase 1 Special Agents where there are
mission requirements. A Special Agent’s Phase 2 assignment is a protective assignment within
Office of Protective Operations (OPO), TEC, INV, or in protective intelligence. Phase 1 Special
Agents entering their Phase 2 assignment have an opportunity to identify their desired Phase 2
assignment; however, the majority ask for an assignment to the Presidential Protective Division
(PPD) and only a handful can be accommodated. The remaining Special Agents are placed where
there is a need, but Special Agents are not provided any reasoning for the Phase 2 protective detail
assignment that they receive. Agents then move to their Phase 3 assignments, which can be any
of the following: post-protection field assignment, protection assignment, or headquarters
assignment. Placement in Phase 3 is accomplished through one of two established mechanisms:
1) Applying for a Job Opportunity Announcement and getting selected for the position; or
2) Through the Special Agent Reassignment Committee (SARC), which selects Special Agents
for assignments. Agents can identify their preference based on a wish list approach that
gives priority to Agents who have been in the Secret Service longer.
Special Agent interviewees find that the current career phasing process lacks transparency and
predictability while limiting their ability to pursue areas of the Secret Service mission that inspires
them the most. Phase 1 and Phase 3 Agents feel that the process is not transparent in that they are
not made aware of why certain decisions regarding phase assignments are made, and they do not
understand what they need to do to end up where they want within Secret Service. This lack of
transparency feeds a cycle of unpredictability because Agents cannot plan for the assignments or
potential locations where they might land. And finally, it prohibits Special Agents from pursuing
the areas of the Secret Service mission that matter most to them. For example, there is only one
way around this generic phasing for Special Agents, and that is to pursue the Cyber Technical
Agent Career Progression, which is a relatively new career path within Secret Service. Special
Agents who choose this career path hit a ceiling at the GS-14 level.
Special Agents in this career
path conduct online crime investigations, computer forensics, systems protection, and assist on
other cyber/technical efforts.
There was a second career path called the Special Operations Division (SOD) Targeted
Recruitment Program, which reverses Phase 1 and Phase 2 for Special Agents who possess the
skills and experience necessary to serve on a special operations team protective assignment for
Phase 1. Special Agents would serve a total of 6-9 years on the SOD, which fulfills their Phase 1
and Phase 2 career requirements. SOD Special Agents then complete a minimum of two years in
a post-protective assignment at a field office. Once that is completed, they are then considered
traditional Phase 3 Agents. However, the SOD Targeted Recruitment Program was paused in late
2019 because of limited success.
The unpredictability continues beyond a Special Agent’s first Phase 3 assignment. After
September 2015, Phase 3 Special Agents at the GS-13 level generally move (permanent change of
station) a minimum of two times with the potential of moving four to five times throughout the
43
remainder of their career.
43
These moves can include moving from protection to a field office,
moving within field offices, moving to Washington, D.C. for a required D.C. rotation, and
returning to the field after completing the Washington, D.C. assignment. These requirements are
laid out in a Special Agent Career Progression Plan, which follows the phasing approach explained
in the preceding paragraphs.
The Secret Service is working to improve the SARC process. In one example, the Secret Service is
working to keep employees satisfied by giving them the option to end up on the protective detail
that an Agent most desires. For example, a Phase 1 Special Agent is sent to the Vice President’s
protective detail, which is a 6-year commitment. The Secret Service recently changed its policy
and now allows that Agent to move to the President’s detail after 4 years on the Vice President’s
detail, and with a commitment by the Special Agent to serve on the President’s detail for 4 years
(total Phase 2 commitment of 8 years).
When leaving a Phase 2 protective detail assignment for a Phase 3 field office (or the Washington,
D.C. headquarters) assignment, the Secret Service is trying to help those Special Agents transfer
to the field office of their preference. They have done so by adding a 1-year deferment option. The
SARC now publishes a list of available field offices from which Agents may choose. If an Agent
does not see a field office location of their preference, they can opt-in for another year at their
current assignment location in the hopes that a field office location of their preference opens up.
When a Phase 3 Special Agent reaches the GS-14 level or higher, they are then subject to a “Five-
Year Notice and Directed Reassignment Process.” Any Special Agent who is in the same GS-14 (or
higher) position for four years will receive a letter from the SARC directing the Special Agent to
apply for a vacant reassignment or promotional opportunity. If the Special Agent does not
voluntarily apply for a vacant reassignment or promotional opportunity, then they receive a
directed reassigned to a new position by the SARC one year after receiving their letter encouraging
them to voluntarily apply for a new position. Interviews with Special Agents reveal that this policy
requiring Special Agents to change positions (and likely locations) after four years discourages
some Special Agents from moving up the GS-14 level, meaning they effectively hit a max grade of
GS-13 within the Secret Service. This results in some GS-13 Secret Service employees seeking
employment outside of the Secret Service to take a GS-14 position in an Agency that can afford
the Special Agent more predictability both professionally and personally. For others who choose
to continue with the Secret Service at the GS-14 level (or higher), it means they must subject their
family to potentially more moves and unpredictability in order to reach higher grade levels in the
Secret Service’s leadership structure. This constant movement can create leadership instability,
which was raised by some interviewees and highlighted in the Chapter 9 sections on RES and the
Phoenix, Arizona field office.
The Eagle Hill report from 2016 found similar statements from Special Agents. Focus groups
involving Special Agents resulted in a finding that Special Agents “believe the career path needs
to be adjusted to give people something to look forward to after completing a protection
detail….[and] expressed a desire for the Secret Service to consider the post-detail as an
43
FY 2018 Department of Homeland Security Budget Overview, U.S. Secret Service, p. 19.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/USSS%20FY18%20Budget.pdf
44
opportunity to provide specialized training to a proven Special Agent on investigations or
protection that will help them build a meaningful and valuable role that continues to advance
their skills throughout their career.”
44
Uniformed Division Officers
A substantial portion of this review was spent examining employee engagement within the UD.
UD Officers are highly trained, understand the protective mission, and have significant experience
within the Washington, D.C. region protecting foreign dignitaries, the White House, and other
facilities. Each year, senior leaders at the Secret Service agree on the number of UD Officers they
will allow to transfer to be Special Agents. However, many Officers apply as external applicants
because some years the limit on UD to Special Agent transfers is low, so they feel they are more
likely to become a Special Agent within the Secret Service by applying externally. This
arrangement is perplexing to them, especially given that UD Officers have cleared the same
background check and medical requirements that are used to qualify prospective Special Agents
from outside of the Secret Service. Providing a career path for UD Officers to become Special
Agents presents an opportunity for the Secret Service to retain UD Officers while creating a
pipeline of future Special Agents.
Additionally, the Eagle Hill report identified through focus groups with UD Officers that they too,
“believe a defined career path that allows them to build skills and specialized knowledge would be
beneficial to the employees and the organization.”
45
Similar to Special Agents, UD Officers would
like to have career paths that allow them to pursue a field within the UD that most interests them.
UD has a career path that sends a UD Officer to the Emergency Response Team if they have the
skills and experience to serve on a special operations team upon entry into the UD. They also have
some other specialized operations team positions such as a countersniper unit and a K-9 unit.
More detail on career paths and training within UD can be found in Chapter 8 of this report.
Technical Law Enforcement
In several interviews, TLE personnel, which are part of all the major focus offices addressed in
this review, expressed a desire to understand their role, as a relatively small and very specialized
career category within the larger Agency. TLE personnel fall into three major categories, including
protective operations support, investigative operations support, and technical operations. The
perception among these individuals is that the more immediate focus of the agency is standing up
this relatively new job group that started only in FY 2019, ensuring the positions are filled with
trained and ready personnel with those slots are placed appropriately. There is less focus,
according to TLE interviewees, on career paths and growth. Chapter 9 provides more detailed
context recommendations for TLEs within TEC.
44
Eagle Hill Consulting, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment, August 22, 2016,
p. 74.
45
Eagle Hill Consulting, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment, August 22, 2016,
p. 75.
45
Administrative, Professional, and Technical (APT) Employees
In multiple interviews, APT employees said that they have a limited understanding of what it takes
to reach higher echelons of leadership at the Secret Service. The Academy’s 2016 report found
that the Secret Service was piloting a career progression program for APT employees; however, it
was limited to a small number of job series as a proof of concept. This developmental problem
requires expanded training to enhance skills and competencies.
46
There seems to be little change
since the Academy’s 2016 report. On more than one occasion, the study team learned that APT
employees have been told by their superiors that they would need to leave the Agency and reapply
for a higher-level position within the Secret Service to gain a promotion. The Eagle Hill report
found the same to be true, using one prominent quote to elucidate what it heard more broadly in
its focus groups with APT employees – “APT employees just don’t have career progression and
that’s limiting. I love the Service. This is my work family. But when you cannot go any further
sometimes you need to look outside and not limit yourself.”
47
This does little to generate a sense
of employee engagement, morale, and enthusiasm for the work they perform.
Training
The PMP, HOGR, Eagle Hill, and the 2016 Academy study all focused on training as an important
factor that affects employee attrition and morale. All newly hired Special Agents, UD Officers, and
TLE employees attend the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) for months of basic
law enforcement and criminal investigator training. All three groups then go to the Secret
Service’s RTC for more specialized Secret Service training with an emphasis on Secret Service
policies and tactics. Training that occurs after basic training at FLETC and the Secret Service’s
RTC is dependent on the Secret Service’s staffing levels and the intensity of the protective and
investigative missions. For example, Presidential Protective Division (PPD Agents spent only two
percent of their time training in FY 2013 because of mission demands and low staffing (they had
an established goal of 25 percent of time spent training for FY 2013).
48
As of FY2013, the UD
received the equivalent of about 25 minutes of training for each of its 1,300 UD Officers.
49
Noting the importance of training on mission capability and individual capacity, the PMP (in
2014) recommended: “the Secret Service should be staffed at a level that enables it to provide a
true Fourth Shift for training to its protective forces, and to ensure that UD Officers are in training
46
National Academy of Public Administration, United States Secret Service: Review of Organizational
Change Efforts, October 2016, p. 45, https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/USSS-
Final-Report-10.31.16.pdf
47
Eagle Hill Consulting, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment, August 22,
2016, p. 75
48
This contrasts with the Secret Service of the 1980s, which instituted a fourth two-week shift to PPD
where agents spent their time training and refreshing skills. The Secret Service is implementing a fourth
and fifth shift for PPD, and a fourth shift for VPD. United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel,
Report from the United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, December 2014, p. 13
49
Ibid, p. 13
46
for no less than 10 percent of their time.”
50
In February 2015, the Secret Service created an
independent Office of Training (TNG) that reports directly to the Deputy Director of Secret
Service: TNG was originally in HUM. The purpose of this move was to provide greater institutional
visibility and focus on training. A new leadership team was put in place and charged with
conducting a comprehensive review of capabilities, staffing, and resourcing of the operational
training functions with a focus on curriculum, facilities, and career development, and continuing
education.
TNG is now made up of 400 employees that include Special Agents, UD Officers, engineers,
trainers, and other APT employees. TNG has demonstrated an increase in the total number of
students trained in classrooms or other venues from 20,556 in 2015, to 28,877 in 2019. Total
students completing online training courses has increased from 81,925 in 2015, to 94,507 in 2019.
TNG has also continued its development and deployment of a Regional In-Service Training
Program that first began in 2017. The in-service training program is now fully deployed, and TNG
has deployed eight TNG employees to field offices who are called Regional In-Service Training
Coordinators. Each Regional In-Service Training Coordinator is a full-time, post-detail, Phase 3
Agent who will spend no less than three years in the field ensuring that every Special Agent and
UD Officer meets the 25 percent (Special Agent) and 10 percent (UD Officer) training goals in the
PMP report. The regional coordinators will have access to the Secret Service’s training application
called Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS), which reportedly will help
regional coordinators ensure that every Special Agent in the field receives the training they need.
51
While these are promising achievements, there is a sense among Special Agents, UD Officers, and
TLE interviewees that more training is needed. This is especially true of younger Phase 1 Special
Agents that do not have any law enforcement experience before joining the Secret Service. These
Phase 1 Agents rely heavily on the informal network of Phase 1 and Phase 3 Special Agents with
whom they work within their field office to provide training. This means that the hands-on
training a Phase 1 Special Agent receives at one field office might be different than what one would
receive at a different field office. Additionally, Special Agents interviewed for this study found in
some cases, that they were primarily focused on investigations and rarely had the opportunity to
work on protective details. This leaves a gap in their development that worries Phase 1 Special
Agents as they prepare for their Phase 2 protective detail assignment.
To address these concerns, TNG offers a required three-week transition training for Phase 1
Special Agents who are going to a protective detail. In addition to this, TNG is piloting an on-the-
job training program to standardize the lessons all Phase 1 Special Agents receive, but it has not
been fully implemented. At the end of a Special Agent’s phase 2 protective detail assignment, TNG
has a three-week reintegration course for those who are returning to the field for their phase 3
assignment.
50
United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, Report from the United States Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2014, p. 14
51
PALMS provides learning history, including courses taken, training progress, and required training. The
data is populated into a dashboard. More on PALMS can be found here:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-usss-eperson-b-december2019.pdf
47
FEVS shows that concerns remain about the adequacy of training within the Secret Service over
the past five years. In 2014, 32.3 percent of respondents to FEVS answered positively (40.7
percent answered negatively) that their training needs are assessed, and 35.2 percent answered
positively that they are satisfied with training (38.4 percent answered negatively). In 2019, 45
percent of respondents to FEVS answered positively that their training needs are assessed (33
percent responded negatively), and 47 percent answered positively that they are satisfied with the
training they receive (33 percent responded negatively). The improvement is promising, but 33
percent still responded negatively meaning there is more work to be done here.
There is also some concern regarding the quality and applicability of training received. The Secret
Service does not collect satisfaction scores for online training courses it provides to employees.
The Secret Service does collect course evaluations after in-person training courses it provides but
course evaluations are kept as raw survey results. Analyzing surveys requires viewing in person at
RTC. Field Office Special Agents interviewed for this study reported that training is often online
with an emphasis on compliance-based tasks. So, while Secret Service has increased the number
of classes it has provided since 2015, it may not be able to determine whether those classes address
the needs of the workforce.
In 2019, GAO was tasked with assessing the Secret Service’s progress responding to the
recommendations of the PMP. GAO found that “the Secret Service instituted a fourth and fifth
shift for PPD and a fourth shift for [the Vice Presidential Protective Detail] …. implementation is
still in progress because neither PPD nor Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD) Special
Agents consistently used this time to train and missed the training targets established by this
recommendation.”
52
As for the 10 percent training goal for UD Officers, GAO found that “Secret
Service does not have a documented process for collecting complete and appropriate UD training
data that the Agency can use to determine whether Officers trained for 10 percent of their work
hours.”
53
Leadership Development
Related to career pathing is leadership development. During interviews across the Secret Service
and in all employee groups, it became clear that the Secret Service is full of talented individuals
who are competent, confident, and motivated by the mission. A majority of those interviewed for
this report are not supervisors at this time but hope to be so in the future. These junior- and mid-
level employees feel that the Secret Service could do more to develop them as aspiring leaders.
The PMP recognized the same opportunity in 2014 when it found that “the [Secret Service] needs
to do a better job of identifying future leaders and preparing them for the role.” In 2016, employee
focus groups that participated in the Eagle Hill study reiterated the concern, stating “employees
across the organization pointed to a lack of leadership development to prepare future supervisors
for their roles.”
52
U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address
Protective Mission Panel Recommendations, May 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699267.pdf
53
Ibid.
48
The Secret Service views rotations to different offices and locations as leadership development.
While rotational assignments are certainly one element of development, rotations are often
considered part of a broader leadership development strategy. As the PMP noted– “exposure to
different functions is not the same as training them to lead. There are a variety of models that can
work. Some agencies administer their own mid-career executive training program; for example,
the FBI has put thousands of its managers through a Kellogg School of Management change-
management program. Others, like the military, have utilized career-ladder programs to identify
and grow leadership.”
The Secret Service is also in the process of developing a competency-based leadership
development program called Secret Service Leadership Development System (LEADS). A
component of this development is leadership coursework at American University. This leadership
development program is moving from the pilot phase to full implementation. Those who have
participated in the American University program cite it as a rewarding and worthwhile activity
but said that more should be done to develop the next generation of the Secret Service. The view
of the interviewees for this study is that leadership development should begin earlier in one’s
career, and certainly well before an employee takes their first GS-14 team leadership position. One
interviewee reported that the Secret Service is beginning to train GS-13 employees before taking
a GS-14 supervisory position, and that is a promising step in the right direction. There are
graduate-level programs available to employees, such as at the National Defense University, that
allow an employee to leave the Secret Service for graduate-level studies for one to two years.
Recommendations
5.1 Implement a more comprehensive leadership development program that
brings together Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE personnel, and APT
employees for courses, workshops, and career-broadening assignments.
Steps include:
• Developing a tracking and reporting mechanism to drive
implementation and measure success across employee groups.
• Ensuring training before an employee’s first supervisory assignment.
• Prioritizing helping leaders learn basic critical management skills,
such as communicating with and listening to employees, delegation,
employee recognition, and team building.
5.2 Develop and implement an Agency-wide policy with associated directives,
guidance, and communications about career paths and the promotion
process, including the ability to switch career paths. Steps include:
• Detailing competencies personnel must demonstrate and the
experiences they must seek out in order to continue their professional
growth within Secret Service.
• Communicating broadly the career paths for Special Agents, UD
Officers, and APT employees.
49
• Providing opportunities for employees to switch career paths with
some ease in order to retain employees rather than losing them.
5.3 Review senior executive positions to ensure that as many as possible are open
to full competition from as many employee categories as possible. Steps
include:
• Communicating to eligible candidates the desire to put in place the
most experienced and qualified leaders, whatever employee status,
while highlighting that the positions are not now “reserved” if a
candidate from a different position fills the vacant senior position.
50
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51
Chapter 6: Professionalism and Business Operations
One of the most consistent themes during interviews was the way that the Agency’s mission
support organizations directly contribute to engagement, emerging as a key driver that enables
core elements, like employee development and staffing levels. Interviewees indicated that these
operations are working more smoothly than at any point in recent history. Support in the areas of
human resources, acquisition, finance, and IT has increased substantially in the years since the
PMP and the Academy 2016 report. There are still issues among mission support functions, but
the Agency continues to examine ways to perform critical support functions faster, better, more
efficiently, and affordably.
This chapter outlines some of the Agency’s key initiatives to ensure there is a professional
leadership cadre that understands management and can address specific functional issues
impacting the Secret Service. It also addresses some of the challenges in the acquisition, human
resources, and IT functions that provide critical support across the Agency. The chapter looks at
the efforts to create a culture of responsive and effective customer service, as well as one focused
on process improvement.
Professionalized, Balanced Leadership
The placement of expert, longtime managers and professionals into mission support offices has
reaped great benefits to the Agency. More than five years ago, the Secret Service created the
position of the COO to oversee key management and administrative functions, like acquisition,
IT, human resources, and finance. Previously, this position did not exist, leaving the Deputy
Director, traditionally a Special Agent, to oversee these mission support functional components
with all their unique rulesets, issues, and standards. The Director and Deputy Director now can
focus more closely on law enforcement, protection, and investigation-related mission matters.
After the COO was established, the Agency took action to fill senior administrative leadership
positions with professionals who had deep backgrounds within their respective functional areas.
Using experienced mission support leaders with a clear understanding of how the Secret Service
operates along with a detailed understanding of technical matters, the Agency now takes a more
strategic approach to mission support, ensuring a close tie between these activities and its larger
goals. Similarly, the Agency is better able to manage crises and resolve issues.
Members of the workforce interviewed in the course of this study mentioned how the placement
of professionals as office heads in human resources, finance, and IT has helped the Agency run
more smoothly and efficiently. There are many values a professional leader brings, starting with
continuity. An experienced professional can stay in a position for many years while Special Agents
tend to move to new positions relatively quickly as they move up in the ranks. The model the
Secret Service uses allows it to have professional leaders with organizational continuity while also
providing Special Agents rotational assignment to obtain a broad understanding of the mission
support programs. In addition to providing a leader who is not rotating frequently, a professional
is viewed as more experienced in shaping the organization, directing an office to meet strategic
goals, enhancing performance, and resolving inevitable issues and conflicts.
52
Interviewees noted that the most effective mission support organizations at the Secret Service
have found a way to ensure leadership receives advice and guidance from Special Agents and UD
Officers. These Special Agents and UD Officers provide an understanding of how policies will work
when put in place, as well as explaining to others why certain rules and practices are or are not
put in place. A dynamic synergy exists when professionals rely on operational advisors and vice
versa. The opposite dynamic can also arise. Organizations that have not included sufficient Special
Agents or UD Officers in mission support divisions can, at best, be seen as somewhat disconnected
and, at worst, not caring and “anti-Agent” and/or “anti-Officer.”
The establishment of an ERB allows the Secret Service to engage its senior leaders in large-scale
management decisions. The ERB is the senior decision-making council on management matters.
Board members are leaders of key operational entities throughout the Service, such as the Chief
Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer (CIO), and CHCO. While most ERB members are
voting members, some are on in a limited capacity, such as the Communications Director.
Members belonging to the latter group do not participate in the weekly meetings.
Each week, the ERB convenes to discuss the most pressing matters, budget allocations,
performance, and alternatives to address problems. The ERB is vital to the smooth functioning of
the Agency, according to the discussions with the directors and office heads interviewed during
this study.
Despite the positive role of the ERB, it is not codified in Agency mission directives beyond the
specification of membership.
54
There is not a broader policy description of the ERB, though some
of the subordinate level boards or committees in the Agency have responsibilities and
membership specified. Similarly, the COO position is not defined in Secret Service policy or
mission directive. Several policies refer to the COO, including delegations of authorities, orders
of succession, and budget process directives, as well as the job description used for the position.
A position of such importance for the smooth-functioning and success of the Agency is typically
codified in the Agency’s internal directives. The danger in not codifying this important position
and management boards or committees is that new Agency leadership may eliminate these critical
positions, boards, and committees. Institutionalizing professional leadership and management
structures provide stability and continuity to agencies in the long term.
Acquisition Improvements
Acquisition, how the Secret Service goes about obtaining the goods and services necessary to carry
out its mission, emerged as an area of significant concern and interest among all the employee
groups encountered during the Academy’s work. The acquisition process in the Secret Service has
faced dramatic changes; the functions were transferred from the OCFO and split into three
54
The Government Accountability Office, in a broader study on information technology, has noted for the
Secret Service that the ERB does not have a codified charter. GAO, “Information Technology Investment
Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity,” GAO-04-394G, Mar 1, 2004,
Washington, D.C. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Secret Service – Action Needed to Address
Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices,” GAO-19-60, November 2018, Washington,
D.C. p. 27.
53
different divisions to improve the processes and outcomes that have a direct positive impact on
Agency employees. As these changes occurred, the way the new divisions have faced process
integration, change management, and employee engagement made a major difference in the
success of these programs.
The Secret Service’s Enterprise Readiness Office (ERO) is home to Secret Service’s two
operational divisions responsible for acquisitions and procurements:
1) Procurement Division is responsible for procuring goods and services on behalf of the
Secret Service.
2) Administrative Operations Division (AOD) is responsible for maintaining Secret Service’s
government leases on field offices, vehicles, etc.
Both divisions have a direct impact on the morale of Secret Service employees because the
workforce relies on ERO to provide the support and equipment Special Agents, UD Officers, and
APT employees need to do their jobs. Employees interviewed throughout the study said that the
Agency’s performance in this mission support function has noticeably improved in the past
several years, and the story is particularly informative. ERO improved employee morale and
engagement by refocusing on the Agency’s mission and demonstrating to employees the direct
impact acquisitions and procurements have on that mission.
The Procurement Division and AOD were previously located in the OCFO. The Academy’s 2016
report found that having both divisions within OCFO “could be diverting attention away from the
attainment of strategic goals for budget and financial management.” It went on to recommend
that the Secret Service “conduct an organizational assessment of the OCFO,” with particular
emphasis on “evaluating the placement of the Acquisition Executive, Procurement Division, and
Administrative Operations.” The Secret Service conducted an organizational assessment of these
three functions and found that both the Procurement Division and the AOD were not meeting the
required performance levels. Recognizing that the performance of both divisions has a direct
impact on the morale of the Secret Service, leadership at the time decided to remove both the AOD
and the Procurement Division from the OCFO and placed them in what is now ERO.
ERO is led by a Deputy Assistant Director (DAD). Upon reorganizing both divisions into ERO, the
DAD noticed that the workforce felt disconnected from the Secret Service mission. One of the
leading reasons for this, according to interviews, was the removal of operational voices,
particularly Special Agents, from the office itself. In response, the DAD appointed a Deputy
Special Agent-in-Charge (DSAIC) to each of the divisions. One of the DSAICs brought experience
in hiring and helped expedite the onboarding process. That DSAIC is now working to improve
retention incentives as well as hiring bonuses for new employees. ERO also implemented telework
and flexible work schedules (before COVID-19) to provide employees with more flexibility and to
improve employee engagement and morale.
The DAD communicates more frequently with employees through all-hands meetings. In doing
so, the DAD draws attention to the impact of the work of employees within ERO and the mission.
An example of this is when ERO made a significant armored vehicle purchase. The DAD took the
team to see the vehicles the office worked hard to procure. The DAD is also working to expose
54
employees to unique opportunities such as traveling on a protective assignment to better connect
them with the mission.
The third organization involved in acquisition program management is the Office of Strategic
Planning and Policy (OSP). The Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) function, including
liaison with DHS, was transferred from the OCFO to OSP to better align strategic acquisition and
program reviews with both the planning and financial programing functions. This merger has
anecdotally led to improved program management and communication between the multiple
organizations involved with long term, systemic improvements in lines of business and
operations.
Activities that connect employees to the mission have an outsized impact on the morale of the
workforce, and it shows in their performance as well. Interviews with ERB members indicate that
ERO has greatly improved customer service, especially in the field. It also shows improvement in
the FEVS scores of the AOD.
55
In one year, the AOD saw a 37 percent jump in the FEVS Leadership
Index, improving from 30 percent satisfaction in 2018 to 67 percent satisfaction in 2019. The AOD
also saw a significant one-year increase of 21 percent increase in the category of “openness,” and
a 29 percent increase in the category of “cooperative.” The office generally saw increases of
approximately 5 to 10 percent in all other reporting indexes within FEVS, except for a small (1 to
4 percent) backslide in a couple of indexes that were previously higher than average.
Customer Service and Business Process Improvement
Employees interviewed during the study mentioned that the Secret Service had made great strides
in two key areas of ongoing operations: creating a culture of internal customer service and
improving business processes. The two areas are closely related, as a heightened sense of
customer service—a desire to improve how key communities receive support—can lead to a desire
to improve day-to-day workings. A greater focus on business process improvement often leads to
customer service improvements, especially when stakeholders are closely involved, and the
changes are communicated throughout an organization. High-functioning organizations
incorporate a positive feedback loop fostering a more focused and engaged workforce.
The Secret Service has made strides in putting into place concrete improvements in customer
service, which is generally marked by several characteristics. First, an organization focused on
customer service will seek to eliminate the overlap, duplication, gaps, and seams that can slow
down actions, cutting through the silos that get in the way of good communication and eliminating
turf-wars that can get in the way of the experience of a supported partner. Second, a customer
55
Due to the newness of the office and a lack of employees to meet the reporting threshold (a minimum of
10 employees), the Procurement Division is not currently represented in the 2018 and 2019 Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey scores the study assessed.
55
service-oriented organization ensures that it has set standards and measures success against those
standards.
56
There are numerous processes that the Secret Service streamlined in recent years that improved
customer service and overall Agency performance. Offices within the Secret Service, for instance,
were maintaining paper copies for time and attendance records, which created storage issues,
limiting space available for adding additional staff to the office. TEC personnel believed that those
records would be audited. A staff member checked with the inspectors to ask whether paper
records were actually reviewed. Once it was confirmed that those records were not reviewed, the
office stopped collecting the paper time and attendance records and was able to reclaim the office
space when they removed the storage cabinets. In this example, the communication between the
auditor and executing office broke down the stovepipe, allowing TEC to take an action that
enhanced effectiveness and efficiency.
Similarly, travel reimbursement is a particularly sensitive area for Special Agents and those who
frequently travel to accomplish their mission assignments. The Secret Service reduced the time
for reimbursement from a matter of months to weeks upon document submission. Here, the
improvement came because of leaders focusing on the problem, reinforcing the need for quick
reimbursement, and applying the staffing necessary to expedite the process.
The Agency has also improved communication via computer networking software. In response to
communication issues during the work at home orders associated with COVID-19, the CIO quickly
put a new VPN in place to allow its workforce to work remotely. The Agency had long planned to
enhance this network, as the demand for telework opportunities was already increasing. OCIO
worked with stakeholders to understand and define requirements and develop an accompanying
plan. When the pandemic struck, Secret Service leaders collectively recognized that the Agency
did not have the capacity for every employee to work on the VPN network. Agency leadership
provided the funding, and the CIO was able to quickly procure a new system. The installation of
the new VPN demonstrated where problem identification and planning put the Agency in a
position to significantly enhance how it does business and support all aspects of the organization
when the resources are available.
While there has been significant attention to the processes associated with Special Agent hiring,
discussed extensively in Chapter 3, additional steps are necessary to expedite and improve the
professional and mission support processes.
Several interviewees expressed concerns about customer service in a specific high-profile
financial management area. Office directors have had difficulty tracking where they stand in
program budgets and expenditures. Congress often asks how much funding has been spent
against appropriations. Several interviewees said the Agency can be slow to respond to these
56
Partnership for Public Service, Colleagues as Customers: How Mission Support Services Can Improve
the Customer Experience,” August 2019, Washington, D.C. https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/Colleagues-as-Customers.pdf
56
inquires. The Secret Service acknowledges these delays, which the Agency attributes to changes
in the Financial Management reporting structure and supporting IT system.
57
Improving Information Technology Infrastructure
As shown by the significant business process improvement that arose from the installation of the
new VPN, IT is one of the most vital tools for employees to carry out their work. Whether Secret
Service employees have effective tools that are up-to-date affects productivity, motivation, and
outlook. Employees interviewed said the IT available for main functional areas involving Special
Agent activities, UD Officers’ operations, and key administrative functions are well supported and
generally updated. OCIO recently led the development of the EPS system and an Event Resources
Scheduling system, a data-sharing system with state and local law enforcement. OCIO maintains
a strategic plan and a technical roadmap that addresses the Agency’s direction. These discussions
and associated analyses revealed several areas where modernization impacts employee
engagement.
The first centers around how to maintain forward momentum on IT modernization, as more and
more services migrate to the cloud. There is a strong desire among various offices and divisions
within the Agency to leverage big data and access data visualization tools: these types of systems
are moving to the cloud or are currently cloud-based. The Agency must “section off” an area of the
cloud to meet its high-security needs. The experience of other security-oriented agencies like the
Department of Defense demonstrates that this migration can be considerably expensive and
burdensome.
The OCIO provides risk assessments and remediation recommendations to ensure directorates
securely operate in cloud environments. Several cloud initiatives are in various stages of
development and deployment, including HRConnect, Secret Service Hire, Microsoft Office 365,
PALMS, WebTA, and USA Performance, which is used by the entire Agency. The CIO follows the
security authorization process set forth by the DHS Risk Management Framework (RMF) as in
DHS 4300A and NIST guidelines. The Agency is striving to keep pace while maintaining its
security practices.
The Secret Service will have to determine whether moving to the cloud will provide the necessary
and appropriate return on investment. Decisions on cloud migration will ultimately turn on
questions of basic effectiveness and capability. The Agency requires consolidated databases to
have a complete picture of the Agency, and cloud vendors are often unable to provide complete
and accurate data sets.
The second IT area that can strongly affect employee engagement relates to accessing specialized
software. Several employees talked about delays in having specialized software packages installed.
This software may be commonly used in the private sector and other federal agencies but is not a
commonly used software across the Agency. The advanced statistical software program called
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, often referred to as SPSS, is an example. The stretched-
out timelines for installation mean that an employee simply may not be able to do his or her job,
57
Prior to publication, the Agency indicated that the reporting structure has largely stabilized and both
internal and external reporting is now timely.
57
which has a debilitating effect on whether the individual feels they are contributing to the mission.
The CIO reported that it approves a majority of requests for specialized software put forth through
its Enterprise Architecture Board (EARB), though it will deny requests when the requesting
directorate has failed to include the budgeted lifecycle sustainment costs. Individual directorates
must include funding for specialized software in the individual budgets, and some of the delays
employees experience come from the need to cobble together and wedge in the necessary funding.
The third IT area that impacts engagement involves whether the Agency develops software tools
“in-house” versus obtaining commercial off-the-shelf products (COTS). Employees interviewed
during the study said they believed that the Agency can be overly reliant on developing systems
internally versus adopting off-the-shelf systems that are readily available. That approach,
according to interviewees, can result in slower-to-develop, less cost-effective software tools.
The OCIO reports it follows established policies and procedures on COTS versus governmentally
developed systems, and it seeks to develop systems in the most timely, cost-effective manner.
While interviewees across the Agency had the impression that the vast majority of new software
was developed in-house, OCIO reports that 90 percent of software requests are COTS. The EARB
discusses software solutions and recommends if there should be a custom development or COTS
product. The OCIO stated in interviews that the office that will use the system, OCIO’s “customer,”
makes the ultimate decision pending product funding, security, and support capability, though
several of these customers interviewed during the study reported never receiving an option. OCIO
says that it balances specific customer needs, the capability of a potential COTS solution, and
budgeted resources in making recommendations. Several APT personnel in HUM interviewed
believed that the Secret Service Hire could take on several additional functions and processes, but
OCIO reports that the Agency opted against merging in merit promotion and applicant tracking
after a review of the purpose and capabilities.
The Secret Service experienced significant challenges procuring COTS software for one of its most
important areas – scheduling for Special Agents and UD Officers. The Agency indicated that it
originally attempted to develop the system with three different contracts over 5 years at a cost of
over $30 million. No usable product emerged. Those efforts involved implementing the best
scheduling products, including those used in such high-profile organizations such as DOD Special
Operations. After the third attempt, Secret Service OCIO developed a usable product in four
months that met the needs of the Agency, using only federal employees’ technical skills for no
additional cost.
The Panel notes that there are several areas of concern as the Agency decides whether to take the
“in-house” versus COTS solution. One is that there needs to be flexibility in adapting
organizational business processes to take advantage of the efficiencies and performance
improvements various software systems offer. When rigid processes and requirements are
demanded during development the provider-contractor must include additional functionality,
which adds time, cost, and complexity.
58
The other consideration is that OMB provided guidance in 2016, which can help an agency decide
whether existing software could be used rather than developing new software in-house.
58
The
OMB memorandum establishes three steps in determining the correct path of providing software
support:
1) Step one involves a strategic analysis and a formal analysis of alternatives. Each agency
must conduct research and analysis before initiating any technology acquisition or custom
code development.
2) Step two directs Agencies to consider existing commercial software solutions. If an
Agency’s analysis of alternatives concludes that existing Federal software solutions cannot
efficiently and effectively meet the needs of the Agency, the Agency must explore whether
its requirements can be satisfied with an appropriate commercially available solution.
3) Step three is pursued only after an Agency’s CIO concludes that an existing Federal
software solution or commercial solution cannot adequately satisfy its needs. At that point,
the Agency may consider procuring custom-developed code in whole or in conjunction
with existing Federal or commercial code.
Whether in the case of COTS versus organic software or specialized software or IT strategy in
general, there is a need for more communication on important decisions that impact employees’
day-to-day work. There is a disconnect between what employees perceive and what steps the
Agency is actually undertaking, according to the CIO. The misperceptions—employees not
understanding the larger strategic efforts and management not grasping the very real concerns
among employees—can have an all-too-real impact on the engagement, outlook, and productivity
of employees. The OCIO does not have an integrated communications plan and strategy to explain
IT process, modernization efforts, and equip division leaders and supervisors with the tools to
communicate with the force.
Recommendations
6.1 Codify the directives that define the role and mission of the COO and critical
mission support organizations to ensure the leadership of mission support
organizations by professionals is balanced with Agent-filled leadership roles,
such as deputy and branch-chief positions. Steps include:
• Defining the COO role in the Agency leadership hierarchy and
specifying in the implementation directive that this senior position will
continue to require substantial administrative experience.
• Creating an explicit directive for the ERB that spells out its
membership, roles, and responsibilities.
6.2 Develop and implement a customer-focused, internal strategic
communications campaign for the IT roadmap, including the modernization
strategy, key initiatives, and progress as well as information on the process
58
OMB Memorandum M-16-21, Federal Source Code Policy: Achieving Efficiency, Transparency, and
Innovation through Reusable and Open Source Software, August 8, 2016.
59
for employees to request IT tools and specialized software program. Steps
include:
• Acknowledging the key role of IT for employee engagement and
effectiveness.
• Encouraging working with customers so that, when appropriate,
rather than customizing COTS, encourage customers to change
business practices.
6.3 Assess the implementation of the Agency’s IT strategy to determine if it is
moving in a positive direction on modernization, address the use of
organically developed systems versus COTS, and improve customer service.
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Chapter 7: Culture of Inclusion and Communication
This chapter examines some of the more intangible and less quantifiable aspects of the Secret
Service workplace that are key drivers of employee engagement. These topics are challenging to
put in neat categories and describe in purely objective terms, but they are significant because they
motivate the workforce to carry out its mission. The Secret Service can put in place additional
streamlined business operations, concrete hiring plans, and new work-life balance initiatives, but
retaining employees will be a challenge if employee engagement and the workplace culture are
not prioritized. This chapter describes the workplace culture as reflected in the various interviews
and discussions. It looks at the Agency’s communication, the sense of teamwork that exists across
the Agency, the diversity of the workplace, and the Agency’s change management approach.
Mission Demands Drive Workplace Culture
As noted earlier, among all the Agency employees engaged during this study, there is a noticeable
dedication to the Agency’s mission. Interviewees recognize that the safety of the President and his
family ensures the basic workings of the country’s constitutional democracy. The importance of
the other aspect of the Secret Service’s mission, investigation of financial crimes, is also well-
understood. Almost every individual engaged during this study mentioned the overwhelming
need for confidence in the nation’s currency and the security of its money supply. Those who
would try to tamper or steal must be investigated and prosecuted. Almost all respondents from
the Agency responded affirmatively to the question in the 2019 FEVS scores that his or her work
is important. Similarly, the employees of the Secret Service roundly agree with the statement that
the Agency is successful in its mission. There is a recognition of the Agency’s important role in the
government and the country, as well as a basic pride in the organization, that is very similar to the
nation’s armed services.
Time and time again, interviewees described a culture of “doing more with less,” and the FEVS
scores in this area support that narrative. Secret Service employees score the Agency well below
other federal agencies overall in terms of resource sufficiency.
Operational demands steer the Secret Service’s organizational culture driving a wedge among the
various employee groups. There is a pervasive perception of strong divisions among the various
personnel– Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE and APT employees. These cleavages, which are so
deleterious to a highly functioning organization, have become noticeably better in recent years
with the professionalization of key support functions discussed in Chapter 6. As these
organizations continually improve in performance, personnel of all categories see the benefit.
Interviewees, throughout this study, had the sense that leadership is working on improving
employee engagement and morale but said they would like to see stronger affirmation that
leadership is actively working to address workplace climate and culture concerns. The Agency has
not disseminated a vision for its workplace culture, how that environment will specifically
enhance employee engagement, through such steps as developing the next generation of Secret
Service leaders in ways that improve teamwork among employee groups.
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Strategic Communications Impacting Organizational Culture
Secret Services employees are generally satisfied with
the communication they receive from the Director’s
front office, and, according to interviews and
engagements, there are opportunities to be heard by
upper-level leadership at the Secret Service.
Interviewees generally expressed appreciation for
what they perceive to be better and more frequent
communication by the top leadership in the Agency.
The Secret Service’s top leadership has made
improving communication to the workforce a priority,
and the results of these efforts are positive.
There is, however, a desire for increased internal
communication within divisions and offices. Offices
with leading engagement scores in the Secret Service
communicate frequently with their staff. They hold
regular all-hands meetings, host employee
recognition programs, and host social events
throughout the year. These types of events help build
an intra-division and intra-office culture that ideally
becomes more open and supportive of one another.
The pressure “to do more with less” often comes at the
expense of employee engagement meetings and
events. While there will inevitably be days and weeks
where the mission makes these events undoable, it
remains imperative that division and office leaders
prioritize making time for their division and office
teams to meet for events that contribute to a stronger
sense of engagement and workplace culture. The
challenges that division and office heads have in
communicating with their teams likely derive from a
lack of training and leadership development
opportunities (as discussed in Chapter 5) to learn
about best methods for connecting and motivating
teams, as well as essential management skills.
Now that the Secret Service has improved its top
leadership communication, the Communication and
Media Relations (CMR) office is looking to focus
efforts on improving intra-division and intra-office
communication. To do so, CMR says it will work with
divisions and offices to tailor their communications to
the workforce so that employees find value in their engagements with division and office heads.
OCFO is an Example of
an Organization
Undergoing Major
Change
The OCFO has undergone two
major operational changes in
recent history. Two divisions
within OCFO moved to the Office
of Enterprise Readiness, OCFO
transferred the Component
Acquisition Executive position
and staff to OSP, and OCFO
implemented a new financial
management system that
automated Secret Service manual
processes (including paper/fax
invoices) using modern tools and
systems intended at providing
more internal controls and rigor.
The implementation of a new
financial management system
began in 2012 and has continued
since then. Many employees had
several years, if not decades, of
experience with the old financial
management system. While the
new system brought with it many
efficiencies, it also brought a sense
of uneasiness among the
employees who were used to the
old system.
For more on OCFO organizational
challenges and recommendations,
see Chapter 9.
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This is a promising development, and it also shows an awareness that intra-division and intra-
office communication need to be improved.
An element of this effort includes improving “all-users” email blasts. Many offices, like HUM or
OCFO, send out notes to the entire workforce, creating a high volume of communication. The
Agency is working to tailor messages to ensure Agency-wide emails and communication are going
out when necessary. There have been intensive efforts to ensure greater coordination on
communication to ensure that, when an employee receives a note from headquarters, they will
know it is truly important and worth their valuable time amidst their many responsibilities. A best
practice followed by at least one other federal law enforcement agency, to send out very short
emails with topic items that are hyperlinked to a more detailed description of the item in the email.
That way employees who are not interested in the topic can disregard the hyperlink, avoiding the
need to read long narrative emails to search for topics they might be interested in reading.
Throughout the interview process, Special Agents and APT employees said that they appreciate
that the Secret Service leadership is providing various opportunities for employees to express
opinions and provide feedback and suggestions for improving employee engagement and
satisfaction. Employees generally said they could provide candid and open feedback, however,
some long-term employees said they would never raise an issue in an open forum based on their
experience in the Agency. The Agency continues to use SPARK!, an online forum designed to allow
employees to bring issues to the fore and to offer suggestions for operational improvements.
Employees can review, comment, and “vote” on ideas. Once there is discussion or comments at a
certain level, leadership must address those issues.
However, the appeal of SPARK! seems to be wearing off, and interviewees said that SPARK! Is
now used as a tool for forcing leadership to answer rumor mill questions as opposed to SPARK!’s
original intention as an innovation tool. Rumors can arise within any organization and on a range
of sensitive subjects: such as pay and benefits, assignments, or promotions - all items that are
important to employees. These rumors create distraction and uncertainty, and the Agency has
found it essential to be able to tackle misunderstandings and misconceptions. To return SPARK!
to its original intention, the Secret Service is considering deploying another online forum called
the Watercooler designed to quickly bat down rumors and set the record straight.
Recommendation
7.1 Implement a “SPARK! 2.0” with an enhanced appearance and end-user
experience to address outstanding concerns regarding its utility.
Evolving Change Management Approach
In efforts to improve operations, organizations typically reorganize and realign functions or
reporting structures, which as a by-product, can disrupt the day-to-day rhythms of the workforce.
Change management is vital to reap the benefit and goals that the redesign was set up to achieve
and to ensure that the workforce can contribute and succeed in the new arrangement. In recent
years the Secret Service has instituted several significant office reorganizations, and the
interviews revealed mixed success in the Agency’s change management efforts.
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For example, HUM embarked on several functional changes, including the creation of a division,
called Human Resources Business Solutions (HBS), and the shifting of management of Secret
Service Hire to TAD. These organizational changes were designed to enhance oversight over the
various human resources IT systems and explore potential consolidations of systems and
organizational efficiencies.
In conducting numerous engagements with federal agencies, the Academy has identified best
practices for change management, based on extensive research on organizational transformation
in the public and private sectors. Key change management success indicators include:
1) Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.
2) Establish a clear vision and integrated strategic transformation goals.
3) Design the organizational structure that will enable the vision.
4) Create a sense of urgency, implement a timeline, and show progress from day one.
5) Communicate frequently throughout multiple channels to multiple stakeholders.
6) Dedicate a powerful implementation guidance team to manage the transformation
process.
7) Engage employees to seek their improvement ideas, build momentum, and gain
ownership and transformation.
8) Sustain the effort by nurturing a new culture, rewarding risk, and measuring progress.
The PMP called on the Secret Service to commit itself to transformative and continuous change.
The Academy’s 2016 study reiterated that need and found a few important pieces that were
already in play, including the establishment of OSP and the development of a “Strategic Outlook
2016-2026” that looks to synchronize personnel, technology, and other resources to meet
tomorrow’s needs. In May of 2018, the Secret Service issued its 2018-2022 strategic plan and is
working on the release of a new human capital strategic plan.
What is missing, however, is a more tactical change management plan that is integrated with the
Secret Service’s strategic management documents. The Secret Service’s change management
strategy does not include an emphasis on division- and office-level results, often called “unit-level
health and performance.” In 2018, an Academy Panel released a report on strengthening unit-
level health and performance and provided three strategic components to doing so:
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1) Strengthen unit-level health and performance. Start by using existing data, such
as the EEI derived from the annual government-wide FEVS, to assess and diagnose the
state of unit-level organizational health and performance. These survey data are available
to 28,000 work units across the government. Expand and refine analyses over time to
include the use of other data sources, such as operational and mission support
performance data.
2) Create a learning-based approach to improving results. To act on these
assessments, create a learning-based approach (rather than a directive approach) to
59
National Academy of Public Administration, Strengthening Organizational Health and Performance in
Government, January 2018,
https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Strengthening_Organizational_Health_and_Performance_in_Gove
rnment.pdf
65
improve organizational capacity and performance in agencies by engaging organizational
units to develop with employee input their own individually tailored plans for
improvement. The specific elements would be defined within each major mission area.
The strategy may cross the program and agency boundaries. Plans would be peer-
reviewed.
3) Employ the power of data analytics to manage. To sustain the learning-based
approach, help managers make effective use of a flood of new data relevant to their
operations by giving them tools to access, analyze, and apply those data, as well as the
skills to manage in this new data-rich environment. Encourage the creation of
communities of practice where managers can learn from each other’s experiences well as
from more formal training opportunities.
Recommendation
7.2 Adopt an integrated strategic management approach applying a rigorous
management strategy, which was a key recommendation in the Academy’s
2016 report for the Agency.
Acknowledge Contributions and Build Office Cohesion
Along with the ability to grow as a professional, whether upward assuming new responsibilities
or laterally broadening one’s knowledge through acquiring new skills and experiences, employees
of highly functioning, engaged federal organizations want to be recognized for their work and
know they are contributing to a larger team.
Employee recognition and team cohesion at the Secret Service emerged as inconsistent and
something of a patchwork based on interviews and analysis. Some offices make it a priority to
have special orientation sessions for their division, regular office gatherings, and other special
events. Often these gatherings provide an opportunity to announce awards, formal recognitions,
or more informal “employee-of-the quarter” type awards. Offices that face especially significant
personnel shortages tend to have a more difficult time gathering for recognition purposes.
The Agency’s exit surveys indicate that departing employees often cite the lack of recognition as a
reason for leaving. The lack of an effective awards program can accelerate the departures and have
the effect of throwing oil on the fire of the Agency’s attrition challenges. Even small changes that
reduce recognition and team gatherings can elicit negative feelings among employees. Employees
repeatedly mentioned instances when no holiday gathering occurred or when a plaque that
recognizes achievement and real contribution had not been updated in years.
Diversity and Inclusion as a Pillar of Secret Service’s
Organizational Culture
Ensuring an environment of diversity and inclusion is one of the most important pillars of
organizational success. When each member of the organization feels valued and possesses a sense
of belonging, offices function at a higher level in several ways, from bringing multiple perspectives
66
and views to complicated problems to ensuring the organization more closely reflects the larger
society. Diversity and inclusion improve organizational performance.
60
Secret Service employees expressed the view that the organization performs satisfactorily but does
not excel in creating a diverse workforce. The Agency FEVS scores closely mirror government-
wide averages on the question of whether the Agency has the policies and approach to build
diversity. The interviews for this study revealed concern but did not outweigh the staffing, work-
life, development, and communication issues already discussed.
Matters of unconscious bias and structural barriers to the advancement of minorities did arise in
discussions, as the country was in the midst of protests over the killing of George Floyd and the
Agency was assisting in the federal response. The Agency’s Director, in partnership with his entire
leadership team, held an informative agency-wide virtual town hall meeting with the workforce
to address current issues impacting law enforcement, African Americans, and other people of
color communities. This virtual town hall meeting about racial justice and equal opportunity
occurred in the weeks following the first nationwide protests.
Shortly thereafter, the Office of Equity and Employee Support Services (EES) formed an internal
Social Injustice and Race Relations Working Group (SIRRWG), developed a “Facilitator’s Guide
to Courageous Conversations,” and conducted sixteen 90-minute facilitator-led virtual
discussions between the period of July–August 2020. EES also partnered with the Chief of UD to
host a Guest Speaker from the National War College and conducted ten small (in-person) group
discussions for the UD workforce to share their experiences and perspectives on the topics of
social injustice and race relations. In those sessions and during several notable interviews during
this study, several individuals expressed their appreciation for the Agency offering opportunities
for these discussions. Many employees shared that their participation led to breakthroughs
regarding their understanding of the issues that are the driving concerns of people of color.
Ensuring that the Secret Service is ethnically diverse and with a balance of male and female
employees is a challenge. Men make up most of the employees at 76 percent of the Agency with
women comprising 24 percent. Males hold most top leadership posts, representing almost 75
percent of these positions, while women comprise 25 percent, basically reflecting the larger
workforce average. In terms of ethnicity, almost eight percent of the Agency’s employees are
Hispanic, 18 percent Black, three percent Asian, and 70 percent White. At the Senior Executive
Service (SES) and Senior Leader (SL) level, 73.4 percent are White, 18.5 percent are Black, 6.3
percent are Hispanic, and 1.6 percent are Asian.
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The Agency takes very seriously its responsibilities under a 2017 consent decree that minimizes
the potential for discrimination in the Special Agent promotion process, including providing
greater visibility for the Executive of the Office of Equity and Employee Support Services who also
60
There is a breadth of literature on the importance of diversity and inclusion to organization
performance. The Academy’s report for the CDC, Action Plan to Achieve a Diverse Workforce, describes
some of the benefits of a diverse workforce:
https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/05ActionPlanAchieveDiverseWorkforce.pdf
61
U.S. Secret Service, MD-715 Equal Employment Opportunity Program Status Report, FY 2019
67
serves as the Agency’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. This position reports directly
to both the Secret Service’s Director and Deputy Director.
Senior leaders remain very concerned about ensuring greater representation at the higher grade
levels. The Agency is monitoring the participation of women and minorities in key developmental
courses and programs, completion of which can be a critical requirement for promotion to the
senior ranks. As described in a 2017 GAO report on the status of equal employment within
agencies of DHS, the Secret Service regularly conducts barrier analyses to track advancement
across race, ethnicities, and gender. The Agency reviews such data as hiring in mission-critical
career areas compared against relevant benchmarks. The Agency has intensified its quarterly
tracking of ethnicity, race, and gender data, as well as tracking the net changes, in hires,
resignations, and retirements. The Secret Service is exploring the expansion of its diversity
recruiting efforts.
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In 2018, the EES office launched the Inclusion, Diversity, Engagement in
Action (IDEA) – New Inclusion Quotient (IQ) training course. The course offers a new approach
to diversity training where facilitators use interactive exercises to reinforce how diversity can be
used to increase performance by capitalizing on differences to solve complex problems. The skills
taught in this course, according to the Agency, highlight how each employee is not only
empowered to “create” – but “sustain” a more inclusive, diverse, and engaged workplace.
The Agency would benefit from even more support for the collective recognition that every person
and position adds value. When those who support the Special Agents or UD Officers on the “front
lines” feel valued, the quality and character of that support will only improve. When the
environment feels more inclusive, recruitment and retention will be enhanced, and the Agency
will be able to bring in and retain even higher quality groups of dedicated, sacrificing public
servants.
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Government Accountability Office, Report 19-573, “Equal Employment Opportunity”, July 2019, Page
18-19.
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Chapter 8: Uniformed Division
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the second phase of the review of Secret Service employee engagement
focused on UD. Phase 2 used the same methodology as the first phase, interviewing in discussion
groups and one-on-one sessions more than 125 Division members from each branch, reviewing a
wide range of UD policies, directives, and internal analyses of issues like staffing levels, attrition,
scheduling, pay, and retirement data. The review also looked at past reports on the Secret Service
and federal law enforcement best practices by the Academy, Eagle Hill, PMP, and GAO, among
others. The UD was welcoming and eager to share information when requested. The UD staff was
readily available for interviews, successfully managing the difficulties of remote interaction due
to the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the second phase. All interactions were virtual through
phone calls and video-teleconference engagements.
The Uniformed Division (UD or the Division), established in 1922 as the White House Police with
only 33 Officers, provides physical security and protection for U.S. Secret Service protectees. The
facilities the UD protects include the White House and nearby Treasury Department, the Naval
Observatory (Vice President’s Residence), and Foreign Diplomatic Missions, primarily in
Washington, DC. The Division’s four branches largely correspond with these sites, supplemented
by SOD that provides unique capabilities like counterassault, countersniper, K-9, and chemical
protection.
The UD is responsible for a variety of duties at these facilities, including access control, vehicle
patrols, foot patrols, bicycle patrols, and magnetometer operations. The nearly-1700 Officers of
the Division have enforcement authorities for Federal and Washington, D.C., law among other
responsibilities necessary to keep the facilities and venues housing the nation’s highest leadership
safe and secure. The Division’s Officers also have important security responsibilities when the
President or other protectees travel for public events, assisting in key physical security operations.
Like their Special Agent counterparts, UD employees can spend a significant amount of time on
the road performing their security and protection duties.
A high-quality, well-trained, ready workforce is key to ensuring the highest quality of security and
protection for high-profile facilities. The Division requires strict qualifications for candidates
applying for positions. To qualify, an applicant must be a U.S. citizen, high school diploma or
equivalent, be between the age of 20 and 37 at the time of appointment, pass a written exam, be
in excellent health and physical condition, and pass a polygraph interview. Once hired, Officers
must graduate from the 12-week program at FLETC and the 14-week program at the Agency’s
training center, RTC, where they are taught protective techniques relevant to their specific
mission.
Overall Observation
The UD carries out one of the many difficult aspects of the Secret Service’s mission – physical
protection of high-profile facilities and venues. They understand and believe in the importance of
this mission. The prestige of working at the White House and a strong compensation package adds
to the attraction of the Division. Yet, for the bulk of its Officers responsible for the main protective
mission, the work, with long, repetitive hours, has become a grind. Many Officers encountered in
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this study face burnout. The workforce is working considerable overtime, at times involuntarily,
due to staffing level shortfalls and attrition. In FY 2020 this was compounded by the requirements
to adjust schedules to have a Ready Reserve to decrease COVID contagion, staff a Civil
Disturbance Unit for summer demonstrations, and the additional activities of an election year.
As Figure 7 shows, the average Officer worked 537.83 hours of overtime in FY 2020, which equals
about 3 months and a week of additional work hours in a calendar year. Due to the cost of living
in the Washington, D.C. area, many Officers face long commutes with little time at home before
returning to post, sometimes involuntarily as they are called back to work. Employees use
compensatory (comp) time and take sick leave to avoid forced overtime and to guarantee time off,
which has the domino effect of causing another Officer to involuntarily lose a day off and be forced
to work overtime.
Figure 6: Uniformed Division Overtime Hours (Source: National Academy of Public
Administration analysis of Uniformed Division overtime data)
Note: Only Officers, Officer Technicians, Sergeants, Sergeant Technicians, and Lieutenants are eligible for overtime.
Staffing shortages ripple across other aspects of employees’ tasks and responsibilities, from taking
away training opportunities, to preventing a closer relationship with peers and mentoring with
supervisors. Officer attrition takes the form of departures to different non-UD positions within
the Secret Service, other federal law enforcement agencies, or outside the federal service
altogether. Attrition fluctuates but remains high and steady, placing additional demands on the
already understaffed Division. Overall, job satisfaction and employee engagement as reflected in
the interviews and surveys is low, and the current level of focus, commitment, and drive put the
Division at a concerning level of risk.
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This situation is structural, neither tied to an administration nor the demands of the election cycle.
The Agency’s workforce planning shows the necessary level of manpower, given an average level
of effort and the number of days off that can be provided. The Division’s staffing levels are
significantly below the required numbers. The impact that plays out in the day-to-day lives of
Officers, Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains is what the models, discussed below, would
predict: significant overtime, canceled weekends, and days off. Employee engagement issues,
while most pronounced at the White House Branch, exists in all the other branches, including the
SOD.
The Secret Service has been aggressively tackling job satisfaction among UD Officers, adding
substantial personnel to its ranks over the past half-decade, standing up training offices within
each branch, and stepping up communications and outreach through rollcalls, along with several
other measures. Other initiatives include enhancements to the Officer merit promotion process
and allowing UD Officers to participate in senior level training, such as the SES Candidate
Development Program and military War Colleges.
The Panel believes that there are additional short-term steps UD can take to mitigate some of the
most immediate issues and address some of the relentless pressure many Officers face.
Regardless, the risk level will remain significant until either additional staff members are hired
and trained to fill posts, mission demands are reduced, or the way the Division conducts its
mission changes.
Staffing Level Requirements
Issues relative to staffing the Division with ready and trained individuals carrying out the mission
day-to-day—dominated the concerns of UD Officers. The view among Officers, especially at the
White House Branch but also among the other branches, is that the sheer number of staff is not
adequate to cover the mission requirements without requiring a significant, and unsustainable,
level of overtime. The other overarching staffing concern is instability that results from staffing
level shortages and how constant and uncontrolled overtime leads to high attrition levels and a
constant influx of new, inexperienced personnel. The Secret Service faces remarkable challenges
in determining staffing requirements, given the unpredictability of its missions.
An Officer Shortage
An examination of the Secret Service staffing requirements models reveals that UD is facing a
built-in personnel shortage. These models, developed by the manpower experts within the
Division, OSP, and HUM, were validated through several budget cycles and carefully scrutinized
by DHS and Congress. The models account for the staff to cover shifts, fill full-time administration
positions, and travel, while also accounting for training, sick leave, compensatory time, and
annual leave. With the force working at a law enforcement standard 8-hour shift, 1967 Officers
would be required.
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To cover those same needs at 8-hour shifts, while relying on overtime work
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That level of staffing would allow the Division to sustain a “fourth shift,” as recommended by the PMP
and reinforced by the 2016 Academy study. A fourth shift provides a reserve force who are ready to travel,
train, and conduct preparedness and response exercises. This shift would rotate every two weeks. After a
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that would essentially eliminate a day off for each Officer every two weeks, requires 1,733
personnel. The UD, as well as the entire Agency leadership, would like the workforce to receive all
of their days off. However, given staffing constraints, leadership agrees that working one day off
every two weeks is an acceptable necessity when spread workforce-wide, providing some
downtime and home-life to Officers, as well as overtime pay that many value.
For FY 2021, UD is funded at 1,698 personnel. Complicating the situation is the actual staffing as
of March 15, 2021, UD has almost 1,651 Officers, almost 50 below the budgeted number and 80
short of the staffing level goal to ensure Officers receive at least three of four days off every two
weeks. The Secret Service budget anticipates a considerable amount of overtime, taking more than
one day off from each Officer every two weeks.
As a result, the workforce is working significant overtime. On average, each member of UD is
losing one day off a week, a 50 percent Working Day Off (WDO) level, to use the Secret Service
parlance. The workforce in total worked 993,498 hours of voluntary and involuntary overtime in
FY 2020.
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As discussed in more detail below, a policy on earning compensatory time for the extra
hours worked, which allows Officers to guarantee days off, exacerbates the situation, forcing
Officers to work additional shifts to cover for those Officers taking their compensatory time.
The Agency has acknowledged this situation and has worked to increase staffing levels, adding
more than 300 Officers over the past five fiscal years, ending in FY 2020. The FY 2022 budget, if
approved by Congress, includes funding, to increase funded personnel to close to the 1733 number
allowing for a 25 percent WDO, giving Officers on average at least three days off every two weeks.
The long-term Human Capital Strategic Plan hiring goal for FY 2027 is 1,797 Officers. At that
level, a considerable portion of the workforce will still be working overtime on their days off five
years from now. UD faces real personnel shortages for the workforce for the foreseeable future
under its current plans.
The Secret Service has been focused on accelerated hiring to fill vacancies and deal with these
shortages. The Agency, as highlighted in earlier chapters, faces several internal and external hiring
challenges. Internal challenges include the stretched hiring timelines, along with the competing
need to increase hiring for Special Agents that can often draw on the same HUM and INV
personnel. External challenges to accelerated hiring center primarily around the competition for
candidates from other law enforcement agencies and the broader economy. Jobs within UD are
especially comparable to positions within the National Park Police and the Capitol Hill Police, the
latter of which is likely to undertake a hiring surge after January 6
th
.
fourth shift is completed, the group would rotate back into the operational schedule count and a new
group would rotate into the fourth shift. Officers would know when their fourth shift detail would be
scheduled in advance, and the Officer could plan not to take annual leave. The fourth shift, according to
the PMP, allows Officers to train, remove the reliance of travel protection on the operational manpower,
and reduces overtime hours.
64
UD Overtime and Compensatory Time, FY 2018-2020
73
Attrition and Turbulence
In addition to the overall shortage of personnel that leaves the Division often scrambling to fill
shifts, the other central characteristic of UD’s staffing situation is the constant influx and outflow
of personnel, which is so notable that Division’s leadership has named it, “The Churn.” UD
personnel interviewed said that the impacts of attrition, largely driven from overtime, have several
negative effects on morale and retention for those remaining in the workforce. The effects include
weak cohesion within the branches as so many Officers come and go, a widespread view that the
branch is purely a stepping-stone for other opportunities, which in turn makes those looking to
stay for a long-term career with the Secret Service feel abnormal.
The Division has experienced significant turnover. Over five years, from FY 2015 to FY 2020, 1220
UD personnel left the Division with 1495 new Officers hired, a positive balance that reflects the
Agency’s vigorous hiring efforts (see Figure 8). Turnover rates average more than 10 percent of
the workforce per year with 11.27 percent leaving in 2019 and 11.24 percent in 2018, 10.9 percent
in 2017, and 11.17 percent in 2016. As the current shortfall of 50 Officers indicates, the Agency has
struggled to keep up pace with the employee departures.
Figure 7: Uniformed Division Officer Hires and Losses
Source: National Academy of Public Administration analysis of Secret Service data
The levels of attrition seen in UD are similar to those faced at other law enforcement
organizations. A certain amount of the Division’s attrition is built into the Division’s basic
structure, its mission, and how it is situated within the Secret Service. Many individuals become
Officers in the Division to position themselves to become Special Agents. Each year, Officers apply
to the program described in Chapter 5 that brings over Officers to Agents in an expedited fashion.
Last year, the Agency received more than 200 transfer applications. The number of candidates
210
136
21
35
130
151
309
259
356
309
111
168
103
59
95
107
167
213
214
266
208
152
42
33
(38)
(60)
23
(16)
96
45
90
101
(41)
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020
FULL TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE)
Uniformed Division Officer Hires and Losses
FY 2010-FY 2020
Total Hires Total Losses +/-
74
selected depends on what Agency leaders, including the UD Chief, deem appropriate given the
overall staffing situation. Those Officers not selected or who must wait, sometimes over many
years, to transfer will look for opportunities elsewhere, given their goal to become a Special Agent.
Another built-in contributor to attrition is the special credentials (security clearances, high-profile
experience) Officers gain through their UD experience. Officers are very attracted to other law
enforcement agencies and security firms inside and outside of government.
High UD attrition levels have a significant negative impact on the Agency, including negatively
impacting readiness because the force has not received the training and gained the experience to
appropriately respond to various scenarios. The readiness concerns are of particular importance
given the strict requirements that must be enforced to protect the President, Vice President, and
other key protectees. The high attrition also creates significant turbulence. As described earlier,
hiring can take so long that the departures create gaps contributing to the staffing level shortages
thus driving significant overtime. Due to constant attrition and subsequent hiring, UD staffing
levels and demographics are constantly changing. Overall experience levels have also declined, as
more experienced Officers have departed, and newly hired individuals require significant training
and seasoning. Secret Service figures indicate that 31 percent of line UD Officers have less than
three years of experience, and 62 percent have less than five years of experience.
Turnover, with experience-level and readiness consequences, remains a strong concern of Agency
and Division leadership. The UD Chief and the Chief’s staff conduct intensive interviews with
departing personnel to understand the specific reasons for departures. Understanding the
concerns of the workforce continues to be a focus of rollcalls and discussions, as the Leadership
tries to monitor operations and keep a pulse on what the workforce is thinking. The Agency also
analyzes the departures at a macro-level, which shows work-life balance is one of the most
important elements of retaining Officers.
The factors that the Agency is scrutinizing and that are driving trained personnel to leave UD—
work-life balance, compensation, room for career growth, and leadership development
opportunities—are the focus of the remainder of this chapter, as they are closely related to
employee engagement, morale, and outlook.
Unpredictable Mission Demands
UD has a challenging, often unpredictable, mission that drives its workforce staffing
requirements, making it extremely challenging to determine its force structure requirements.
Fluctuating threat levels at protection sites and unpredictable travel requirements create ever-
changing, difficult-to-forecast needs. Threats continue to grow and take different shapes, creating
pressure to ask the Division to do more.
Operational demands on the Division have grown more complex. The protests in May and June
of 2020 have underscored the importance of monitoring and engagement outside the boundaries
of the White House. Those events, as well as the January 6
th
event at the Capitol, have underscored
the importance of the capability to respond to civil disturbances.
The Secret Service periodically reviews the number of security posts and patrol beats (e.g., static,
walking, bicycle, vehicle) in and around all of the protective facilities. The number of posts is
75
dependent on leadership, technology, and a careful analysis of risk acceptance versus avoidance.
It has also been reviewed by a third party. An anecdotal comment made by Officers is that posts
have only increased over the past decade.
The PMP recommended the Secret Service “engage other federal agencies to evaluate the threats
that the agency faces and its ways of doing business.”
65
It went on to say that such an outside
perspective could help Secret Service identify new technologies, training, best practices, and to
“test assumptions that might be shared within an organization but are, in fact, contestable.”
66
The
2016 Eagle Hill report recommended Secret Service “redesign the security plan for Uniformed
Division posts using a risk-based approach to determine the appropriate number and location of
posts,” because UD Officers in focus groups suggested that the additional posts added after
reactions to specific incidents “created additional workload without any justification as to the
security need for the posts.”
67
UD Officers consistently made similar statements in discussion
groups for this project.
New approaches to UD operations and how it carries out its mission might allow the Division to
provide the same level of protection and capability with fewer staff and resources in the long term.
The Secret Service says it does not have a great deal of flexibility in carrying the physical security
mission at the White House, Naval Observatory, or Foreign Missions with anything other than a
substantial presence of federal Officers or employees of some kind. The Agency has not
contemplated private contractors like some other federal national security agencies, due to the
inherently governmental nature of its mission.
Similarly, new surveillance and other technologies might allow the Division to focus its personnel
on fewer posts and critical areas of vulnerability. The completion of the new fence around the
White House is a notable example of how new technologies have the potential to save staff levels.
TEC continues to explore new technologies to supplement security, but the Agency reports that
no technology has emerged that can fully substitute or replace a trained Officer who can put his
or her eyes on a situation and immediately respond to a threat.
Many UD personnel at all levels suggested that a larger merger across the Agency with UD as an
initial point of entry and first assignment would create significant manpower efficiencies. Under
this approach, service in UD, particularly the White House Branch, would be the initial
assignment for all operational personnel, moving along from there to such career tracks as Special
Agent, UD Officer, or TLE. This single-point-of-entry arrangement would prevent the Secret
Service from competing with itself from a narrow talent pool, provide a baseline experience for
operational personnel, and prevent the pressure to deplete personnel from one part of the Secret
Service to make another one healthier. The approach would, on paper, lead to streamlined
administrative processes and policies, instead of having a separate set for UD and Special Agents.
65
United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, Report from the United States Secret Service
Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2014
66
Ibid.
67
Eagle Hill Consulting, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment, p. 194-195,
2016.
76
The number of administrative personnel to manage these processes might be substantially less.
Interviewees cited the success of the manpower model of the U.S. Marshals Service, which
requires all its operational personnel to first serve assignments in the courts before moving to its
nationwide field offices. The Secret Service has not explored the idea of this type of operational
consolidation and specifically has not identified the costs and benefits relative to staffing levels
and, more importantly, basic capability.
Recommendations
8.1 Pursue a Grow, Stabilize, and Develop Strategy for UD that reduces forced
overtime, gives downtime back to employees, provides more predictable
schedules, increases training, boosts developmental opportunities, opens up
more paths to a fulfilling career in the branch, and restores staffing. Steps
include:
• Developing and implementing an employee wellness vision and
action plan that includes the input of Officers and key stakeholders
and requires ongoing communication that includes.
• Communicating with measurable near-, mid-, and long-term goals
and accomplishments.
8.2 Plan for and execute the hiring surge for the Division, in the short term, to
reach the 1797-Officer level included in the Human Capital Plan within three
years. Steps include:
• Working with DHS and Congress to secure approval for the
increase, along with the necessary funding.
• Increasing capacity within HUM and INV to expand recruiting,
accommodate additional background checks, and speed-up hiring
through organizational changes (exploration of a single office for
Special Agent and Officer hiring), personnel details (additional UD
personnel staffing HUM), and process improvements (additional
ELACs and shortening time associated with hiring actions).
8.3 Conduct periodic third-party reviews of posts, perimeter security, and wider
operations, including travel, to ensure appropriate staffing levels, address
the impact of additional staffing requirements, operational intensity, and
force-stress of these arrangements. Steps include:
• Using technology, whenever possible, to reduce the number and
location of posts, which could benefit UD operations.
8.4 Conduct a study, in the long term, that delineates the basic characteristics
and authorities of contract and federal law enforcement Officers, while
working with TEC to explore how technology can enhance UD’s mission
execution.
77
8.5 Study the option of restructuring Officer and Special Agent recruiting into a
single point of entry along with dual and separate career paths for those
remaining in UD and movement to Special Agents positions.
Work-Life Balance
Lack of work-life balance—the inability to have downtime outside of work and the sometimes
monotonous nature of the work itself—contributes substantially to low employee engagement at
UD and its high attrition. Position vacancies, widespread use of compensatory time, a high volume
of Officers on sick leave contribute to the personnel shortages that are driving so much forced
overtime, taking personnel away from families, outside pursuits, rest, and recovery. The Division
has struggled to find an optimal schedule to mitigate the personnel shortages as fairly and openly
as possible.
A Crisis in UD Work-Life Balance
Interviewees described the inherent challenges of the day-to-day responsibilities of a UD Officer,
particularly one at the White House. Officers stand post for long shifts or walk patrols, of course,
always at a heightened state of awareness. The work can become repetitive at best, monotonous
at worst. “This is a very tough and hard job” was a refrain in this review’s many discussions, as
Officer described what it is like to come to work, day after day, week after week.
The additional overtime to carry out these difficult tasks contributes to the sense that UD work is
relentless and grinding. In this situation, Officers may work with different groups of Officers and
there is often little consistency amongst teammates with whom an Officer might staff a post or
walk a patrol. Officers can go many days and sometimes weeks without interacting with their
supervisors. Because staffing level shortages have become the norm and cynicism is pervasive,
there is a sense that some Officers believe that the situation is not going to get better and despite
what anyone at any level says about steps to fix the situation, nothing will change. Interviewees
said that cynicism is often fueled by Officers near retirement embittered by the lack of career
progression. Officers said during interviews that they are exhausted, frustrated, and unable to
perform their best on the job.
The overtime that leads to the involuntary loss of so many weekends and days off for Officers
means that UD personnel do not have the quality home life they need to balance against a very
difficult job. The more than 900,000 hours of overtime that the workforce accrues means that
Officers are on average losing two days off every two weeks, the equivalent of every other weekend.
Officers have difficulty committing their availability to loved ones to attend evening outings and
events, or day trips and visits due to the likely loss of days off. Officers report that notices of losing
days off for work come with little or no advance notice, e.g., the prior evening.
The lack of work-life balance led several Officers to mention in interviews that they were searching
for opportunities outside the Division, whether within the Secret Service as a Special Agent, with
another federal law enforcement agency, or outside of the government altogether. Several Officers
mentioned that the work is so interesting and important, and the benefits and compensation
relatively strong, that they thought when they joined UD that this part of the Secret Service would
78
make up their whole career. The inability to spend time with family and engage in outside
activities other than commuting, eating, showering, and sleeping has forced a change of thinking.
Based on interviewees, the UD branch with the greatest concern is the White House Branch.
Unexpected protective travel primarily pulls from White House Branch personnel. Officers from
the Naval Observatory and the RTC, as well as Special Operations, believe they have a better work-
life balance because they have more manpower and flexibility to balance schedules.
Compensatory Time Off and Sick Days
While interviewees attributed the work-life concerns primarily to staffing levels, several Division
policies exacerbate the situation. To guarantee downtime, Officers use their accrued
compensatory time to guarantee they get the desired days off. Under UD policy, UD personnel
can accumulate compensatory time and use it without it counting against their yearly maximum
of 160 hours. Some individuals accumulate as many as 500 hours of compensatory time in a single
year by working overtime but capturing it as compensatory time, then using that compensatory
time and repeating the process because the 160-hour cap does not have a time limit, like per year.
In a practice known as “Earn and Burn,” Officers use the compensatory time as they earn it or as
they get closer to the 160-hour cap. UD personnel said that the widespread use of compensatory
time forces other personnel to work overtime to fill that gap, adding to the staffing shortages.
Many officers feel they have no choice but to earn and use compensatory time to ensure time with
their families. A similar dynamic plays out when it comes to sick leave. While the thought among
UD leaders is that most of those Officers calling in sick are genuinely ill, there are cases where sick
leave is being used to take days off.
UD leadership has identified the issues caused by compensatory time accrual and use and they
are developing policies to help alleviate the stress on the workforce. The Division has developed
an initiative to ensure compensatory time is used within 26 pay periods, reduce the maximum
hours of compensatory time from 160 to 120, and eliminate the ability to “earn and burn” with
time used counting against the yearly total of 120 hours. The Division will have to secure funding
for compensatory time accumulated outside of the 26 pay period time frame. UD personnel who
currently have compensatory time accumulated from outside this time frame will be compensated
for that time as soon as the policy is implemented.
68
Scheduling System
In addition to compensatory time use and the need to cover shift requirements, there is a view
among many Officers that the scheduling system can either serve as an accelerant to the fire the
68
There is very little in current literature about the advantages and disadvantages of using compensatory
time off. In a paper produced by the International Personnel Management Association on compensatory
time off, the author notes, that employers should know compensatory time carries certain disadvantages.
Since it is additional leave that an employee will take, it can be challenging to balance service to the
customer or depending on the work, safety, and security. The International Public Management
Association for Human Resources, Compensatory Time Overview, Amy Phillips, https://www.ipma-
hr.org/docs/default-source/public-docs/importdocuments/pdf/hrcenter/compensatory-time/cpr-comp-
phillips.
79
staffing level shortages have created or can mitigate and alleviate the worst effects. The scheduling
system—the arrangement of shift lengths, size, and distribution, along with the associated IT
system—is the interface between an Officer and the rippling effect of personnel shortages and
attrition.
The Division takes a decentralized approach towards scheduling with each branch within UD
scheduling their personnel independently and sometimes differently. According to UD Officers
and their supervisors, the ideal shift length is 8-hours.
69
The response to COVID-19 forced several
branches to move to a Ready Reserve week schedule with Officers working 12-hour shifts for 7
days while remaining ready to be called in for a shift but otherwise at home another 7-days. The
White House Branch, with its more than 500 personnel, is so large that it had to revert to 8-hour
shifts as the response to the pandemic evolved.
Interviewees had mixed thoughts on their preferences of 12-hours vs. 8-hour shifts. Many
interviewees favored 12-hour shifts because it allows an increase in days off per pay period, despite
frequently being forced to work on their days off due to the lack of manpower.
70
Other interviewees
favored 8-hour shifts because the 12-hour shifts are strenuous, employee productivity suffers, and
fatigue sets in at the end of a 12-hour shift. A National Police Foundation Study funded by the
Department of Justice concluded that 10-hour shifts are optimal because the “shifts resulted in
significantly more sleep by officers (approximately 30 minutes more per 24-hour period),
significantly reduced overtime, and increased quality of work life.”
71
UD has not explored a 10-
hour shift schedule. There are benefits to 12-hour shifts, like an increase in the number of days off
and reduced overtime; however, the National Police Foundation found that Officers
“demonstrated significantly more sleepiness…[and a] small to moderate sized effect of alertness”
during 12-hour shift lengths.
72
The Division is considering implementing a new 12 hour-shift for the White House Branch to
provide guaranteed days off for its Officers. Given the mixed views of these longer shifts,
leadership is concerned about how well the branch can sustain such long days over many weeks.
The associated risks of fatigue are seen as acceptable given the lack of days off and the
consequences for engagement. The Division plans to test out the new 12-hour shift for a period of
69
“The [Protective Mission Panel] recognizes that law enforcement officers regularly work overtime, and
the average UD officer has always worked more than a regular 40-hour week. Research of law
enforcement agencies shows that offices working four ten-hour shifts per week show measurable drops in
alertness. But even if the current workload is consistent with historical or other norms, the Panel’s
fundamental concern remains: The current workload for UD results in the complete and unacceptable
elimination of training.” United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, Report from the United
States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel to the Secretary of Homeland Security, December 2014
70
Some Officers worked the maximum allowed overtime hours during the 7 days working, which would
almost guarantee that they would not be called in during their 7 days as a ready reserve.
71
National Police Foundation, The Shift Length Experiment, December 2011,
https://www.policefoundation.org/projects-old/the-shift-length-experiment/
72
Ibid.
80
a month, though such a short test might not be sufficient time for branch members to get into the
rhythm of the new schedule and understand its benefits and downsides.
As discussed in Chapter 6, despite UD’s extensive efforts through commercial providers to develop
a software system to manage its schedule, the Division, as of 2021, uses the EPS scheduling system
that was developed in-house by the OCIO. EPS allows UD personnel to know their schedule,
assigned shifts, and any issues resulting in last-minute changes to their shift. EPS allows
personnel to sign-up for events, travel details, and training opportunities. Additionally, EPS has
a leave request feature that allows the Assignments and Scheduling Office (ASO) to plan in
advance of someone taking leave.
While the EPS scheduling system has many useful features, the system does not have a shift swap
function. If, for example, two Officers want to swap shifts, they will go directly to ASO without the
approval of their supervisor. In interviews, UD personnel suggested it would be a beneficial
feature to include a shift swapping function in EPS that sends out a requested shift change to the
force. A shift swapping feature would allow Officers who do not want to take leave to assume
another Officer’s shift in exchange for theirs. Officers would need to be cross-trained on the
branch they wish to swap with. RTC training instructors typically work overtime shifts at other
branches because they have the training experience to do so.
Supplemental Federal Law Enforcement Assistance
One additional alternative to mitigate the worst effects of staffing level shortages is to provide the
Division with temporary duty assignments. The Secret Service has put new Phase I Special Agents
through UD White House posts for two-week rotations to familiarize themselves with the grounds,
the mission of the Division, and the Agency as a whole. The Special Agent personnel filling those
shifts makes a real difference in providing real relief, according to several Officers interviewed in
the course of the project. The Secret Service could also explore formal assistance from other DHS
law enforcement agencies. The Agency has not explored this alternative, though other federal law
enforcement agencies, with which they constantly coordinate, face similar staffing challenges.
Recommendations
8.6 Develop and implement a new approach and policy for UD that limits the
accrual and use of compensatory time. Steps include:
• Implementing the policy to reduce compensatory time from 160 to 120
hours during a calendar year, eliminating “earn and burn,” and
evaluating the reduction’s impact on UD.
• Promulgating associated directives and communications.
• Exploring alternatives to further reduce the use of compensatory time.
8.7 Implement the UD pilot 12-hour schedule at the White House and stand-up
an internal working group to closely monitor employee’s preferences
compared to their previous 8-hour shifts. Steps include:
81
• Conducting the pilot for at least 3 months to allow participants to
adjust and settle into the new schedule.
• Assessing the results of the pilot and reporting them to UD
leadership.
73
8.8 Conduct a third-party assessment, in the long term, of shift length and
provide recommendations on appropriate shift schedules for UD and its
branches.
8.9 Develop a shift-swapping function to be embedded in the EPS system that
allows Officers to send a requested shift swap to the entire UD workforce.
Steps include:
• Clarifying UD policy to only permit shifts to be swapped between
branches if the personnel have been trained or have experience at the
other’s respective branch.
Compensation
Officers of the Division expressed general overall satisfaction with pay and compensation. The
consensus during the many panel interviews was that the core set of pay and benefits, including
the basic retirement under FERS, was fair and adequate. Officers said that they work so much
overtime that pay is not a major issue when it comes to job satisfaction, engagement, or decisions
about whether to stay or leave the Division. HUM’s analysis of exit surveys in 2019 showed, like
other workforce categories highlighted in Chapter 4, that programs like the childcare subsidy or
tuition assistance played less a significant role in retention than staffing levels and work-life
balance continuation decisions.
Officers underscored, however, that the continual efforts to improve benefits through such
initiatives as the UD Group Incentive Program demonstrates the Agency’s commitment to their
well-being and to providing support to an overworked force. All Secret Service technicians receive
6% additional pay. The Secret Service is pursuing authority from Congress to increase from 6%
to 10% Technician Pay for specialized teams that require additional training and periodic
certifications. Technicians within SOD said this pay would be beneficial, and there is strong
interest in its approval.
Leadership Development, Career Pathing, and Training
A theme that arose in nearly every discussion group with Officers was the need for better
leadership development, career pathing, and training. Officers in UD are not satisfied in these
73
Prior to publication, the USSS adopted this recommendation and conducted the pilot. The results are
being assessed.
82
three areas, and the concerns are not new; they were identified in 2016 in an Eagle Hill review
entitled, United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment.
74
As highlighted in Chapter 5, the RAND study Police Recruitment and Retention for the New
Millennium, identifies career growth, training, and leadership as key concerns that drive
engagement, attrition, and organizational health. Discussion groups with UD Officers confirm
that these organizational characteristics are important influencers of employee engagement and
morale.
75
There is also an important nexus between employee engagement and first-line
supervisory support and competency. The RAND study found “the relationship that immediate
and midlevel supervisors have with their employees often has the most influence on an Officer’s
decision to stay or leave a department.”
76
In the 2019 FEVS, UD scored particularly low on two questions: (1) “I am given a real opportunity
to improve my skills in my organization,” and (2) “How satisfied are you with the training you
receive for your present job.” Organizational breakout scores within the Uniformed Division
indicate that training is a problem area within UD, especially within the countersniper Unit of the
SOD (see Table 2). The Uniformed Division also scores poorly in the EEI on Leadership, while the
EEI scores on Supervisors are satisfactory (see Table 3).
Table 2. FEVS Results on Skills and Training
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Question #1: “I am
given a real opportunity to improve my skills in my
organization.”
Positive
Response
Neutral
Response
Negative
Response
Uniformed Division
49%
18%
33%
• Naval Observatory Branch
44%
19%
37%
• Foreign Missions Branch
47%
42%
11%
• Canine (K9) Unit
50%
30%
20%
• Countersniper Unit
12%
21%
66%
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Question #68:
“How satisfied are you with the training you receive for
your present job?
Positive
Response
Neutral
Response
Negative
Response
Uniformed Division
31%
23%
46%
• Naval Observatory Branch
27%
15%
57%
• Foreign Missions Branch
22%
58%
20%
• Canine (K9) Unit
27%
30%
43%
• Countersniper Unit
7%
32%
60%
74
Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium, RAND Corporation, 2010,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf
75
Ibid.
76
RAND Corporation, 2010, Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium: The State of
Knowledge, p. 41,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.pdf
83
Source: Data from the 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey.
Note 1: The color green represents a desirable score, and red represents a less desirable score.
Note 2: The White House data is missing from this (or these) table (s) due to a sampling error of data collected from
Special Agents and UD Officers, along with a very low rate of participation, which precludes using this data as
representative of UD Officer opinions in the White House branch.
Table 3. Employee Engagement Index Scores
Leaders Lead
(Q53, Q54, Q56, Q60, Q61)
Leaders Lead
Index Score
Supervisors
(Q47, Q48, Q49, Q51, Q52)
Supervisors
Index Score
Uniformed Division
41%
Uniformed Division
71%
• Naval Observatory
Branch
36%
• Naval Observatory Branch
66%
• Foreign Missions
Branch
32%
• Foreign Missions Branch
83%
• Canine (K9) Unit
36%
• Canine (K9) Unit
69%
• Countersniper Unit
27%
• Countersniper Unit
58%
Source: Data from the 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey
Note 1: The color green represents a desirable score, and orange represents a less desirable score.
Note 2: The White House data is missing from this (or these) table (s) due to a sampling error of data collected from
Special Agents and UD Officers, along with a very low rate of participation, which precludes using this data as
representative of UD Officer opinions in the White House branch.
Leadership Development
As demonstrated in the FEVS scores in Table 3 and confirmed through discussion groups, Officers
do not believe they are adequately prepared to become leaders in the Division. The UD leadership
acknowledges these concerns. The Division has implemented two promising leadership
development programs but notes that more remains to be done to expedite and institutionalize a
curriculum for all ranks.
Within the past year, the UD implemented a Field Training Officer (FTO) program and a Sergeant
Training course to improve first-line supervisor training and readiness. The FTO and Sergeant
Training courses are a step in the right direction in many Officers’ views. However, Officers at all
ranks and experience levels agree that more leadership training is needed. Currently, Officers who
are promoted receive notice of their promotion and new assignment one pay period in advance of
the promotion and reassignment date. Newly promoted Officers are often moved to new branches
to broaden their experience and are left to reach out to their new branch informally to familiarize
themselves.
The Field Training Officer (FTO) program is, in some ways, equivalent to the rank of corporal in
the military. A FTO is an Officer with a couple of years of experience who is considered exemplary,
serving as a role model for Officers within their Branch. The Sergeant training course is still in
development. The course’s intended purpose is to prepare Sergeants using real-world scenarios
prior to promotion. Participants spend half of their training in the classroom, and half drilling
scenarios discussed during the classroom session. These scenario-based exercises can include
use-of-force situations, de-escalation tactics, and magnetometer scenarios. The training also
84
includes activities related to their day-to-day work, such as refreshers on administrative
paperwork and arrest processes.
The FTO program is in the early stages of implementation, so the role and authority of FTOs are
becoming more familiar to others. During discussion groups, Officers were aware of Field
Training Officers, but the purpose of FTOs was not clear to them. Some discussion groups
included FTOs who appreciate being selected to be among the first cohort, but those same Officers
said that they need more direction on what they should be doing in their new role.
The Sergeant training course is still in development, and the primary limitation is classroom
availability. Secret Service is having a challenging time reserving classroom space that can
accommodate the scenario-based training at RTC. Discussion groups with RTC employees
confirmed that not only is the classroom and scenario-based training space limited, but there is
the added complexity of available instructors to conduct classroom and scenario-based learning.
The goal is to have the Sergeant training course ready at the beginning of 2022.
Given mission demands, the UD is not able to create a leadership development curriculum
themselves, nor is it their sole responsibility to do so. Chapter 5 highlighted the need for the Secret
Service to implement a comprehensive leadership development program that brings together
Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE, and APT employees for courses, workshops, and career-
broadening assignments, develop a tracking and reporting mechanism for the leadership
development program, and establish metrics to help Secret Service leadership drive the
implementation and measure success across employee groups. Under this model, leadership
development begins the day an Officer stands their first post.
Career Pathing
Like other employee groups, UD Officers would like a more structured career path. UD offers
Officers a variety of opportunities and experiences through its three branches, each with different
facility security requirements, all of which are supported by the SOD. Officers experience various
security-related assignments (static post, foot beats, bicycle patrol, and vehicle patrol) at all three
branches. Officers have many specialty opportunities they may experience throughout their
careers. They could join the K-9 unit, the Emergency Response Team, the hazardous materials
response team (HAMMER Team), countersniper team, crime scene search unit, motorcycle
support unit, specialized rifle unit, protective intelligence team, training instructors (firearms,
mission, protective driving), classroom instructors at the RTC and FLETC, countersurveillance
team, polygrapher operations, and magnetometer operations. These opportunities are built-in
retention incentives as Officers seek new experiences over the course of their career, and the Chief
recognizes this and places a priority on moving Officers to new branches.
However, some assignments are more desirable than others, and Officers know this. Protection
assignments at the White House Branch are exacting as Officers must be on guard and ready to
intervene at a moment’s notice. This requires that Officers remain alert throughout the entirety
of their shift. The White House Branch is also UD’s largest branch (over 500 Officers), meaning
that Officers sometimes feel “lost” among all the Officers in the Branch. An Officer can work
through multiple shifts at the White House Branch without seeing their immediate supervisor.
Officers are not asked to chart out the experiences and positions they hope to have over the course
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of their career at UD. This contributes to the sense of being “lost” or “forgotten” within the
Division. During discussion groups, some Officers said that their colleagues lose track of their
long-term goals and begin considering opportunities outside of the Secret Service that more
immediately align with their career interests.
UD has not asked Officers to develop a career progression plan. Such a plan would chart out the
experiences Officers would like over the course of their career with supervisors talking to their
Officers about their career progression plan. To make the plans relevant, Officers would be asked
to update their career progression often as they find new areas of career interest. Doing so would
provide Officers with a vision for their career, reminding Officers of the many opportunities they
have within UD.
A longer-term goal would be temporarily rotating Officers into their desired next posting to learn
more about the Branch or Division. This sort of activity can help an Officer better understand the
position and inform their career progression plan. It would also inform the training an Officer
receives, and when they receive it. For example, some Officers might indicate that the Officer
Technician role is their desired next promotional assignment, as opposed to Sergeant. Both
require fundamentally different training courses.
Peer-to-Peer Mentoring
Both newer Officers and higher-ranking Officers mentioned in interviews that a mentorship
program that pairs Officers with more experienced peers would be beneficial. This is especially
true of newer Officers who feel that they are left without a peer mentor they can speak with
regarding day-to-day challenges and for broader perspective and guidance. For newer Officers,
their Sergeant (who is their direct supervisor) might not work on the same shift. Even if the
Sergeant works on the same shift as the newer Officer, the span of control becomes an issue as
Sergeants typically have many Officers under their command.
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Although FTOs serve as mentors
in each shift, higher-ranking Officers agreed that younger Officers could benefit from a peer
mentorship program, adding that higher-ranking Officers could also benefit from such a program.
Discussion groups with Officers of similar rank revealed that Officers are collegial and willing to
talk candidly about challenges they face at UD. Discussions at all ranks were constructive,
realistic, and demonstrated that Officers generally get along with their peers. One of the concepts
that came up at all ranks is the desire for a peer-to-peer mentoring program. Peer mentoring, as
defined by OPM, “is usually a relationship with an individual within the same grade, organization,
and/or job series. The purpose of peer mentoring is to support colleagues in their professional
development and growth, to facilitate mutual learning, and to build a sense of community. Peer
mentoring is not hierarchical, prescriptive, judgmental or evaluative.”
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For example, at the White House branch there is an average ratio of 1 Sergeant: 17 Officers.
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U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Best Practices: Mentoring, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/training-and-development/career-development/bestpractices-mentoring.pdf
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Training Coordination
Most Officers who participated in the discussion groups do not believe they are provided the
proper level of training to accomplish their jobs, and the FEVS scores in Table 2 support the
assertion.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Secret Service lacks the ability to collect and analyze training data to
ensure that Officers are training for no less than 10 percent of their work hours. In 2019, GAO was
tasked with assessing the Secret Service’s progress responding to the recommendations of the
PMP. GAO found that “Secret Service does not have a documented process for collecting complete
and appropriate UD training data that the Agency can use to determine whether Officers trained
for 10 percent of their work hours.”
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Officers frequently highlighted several training issues during discussion groups. They feel that
their training is not pertinent to their day-to-day duties, and they do not feel they are given enough
time to train. They want a more actionable curriculum of on-the-job training, recertification
training, training to introduce new skills to Officers, and training to refresh perishable skills.
Interviewees said that coordination between instructors at RTC, FTOs, and TNG employees
dedicated to each branch could improve UD’s training curriculum. Secret Service has three top-
level training instructor groups within UD, all of whom are highly motivated and engaged Officers
and employees. The three groups are the instructors at Secret Service’s RTC, located 20 miles
from the White House, the FTOs who can assist in day-to-day training matters while on duty, and
the Secret Service Office of TNG employs points of contact for each UD branch to assist each
Branch with training.
The three training groups (RTC Instructors, FTOs, and TNG-embedded branch training office)
serve as a foundation that can be built upon, and better coordination between the three could be
a quick win for improving employee satisfaction with the training staff receive. Currently,
communication between all three training groups is limited. There is no coordinating body or
meeting time for all three to discuss training needs and opportunities. For the most part, each
training group exists within its own silo, working on what each group believes is needed within
the Branch or at RTC.
Recommendations
8.10 Provide newly promoted UD Officers early notification of their promotion (at
least two pay periods) before the promotion takes place. Steps include:
• Connecting newly promoted UD Officers with their new branch and
provide the Officer time to shadow their incumbent.
• Prioritizing classroom space for the Sergeant training program and
expedite its implementation to the extent possible.
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U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address
Protective Mission Panel Recommendations, May 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699267.pdf
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8.11 Ask UD Officers to develop a career progression plan early in their service
and encourage supervisors to talk frequently to their Officers about career
progression plans. Steps include:
• Asking Officers to update their career progression plans as they find
new areas of career interest.
• Rotating Officers into their desired next posting to learn more
about the Branch or Division.
• Using career progression plans to inform necessary training.
8.12 Implement a peer mentoring program, beginning with newly trained
Officers, to help work through day-to-day challenges and to provide broader
perspective and guidance. If successful, expand the program to all Officers at
all ranks.
8.13 Charter a training committee that connects RTC Instructors with TNG-
embedded training employees and FTOs at all three branches of the UD.
Communications
As addressed earlier under Strategic Communications, UD Officers appreciate the efforts taken
by the Secret Service to provide open communication channels. UD Officers are interested in
finding out what is planned for UD and the Agency with communication flowing up and down the
chain of command. Officers, like their Special Agent, APT, or TLE counterparts, desire increased
internal communications. There are multiple specific issues regarding communications that
surfaced through interviews with UD Officers.
Vision and Policy Changes
Interviewees expressed a desire to better understand the long-term outlook for the Division and
how it fits within the strategic direction of the Secret Service. Interviewees repeatedly commented
on receiving only occasional glimpses of the big picture for the organization and the milestones
and goals toward which the Division is driving as a group. The lack of vision can sometimes lead
to inconsistency in decision-making. A new Deputy Chief, for example, can take command of a
branch and initiate a new set of priorities, which may disrupt ongoing work within their
command. Employees would like to see a plan for where the UD is going, as well as consistency
and momentum in moving forward even through the inevitable leadership changes. The Division
has not promulgated a larger message about the importance of UD work, how the mission is likely
to evolve, and the steps necessary to get there. The effect is that some Officers do not feel the
Division is “selling” the positive qualities and attributes of the work to help Officers contextualize
all the daily challenges they face.
Officers would similarly like more clear and consistent communications on new policies, program
changes, or initiatives. Division leadership frequently engages Officers at all ranks to discuss
major topic areas through roll-calls and branch visits. These engagements present the opportunity
for back-and-forth discussion. However, the study team was told that such engagements can be
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inconsistent. One initiative can be rolled out with several emails and follow-on conversations,
while another can emerge without a deliberative rollout and no explanation of the rationale for
the change. When it comes to communications on policies and initiatives, there is a possibility of
a breakdown where Officers feel that most of the information they receive is from other Officers
informally relaying information they heard, while UD supervisors and leadership feel
communications are more clear, timely, and informative.
Soliciting Feedback
Several mid-level supervisors attributed the potential for communications disconnects to
inconsistency in tapping into the regular chain of command to disseminate information and solicit
feedback. Sergeants, Lieutenants, and above said that regular chain-of-command is not a path for
raising issues and suggesting improvements, as there is often a lack of receptivity or follow-up.
Officers and supervisors expressed concern about the means and methods for the force to provide
ideas on how to improve operations. Officers are reluctant to use SPARK! to present their ideas
because they cannot submit anonymous suggestions and comments. There is some fear of
retribution and ridicule, so SPARK! is not used frequently when an Officer has a suggestion or is
trying to clarify policy or procedure.
Survey Utilization
Surveys are an important communications tool; the results of which are used to help drive policy
and process direction. The response rate from the Division to the 2019 FEVS, one of the most
important surveys to measure employee engagement and professional work climate, was low. The
response rate divided by operational staff (i.e., not including Officers in training) is broken down
in the following table. With the limited number of respondents, there may not be enough
responses to legitimately apply them to the totality of UD to form impressions of employee
satisfaction and morale unless the results are paired with other data gathering methods, such as
interviews.
Table 4. FEVS Response Rate for UD
Division
Number of
Responses
Staff Level
Response Rate
UD Overall
164
1432
11.45%
NOB
32
139
23.03%
FMB
14
167
8.38%
K9 Unit
15
120*
12.5%
Countersniper
13
53*
24.52%
*Estimate based on UD manpower calculator
Note: The White House data is missing from this (or these) table (s) due to a sampling error of data collected from
Special Agents and UD Officers, along with a very low rate of participation, which precludes using this data as
representative of UD Officer opinions in the White House branch.
Before the release of this and any other surveys, consistent messaging must occur on the
importance of responding to surveys. Opportunities for Officers standing post to complete the
surveys would encourage and give insight into the feelings and responses of Officers on the topic
surveyed.
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Recommendations
8.14 Create and publish a Communications Plan for UD that provides guidance on
how to (1) distribute key information on decisions and policies and (2) invite
employee feedback and suggestions. Steps include:
• Formalizing how results from surveys and other tools for soliciting
feedback will be shared with UD Officers.
8.15 Review communication mechanisms in place for Officers, especially through
the chain of command.
Culture, Climate, and Professionalism
Members of UD work against the backdrop of how their efforts are perceived, valued, and
rewarded both within the Division, across the Agency, and beyond. Like other non-Special Agent
employees (e.g., APTs), there remains a sense among UD personnel that they are lesser and in
some ways subordinate to Special Agents. This view of a lingering “caste” system is more common
among more junior Officers who questioned in interviews whether they are seen as part of the
team. Several Officers said the divide is something akin to the differences between Officers and
Enlisted in the Military.
Senior leaders and higher-level supervisors believe the relationship and respect accorded to the
Division’s contributions has improved significantly in recent years with SAICs, senior
administrators, and other senior officials expressing the strongest support. That respect is hard-
earned, gained through the recognized contributions to achieving the mission. The Division’s
Officers are an integral part of the work with the Washington, DC Field Office of INV, while the
Agency’s training center uses a command structure that incorporates Officers and Special Agents.
Interviewees there said they enjoy a close working relationship with Special Agents. UD Sergeants
within some special teams oversee Special Agents, and, prior to the pandemic response, every
recently minted Special Agent was required to stand post with Officers at the White House.
Officers, however, believe that more can be done to build pride more generally across UD,
fostering the message that its members are part of a special and unique professional community,
carrying out a high-profile, unique mission. They see little esprit-de-corps occurring. Some
officers also do not feel that contributions and achievements are appropriately acknowledged and
rewarded. There are very few UD-centered employee recognition events, parties, and the like.
When events are hosted, they are often attended by higher ranks because Officers do not have the
time to attend.
Recommendation
8.16 Develop and promulgate a new Officer recognition program that describes
the range of awards available, along with specific criteria for UD Officers to
earn recognition.
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Unique Branch and Unit Issues
In the course of the Academy’s engagement with UD, several issues unique to particular branches
or teams arose.
K-9 Unit
A tactical group within the SOD, the K-9 unit is considered one of the most sought-after units in
the UD to work in according to interviewees. The K-9 unit has no formal policies for when an
Officer’s dog retires or passes away. Currently, the unit allows the Officer to stay on the K-9 team
for two weeks after their dog retires or passes away, then the Officer is rotated out of the team and
back into the core workforce. The Officer can then apply for the new position opening in K-9 but
must compete with other applicants within UD. Officers believe this re-application process is
futile as they will not be selected to allow others the opportunity to work within K-9.
While the practice of rotating Officers in and out of the K-9 unit helps create job opportunities for
other Officers and helps with retention within the Division, the practice has a downside. The unit
struggles to retain Officers with K-9 experience and institutional knowledge, as a new handler
brought in from the core workforce has no K-9 experience compared to the Officer they replace.
A new Officer must receive significantly more training than an Officer who recently lost their dog.
Foreign Mission Branch Vehicles
The Division maintains more than 500 vehicles in its fleet, including patrol cars, motorcycles,
special purpose, and cargo vehicles. The Division uses a General Service Administration lease
program for two-thirds of that fleet, which has led to the steady upgrade and replacement of much
of its fleet. The Secret Service is exploring pursuing the arrangement for the remainder of its
vehicles after it secures funding.
As the branch responsible for the protection of over 500 diplomatic locations in the Washington,
DC area, FMB especially relies on patrol vehicles. Branch interviewees spoke about the often-
deplorable state of vehicles and the impact on their quality of work. The computers within the
vehicles are out of date, the computer docking stations are broken, and floorboards are missing
among other issues according to interviewees. Some of the vehicle damage is beyond normal wear-
and-tear, inflicted by Officers during long watches, including cases of intentional damage. The
vehicles in the Branch operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which puts tremendous stress on
the vehicle not built to be operated in that capacity. Officers feel that they do not possess the
quality of equipment essential to effectively accomplish their job.
The Division relies on ongoing communications from the Branches on maintenance needs.
Administrative approval requirements, limited staffing within the fleet-management office, and
funding can create slowdowns in getting vehicles into the “shop” for repair.
Recommendations
8.17 Develop and promulgate a new K-9 policy that provides clear and transparent
criteria for when a K-9 Officer Technician can continue working within the K-
9 unit after a dog retires or passes away.
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8.18 Upgrade the state of the vehicle fleet within FMB and use accountability
procedures to ensure proper handling.
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Chapter 9: Individual Organizational Challenges
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC)
Overview
TEC is responsible for developing and conducting extensive scientific and technical support
programs, including the design, installation, and modification of technical security equipment
used for Secret Service mission applications. TEC is headquartered in Washington, D.C., but
embeds staff in field offices nationwide for a set number of years (typically five years), and
frequently deploys TEC staff nationally and internationally to assist with protective movements
and investigations. TEC is led by Secret Service’s CTO and has one division – Technical Security
Division (TSD), which itself is subdivided into multiple subdivisions and branches. TEC staff
includes Special Agents, PSS, TLE, Scientists, Engineers, and Program Managers (APT).
Observations
Employees within TEC are highly skilled, specialized, and well-trained. As such, recruiting and
hiring is a challenge because prospective TEC employees are in demand across government and
industry. A lengthy and detailed Secret Service hiring process results in TEC losing many
applicants over the months-long hiring and background clearance process. Because of this,
position vacancies present a continuous morale challenge for TEC because the shortages force
employees to travel more often, oftentimes on short notice, and with very limited ability to deny
or find replacements for travel because it is often considered mission essential. The CTO is aware
of this, talks to TEC employees frequently about these realities, and is working with HUM to fill
positions as quickly as feasible. However, the frequent travel and other mission requirements
limit the amount of time TEC spends developing employees through training and other
opportunities, and this limits TEC’s ability to carry out employee-centric events. Both are desired
by employee groups.
Additionally, TLE, PSS, and APT employees within TSD have limited promotion potential,
adversely affecting morale and tenure in TSD. The highest rank these employee groups can attain
is a supervisory GS-15 position within TSD. In addition to affecting morale, employees report that
they are more likely to leave TSD when they become retirement eligible due to the lack of vertical
movement potential. TLE, PSS, and APT employees representing various lengths of tenure are
discouraged by the limited prospects for vertical movement within TSD.
TSD has several subdivisions whose mission is to understand technology developments and
trends, as well as creating sensors and other technologies to counter threats and enhance
protective operations. The technologies these offices identify are often quickly put in place,
drawing on the staff to operate, support, and sustain these technologies for ongoing operations.
The pressure to make sure these new systems work and, directly supporting ongoing missions
requires office personnel to refocus themselves away from their primary responsibility of
understanding and tracking new technologies and trends that are coming across the horizon. The
2016 Academy report recommended that TEC create a separate organization or division to carry
out these research and development activities known in the Agency as technology forging.
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The TEC office employs PSS, a job series that the Agency is phasing out in favor of TLEs because
that category lends greater flexibility. In 2017, the decision was made to no longer hire PSS
positions, and to offer legacy PSS the opportunity to transition to a TLE position. The Agency
originally told PSS personnel that conversion to the new status was optional. Some PSS staff are
concerned about transitioning to TLE because the transition process requires multiple weeks of
training at FLETC and at RTC, both of which are especially difficult for some PSS who have served
at the Agency for decades and are therefore older in age. Subsequently, the Agency said that PSS
employees would have to decide to convert within a year. This contradictory messaging created
confusion among PSS personnel, leading to questions about whether there would be the ability to
move up in the organization and have broader opportunities. As of FY 2019, there were 181 TLE
positions, of which 150 are filled, and 63 PSS, per interviews.
TEC staff expressed concern about a policy that requires a return to headquarters after a five-year
assignment to the field. Family circumstances or concern about the higher costs of living in the
Washington Metropolitan Region have led to requests, often denied, for extensions. Several highly
experienced TEC experts have opted to switch to other agencies or leave federal service rather
than move back to Headquarters. The leadership of TEC explains the return-to-Washington, D.C.
policy is designed to bring seasoned, experienced individuals back to Headquarters, as well as
ensure Washington, D.C. personnel have the chance to live across the country and support Secret
Service activities in the field.
Delays in the procurement process hinder TEC’s ability to repair and field technologies in support
of the investigative and protection missions. According to interviewees, a lengthy and
unpredictable procurement process – with limited in-office advisory support – can cause
disruptive delays even when procuring rather simple parts for repairs to equipment. TSD’s field
employees are often left to individually engage in complex and time-consuming procurements.
Field staff also express a desire for increased procurement assistance.
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Recommendations
9.1 Prioritize and encourage leadership development training for TSD employees
and consider opening TSD leadership opportunities (some of which are
currently reserved only for Special Agents) to all employee groups within
TSD.
9.2 Prioritize hosting more regular employee-centric events, including employee
recognition programs, and social events, and implement a more robust
onboarding process to ensure that new employees feel like they are a part of
the TEC team beginning on day one.
9.3 Establish a separate research and development branch within TEC and
develop a TEC strategy and multi-year investment plan consistent with the
2016 Academy report.
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The Agency indicated employee engagement scores in TEC have improved in 2020. The individual
office FEVS 2020 information, including those for TEC, were not provided. See discussion on page 11.
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9.4 Reengage PSS personnel, develop a new conversion policy, and clearly
articulate that policy, addressing questions and concerns during
implementation.
9.5 Communicate the rationale for the move-back-to-D.C. policy and explain that
the granting of policy waivers will likely be limited and sparing.
9.6 Explore alternatives to provide helpdesk-like procurement assistance to TEC
staff both at headquarters and in the field.
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Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
Overview
OCFO carries out several of the core business enterprise functions of the Agency: budget
formulation and execution, financial management, relocation services, and financial systems.
OCFO has two subdivisions: the Financial Management Division and the Budget Division. OCFO
was broken out to be its own standalone office during FY 2015; it was previously housed within
the Office of Administration. After the reorganization, three functions within OCFO were
removed: the Procurement Division and AOD and are now a part of a directorate called the
Enterprise Readiness Office, and the Component Acquisition Executive is now within the Office
of Strategic Planning and Policy (OSP).
Observations
The OCFO has undergone two major (and somewhat disruptive) changes in recent history. The
OCFO reorganized with two divisions (noted above) within OCFO moving to the Office of
Enterprise Readiness, and the Component Acquisition Executive position and staff transferring
to OSP. In addition, OCFO implemented a new financial management system that automated
financial management manual processes (including paper/fax invoices) applying modern tools
and systems intended at providing more internal controls and rigor. The implementation of new
financial management systems initially began in 2012 but continues today. The implementation
of new accounting software, R12, was one of the key capstones that improved the capability to
manage the Agency’s books but most significantly impacted previous ways of handling business
processes. The new financial management system represents a major change in the way the Secret
Service conducts its business, and as such, it was a major change for employees within the OCFO’s
office.
Many employees had several years, if not decades, of experience with the old financial
management system, so the office had a considerable challenge ensuring the workforce could
successfully navigate and take advantage of the new system. While the new system brought with
it many efficiencies, it also brought a sense of uneasiness among employees who were comfortable
with the old way of doing business. OCFO leadership tried to mitigate the disruption by providing
employees with opportunities for training, but, rather than patiently proceeding with this training
effort while applying change management practices, the office leadership opted to bring in
contractors and others outside the office to operate the system. The result is that the office has
experienced significant attrition within its ranks and a noticeable decrease in employee
engagement without the benefit of improved performance. Employees feel that they were not
given opportunities to grow professionally with the implementation of the new system.
The office emerged as the most troubled at the Agency in terms of employee engagement
problems, in the areas of staffing, development, and a positive work climate focused on efficiency
and effectiveness. Employees expressed concern about their workload with little hope for
advancement, lack of recognition for contributions, and generally weak office cohesion. The office
has tremendous difficulty hiring individuals with the right background and skills, citing
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competition from other federal agencies and little desire to live in Washington, D.C., the main
center of the office’s work.
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OCFO leadership has taken several steps to improve communication—such as a monthly
newsletter, a weekly message from the CFO, quarterly all-hands meetings, and CFO/Deputy CFO
listening sessions with branches to improve communication. To recognize employee performance,
OCFO conducts an annual awards ceremony to reward outstanding performance.
Recommendation
9.7 Create and publicize a strategy for improving employee wellness and
engagement and work with the staff to understand the sources of concern and
identify opportunities for improvement. Steps include:
• Analyzing the FEVS scores and existing surveys and interviews to
determine the cause and levels of dissatisfaction.
• Defining a vision for employee engagement and office culture so that
leadership and employees have a shared understanding of cultural
behaviors.
• Ensuring that employees within the office see demonstrable actions
that consider their engagement and morale, including clearly
articulating and documenting what it takes to receive internal
promotions, providing the time needed and opportunities for training
related directly to job responsibilities and for broader development,
hosting employee-centric events and awards to demonstrate
appreciation for the OCFO workforce, and connecting more frequently
with other mission (OPO and INV) and mission support organizations
to better understand the organization and customer needs.
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The Agency indicated employee engagement scores in OCFO have improved in 2020. The individual
office FEVS 2020 information, including those for OCFO, were not provided. See discussion on page 11.
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Office of Professional Responsibility (RES)
Overview
RES is home to the Inspection Division (ISP), which conducts internal accountability activities,
including compliance inspections of Agency offices and divisions and employee integrity
investigations. The division is staffed primarily with Special Agents who are at the GS-14 level or
higher, and these Special Agents are supported by a small APT employee complement. All of the
Special Agents in this office have at least 15 years of experience as a Special Agent and have
generally gone through rotations throughout the Agency before their assignment to RES. Work
hours in this office resemble that of a typical job (9 am-5 pm) with occasional travel as needed to
conduct, compliance inspections and interviews. The Office is located in Secret Service’s
headquarters building in Washington, D.C.
Observations
ISP went through a period (approximately six years) of leadership instability that left ISP without
clear and consistent direction beginning in 2012. ISP is led by a SAIC and two Special Agents at
the DSAIC level. For those roughly six years of leadership instability, the office saw SAICs and
DSAICs rotate for career advancement or retire sometimes as frequently as every six months. That
changed in 2018 when Secret Service leadership appointed a new leadership team (SAIC and
DSAICs) within RES that has been in place for about two years now. Both Special Agents and
administrative staff within RES agree that the consistency of the RES leadership team has resulted
in a stronger sense of employee engagement and morale, and interviewees report increased
productivity because of the consistent leadership direction they receive. RES is a “very
collaborative” office where there is a genuine feeling of support and a collegial attitude among
staff.
The rotation of SAICs and DSAICs is an important element of Special Agent development;
however, rotations that are less than 18-24 months in duration are disruptive to employees and
the work of offices, which the SAIC and DSAIC are responsible for leading. RES is an example of
both the disruption and consequences of frequent leadership change on employees, as well as the
benefits of consistent leadership at the SAIC and DSAIC levels for employee engagement, morale,
and productivity.
Given the nature of ISP’s work, any morale issues they face are atypical of a normal Special Agent.
Special Agents in ISP do not participate in protective assignments or investigations in the
traditional Secret Service sense (financial-, cyber-, fraud-related crimes). Morale issues arise
within RES due to the exposure to employee integrity investigations. The integrity group is
responsible for conducting employee integrity investigations. Secret Service, writ large, maintains
a supportive culture that works hard to assist those who are experiencing hardship. However, the
Special Agents and administrative support staff in RES are responsible for investigating
misconduct. This puts RES in a position not found elsewhere in the Secret Service.
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82
The Agency indicated employee engagement scores in RES have improved in 2020. The individual
office FEVS 2020 information, including those for RES, were not provided. See discussion on page 11.
99
RES is in Secret Service’s headquarters building in Washington, D.C. Putting RES in the same
building as the people it may be investigating creates awkwardness at best and can impinge
investigations at worst. An additional concern is that anyone seen even in the vicinity of the office
could be viewed under investigation. Rank-and-file members of the office have repeatedly raised
this issue but have been told that a move cannot be made because of limited resources and the
low number of cases.
Recommendation
9.8 Move the RES office to a physical location where its Agents will not frequently
encounter members of the workforce who are the target of an internal
investigation.
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Office of Human Resources (HUM)
Overview
HUM administers human capital operations for the Secret Service. It is responsible for human
resources programs across the human capital life cycle along with personnel security and
emergency preparedness. Some agent-related functions are outside of HUM’s responsibilities,
such as law enforcement training under TNG. HUM is made up of eight divisions that encompass
core human capital functions. The nine divisions are: (1) SAF; (2) Benefits and Payroll; (3)
Human Resources Research and Assessment (HRR), (4) Security Management; (5) Workforce
Planning; (6) Performance Management and Employee Relations; (7) TAD; (8) Human
Resources Policy and Accountability (HRP); and (9) HBM. HUM also includes two program-
specific offices: (1) Emergency Preparedness and (2) Executive Resources Management. HUM’s
nine divisions and two program-specific offices are led by the Secret Service’s CHCO, who was
hired in late 2016.
Observations
The PMP recommended that the Secret Service reform and professionalize recruiting, hiring,
promotion, and rotation programs in the Secret Service. Progress toward professionalization of
the human capital function was achieved after the Academy’s 2016 report. HUM is held up across
the Agency as an exemplar of the success of having non-agent professionals who bring deep
expertise and lead long-term continuity in a mission support function of the Secret Service. HUM
has also placed Special Agents in key SAIC and DSAIC roles, ensuring that policies and processes
remain sensitive to agent needs.
As mentioned earlier in this report in the discussion on hiring, HUM is operating two dueling
personnel management software systems that are both focused on hiring. The first system is a
COTS product, Monster Hiring, internally referred to as Secret Service Hire. The second is a hiring
software built in-house, ALIS, used in the Safety, Health and Environmental Programs Division
and Security Management Division. These two systems, used separately for the same hiring
actions, have some duplicative functions. The two systems are not connected (i.e., they do not
automatically share data) and the result is that there are occasionally inconsistencies between the
two that must be resolved by HUM employees.
There is also confusion over the development of the official human resources policy. HUM
interviewees indicated that there is no established process for policy development and that
various directorates within HUM concurrently review draft policies. The policy development
process does not flow consistently through HRP before moving to HUM leadership for review and
approval. The lack of a documented and accountable process causes time delays and generates
unnecessary inefficiencies.
Lastly, HUM’s HRR conducts staff and climate surveys and assesses selection processes and
exams. HRR is staffed by a combination of industrial and organizational psychologists, human
resources specialists, and management analysts. The office is regarded by many as a capable
group and are therefore frequently tasked with many ad hoc assignments outside its core
responsibilities. These unexpected assignments create stress on the HRR workforce, and that
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stress is compounded by the fact that HRR has multiple position vacancies. The stress drives staff
attrition within the office.
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Recommendations
9.9 Examine the connection between the recruitment (Secret Service Hire) and
the candidate tracking/investigations (ALIS) IT systems to facilitate data
transfer and, over time, bringing the functionality of the systems together.
Steps include:
• Determining which one of the systems can perform the functions of the
other or build a bridge between the two systems so that information is
directly transferred rather than having to engage in dual data entry.
9.10 Review procedures to ensure that the human resources policy development
process is transparent and provides full stakeholder participation and
coordinates with necessary stakeholders (internal and external to HUM), and
is managed by the HRP.
9.11 Set an annual work plan that prioritizes the work HRR is to accomplish each
year. Steps include:
• Soliciting staff feedback to gain buy-in on the work plan and generate
more engagement and boost morale.
• Avoiding creating new branches and office specialties to ensure
maximum flexibility of the workforces.
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The Agency indicated employee engagement scores in HUM, including HRR, have improved in 2020.
The individual office FEVS 2020 information, including those for HUM, were not provided. See
discussion on page 11.
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Field Offices within the Office of Investigations (INV) (Miami,
Florida, and Phoenix, Arizona)
Overview
The primary role of Field Offices is to support the Secret Service’s investigative mission. Special
Agents conduct investigations to identify, locate, and apprehend criminal organizations and
individuals targeting the nation’s critical financial infrastructure and payment systems. In
addition to investigating financial and electronic crimes, Special Agents conduct protective
intelligence, which entails investigating threats against protected persons, including the
President, and protected facilities, such as protectee residences. There are 162 Field Offices and
Resident Offices in the United States and abroad, and 3,081 positions assigned to Field
Operations in FY 2019. For this project, two site visits were conducted. The first, an in-person site
visit to the Miami Field Office in January 2020, which is classified as a large field office. The
second, a virtual site visit to the Phoenix Field Office, which is classified as a smaller field office.
Both site visits included discussion groups with roughly three to eight individuals within the same
peer group (Special Agents and APT employees). The team also interviewed the SAIC at both field
offices.
Observations
Interviewees at both field offices described a strong workplace culture where staff is collegial and
supportive of one another. The SAICs at both field offices are committed to the workforce, Special
Agents and APT employees, they oversee. Supervisory Special Agents at both sites do an
admirable job managing Phase 3 and Phase 1 Special Agents they oversee. Phase 3 Special Agents
act as mentors and serve a very important role in the Secret Service by ensuring that Phase 1
Special Agents receive a wide range of experience during their time at the field office. Finally,
Phase 1 Special Agents at both field offices were spoken of very highly for their dedication and
tireless commitment to the mission. Interviews with Phase 1 Special Agents at both field offices
revealed an outstanding cohort of Special Agents who are supportive of one another. The Phoenix
field office has made it a priority to recruit locally for Special Agents.
Leadership stability in both Miami and Phoenix has improved mission effectiveness and improved
morale and engagement within both field offices. The consistent leadership teams in both Miami
and Phoenix have enabled the Secret Service to forge relationships with the surrounding
community and local government agencies. The SAIC at the Phoenix field office has created
stability and improved employee morale and engagement by providing a limited number of merit
promotion opportunities internally. Phase 1 and Phase 3 Agents appreciate the stability and report
that it has heightened experience, increased knowledge of the surrounding community and local
stakeholders, and fostered a stronger sense of office culture and camaraderie.
Phase 1 Special Agents spoke of the challenges in entering the Secret Service workforce, going
through training, and moving to their new assignments. As mentioned in the compensation
discussion in Chapter 4, Special Agents said that they are not paid for their initial move to their
first field office assignment, which creates several hardships. Additionally, newly hired Special
Agents are provided limited time (in some cases, not all) before their entrance on duty. In one
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case, the study team heard that an Agent had less than a week to prepare for his move to training
– meaning he had to abruptly leave his prior law enforcement job without giving proper notice to
his employer. Both issues are seen as an unfortunate beginning to a Special Agent’s career, and
both do not reflect the supportive culture that the Secret Service is driving toward.
Special Agents mentioned the difficulties in receiving IT support in field offices, which hinders
their abilities to address casework and handle ancillary training activities. Additionally, IT staff in
the field have indicated that they are stretched thin in providing support to the field, resident, and
satellite offices, which may cover more than one state.
Recommendations
9.12 Examine the benefit of longer rotations at the SAIC level and prioritize the
development and promotion of field-based, in-office personnel to higher
levels of leadership as demonstrated by the Phoenix Field Office.
9.13 Review the IT support workforce that service field offices to ensure that there
is sufficient staff to handle all IT issues that surface in not only the field office
but also resident offices and other satellite facilities.
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Chapter 10: Summary of Recommendations
The Panel offers a series of 48 recommendations: 17 that would have Agency-wide impact, and 31
that address challenges in particular divisions, offices, or branches, including 18 within UD.
The recommendations that follow are grouped under seven categories of objectives that the Panel
believes the Secret Service should prioritize:
1) Focus Employee Engagement Efforts
2) Improve Hiring and Retention
3) Create a Better Work-Life Balance and Enhance Compensation
4) Develop the Next Generation of Secret Service Employees
5) Operationalize for the Future
6) Reinvigorate the Uniformed Division
7) Address Individual Office Matters
Focus Employee Engagement Efforts
The Secret Service should focus its many programs, initiatives, and actions to improve job
satisfaction around a new vision for employee engagement, aligned with the Agency’s broader
mission strategy. The Agency should revitalize its communications, through strategic messaging
and soliciting employee feedback.
2.1 Develop, implement, and internally publicize a new vision and strategy for
healthy employee engagement that aligns with the Agency’s strategy,
including outcomes desired and steps needed to achieve the vision. Steps
include:
• Setting the ideal picture for healthy engagement, such as the work-life
balance, staffing levels, and access to developmental opportunities the
Secret Service strives to achieve;
• Detailing the type of inclusive work environment that the Secret
Service wishes to achieve in order to foster greater teamwork among
all personnel;
• Acknowledging the current state of engagement and setting forth
specific steps;
• Detailing assignment of office responsibilities to enact that strategy,
along with specific actions and timelines; and
• Evaluating desired outcomes and measuring concrete progress.
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7.1 Implement a “SPARK! 2.0” with an enhanced appearance and end-user
experience to address outstanding concerns regarding its utility.
Improve Hiring and Retention
The Secret Service should ensure it has sufficient personnel with the right skills, and experience
to fill its ranks and execute the mission.
3.1 Stabilize the relative size of the protection portfolio, providing the Agency
more planning predictability for the protection and investigative missions.
Steps include:
• Identifying the historically standard protection portfolio that is in
addition to statutory protectees (Cabinet Members and White House
Officials).
• Identifying, and continually updating, the fully burdened cost per type
of protectee (e.g., young family member, adult family member, White
House Official) at various risk levels.
• Continuing to engage the DHS, White House and Congress to review
the impact of covering protectees beyond those required in statute,
including a threat-based requirement as a condition of providing or
extending protection.
3.2 Pursue support from DHS, OMB, and approval from Congress to accelerate
and fund staffing increases consistent with validated, manpower models.
Steps include:
• Including messaging that points to how the conditions and challenges
that precipitated the last personnel size increase still exist, albeit less
severely, and it is those increases that have prevented high-profile
events from otherwise occurring and improving conditions.
3.3 Accelerate hiring for current, open positions among all personnel categories,
seeking to meet and exceed time standards at each hiring stage set by the
OPM. Steps include:
• Setting up a schedule to conduct regular ELACs sessions across the
country. The Agency, particularly HUM in partnership with the INV
field offices, should ensure the associated offices have the appropriate
staffing to carry out these sessions regularly.
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• Conducting regular meetings among the various process owners for
hiring, ensuring regular communication, sharing best practices, and
documenting issues identification.
• Reducing time requirements for completing such key steps in the
hiring process as issuing a certificate of eligibles or conducting
interviews.
• Exploring consolidating hiring of Special Agent and UD Officers into a
single office, drawing on positions and personnel from the relevant
offices and branches.
3.4 Renew emphasis on retention, placing as much focus and energy on retaining
Agency talent as recruiting and training new personnel. Steps include:
• Conducting regular exit surveys across the workforce to identify
drivers for attrition.
• Analyzing and highlighting the drivers of attrition to senior leadership.
• Performing a formal study to document the fully burdened cost of
hiring and training new Special Agents and UD Officers.
Create a Better Work-Life Balance and Enhance Compensation
While the hiring surge evolves and has time to take effect, the Secret Service should pursue new
initiatives to give the greater work-life balance that is so prized by the workforce, while ensuring
that pay and benefits adequately compensate its hard-working employees.
4.1 Revise and update the use of telework in mission directives, policies, and
operations, to reflect recent trends in telework, while updating training to
allow supervisors to effectively oversee remote work, ensure continued high-
performance, and foster office and organizational cohesion. Steps include:
• Encouraging supervisors to be cognizant of the amount of travel, time
at post, or hours in-office an individual may log.
• Including messaging that employees can conduct duties from home
where possible and appropriate, especially given the expansion of the
VPN and the experience of teleworking during COVID-19.
• Releasing strategic communications from the top leadership that
embrace telecommuting as a permanent feature of work.
4.2 Undertake a detailed review to determine whether the Agency could more
cost-effectively manage the overtime program for Special Agents to ensure
fewer Special Agents reach overtime caps by leveling assignments across the
force.
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4.3 Rebalance the bonus and benefit programs to encourage Agency mid-career
personnel to continue with the Secret Service through their entire career by
exploring, developing, and implementing a program that commits employees
to staying in the Agency for a specific period of years, such as
enhancement/supplement to the current government retirement solution, or
through a continuation pay/bonus solution.
4.4 Pay for the first move of Special Agents at the start of their careers.
Develop the Next Generation of Secret Service Employees
The Secret Service should ensure all its employees can grow professionally and have concrete
career paths that show the road to advancing their careers as they gain experience and work to
exceed performance expectations.
5.1 Implement a more comprehensive leadership development program that
brings together Special Agents, UD Officers, TLE personnel, and APT
employees for courses, workshops, and career-broadening assignments.
Steps include:
• Developing a tracking and reporting mechanism to drive
implementation and measure success across employee groups.
• Ensuring training before an employee’s first supervisory assignment.
• Prioritizing helping leaders learn basic critical management skills,
such as communicating with and listening to employees, delegation,
employee recognition, and team building.
5.2 Develop and implement an Agency-wide policy with associated directives,
guidance, and communications about career paths and the promotion
process, including the ability to switch career paths. Steps include:
• Detailing competencies personnel must demonstrate and the
experiences they must seek out in order to continue their professional
growth within Secret Service.
• Communicating broadly the career paths for Special Agents, UD
Officers, and APT employees.
• Providing opportunities for employees to switch career paths with
some ease in order to retain employees rather than losing them.
5.3 Review senior executive positions to ensure that as many as possible are open
to full competition from as many employee categories as possible. Steps
include:
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• Communicating to eligible candidates the desire to put in place the
most experienced and qualified leaders, whatever employee status,
while highlighting that the positions are not now “reserved” if a
candidate from a different position fills the vacant senior position.
Operationalize for the Future
The Secret Service should continue to enhance and upgrade the mission-support, business, and
administrative functions that serve are a critical backdrop to mission-execution and impact how
employees performing administrative functions feel about their work.
6.1 Codify the directives that define the role and mission of the COO and critical
mission support organizations to ensure the leadership of mission support
organizations by professionals is balanced with Agent-filled leadership roles,
such as deputy and branch-chief positions. Steps include:
• Defining the COO role in the Agency leadership hierarchy and
specifying in the implementation directive that this senior position
will continue to require substantial administrative experience.
• Creating an explicit directive for the ERB that spells out its
membership, roles, and responsibilities.
6.2 Develop and implement a customer-focused, internal strategic
communications campaign for the IT roadmap, including the modernization
strategy, key initiatives, and progress as well as information on the process
for employees to request IT tools and specialized software program. Steps
include:
• Acknowledging the key role of IT for employee engagement and
effectiveness.
• Encouraging working with customers so that, when appropriate,
rather than customizing COTS, encourage customers to change
business practices.
6.3 Assess the implementation of the Agency’s IT strategy to determine if it is
moving in a positive direction on modernization, address the use of
organically developed systems versus COTS, and improve customer service.
7.2 Adopt an integrated strategic management approach applying a rigorous
management strategy, which was a key recommendation in the Academy’s
2016 report for the Agency.
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Reinvigorate the Uniformed Division
The Secret Service should place more focused, prominent, and sustained emphasis on the
employee engagement issues within UD, pursuing a multi-year strategy that boosts hiring and
retention, minimizes the turbulence in staffing levels, implements new policies on compensatory
time and scheduling to help mitigate the worst and most immediate effects of short-staffing.
Overall
8.1 Pursue a Grow, Stabilize, and Develop Strategy for UD that reduces forced
overtime, gives downtime back to employees, provides more predictable
schedules, increases training, boosts developmental opportunities, opens up
more paths to a fulfilling career in the branch, and restores staffing. Steps
include:
• Developing and implementing an employee wellness vision and
action plan that includes the input of Officers and key stakeholders
and requires ongoing communication that includes.
• Communicating with measurable near-, mid-, and long-term goals
and accomplishments.
8.2 Plan for and execute the hiring surge for the Division, in the short term, to
reach the 1797-Officer level included in the Human Capital Plan within three
years. Steps include:
• Working with DHS and Congress to secure approval for the
increase, along with the necessary funding.
• Increasing capacity within HUM and INV to expand recruiting,
accommodate additional background checks, and speed-up hiring
through organizational changes (exploration of a single office for
Special Agent and Officer hiring), personnel details (additional UD
personnel staffing HUM), and process improvements (additional
ELACs and shortening time associated with hiring actions).
Staffing Requirements
8.3 Conduct periodic third-party reviews of posts, perimeter security, and wider
operations, including travel, to ensure appropriate staffing levels, address
the impact of additional staffing requirements, operational intensity, and
force-stress of these arrangements. Steps include:
• Using technology, whenever possible, to reduce the number and
location of posts, which could benefit UD operations.
8.4 Conduct a study, in the long term, that delineates the basic characteristics
and authorities of contract and federal law enforcement Officers, while
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working with TEC to explore how technology can enhance UD’s mission
execution.
8.5 Study the option of restructuring Officer and Special Agent recruiting into a
single point of entry along with dual and separate career paths for those
remaining in UD and movement to Special Agents positions.
Work-Life Balance
8.7 Develop and implement a new approach and policy for UD that limits the
accrual and use of compensatory time. Steps include:
• Implementing the policy to reduce compensatory time from 160 to 120
hours during a calendar year, eliminating “earn and burn,” and
evaluating the reduction’s impact on UD.
• Promulgating associated directives and communications.
• Exploring alternatives to further reduce the use of compensatory time.
8.7 Implement the UD pilot 12-hour schedule at the White House and stand-up
an internal working group to closely monitor employee’s preferences
compared to their previous 8-hour shifts. Steps include:
• Conducting the pilot for at least 3 months to allow participants to
adjust and settle into the new schedule.
• Assessing the results of the pilot and reporting them to UD leadership.
8.8 Conduct a third-party assessment, in the long term, of shift length and
provide recommendations on appropriate shift schedules for UD and its
branches.
8.9 Develop a shift-swapping function to be embedded in the EPS system that
allows Officers to send a requested shift swap to the entire UD workforce.
Steps include:
• Clarifying UD policy to only permit shifts to be swapped between
branches if the personnel have been trained or have experience at the
other’s respective branch.
Leadership Development, Career Pathing, and Training
8.10 Provide newly promoted UD Officers early notification of their promotion (at
least two pay periods) before the promotion takes place. Steps include:
• Connecting newly promoted UD Officers with their new branch and
provide the Officer time to shadow their incumbent.
• Prioritizing classroom space for the Sergeant training program and
expedite its implementation to the extent possible
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8.11 Ask UD Officers to develop a career progression plan early in their service
and encourage supervisors to talk frequently to their Officers about career
progression plans. Steps include:
• Asking Officers to update their career progression plans as they find
new areas of career interest.
• Rotating Officers into their desired next posting to learn more about
the Branch or Division.
• Using career progression plans to inform necessary training.
8.12 Implement a peer mentoring program, beginning with newly trained
Officers, to help work through day-to-day challenges and to provide broader
perspective and guidance. If successful, expand the program to all Officers at
all ranks.
8.13 Charter a training committee that connects RTC Instructors with TNG-
embedded training employees and FTOs at all three branches of the UD.
Communications
8.14 Create and publish a Communications Plan for UD that provides guidance on
how to (1) distribute key information on decisions and policies and (2) invite
employee feedback and suggestions. Steps include:
• Formalizing how results from surveys and other tools for soliciting
feedback will be shared with UD Officers.
8.15 Review communication mechanisms in place for Officers, especially through
the chain of command.
Culture, Climate, and Professionalism
8.16 Develop and promulgate a new Officer recognition program that describes
the range of awards available, along with specific criteria for UD Officers to
earn recognition.
Unique Branch and Unit Issues
8.17 Develop and promulgate a new K-9 policy that provides clear and transparent
criteria for when a K-9 Officer Technician can continue working within the K-
9 unit after a dog retires or passes away.
8.18 Upgrade the state of the vehicle fleet within FMB and use accountability
procedures to ensure proper handling.
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Addressing Individual Office Matters
The Secret Service should address a range of employee engagement challenges unique to its
various Offices and Divisions.
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC)
9.1 Prioritize and encourage leadership development training for TSD employees
and consider opening TSD leadership opportunities (some of which are
currently reserved only for Special Agents) to all employee groups within
TSD.
9.2 Prioritize hosting more regular employee-centric events, including employee
recognition programs, and social events, and implement a more robust
onboarding process to ensure that new employees feel like they are a part of
the TEC team beginning on day one.
9.3 Establish a separate research and development branch within TEC and
develop a TEC strategy and multi-year investment plan consistent with the
2016 Academy report.
9.4 Reengage PSS personnel, develop a new conversion policy, and clearly
articulate that policy, addressing questions and concerns during
implementation.
9.5 Communicate the rationale for the move-back-to-D.C. policy and explain that
the granting of policy waivers will likely be limited and sparing.
9.6 Explore alternatives to provide helpdesk-like procurement assistance to TEC
staff both at headquarters and in the field.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
9.7 Create and publicize a strategy for improving employee wellness and
engagement and work with the staff to understand the sources of concern and
identify opportunities for improvement. Steps include:
• Analyzing the FEVS scores and existing surveys and interviews to
determine the cause and levels of dissatisfaction.
• Defining a vision for employee engagement and office culture so that
leadership and employees have a shared understanding of cultural
behaviors.
• Ensuring that employees within the office see demonstrable actions
that consider their engagement and morale, including clearly
articulating and documenting what it takes to receive internal
promotions, providing the time needed and opportunities for training
related directly to job responsibilities and for broader development,
hosting employee-centric events and awards to demonstrate
appreciation for the OCFO workforce, and connecting more frequently
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with other mission (OPO and INV) and mission support organizations
to better understand the organization and customer needs.
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES)
9.8 Move the RES office to a physical location where its Agents will not frequently
encounter members of the workforce who are the target of an internal
investigation.
Office of Human Resources (HUM)
9.9 Examine the connection between the recruitment (Secret Service Hire) and
the candidate tracking/investigations (ALIS) IT systems to facilitate data
transfer and, over time, bringing the functionality of the systems together.
Steps include:
• Determining which one of the systems can perform the functions of the
other or build a bridge between the two systems so that information is
directly transferred rather than having to engage in dual data entry.
9.10 Review procedures to ensure that the human resources policy development
process is transparent and provides full stakeholder participation and
coordinates with necessary stakeholders (internal and external to HUM), and
is managed by the HRP.
9.11 Set an annual work plan that prioritizes the work HRR is to accomplish each
year. Steps include:
• Soliciting staff feedback to gain buy-in on the work plan and generate
more engagement and boost morale.
• Avoiding creating new branches and office specialties to ensure
maximum flexibility of the workforces.
Field Offices within the Office of Investigations (INV)
9.12 Examine the benefit of longer rotations at the SAIC level and prioritize the
development and promotion of field-based, in-office personnel to higher
levels of leadership as demonstrated by the Phoenix Field Office.
9.13 Review the IT support workforce that service field offices to ensure that there
is sufficient staff to handle all IT issues that surface in not only the field office
but also resident offices and other satellite facilities.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Panel and Study Team Member Biographies
Panel of Academy Fellows
Ms. Ellen Tunstall,* Chair: Adjunct Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation. Former Senior
Advisor, FMP Consulting. Former Department of Defense positions including: Acting Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, Civilian Personnel Policy; Director, Workforce Issues and
International Programs, Under Secretary of Defense, Civilian Personnel Policy; Division Chief,
Civilian Assistance and Re-Employment Division, Defense Civilian Personnel Management
Service; Senior Policy Specialist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Office, Civilian Personnel
Policy; various human resource positions with the Department of Air Force. Former positions
with U.S. Office of Personnel Management: Deputy Associate Director, Talent and Capacity
Policy; Program Manager, Office of Insurance Programs.
Mr. John Koskinen:* Former Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of
the Treasury. Former Chairman of the Board and Director, Freddie Mac; President, U.S. Soccer
Foundation; City Administrator, Government of the District of Columbia; Assistant to the
President of the United States and Chair, President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion; Deputy
Director for Management, U.S. Office of Management and Budget; President and Chief Executive
Officer, The Palmieri Company; Administrative Assistant to Senator Abraham Ribicoff; Assistant
to Mayor John Lindsay and to New York City; Special Assistant to Deputy Executive Director,
"Kerner Commission."
Ms. Cynthia Heckmann:* Project Director, National Academy of Public Administration. Chief
Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Strategic Advisor for Government Executives (SAGE),
Partnership for Public Service. Former Strategic Advisor, Research, Partnership for Public
Service. Former positions with U.S. Government Accountability Office: Chief Human Capital
Officer, Deputy Chief Information Officer. Former policy and program positions in: Health Care
Financing Administration, Office of Education, and National Institutes of Health, U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Department of Health and Human Services
and Department of Education; and Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Mr. Reginald Wells:*Executive in Residence, American University. Former Deputy
Commissioner for Human Resources, Chief Human Capital Officer & Chief Diversity Officer, U.S.
Social Security Administration; Deputy Associate Commissioner for Disability Program Policy &
Senior Advisor to the Deputy; Commissioner for Disability and Income Security Programs;
Deputy Commissioner for the Administration on Developmental Disability, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services; Deputy Commissioner, Commission on Social Services, District of
Columbia. Former positions at Mental Retardation/Developmental Disabilities Administration:
Deputy Administrator/Acting Chief, Bureau of Community Services; Superintendent/Chief,
Bureau of Habilitation Services. Former positions at Department of Health & Rehabilitation,
County of Essex, NJ: Division Director, Geriatrics Center; Deputy Department Director for
Planning and Development; Chief of Program Monitoring and Evaluation. Former Research
Associate, National Center on Black Aged.
*Academy Fellow
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Mr. David Williams:* Distinguished Visiting Professor, Scholar School of Public Policy, George
Mason University; Former Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Postal Service;
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Inspector General, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, U.S.
Department of the Treasury.
Study Team
Brenna Isman, Director of Academy Studies: Ms. Isman has worked at the Academy since 2008
and oversees the Academy studies, providing strategic leadership, project oversight, and subject
matter expertise to the project study teams. Prior to this, Ms. Isman was a Project Director
managing projects focused on organizational governance and management, strategic planning
and change management. Her research engagements have included working with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Social Security
Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as multiple regulatory and Inspector
General offices. Prior to joining the Academy, Ms. Isman was a Senior Consultant for the Ambit
Group and a Consultant with Mercer Human Resource Consulting facilitating effective
organizational change and process improvement. Ms. Isman holds a Master of Business
Administration (MBA) from American University and a Bachelor of Science (BS) in Human
Resource Management from the University of Delaware.
Daniel Ginsberg, Project Director: Mr. Ginsberg has directed and provided subject matter
expertise for a number of projects for the Academy and draws on his expertise as a defense, health
care policy, and human capital consultant in Washington, DC. From 2009 to 2013, he served as
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, leading the Air Force’s
efforts to provide trained and ready personnel, while transforming human capital management
for the almost 700,000-person armed service. Mr. Ginsberg served for a decade as the senior
defense policy advisor to U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont. He is also a former member of
the staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services during the Chairmanship of U.S.
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.
Ginger Groeber, Senior Advisor: Ms. Groeber is a Senior Advisor at the Academy. She is also
an Adjunct Senior Policy Analyst at RAND Corporation. Since 2010, she has owned Groeber
Consulting Group providing consulting to federal agencies and companies providing service to
federal clients. She is a former Vice President for Human Capital Line of Business at Lockheed
Martin Corporation. As a presidential appointee she served as the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy. Ms. Groeber spent her civil service career in human
resources, financial management, organizational design, and operations with the Department of
the Army, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Adam Darr, Senior Research Analyst: Mr. Darr is a Research Analyst at the Academy. Mr. Darr
joined the Academy in 2015 as a research associate, having previously interned in the summer of
2013. He has served on numerous Academy projects, including work for the National Science
Foundation, National Nuclear Security Administration, Farm Service Agency, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. His areas of emphasis have been
governance and management reform, organizational change, human capital, and project and
*Academy Fellow
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acquisition management. Mr. Darr is currently pursuing a Master’s in Public Administration at
The George Washington University and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
Homeland Security/Emergency Management from Virginia Commonwealth University.
Sean Smooke, Senior Research Associate: Mr. Smooke has worked for the Academy as a
Research Associate since August of 2019. He has served on several Academy studies, including
the Montgomery County Council: Legislative Branch Operations Assessment concluding in
November of 2019, and Interim Report 4 and the Final Report on Tracking and Assessing
Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the spring and fall of
2020 respectively. He provides additional support to the Academy's Quarterly Working Capital
Fund Symposium. Mr. Smooke holds a Bachelor of Arts from Claremont McKenna College in
Government and Legal Studies.
Richard Pezzella, Senior Research Associate: Mr. Pezzella joined the Academy in June 2018
following internships in the House of Representatives and at a boutique government relations
firm. He recently worked on the Academy’s Blue Ribbon Panel study of building renovation
options for the Architect of the Capitol, and a study providing guidance on the design and
implementation of an innovative personnel system for the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). He previously supported the Academy’s study of the organization of the
research components of the Department of Transportation, and a two-study series with the
National Coalition of STD Directors on addressing the epidemic of sexually transmitted infections
in the United States. His areas of interest include infrastructure, public health, international
relations, technology, and space policy. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology, and
International Relations from the State University of New York at New Paltz.
Jennifer Butler, Intern: Ms. Butler joined the Academy in February 2021 as an intern for the
spring semester. She is a student at Cornell University, working toward obtaining a Bachelor of
Arts in Sociology with minors in Education and Inequality Studies. Her academic interests include
understanding culture, diversity, and social problems in society.
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Appendix B: Agency Structure
Secret Service staff are distributed across the nation and the world between the Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., and the 162 Field Offices (21 international and 141 domestic), out of which staff
conduct investigations and protective operations.
Figure 8. Secret Service Organization Chart
Subject Office Description and Areas of Responsibility
Office of Investigations (INV): In charge of investigative operations, INV also manages
the Agency’s Field Offices.
• Field Offices: The Academy study team spoke with the majority of employees
and leaders at the Miami and Phoenix Field Offices, as well as individual employees
from field offices throughout the country.
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES): Ensures that Secret Service offices and
programs comply with agency policies, procedures, and protocols and with federal
regulations; conducts investigations of alleged misconduct.
120
Office of Protective Operations (OPO): OPO oversees the protective mission of the
Agency, which includes providing guidance to 10 protective details and the Uniformed
Division to protect our Nation’s leaders and visiting dignitaries, and plan and execute security
operations for National Special Security Events.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO): Headed by the Chief Financial Officer,
OCFO manages the Agency’s financial infrastructure.
Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO): Headed by the Chief Information
Officer, OCIO manages the Agency’s technical infrastructure and information technology.
Office of Human Resources (HUM): Headed by the Chief Human Capital Officer, HUM
serves as the Agency’s HR function, and encompasses several of the core business support
functions.
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy (OSP): OSP manages short and long-term
strategic planning for the Secret Service. OSP also coordinates whole-of-agency
implementation of new business practices, marketing strategies, and enterprise policy
development.
Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs (IGL): IGL manages the Agency’s
intergovernmental affairs, acting as a liaison between the Secret Service and other
organizations of the federal government.
Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (SII): Headed by an Assistant
Director (AD), SII conducts data gathering and analysis on potential threats, as well as
counterintelligence and data security operations. The division works with OPO and INV to
ensure the information on threats is accounted for in planning. The division has two divisions:
Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division, and Counter Surveillance
Division.
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC): The CTO of the Secret
Service leads TEC, which is responsible for technology-related security and countermeasures.
The office differs from OCIO in that the technical elements developed, implemented,
maintained, or assessed by TEC are generally operational, and linked directly to the
investigative and protective missions—OCIO handles the Agency’s technology needs insofar
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as they apply to business processes and general information technology. TEC has a single
division: Technical Security Division (TSD).
Office of Training (TNG): Headed by an AD, TNG oversees the training of Special Agents
and Uniformed Division Officers. This training is generally administered at the James J.
Rowley Training Center.
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123
Appendix C: Cross-Report Recommendations Matrix
The following table provides a summary of overlapping recommendations provided to the Secret
Service through various reviews over time. While this study highlights the Secret Service’s
progress addressing these overlapping findings, the Agency will benefit in continuing examination
and the implementation of the recommendations in this study.
Table 5. Recommendations across Recent Secret Service Studies
Recommendations
2020
Academy
Report
2016
Academy
Report
2016
Eagle
Hill
Report
2015 HOGR
Committee
Report
2014
Protective
Mission
Panel
Promulgate a
Strategic Vision for
Employee Welfare
Encourage Openness
and Transparency in
Communication
Develop a Human
Capital Operating
Plan (HCOP)
Minimize
Protective
Responsibilities to
Only Those
Required by
Statute
Continue to
Request Personnel
Increases and Tie
to Mission
Capability
Streamline HUM
Hiring Processes
124
Recommendations
2020
Academy
Report
2016
Academy
Report
2016
Eagle
Hill
Report
2015 HOGR
Committee
Report
2014
Protective
Mission
Panel
Consolidate Hiring
of Special Agents
and Uniformed
Division Officers
into Single Office
Make Retention a
Priority
Ensure Regular
Exit Surveys are
Conducted
Support More Time
at Home
Foster a Greater
Ability to Telework
Extend Authority to
Provide Overtime
Pay Above
Statutory Limits
Develop A
Contemporary
Retention Program
Implement a
Leadership
Development Model
for all Employee
Categories
125
Recommendations
2020
Academy
Report
2016
Academy
Report
2016
Eagle
Hill
Report
2015 HOGR
Committee
Report
2014
Protective
Mission
Panel
Implement APT
Employee
Development
Program that has
Been Under
Development since
2016
Provide Career-
Paths with Clearly
Set Expectations
Provide Greater
Transparency in
the Assignment
and Promotion
Process
Codify Professional
Leadership
Positions
Open More Top
Leadership
Positions to APT
Employees
Develop New
Software
Acquisition
Strategy
Fill Vacant CIO
Positions
Adopt a Formal
Change Management
Strategy
126
Recommendations
2020
Academy
Report
2016
Academy
Report
2016
Eagle
Hill
Report
2015 HOGR
Committee
Report
2014
Protective
Mission
Panel
Create a New
Division in TEC
Focused on
Understanding Key
Technologies and
Technological
Trends
Reengage Existing
PSS Personnel and
Develop a New
Conversion Policy
Allow Field
Employees the
Ability to Apply for a
Move Waiver
Document Strategy
for Improving
Morale and
Engagement Within
OCFO
Consider Telework
or Alternative
Work Location to
Widen
Recruitment
Outside of
Washington, D.C.
Move the RES Office
to a Physical
Location Outside of
Washington, D.C.
Headquarters
Consider the Impact
of Frequent Special
Agent-in-Charge
Rotations on Staff
Offices
127
Recommendations
2020
Academy
Report
2016
Academy
Report
2016
Eagle
Hill
Report
2015 HOGR
Committee
Report
2014
Protective
Mission
Panel
Move Towards a
Single Recruitment
and Staffing
Software System
Review and Optimize
the Human
Resources Policy
Development
Process
Develop an HRR
Annual Work Plan
that prioritizes its
Work
Identify and Share
Best Practices
Across Field Office
Ensure Stable and
Experienced Field
Office Leadership
Develop a Process
for Promotion of
Field Office
Personnel to
Supervisory Jobs
Pay for First Move
of New Special
Agents
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129
Appendix D: List of Organizations Interviewed
The list below accounts for the various organizations and offices, which the Academy study team
and Panel (in some cases) spoke with during this study. The study team only fully spoke to the
Miami, Florida, and Phoenix, Arizona Field Offices: some employees of other field offices were
spoken to for information regarding other topics, and their offices are reflected below.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
• Chief Financial Officer
• Financial Management Division (FMD)
• Internal Controls Division
• Budget Division
Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO)
• Chief Information Officer
Communication and Media Relations (CMR)
Office of the Director
• Chief Counsel
• Chief Operating Officer
Office of Enterprise Readiness (ERO)
Office of Equity and Support Services (ESS)
Office of Human Resources (HUM)
• Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO)
• Benefits and Payroll Division (BPR)
• Human Resources Policy and Accountability Division (HRP)
• Human Resources Research and Assessment Division (HRR)
• Performance Management and Employee Relations Division (PRF)
• Safety, Health and Environmental Programs Division (SAF)
• Security Management Division (SMD)
• Emergency Preparedness Program (EPP)
• Talent and Employee Acquisition Division (TAD)
• Workforce Planning Division (WPL)
Office of Investigations (INV)
Field Offices
• Dallas, Texas Field Office
• Detroit, Michigan Field Office
• Los Angeles, California Field Office
130
• Miami, Florida Field Office
• New York, New York Field Office
• Phoenix, Arizona Field Office
• San Francisco, California Field Office
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES)
Office of Protective Operations (OPO)
Uniformed Division (UD)
• Office of the Chief
• White House Branch
• Naval Observatory Branch
• Foreign Missions Branch
• Special Operations Division (SOD)
Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (SII)
Office of Strategic Planning and Policy (OSP)
• Chief Strategy Officer
Office of Technical Development and Mission Support (TEC)
• Chief Technical Officer (CTO)
• Technical Security Division (TSD)
Office of Training (TNG)
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Appendix E: Works Cited
Dalal, Reeshad S., Michael Baysinger, Bradley J. Brummel, and James M LeBreton. 2012. The
Relative Importance of Employee Engagement, Other Job Attitudes, and Trait Affect as
Predictors of Job Performance. Study, Journal of Applied Social Psychology.
Eagle Hill Consulting. 2016. United States Secret Service Work/Life Integration Assessment.
Washington: Eagle Hill Consulting.
Harvard Business Review. 2013. The Impact of Employee Engagement on Performance. Study,
Cambridge: Harvard Business Review Publishing.
National Academy of Public Administration. 2016. United States Secret Service: Review of
Organizational Change Efforts. Academy report, Washington: National Academy of
Public Administration.
Partnership for Public Service. 2016. Employee Job and Workplace Satisfaction in the Law
Enforcement Community. Washington: Partnership for Public Service.
RAND Corporation. 2010. Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millenium: The State
of Knowledge. Arlington: RAND Corporation.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2003. Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective
Strategic Workforce Planning. GAO Report, Washington: U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2020. Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but
Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources. GAO Report, Washington: U.S.
Government Accountability Office.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2019. U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Full
Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations. GAO Report, Washington:
Government Publishing Office.
U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 2015. United States Secret
Service: An Agency in Crisis. House oversight report, Washington: United States House
of Representatives.
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. 2008. The Power of Federal Employee Engagement. Study,
Washington: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.
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