Climate Change and Migration. Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration

Climate Change and

Migration

Legal and policy challenges and

responses to environmentally

induced migration

STUDY

Requested by the LIBE committee

Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

Directorate-General for Internal Policies

PE 655.591

Abstract

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy

Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the

request of the LIBE Committee, examines legal and policy

responses to environmental migration and displacement.

Following a review of international, regional and national

initiatives and legal instruments, it offers recommendations on

ways to better address root causes and consequences of the

climate change-migration nexus in Europe and beyond.

Climate Change and

Migration

Legal and policy challenges and

responses to environmentally

induced migration

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and

Home Affairs.

AUTHORS

Albert KRALER, Danube University Krems

Caitlin KATSIAFICAS, International Centre for Migration Policy Development

Martin WAGNER, International Centre for Migration Policy Development

ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE

Marion SCHMID-DRÜNER

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

Monika Laura LAZARUK

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS

Original: EN

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other

parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal

policies.

To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to:

Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

European Parliament

B-1047 Brussels

Email: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu

Manuscript completed in July 2020

This document is available on the internet at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not

necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is

acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 5

CONTENTS

CONTENTS 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 7

LIST OF BOXES 10

LIST OF FIGURES 10

LIST OF TABLES 10

GLOSSARY 11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13

1. INTRODUCTION 17

2. BACKGROUND 20

2.1. Conceptual framework 20

2.2. Conclusions 25

3. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MIGRATION, MOBILITY AND DISPLACEMENT 27

3.1. Trends in climate change 27

3.2. Key impacts 29

3.2.1. Environmental change as a driver of migration 29

3.2.2. Environmental change and immobility 30

3.2.3. Empirical dimensions of environmental migration and displacement 32

3.2.4. Migration as adaptation 37

3.3. Conclusions 38

4. FILLING A GAP: INTERNATIONAL POLICY INITIATIVES ADDRESSING PROTECTION IN THE

CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 40

4.1. Background: International protection instruments in the context of environmental

displacement 43

4.2. Initiatives and instruments in the field of migration and displacement 46

4.2.1. Global initiatives 48

4.2.2. Addressing cross-border movement in two regional contexts 50

4.2.3. Addressing environmental displacement in the context of IDP protection 53

4.2.4. The New York Declaration and Global Compacts 55

4.3. Addressing environmental migration and displacement in the broader context of climate

change and disaster policies 57

4.3.1. IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural

Disasters 57

4.3.2. The UN Framework on Climate Change and 2015 Paris Climate Conference 57

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

6 PE 655.591

4.3.3. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 58

4.3.4. National-level initiatives in the Pacific 59

4.4. Linking environmental migration and displacement to broader humanitarian and

development aid agendas 61

4.4.1. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda 61

4.4.2. 2016 World Humanitarian Summit 62

4.4.3. Efforts by multilateral development banks 62

4.4.4. A regional approach: Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 63

4.5. Conclusions 64

5. ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPLACEMENT AT EUROPEAN AND MEMBER STATES LEVEL

5.1. The European policy debate 65

5.1.1. The European Union 65

5.1.2. The Council of Europe 67

5.2. Addressing environmental migration and displacement in the EU external dimension 68

5.2.1. Tools in the context of migration and forced displacement 68

5.2.2. Tools in the context of humanitarian aid and disaster relief 69

5.3. Addressing environmental displacement in the EU internal dimension 71

5.3.1. European legislation 71

5.3.2. National legislation and practice 76

5.3.3. European jurisprudence 79

5.3.4. National jurisprudence 82

5.3.5. Excursus: Case law on Kiribati and Tuvalu 83

5.4. Conclusions: protection in the context of environmental displacement 85

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 87

6.1. Conclusions 87

6.2. Policy Recommendations 89

6.2.1. Contribute to conceptual clarity 89

6.2.2. Develop a coherent policy on the nexus of climate change and natural disasters and

mobility in the external dimension 90

6.2.3. Develop a strategy for providing solutions for asylum and migration claims connected

to environmental change 91

7. REFERENCES 94

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 7

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

LERT

Acute Large Emergency Response Tool

BPA

African Union

Brazil Plan of Action

CAT

Convention against Torture

CAMM

Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility

CEAS Common European Asylum System

CFR

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

CJEU

Court of Justice of the European Union

Carbon dioxide

COP Conference of the Parties

CSM

South American Conference of Migration

DREF

Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights

ECTHR European Court of Human Rights

EMN

European Migration Network

European Union

GCM

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

GCR Global Compact on Refugees

GAMM

GIZ

Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

German Agency for International Cooperation

IASC

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

8 PE 655.591

ICCPR

International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights

ICMPD

International Centre for Migration Policy Development

IDMC

Internal Monitoring Displacement Centre

IDP

Internally displaced person

IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IOM

International Organization for Migration

KNOMAD

Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development

MDG

MICIC

Millennium Development Goals

Migrants in Countries in Crisis

Member State

MEP

Member of the European Parliament

OAU

Organisation of African Unity

PACE

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PDD

Platform on Disaster Displacement

Qualification Directive

RCM

Regional Conference on Migration

Return Directive

SDG

Sustainable Development Goals

TFD

Task Force on Displacement

TPD

Temporary Protection Directive

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 9

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNHCR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WHS

World Humanitarian Summit

WMO

World Meteorological Organization

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

10 PE 655.591

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1: Environmental change vs. climate change 22

Box 2: Beyond Europe: Brazil’s humanitarian visa 75

Box 3: Beyond Europe: Australia’s Labour Mobility Scheme 76

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Research on migration and climate change 17

Figure 2: Environmental change and drivers of migration 21

Figure 3: Mobility outcomes of environmental change 32

Figure 4: Disaster vs. conflict/violence-related internal displacement, 2008-2019 (in millions) 34

Figure 5: Stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by cause of displacement, 2019 (in millions)34

Figure 6: Types of hazards causing disaster related internal displacement 2008-2019 35

Figure 7: Relative change in global displacement risk compared with the 1976-2005 baseline 37

Figure 8: Milestones in the global governance of environmental migration and displacement, 2011

– 2020 41

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Typology of environmental migration and displacement 23

Table 2: Types of natural hazard events covered by IDMC’s data collection 25

Table 3: IDMC’S Disaster Displacement Risk Index (2015) 36

Table 4: Overview of key instruments and initiatives concerning environmental migration and

displacement 46

Table 5: Overview of non-harmonised protection statuses in MS+ 77

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 11

GLOSSARY

LIMATE CHANGE

“[T]he change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to

human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and

which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over

comparable time periods.”

LIMATE

(ENVIRONMENTAL)

REFUGEE

“The term ‘climate/environmental refugee’ is used to refer to a category

of environmental migrants whose movement is clearly of a forced

nature.”

More specifically, the term “climate refugee” is used to refer to

persons who are forced to leave because of impacts of climate change.

Individuals and communities threatened by sea-level rise are a classic

case. Generally, the terminology is disputed and the notion of forced

displacement usually limited to disasters.

ISASTER

“A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society

involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses

and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or

society to cope using its own resources.”

ISASTER

DISPLACEMENT

Forced displacement related to a disaster, whether related to

environmental or other causes.

NVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

“Changes in the physical and biogeochemical (chemical, geological, and

biological) environment, over a large scale, either caused naturally or

influenced by human activities,

” thus including both changes attributable

to climate change and changes that are not.

NVIRONMENTAL

DISPLACEMENT

(SYNONYM:

ENVIRONMENTALLY

INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

)

Forced displacement caused by environmental factors, for example a

flood or drought.

NVIRONMENTAL

MIGRATION

(SYNONYM:

ENVIRONMENTALLY

INDUCED MIGRATION

)

Migration driven in significant part by environmental factors, but not

forced.

Foresight (2011), p.233.

IOM (2019), p.32.

Ionescu et al. (2016), p.124.

Foresight (2011), p.233.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

12 PE 655.591

NVIRONMENTAL

MIGRATION AND

DISPLACEMENT

The term “environmental migration and displacement” is an umbrella

term to capture all movements where environmental factors have played

a role.

ORCED DISPLACEMENT

(SYNONYM:

DISPLACEMENT

)

The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to

leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result

of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of

generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-

made disasters.

NTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION

“In the global context, actions by the international community on the

basis of international law, aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of

a specific category of persons outside their countries of origin who lack

the national protection of their own countries.

In the EU context, protection that encompasses refugee status and

subsidiary protection status.”

IGRATION

“The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence,

either across an international border or within a State.”

International

standard definitions distinguish between short-term migration (between

3 and 12 months) and long-term migration (at least 12 months). Short

term movements below 3 months of stay are generally not considered

migration.

IGRATION DRIVERS

Migration drivers refer to factors shaping migration decisions, including

migration decisions in the context of forced displacement.

OBILITY

(Geographical) ‘mobility’ is an overarching term to denote the relocation

from one place to another. More specifically, this study refers to mobility

when movements cannot be characterised as migration, notably in the

case of short-term movements.

LOW ONSET EVENT

Gradual environmental changes such as drought, sea-level rise or soil

erosion whose impact builds up over time.

UDDEN

(

RAPID

)

ONSET

EVENT

Events such as extreme weather events like flooding or storms that strike

suddenly and have an immediate impact.

Note: definitions are derived from this report except otherwise noted.

IOM (2019), p.55.

EMN (2018a).

IOM (2019), p.136.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2011, the European Parliament’s Policy Department on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

commissioned the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to undertake a study

on legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration. While looking at both forced and

voluntary cross-border movements, the study generally focused on protection needs and the possible

role of asylum and other policies related to forced displacement. This current study, nearly a decade

later, re-examines the issue in light of increased interest and momentum in responding to the

migration-climate change nexus.

Indeed, this study comes at a time when the issue of climate change has fully moved to the centre

of political and societal debates. The evidence available today on the expressions of climate change,

its human causes, the speed of changes and interlinkages between different aspects of climate change

(e.g. global warming, sea level rise or extreme weather events) is increasingly sophisticated, enabling

better, more nuanced and more specific assessments of current and future impacts. This includes

discussions of equity and justice in the context of climate change that acknowledge that the impacts of

this phenomenon are uneven, for instance disproportionately impacting poorer and more vulnerable

populations and among these, in particular women. In addition, researchers have also examined how

climate change is affecting enjoyment of basic human rights.

At the policy level, the European Union’s (EU’s) global engagement – both in terms of climate

policy and migration and displacement policy – has significantly expanded and is set to become

yet more important in the context of ongoing geopolitical shifts. This study explores the intersection

of these two prominent issue and policy areas. At the same time, the impasse on a way forward to

reform asylum in Europe raises questions as to the EU’s capability to accommodate migration and

displacement challenges connected with environmental change.

This study reviews academic evidence on the impact of climate change on migration and displacement.

It also examines policy debates and concrete initiatives addressing the nexus of migration,

displacement and climate change, focusing on the global and regional levels, to assess the fitness of the

legal and policy frameworks in place. The report concludes with recommendations and the

presentation of possible options for the European Parliament to further develop policy frameworks at

the EU level. Its primary focus is needs arising in the context of adverse environmental changes,

and thus environmental displacement – although migration as a strategy to cope with climate

change is also explored. The study is based on desk research of academic literature and selected policy

documents and jurisprudence as well as a survey of policymakers in select EU Member States (MSs).

The impact of climate change on migration, mobility and displacement

A review of the literature underscores that the impact of environmental change on migration is

complex: Environmental change interacts with and is mediated by other drivers of migration. Forced

displacement following sudden- or slow-onset environmental events, in contrast, offers a more tangible

category for analysis, raising specific practical and legal concerns. However, it should be noted that

environmental change cannot only spur mobility, it can also drive immobility. In addition, it may

adversely affect immobilised populations, such as those facing protracted displacement situations as a

result of conflict, persecution or violence.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

14 PE 655.591

Climate change is likely to increase the likelihood and intensity of natural hazards, which in turn

will impact drivers of migration. Slow-onset environmental change is mediated by a variety of social,

economic and political factors and generally affects migration indirectly. While disasters often have a

more direct effect, these, too, are socially mediated, disproportionately affecting vulnerable

populations. Existing estimates of the numbers of ‘environmental migrants and displaced

persons’ are problematic on several counts, including because of the difficulties in establishing

causality, the often unclear nature of estimates (do they refer to stocks of migrants or flows? Do they

refer to the present or a future point in time?), and the absence of a trans parent methodology. However,

for over a decade the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (IDMC) tracking of disaster-related

internal displacement provides a robust evidence base on displacement caused by disasters and

classifies the data by type of natural hazard causing displacement, thus allowing to distinguish

environmental from other causes. No such estimates are currently available for cross-border situations.

The IDMC’s data collection methodology, however, offers a good basis for potential further

development of global estimates in this area.

Rather than simply a reaction to climate change or disasters themselves, migration should also be

understood as an adaption strategy, a way to cope with related impacts on lives and livelihoods.

Migration thus needs to be part of the solution both in respect to internal and cross-border situations,

for example through facilitating migration and making it an option for a larger group of people through

planned relocation in internal situations or through considering environmental factors in the context of

resettlement, amongst others.

International policy initiatives addressing environmental migration and

displacement

With environmental migration and displacement being an increasingly visible topic in international

policy discussions and initiatives, efforts to address the issue through global fora have gained

momentum and can be seen in frameworks, guidance, capacity building and other actions. In the

field of migration and displacement, many of these efforts focus on cross-border displacement. The

state-led Nansen Initiative has been particularly active both globally and regionally in strengthening

protection for environmentally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly

and Regular Migration has raised the profile of environmental drivers of migration and ways to

address them through international cooperation. Beyond this, preventing and responding to

environmental displacement has been part of broader global discussions on climate change and

disasters, while the issue is also on the agenda of humanitarian and development actors.

In addition to such global initiatives, several regional initiatives, especially in Africa and Latin America,

as well as national-level efforts, particularly in the Pacific islands, represent important steps in

strengthening frameworks for protection in the context of environmental migration and

displacement. Notably, the African region has developed a few instruments that are legally binding, in

contrast to the voluntary nature of most initiatives.

A number of United Nations agencies, multilateral development banks and other actors have

engaged in this work, reflecting the increased prominence of the topic and need to both strengthen

protections for those displaced and to foster the resilience of those who could potentially be displaced

in the context of climate change and disasters. As international and regional initiatives have gained

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 15

momentum, they have provided tools to better respond to environmental migration and displacement,

filling in key gaps, and underscored the utility of international cooperation to do this. But despite

this progress, the voluntary and fragmented nature of most of these efforts, the need to effectively

implement them, and continued concerns regarding climate change all remain key challenges to

effectively responding to environmental migration and displacement going forward.

Addressing environmental displacement in Europe

The EU and its MSs have taken an active role in promoting environmental protection in global fora;

although the EU was late to the game, it has increasingly addressed the nexus of environmental change

and migration over the past decade. Environmental change and migration is addressed in its civil

protection, humanitarian aid and development policies. However, in the context of policies on

international protection, no concrete initiatives to date have addressed the protection needs of

people affected by environmental change, and specifically environmental – and other – disasters:

According to the prevailing interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, displacement based on

environmental reasons alone does not meet the requirement for refugee protection. Within the EU,

complementary forms of protection deriving from the Qualification Directive and the Temporary

Protection Directive, as well as protection from non-refoulement in the Return Directive, could

provide protection alternatives. However, all of those instruments reveal deficiencies for the

protection of environmentally displaced persons.

Looking at the national level, only Sweden and Finland provide for protection of persons affected by

environmental change and natural disasters and unable to return under national legislation. However,

Finland and Sweden both suspended their national provisions following the high numbers of migrant

arrivals in 2015-16.

Meanwhile, judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the

European Union on sick migrants can serve as examples of how these courts may assess

applications from persons displaced or unable to return for environmental reasons. Socio-

economic reasons in the broader context of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human

Rights could offer crucial bases for protection; however, the threshold is set very high. While national

courts of EU MSs have not yet had to judge cases related to displacement and climate change,

Australian and New Zealand courts have dealt with several cases. However, the only case where a

court in New Zealand has granted residence to a person who claimed to be unable to return due to

climate change was decided based on family ties in New Zealand and not on the situation in the

applicant’s country of origin (Tuvalu). Lastly, in a remarkable recent decision, the United Nations

Human Rights Committee declared that inaction in the face of global warming can lead to violations

of human rights and trigger non-refoulement obligations.

Conclusions and recommendations

Solutions for environmental migration and displacement must acknowledge the diversity of

environmental drivers, including their scope, intensity and duration, as each may involve different

needs and frameworks with which to respond. This calls for a multi-sectoral approach that addresses

both root causes and consequences of the nexus between environmental change, on the one hand, and

migration and displacement, on the other. While protection needs of those affected by slow or sudden-

onset events arise independently of the question whether climate change can be established as a cause

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

16 PE 655.591

of such events, there is clear evidence of the increased risk of environmental hazards due to climate

change. Addressing climate change through climate change, development, trade and other policies is

thus a key element of prevention.

The Study recommends that the European Parliament should:

• Strengthen conceptual clarity, defining its position on climate change and environmental

change more broadly and its impacts on migration and displacement. This includes more

robust data collection and analysis to build the research base; an exploration of MS’ readiness to

address environmental factors in supra-national and national policies on migration and asylum;

and the adoption of a common EU position on the climate change-migration nexus.

• Develop a coherent policy to address migration in the context of climate change and

natural disasters and mobility in the external dimension. This entails mainstreaming

environmental and mobility considerations across policies, strategies and programs; taking

concrete solidarity actions under the Global Compacts; encouraging European regional and

national actors to engage in addressing the issue; and leveraging participation in international

initiatives to foster the further development of tools and policies in areas of the world most

affected by these environmental events, including through technical and financial assistance.

These efforts should encompass the development and expansion of measures in reaction to crises

as well as forward-looking approaches that address future risks, including adaptation strategies

such as migration.

• Push for forward-looking EU asylum and migration policies at internal level, which take into

account climate change and natural disasters alongside other emerging challenges. Such

an effort should recognise that there are different avenues through which the European

Parliament can seek to address the needs of those affected by climate change and natural

disasters within the EU. One such pathway is devising a strategy for providing solutions for

protection claims submitted in Europe that are connected with climate change and natural

disasters.

• Strengthen various forms of assistance to countries particularly affected by environmental

disasters as well as environmental and climate change more broadly as well as step up the

EU’s climate change policies more broadly.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 17

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the European Parliament’s Policy Department on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

commissioned the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to undertake a study

on legal and policy responses to environmental migration. Although addressing both forced and

voluntary cross-border movements, the study generally focused on protection needs and the possible

role of asylum policies on forced displacement more widely.

The study came at a time of increased policy and research interest in the relationship between

migration, climate change and issues of environmental change more generally, reflected amongst

others in an enormous growth of the relevant research literature (see Figure 1, below) and, at the policy

level, the launch of a state-led policy initiative – the Nansen Initiative

– dedicated to addressing the

nexus between environmental change and migration. The growth of both research and policy interest

at the time reflected the wider growth in attention to climate change and its various social, economic

and political impacts.

Figure 1: Research on migration and climate change

Source : Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature, Population and Environment, The uneven geography of research on

“environmental migration”, Etienne Piguet et al., 2018.

That period also saw an important leap in the overall understanding of the nexus of environmental

change and migration, made possible by a number of large-scale and comprehensive studies

conducted at the time.

In a similar vein, the launch of continuous data collection on disaster-related

Kraler et al. (2011).

https://www.nanseninitiative.org/. See in more detail section 4.2.1.1 below.

The Climig database can be accessed at https://climig.com/.

A notable example is the influential Foresight report (Foresight, 2011) bringing together a wide range of expertise from a large number of

scientists from different disciplines, involving some 80 background papers and involving several hundred scientists and other

stakeholders. Another example is a slightly earlier project funded under the EU’s FP6 research programme “Environmental Change and

Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-For, 2007-2009).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

18 PE 655.591

internal displacement by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),

with a first report

published in 2011,

has considerably improved the evidence base on displacement caused by disasters,

including and in particular extreme weather events such as floods, cyclones or drought.

Almost a decade after the publication of the 2011 European Parliament-commissioned study, the

issue of climate change has fully moved to the centre of political debates, both at the Member State

(MS) and European Union (EU) level, even if temporarily overshadowed by the Covid-19 crisis and

response. What is perhaps equally, if not more important, it has moved to the centre of broader societal

debates: EU citizens consider it as one of the top societal challenges Europe is facing.

The

evidence available today on the expressions of climate change, its human causes, the speed of changes

and interlinkages between different aspects of climate change such as global warming, sea-level rise or

extreme weather events is increasingly sophisticated and powerful and enables better, more nuanced

and specific assessments of climate change impacts now and in the future.

In the meantime, debates on ‘climate justice’

have highlighted the centrality of issues of “equity and

justice aspects inherent to both the causes and the effects of climate change”,

stressing amongst other

points that climate change does not affect everybody equally and may hit vulnerable groups

particularly hard. Indeed, as recent research has shown, it is the global poor that are disproportionally

affected by climate change.

Additionally, climate change impacts are clearly gendered.

Apart from

raising concerns around equity and justice, climate change has important human rights implications,

with a number of basic rights being at stake, while responses to climate change in turn may raise new

human rights issues.

At the policy level, the EU’s global engagement – both in terms of climate policy and migration and

displacement policy – has significantly expanded; this is set to continue in the context of ongoing

geopolitical shifts that have made EU leadership in regard to these global challenges even more

important. At the same time, the impasse around the reform of the Common European Asylum

System (CEAS) and the different views on the future of asylum in Europe raises questions as to the

EU’s capability to accommodate human mobility due to environmental change.

It is against this background that the European Parliament commissioned the present study in February

2020. The study is tasked with reviewing the academic evidence on the impact of climate change on

migration and displacement, in addition to policy debates and concrete initiatives addressing the nexus

of migration, displacement and climate change both at the global and the EU level and assessing the

fitness of the legal and policy framework in place. Lastly, the study was tasked with describing possible

The IDMC database can be accessed at https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data.

IDMC & NRC (2011).

The increasing salience of climate change is captured by the Eurobarometer, see European Commission (2019) for results also in

comparison to previous waves.

See for a comprehensive overview of different aspects of climate justice debates Jafry (2019).

Jafry et al. (2019), p.3.

See Hallegatte & Rozenberg (2017) for short summary and Hallegatte et al. (2016) for the full World Bank Study on which the summary is

based.

See Perkins (2019).

See Duyck et a.l. (2018). Policies on planned relocation as opposed to temporary evacuations is one example of a policy issue raising

human rights issues.

As we will argue in the below, the spectre of mass migration due to climate change is both wrong on factual grounds (see for a critique de

Haas 2020) and unhelpful in thinking about protections for those affected by adverse environmental change.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 19

options for the further development of a policy framework at the EU level. The primary focus of the

study concerns the needs arising in the context of adverse environmental changes and related mobility,

and thus environmental displacement.

The study will proceed as follows: In the next section (section 2), we will describe the terms, definitions

and conceptual framework of the study. Section 3 reviews the evidence on the impact of climate change

on migration, mobility and displacement. In so doing, the study will also examine migration as an

adaptation strategy and the issue of trapped populations in whose case such options are often absent.

Section 4 undertakes a broad review of instruments and initiatives on the international level that either

explicitly address environmental migration and displacement or have been mobilised to this end. Apart

from global initiatives, the section also examines a number of regional and national initiatives. Section

5 focuses on European policy debates, examining both the global (external) and internal dimension of

EU policies, that is the EU’s legal framework on international protection, legislation at the MS level and

relevant case law.

The final section (section 6) will provide conclusions and make a number of recommendations.

Note on methodology

This study is based on desk research of academic literature and select policy documents and legal cases.

In addition, section 5.1 also draws on responses to a questionnaire disseminated amongst select EU

MSs.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

20 PE 655.591

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Conceptual framework

The debate on environmental change and migration can be traced back to the 1970s, when the term

“environmental refugees” made its first appearance,

entering common usage in the 1980s.

The term “environmental refugee” suggested two conclusions: first, that movement in response to

environmental change was involuntary, and second, that the involuntary nature of movement gave rise

to specific protection challenges.

However, these assumptions were heavily criticised: The criticism concerned the analytical value of the

concept for helping to understand the relationship between environmental change and migration,

the often loose use of these terms in relevant debates and their normative implications. Social scientists

refuted the terms climate or environmental refugees as implying a simplistic and mono-causal

understanding of the relationship between climate change, environmental events and displacement,

also drawing on broader debates within refugee and migration studies questioning the sharp

distinction between voluntary and forced migration and stressing individuals’ agency.

The Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) rejected the use of the term ‘refugee’ in

this context on grounds that the term ‘refugee’ was a legal term and should be reserved for refugees

According to Black (2001), the term can be traced back to Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute.

The popularisation of the term is commonly attributed to an influential study by a researcher from the United Nations Environmental

Programme (UNEP), El-Hinnawi (1985) (see McLeman R. & Gemenne, F. 2018, p.10).

Notably in terms of the scope of phenomenon.

See for a prominent voice in the debate and at the same time representing a new consensus Foresight (2011), p. 34. The sharp dichotomy

between voluntary and forced migration has been amongst others highlighted by Zetter, R. (2007) and Bakewell (2008) both drawing

attention to the political function of ‘labels’. For a recent critique of the forced vs. voluntary migration dichotomy see Erdal & Oeppen

(2018).

KEY FINDINGS

Climate change is an important driver of environmental change, but not all environmental change

can be attributed to climate change. The present report thus uses the more general term

environmental change.

The impact of environmental change on migration and displacement is complex. Environmental

change interacts with and is mediated by other drivers of migration. The concepts ‘environmental

migration’ and ‘environmental migrant’ are thus only a shortcut for expressing that environmental

factors have played a crucial role.

Displacement following environmental events such as a drought (a ‘slow-onset event’) or a flood

(a ‘sudden-onset event’) presents a more tangible category, raising specific practical and legal

questions in the context of migration and asylum policies.

The present report uses the umbrella term ‘environmental migration and displacement’ to denote

individuals affected in some way or another by the nexus of environmental change and migration.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 21

protected under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.

At the same time, the term was embraced by

a variety of scholars and activists, often writing from a human rights perspective, as appropriate in terms

of conveying both a sense of urgency and in highlighting the protection needs arising in the context of

climate change and related movements.

Commenting on these conceptual debates and the broader notion of ‘environmental migration’, a

major study on environmental change and migration commissioned by the United Kingdom

Government’s Office for Science (subsequently referred to as the “Foresight Study”) reasoned that

“[it was] almost impossible to distinguish a group of ‘environmental migrants’, either now or in the

future”. Discussing related attempts to estimate the numbers of ‘environmental migrants,’ the report

argued that these are “methodologically unsound, as migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is

problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted number of migrants as moving as a direct

result of environmental change.”

The Foresight study criticised what it called ‘deterministic

approaches’ to infer the number of migrants from the number of populations likely to be affected by

environmental change, arguing that such an approach neglects human agency in dealing with

environmental change and constraining factors influencing migration outcomes.

By contrast, the Foresight study advocated for an approach that focuses on the impact of

environmental change on drivers of migration, and thus on changes to the volume of migration

resulting from environmental change, as plotted in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Environmental change and drivers of migration

Source: Foresight (2011), figure ES.1, p.12.

The criticism raised by the Foresight study specifically referred to global estimates of ‘environmental

migrants’ and the related identification of a global subset of migrants that could be designated as

‘environmental migrants’. It does not – per se – concern the conceptual efforts to identify migrants

UNHCR (2008), p.8. Despite these concerns, the term entered the UNHCR’s ‘Thesaurus of refugee terminology’ (quoted after EMN 2018a,

p.119.

See for a recent example Behrmann & Kent (2018) which uses “climate refugees” as the key concept of the book, even if it also contains

critical essays on the discourse on ‘climate refugees’.

Foresight (2011), p.11.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

22 PE 655.591

affected by environmental change and in need of protection, as a protection-oriented approach is less

concerned with the cause of the need for protection than with identifying protection needs. The most

important point here is that it may be moot to try to arrive at a conceptual definition that captures

environmental factors as single causes of any migration (or forced displacement, for that matter). At the

same time, there is a need to have terms to denote both processes of migration and displacement

related to environmental changes and individuals involved in these processes, whatever the real weight

of environmental factors – amongst other drivers – are.

Following the usage in the Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, we will

generally speak of ‘environmental migration and displacement’ when we refer to the overall nexus

of environmental change and migration – ‘migration’ here understood as an overarching term referring

to a change of residence between different locations for a certain period of time.

Reflecting the terminological debates mentioned above, and maintaining a basic differentiation

between voluntary and involuntary migration, we propose to distinguish between ‘environmental

migration’ on the one hand and ‘environmental displacement’ on the other. We refer to environmental

migration (labelled environmentally induced migration in table 1 below) when we refer to (more)

voluntary migration where environmental factors somewhat play a role, and refer to environmental

displacement (called environmentally induced displacement in table 1 below), where some form of

coerced movement takes place, recognising, at the same time, that the distinction between ‘forced’ and

‘voluntary’ is extremely blurry, as is also discussed in more detail below in chapter 3.

Following the Foresight Study, we distinguish between environmental changes attributable to climate

change and non-climatic changes, such as land and coastal and marine ecosystem degradation

attributable to human factors (see box 1).

We use the term environmental change (as opposed to the more specific term environmental

degradation) for two main reasons: first, the term ‘environmental change’ is the most widely used term

in debates on migration and environment, and secondly, it is a more neutral concept covering a wider

range of situations.

Box 1: Environmental change vs. climate change

Foresight (2011), p.39.

The Foresight Study defines environmental changes as “[c]hanges in the physical and

biogeochemical (chemical, geological, and biological) environment, over a large scale, either

caused naturally or influenced by human activities,

” thus including both changes attributable to

climate change and changes that are not.

In contrast, climate change is defined as “[t]he change of climate which is attributed directly or

indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in

addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 23

Source: Foresight (2011), p.233.

The key conclusion from the distinction between environmental changes attributable to climate

change and those which are not is that we should speak of climate change-induced migration and

displacement only if the underlying phenomena – such as a drought, a flood or a hurricane – can be

attributed to climate change.

A second set of key concepts are the concept of ‘slow-onset’ and ‘rapid’ or ‘sudden-onset events’.

‘Slow-onset events’ include gradual environmental changes such as drought, sea-level rise or soil

erosion. ‘Sudden-onset events’ include extreme weather events such as flooding or storms.

Both

sudden- and slow-onset events can imply forced displacement: While forced displacement related to

environmental hazards is usually associated with disasters such as typhoons or flooding (and thus

‘sudden-onset events’), more gradual forms of adverse environmental change such as severe drought

or sea-level rise can also induce displacement, with the case of inhabited islands whose existence is

threatened by sea-level rise being the most extreme example.

In many cases, however, such gradual

environmental change may only be one amongst several factors triggering movement. Environmental

factors may thus play a role in migration decisions but do intersect with other motivations. While such

‘voluntary migrants’

may not require particular protection, policymakers still need to be aware of

environmental drivers as they may affect the volume and nature of migration

Table 1: Typology of environmental migration and displacement

Category Cause of movement Nature of movement Protection Challenges

Environmentally

induced

temporary

displacement

Sudden-onset events;

Slow-onset events

Temporary displacement within

national borders;

Temporary cross-border

displacement

Cross-border displacement:

Temporary, humanitarian

protection;

Internal displacement within

countries:

Limited internal protection

Environmentally

induced long-

term

displacement

Sudden-onset events (if

recovery of the impacted area

is slow and ineffective);

Slow-onset events (no

alternative livelihood

possible)

Long-term cross-border

displacement;

Long-term internal displacement

Cross-border displacement:

Access to protection, access to

durable solutions (resettlement,

local integration, voluntary

return);

Internal displacement:

Limited internal protection;

access to durable solutions

(resettlement, local integration,

voluntary return)

The relevant literature also often uses the term “hazard” as a more general term.

Kraler et al. (2011), p.19.

See for influential academic voices in the debate Biermann & Boas (2008, 2010). On the notion of “root causes” see Carling & Talleraas

(2016).

The dichotomy between voluntary and forced migration have long been criticized in refugee and forced migration studies. Prominent

voices include Roger Zetter (2007) and Oliver Bakewell (2008) both drawing attention to the political function of ‘labels’, arguing that

such labels do not say much about migration decision making. For a recent critique of the forced vs. voluntary migration see Erdal &

Oeppen (2018).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

24 PE 655.591

Environmentally

induced migration

Slow-onset events;

Sudden-onset events

Temporary or long-term

voluntary migration in

anticipation of worsening

conditions, search for more

attractive opportunities within or

across national borders

No specific protection challenges

Source: Adjusted from Kraler et al. (2011), Table 2, p.35

Given the focus of this study – migration and asylum policy responses to environmental change,

including climate change – the starting point must be protection needs. In this context, it is revealing

that both the academic literature and related policy discussions do not limit themselves to the field of

environmental migration and displacement narrowly speaking when discussing protection gaps and

challenges. Indeed, key examples of policy challenges that have been discussed in the literature – such

as responses to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti – are not related to environmental changes, let alone

climate change.

Others, like the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, escape an easy categorisation,

being the result of a combination of a geophysical event (an earthquake provoking a Tsunami) and a

nuclear accident leading to the long-term contamination of large areas.

Recognising that a specific causality might be less important for recognising protection challenges,

important initiatives such as the Nansen Initiative have also gradually moved to address disaster-related

cross-border displacement in general.

Oxford-based scholar Alexander Betts has suggested dropping references to causality altogether, as for

him the specific cause is unimportant in assessing protection needs. Rather, he suggests using the

broader category of what he terms ‘survival migration’, relating to “persons who are outside their

country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy

or resolution.”

While the concept of ‘survival migration’ in a sense only shifts some of the difficult

questions of scope and thresholds for protection, a key point indeed is that there are a number of

high-impact situations, including but not limited to environmental change, that have the capacity to

influence drivers of migration or indeed forcibly displace persons from their habitual places of

residence or countries of origin, or, in a related way, hinder them from returning. The ongoing Covid-

19 crisis, which has prompted a number of countries to adopt regularisation measures and other

measures to protect migrants stranded in countries under lockdown, is a case in point.

More practically, the IDMC has collected data on disaster-related internal displacement since 2011 (with

reference years 2008-2010). Disaster-related displacement covers a wider range of causes than

environmental displacement.

Conceptually, the categories meteorological, hydrological and climatological hazards distinguished in

the table below can be considered to be instigators of ‘environmental displacement’. Yet also, the

See Weerasinghe (2018).

See on Fukushima and industrial accidents more generally Ionescu (2016), p.54.

Mayer (2018), p.328.

Betts (2013), p.23.

PICUM (2020).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 25

category of biological hazards may be linked to environmental factors. For example, the locust plague

affecting several countries in East Africa ongoing at the time of writing can be linked to the impact of

climate change, and specifically the increased frequency of extreme weather events – in this case

unusually wet conditions over prolonged periods of time on the Arab peninsula.

Thus, while capturing

a number of clear-cut cases of movement that can be attributed to high-impact environmental changes,

some basic conceptual problems associated with the notions of environmental migration and

displacement remain.

In addition, IDMC’s data collection does not include some important categories of ‘environmental

displacement’, such as the permanent loss of habitat through sea-level rise.

Table 2: Types of natural hazard events covered by IDMC’s data collection

Climate-related

hazards

Meterological Hydrological Climatological

Sudden onset

Tropical, extra-tropical and local

storms

Floods and wet mass

movement

Extreme temperature

and wildfire

Slow onset - Long-lasting subsidence Drought

Non climate-

related hazards

Geophysical Biological

Sudden onset

Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,

dry mass movement

Epidemics, insect infestation,

animal stampede

Slow onset Long-lasting subsidence Epidemics, insect infestation

Notes : not included by IDMC data-collection. * Droughts are included only since the 2018 Global Report on Internal

Displacement.

Source: Adapted from IDMC (2011), p. 7.

Overall, the category ‘disaster-related displacement’ constitutes an important overarching category

that we will refer to throughout the study where appropriate.

2.2. Conclusions

As has been argued in this chapter, the relationship between environmental change and migration (to

be discussed in more depth in section 3) is complex. This report will use the umbrella term

‘environmental migration and displacement’ as an indicative context helping to denote individuals

somehow affected by the nexus of environmental change and migration. We distinguish between

environmental migration to refer to voluntary forms of migration where environmental factors

somewhat play a role, on the one hand, and environmental displacement, where some form of coerced

movement – following a severe environmental event – has taken place, on the other. At the same time,

we also refer to disaster-related displacement as an overarching concept that includes both

environmental drivers and others (such as human-made disasters or geophysical events) which,

Salih et al. (2020).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

26 PE 655.591

although not related to environmental factors, raise similar protection challenges and thus are relevant

when thinking about policy responses.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 27

3. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHAN G E ON M I G RATION, MOBILITY

AND DISPLACEMENT

In this chapter, we review recent evidence regarding overall trends in climate change and its impact

on migration, mobility and displacement. We start with a brief description of overall trends in climate

change and its effects on a number of areas. In section 3.2, we discuss the impact of climate change on

migration and mobility, discussing environmental change and environmental shocks as drivers of

migration, including its scale, environmental change and mobility and migration as adaptation.

Section 3.3 provides a conclusion for the chapter.

3.1. Trends in climate change

The most recent statement by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the State of the Global

Climate suggests an accelerated pace of climate change, noting that 2019 was the warmest year on

record and each decade since 1980 has been warmer than the decade before. Greenhouse gas

concentrations in the atmosphere reached record levels in 2018, a trend that continued in 2019. While

the oceans absorb an important share of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO

) emissions, CO

absorption

KEY FINDINGS

Climate change is likely to increase the likelihood of a number of natural hazards, which in turn

will have significant effects on migration drivers and migration outcomes.

Slow-onset environmental change affects migration outcomes largely indirectly – through its

impact on social, economic and political factors. While disasters frequently involve direct threats

to the life and safety of those affected and thus have a more direct effect, disasters too have

substantial indirect effects spurring movement. They

also affect more vulnerable populations

disproportionally.

Existing estimates of environmental migration and displacement are problematic

on several

counts. They tend to assume a straightforward attribution of causality, are often unclear as to their

temporal reference and rarely are based on a transparent methodology.

By contrast, in our view, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s tracking of disaster-related

internal displacement provides a robust evidence base for any further development of global

estimates on disaster-related displacement that would include both internal and cross-border

displacement."

Environmental change not only may act as a driver of mobility, but also of immobility. In addition,

it may adversely affect immobilised populations, such as persons in protracted displacement

situations as a result of conflict, persecution or violence.

Migration should also be recognised as an adaption strategy. While the frame of ‘migration as

adaptation’ is not without risk, migration needs to be part of the solution both in respect to

internal and cross-border situations.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

28 PE 655.591

leads to the acidification of oceans, affecting marine ecosystems. In addition, ocean heat levels (‘ocean

heat content’) reached record levels in 2019, which in turn contributed to the melting of sea ice and sea-

level rise, exacerbated by the melting of ice on land. The global mean sea level in 2019 was the highest

since high precision measurements began in 1993.

While climate change is a global problem, the

impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed and are most heavily felt in poorer countries.

This bigger impact is partly because of greater exposure to climate-related hazards (such as flooding or

droughts), but to a large extent also because of greater vulnerability (e.g. importance of agriculture for

livelihoods and economies) and more limited resilience (e.g. more limited state capacity and reliance

on community adaption).

Climate change, i.e. the rise in global average temperatures as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, is

a complex phenomenon involving a number of interrelated yet distinct changes. The contribution of

climate change to these different environmental changes is increasingly well documented. New

approaches and powerful models for assessing the contribution of climate change to diverse

environmental changes and for individual environmental events (“attribution studies”) demonstrate the

important role of climate change in ongoing changes while also allowing scientists to better predict

future outcomes.

The Foresight study on distinguishes six types of climate-related environmental changes, including:

• Sea-level rise leading to higher risks of coastal flooding, erosion and salinisation of low-lying

agricultural land;

• a rise in tropical cyclone and storm intensity;

• changes in rainfall regimes, impacting agricultural productivity;

• an increase in temperatures and related higher frequency of extreme temperatures, involving

risks to health as well as more frequent and intense wildfires, etc.;

• a change of atmospheric chemistry affecting crop productivity as well as productivity of marine

and coastal ecosystems; and

• the melting of mountain glaciers affecting the exposure of mountain regions to hazards.

In addition, however, the Foresight study also highlights non-climate related changes, notably land

degradation and coastal and marine ecosystem degradation caused by human factors.

All these

environmental changes are likely to influence ‘migration drivers’, that is the “[c]omplex set of

interlinking factors that influence an individual, family or population group’s decisions relating to

migration, including displacement.”

These drivers then will shape migration outcomes.

World Meteorological Organization (2020), p. 5.

See Hallegate & Rozemberg (2017), p.255 and Jaffry, Mikulewicz & Helwig (2019), p.2.

See Scott for a short discussion of different approaches used in attribution studies (2016).

Foresight (2011), p.51f.

This is the definition in IOM’s 2019 edition of the Glossary on Migration (IOM, 2019, p.58).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 29

3.2. Key impacts

3.2.1. Environmental change as a driver of migration

Since the beginning of academic and policy debates on climate and broader processes of

environmental change and migration, the main focus has been the impact of environmental change on

increased levels of migration, including displacement. The expectation that environmental change

impacts migration dynamics is, generally, supported by available evidence.

But this evidence is more nuanced than some of the ‘alarmist’ voices in the debate on

environmental change and migration, who warn that dozens, if not hundreds of millions, of people will

be uprooted by climate change in the years and decades to come, would indicate.

Scholars have

criticised the underlying ‘environmental determinism’ informing such views, the framing of migration

as an involuntary uprooting of now stable populations and the related neglect of existing migration

dynamics and patterns.

A notable recent example for this alarmist viewpoint is a study associating

climate change, drought, internal migration and the outbreak of the conflict in Syria by a group of

climate scientists in 2015 that was widely picked up by the media and policymakers and which, in the

midst of the unfolding ‘migration and refugee crisis’ in Europe, suggested that mass migration due to

climate change was already happening. Critical reviews of the study later highlighted that the study

quickly jumped to conclusions where evidence was lacking.

Nevertheless, there are clear links between environmental change and migration. Thus, a recent

review of the academic literature on drivers of migration finds that environmental drivers indeed seem

to impact migration dynamics, although studies have largely focused on developing countries in the

Global South. Thus, slow-onset changes in temperatures and precipitation are associated with out-

migration from affected areas. However, studies generally find that environmental factors mostly affect

migration decisions indirectly, e.g. through the impact on income and wages.

Another review of recent literature comes to a similar conclusion, finding that existing studies show a

significant impact of climate change on both international and internal migration, noting that “rising

temperatures, in agriculture-dependent countries in particular, tend to induce out-migration,” often

mediated through wages and agricultural productivity.

The study observes mixed results for natural

disasters, with almost no effects on international migration but significant effects on long-term internal

migration in the case of especially severe disasters (such as Hurricane Katrina), overall suggesting that

the impact of disasters seems to be short term, with no significant international spill-over, a finding also

See for example Flavell et al. 2019, Foresight (2011), Ionesco et al. (2016), McLeman & Gemenne, (2018).

See for an analysis of securitized narratives on ‚climate migration’ Bettini (2011). For a recent critical appraisal of the “fabrication of a

migration threat” see de Haas, 2020.

See Wiegel at al. (2019), p.2.

See for the original study Kelley et al. (2015). For a short review of the debate see Karak (2019); for a thorough review of the debate and

implications for climate research see Ide (2018).

See Czaika & Reinprecht,(2020), p. 15f. See also Flavell et al. (2019) and Neumann & Hermans (2015).

Berlemann & Steinhardt (2017), p.377f.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

30 PE 655.591

supported by empirical data on disaster-related (internal) displacement discussed in section 3.2.3,

below.

As noted before, the impact of environmental change on migration is often only indirect, with economic

and social factors the primary drivers of decisions to migrate. However, the impact on other factors

“such as incomes, livelihood opportunities, and food security” can be significant. If these indirect effects

are factored into the analysis, the impact of environmental changes is often larger.

Thus, while

individuals may still see their migration decisions primarily as economically motivated,

deteriorating environmental conditions can be linked to migration dynamics by analysing the

impact of environmental change on the economy.

Disasters such as floods, storms or droughts involve direct threats to life and security for those affected

by them. While the impact of disasters may appear to be more immediate, their impact is similarly

mediated by socio-economic factors shaping individuals’ and communities’ vulnerability to be

adversely affected by environmental shocks, as well as their resilience in the face of these.

Fo r exa mple,

a flood may pose a direct threat to life when dwellings are flooded and become uninhabitable. The

flooding of fields or factories, in contrast, poses a threat to the livelihoods of populations in affected

areas. A decision to move elsewhere in order to maintain a family income may appear to be a voluntary

decision but is clearly dictated by the circumstances.

Put in more general terms, disasters may also affect other drivers of migration, such as employment

prospects or market accessibility,

and therefore the ability to stay in an area. However, also in the

context of classic situations of forced displacement due to violence, conflict and persecution,

environmental factors may play a role. The interaction between conflict or persecution and

environmental factors as drivers of displacement has so far been rarely studied, with the exception of

indirect links between environmental change and conflict-related displacement, as in the case of Syria

discussed above.

However, a recent study commissioned by UNHCR, although primarily concerned

with how countries of first asylum used refugee law frameworks to respond to disasters, demonstrates

how the 2010-11 drought and ensuing famine in Somalia led to renewed outflows from the country and

intersected with ongoing insecurity.

3.2.2. Environmental change and immobility

Importantly, environmental change may also cause significant levels of immobility. Indeed, one of

the central messages of the 2011 Foresight report was that people might become trapped in areas of

high vulnerability to environmental hazards, noting that “a significant group of people living in

environmentally prone locations in the future face a double jeopardy: they will be unable to move away

See Berlemann & Steinhardt (2017), p.378

Czaika & Reinprecht (2020), p.15.

See for a discussion of natural hazards, crises and vulnerability and resilience Hendow et al. (2018), p.15-17.

Flavell et al. (2019), p.12.

Czaika & Reinprecht (2020), p.15

Most literature on ‘classical’ displacement and environmental change is concerned with the impact impact of the large-scale presence of

refugees especially in camp-settings on the environment. See for a brief review of that literature Kraler et al. (2011), p. 24-26.

Weerasinghe (2019).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 31

from danger because of a lack of assets, and it is this very feature which will make them even more

vulnerable to environmental change.”

However, the decision to stay may also be voluntary: Individuals

may opt to stay because they see a better future compared to other alternatives. Immobility is related

both to abilities (such as financial means, social capital – that is networks in other places or the lack

thereof, as well as physical abilities and perceived employability) as well as migration aspirations.

Aspirations, in turn, may be shaped by (perceived) abilities but also positive and negative place

attachment.

A recent survey-based study examining migrant-sending areas in highland Peru affected

by climate-related changes highlights that place attachment, rather than resource constraints, explain

immobility in that specific context, questioning the underestimation of individuals’ agency in the notion

of ‘trapped populations’ put forward by the Foresight study and emphasising that immobility, too,

needs to be understood along a continuum.

In some contexts, the decisions to stay put may also be a

response to specific opportunities arising out of situations of environmental change for specific

categories of people.

A major concern in debates on ‘trapped populations’ has been that populations are willing to move and

feel the need to move, but are unable to do so.

The Foresight study thus highlighted, among others,

the case of Somali pastoralists who were unable to relocate elsewhere in response to drought because

of ongoing conflict and insecurity, thus preventing pastoralists from utilising traditional adaptation

strategies in times of drought.

The case of Somalia also highlights the intersection of classical issues

of international protection and protection issues brought about by environmental change.

In summary, existing evidence shows that environmental change impacts migration drivers. In general

terms, four migration outcomes can be distinguished: migration, displacement, being trapped

and voluntary immobility (see figure 3, below).

Foresight (2011), p.29.

See Zickgraf (2018).

See Adams (2017). On the discussion of trapped populations in the Foresight study see Foresight (2011), passim and box 1.3, p.29. See also

Zickgraf (2018).

Hendow et al. (2018, p.29) note specific employment opportunities arising in the context of flooding affecting Thailand in 2011. In a similar

vein, the departure of many labour migrants in Libya in 2011 provided increased opportunities for migrants still in the country and

working (ibid.).

Zickgraf (2018), p.74.

Foresight (2011), p.119.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

32 PE 655.591

Figure 3: Mobility outcomes of environmental change

Source: Ionescu (2016), p. 19, simplifying a figure in Foresight (2011).

3.2.3. Empirical dimensions of environmental migration and displacement

Since the mid-1980s, a series of estimates have been put forward on the volume of migration likely to

be engendered by adverse environmental changes, generally focused on migration resulting from slow-

onset events.

A review of estimates conducted in the framework of the 2011 Foresight study found

existing estimates lacking on several counts. First, conceptually they were often based on vague

definitions of environmental migration and/or displacement; most lacked a clear methodology how

estimates were reached, while some were simply updated extrapolations of problematic base estimates

suggested by earlier contributions to the debate. Finally, their temporal reference and the nature of the

figure (whether they should be understood as flows or stocks) often remained unclear.

Recent

critiques of such estimates also note that their purpose seems primarily targeted at drawing attention

and presenting potential migration engendered by environmental change in general and climate

change in particular as a security risk.

More importantly, efforts to estimate the scale of environmental migration and displacement in

general often rest on a simplistic equation of populations affected by environmental change

(“exposure”) and populations at risk of migrating. A recent study examining the correlation between

extreme weather events and asylum applications in the EU arguing that asylum applications will

increase in the future due to global warming can be criticised on similar grounds, namely by a simplistic

interpretation of correlations found between extreme weather events and migration flows.

A s r esult

of the impossibility of singling out environmental drivers as a factor in migration movements, the

Foresight study and similar stocktaking exercises have thus limited themselves to providing estimates

Flavell (2019), p.39.

Gemenne (2011).

See Boas et al. (2019), de Haas (2020).

The study referred to is Missirian & Schlenker (2017).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 33

of exposure to climate-related hazards without attempting to estimate the share of the total number of

people exposed to a certain hazard (such as floods or storms) that are likely to migrate.

IDMC’s data collection on disaster-related displacement, however, shows that a more limited

approach that focusses on displacement is feasible and can provide high-quality estimates. Some

of the basic conceptual and methodological issues remain, but they are often not so different from

those related to internal displacement due to violence and conflict, notably as regards the question of

where to draw the line between voluntary migration and displacement (see the discussion in section

3.2.1, above).

IDMC collects data on both current displacement and displacement risk, defined as probable annual

disaster displacement with a ten-year perspective. The IDMC estimates of current displacement cover

new disaster-related displacement in a given calendar year. In addition, the data are classified by broad

hazard category (weather related vs. geophysical events), which is further broken down into specific

hazard types (such as floods, storms, wildfires, etc.). IDMC’s “weather related” category corresponds to

the notion of “environmental change” in general and “environmental events” in particular used for the

present report. Importantly, the number of displaced persons due to weather-related disasters cannot

be taken as numbers of displaced persons due to climate change. For this to happen, individual

weather-related disasters would have to be assessed as to whether they would have happened in the

absence of climate change – a question that so called ‘attribution studies’ seek to answer (see above).

At the same time, there is robust evidence on the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather

events and displacement caused by weather related disasters;

it is thus a relevant statistical indicator.

As figure 4 (below) indicates, the scale of new displacement caused by disasters outstrips by far new

displacement caused by conflict and violence. At the same time, the figures also show the volatility of

disaster-related displacement, which is due to a number of factors, most importantly the type, severity

and the geography of the event, i.e. whether it strikes in a densely populated area or not.

See Flavell et al. (2019), p.12 for a brief discussion.

See Flavell et al (2019), p.39.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

34 PE 655.591

Figure 4: Disaster vs. conflict/violence-related internal displacement, 2008-2019 (in millions)

Source: figures on new displacement 2008-2018 taken from IDMC (2019), figure 1, p.2; figures on new displacement in 2020

and stocks of IDPs taken from IDMC (2020).

Since 2019, IDMC has also collected figures on the stock of disaster-related internal displacement (see

figure 5, below). The relationship between new internal displacement caused by disasters vs. new

displacement caused by conflict and violence, and the total stock of disaster-related internal

displacement vs. the stock of internal displacement due to violence and conflict, demonstrates that

disaster-related displacement is largely short term, which thus corroborates existing studies on the

issue.

Figure 5: Stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by cause of displacement, 2019 (in millions)

Source: IDMC (2020).

See on the temporality of disaster related displacement Flavell (2019), p.44.

38,2

16,7

42,4

32,4

22,1

19,1

19,2

24,2

18,8

17,2

24,9

4,6

6,5

2,9

3,5

6,6

8,2

10,9

6,9

11,8

10,8

8,5

0,0

12,5

25,0

37,5

50,0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Di saste r Violence and Conflict

5,1 (10,04%)

45,7

(89,96%)

Di saste r Violence and Conflict

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 35

That being said, IDMC’s stock data show that there are nevertheless significant numbers of disaster-

related internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose displacement situations last longer, some of whom

are at risk of ending up in a protracted displacement situation.

To date, no systematic breakdown is

available to show the scale of protracted and short-term disaster-related internal displacement.

For the roughly 288 million people newly internally displaced due to disasters between 2008 and 2019,

weather-related disasters were the most important causes of displacement, with floods causing about

half of all disaster-related displacement. As IDMC’s 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement

documents, disaster displacement risk is highly uneven and concentrated on five countries in Southeast

and South Asia (India, China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines) characterised by “high levels of

exposure of people and assets, and only slow progress in national efforts to reduce vulnerability.”

Figure 6: Types of hazards causing disaster related internal displacement 2008-2019

Note: The three quantitatively most important categories are shown in the first pie chart to the left. Smaller categories are

shown in the pie chart to the right.

Source: authors’ presentation of IDMC data

See IDMC (2020), p.12. The report notes the case of some 33,000 persons in Haiti still displaced as a result of the 2010 earthquake, but does

not provide a comprehensive account of protracted disaster related displacement.

IDMC (2018), p.60.

Data are available from https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data.

Flood

49,4%

Storm

36,1%

Earthquake

10,2%

Wildfire

0,7%

Dry Mass Movement

1,5%

Mass movement

0,2%

Extreme

Temperature

1,2%

Volcano

0,4%

Wet

Mass

…

Other

4,3%

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

36 PE 655.591

IDMC also provides estimates on the risk of future displacement, estimating the expected annual

disaster-related displacement within a ten-year period.

Table 3: IDMC’S Disaster Displacement Risk Index (2015)

Focus Region Population

Average Annual Displacement

Risk

Relative Annual Displacement

(per 1 million people)

South Asia 1,730,000,000 9,200,000 5,300

Southeast Asia 1,990,000,000 30,000,000 15,100

South Pacific 10,800,000 45,600 4,200

Latin America and

Caribbean

186,000,000 809,000 4,300

Source: Ginnetti (2015) quoted after Flavell et al. (2019), p.39

The risk assessment model is based on historical data stretching back to the 1970s and shows an upward

trend related to population growth, better disaster preparedness (fewer casualties but more people

displaced) and better reporting. While the risk model does provide some tangible measure of disaster-

related displacement risk in the medium term, broken down also by type of hazard and for different

countries, it does not allow for an assessment of the role of climate change. However, for flooding – the

most significant cause of disaster-related displacement, accounting for some 50 per cent of disaster

related displacement in the 2008-2019 period – IDMC has estimated displacement risks for the period

until 2090 (see figure 7, below) combining different scenarios established by the International Panel on

Climate Change.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 37

Figure 7: Relative change in global displacement risk compared with the 1976-2005 baseline

Source: IDMC 2019a, figure 2

We have incorporated the figure for illustrative purposes only. Suffice it to say that the relative risk of

flood-related displacement will significantly rise. As the dark, bold red line in the above figure (an

average of different models in lighter red) shows, the risk is projected to increase almost five-fold

between 2010 and 2090, using the period 1976 to 2005 as a baseline.

3.2.4. Migration as adaptation

The 2011 Foresight report and several academic papers building on it

were particularly influential in

promoting a perspective that considered migration in the context of environmental change not as

a problem whose root causes must be fought but as an adaptation strategy to adverse

environmental changes and part of the solution.

While the role of migration in adapting to

environmental change had already been made apparent by a number of earlier studies,

the Foresight

report was particularly influential in promoting the perspective amongst policymakers, including the

European Commission, whose 2013 Staff Working Paper on ‘Climate change, environmental

degradation, and migration’ drew heavily on the report.

The focus on ‘migration as adaptation’ has

IDMC (2019b).

See in particular Black et al. (2011) and Black et al. (2013).

See Foresight (2011), chapter 8.

See the studies quoted in Kraler et al. (2011), p.22.

See European Commission (2013), in particular p.8

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

38 PE 655.591

also been taken up by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

As an important knowledge

broker and intermediary between academic research on environment and migration on the one hand,

and policymakers on the other, IOM has been an important actor in further promoting this perspective

amongst the latter.

The focus on ‘migration as adaptation’ needs to be understood in the context of

the debates in global climate change policy on adaptation to climate change, and specifically the 2010

Cancun Adaptation Framework.

The significance of this understanding of migration is that it provides

a strong rationale for the promotion of mobility and migration options, both with regard to domestic

situations and internationally, even if actual or potential environmental change will not, and in most

cases cannot be the only political rationale for facilitating movement, for example through the creation

and consolidation of free movement areas and regional arrangements for migration and settlement. In

more general terms, the “migration as adaption” perspective shows that migration can be used as a

means to an end, in the same way as migration has been shown to have positive effects on human

development.

Based on ample evidence that migration presented a standard coping strategy vis-à-vis environmental

changes,

the Foresight report recommended the creation of policies enabling affected populations to

embrace migration as a coping strategy, while – as a last resort – also developing policies regarding

planned relocation

in contexts where areas become inhabitable in a longer term, whether as a result

of slow- or sudden-onset events. Directed mainly at internal situations, the conclusions of the Foresight

study nevertheless have broader ramifications and also raise the question of broader mobility options

across international borders, whether in a regional or a more global context. The study itself

recommended enhancing livelihoods, including by migration, facilitating temporary and circular labour

migration and remittances and utilising migration as an insurance strategy against risks associated with

environmental change.

3.3. Conclusions

This chapter has provided a review of the existing evidence on migration, mobility and displacement. It

has shown that climate change is likely to increase the likelihood of a number of natural hazards,

which in turn will have significant effects on migration drivers. In most situations, environmental

events do not per se trigger migration. Even in the case of disasters, movement is often a response

to consequences of the disaster rather than a response to a life-threatening situation as such, and

thus is mediated by a variety of social, economic and political factors. Importantly, the impact of

environmental changes is highly differentiated and generally affects vulnerable populations

disproportionately.

See the landing page of IOM’s Migration, Environment and Climate Change division at https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-

change, which mentions the promotion of migration as climate change as one three focus areas in that area – alongside prevention of

forced migration in the context of environmental change and assistance to forcibly displaced due to environmental factors. See also

Wiegel et al. (2019), p.3.

See Sakdapolrak et al. (2016), p.82.

UNDP (2009).

See references in Czaika & Reinprecht (2020), p.15.

Relocation refers to the domestic context. For cross-border planned movements, the term resettlement is used.

Foresight (2011), in particular chapters 6 and 8.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 39

This chapter has highlighted the focus of much of the debate on environmental migration and

displacement on the role of environmental change in general and climate change in particular on

triggering migration. Existing estimates put forward, largely by climate scientists, have been

shown to be problematic and resting on a simplistic and deterministic understanding of the

relationship between environmental change and migration, typically lacking basic quality criteria

such as precision of the concept to be measured and transparent methodology. However, for over a

decade, IDMC has been collecting data on current disaster-related displacement. Since 2020, data on

total stocks of disaster-related internal displacement are also available. This data collection provides a

robust and continuously improved evidence base that should be the basis for any further development

of data on global disaster-related displacement. Apart from the expansion of existing data collection to

cover more types of displacement – such as has happened with the recent addition of drought-related

displacement – data collection could be extended to cover cross-border displacement. IDMC’s disaster

displacement risk modelling offers a promising avenue for assessing future risks of disaster-related

displacement, including assessing the likely impact of climate change on weather-related disaster

displacement.

As this chapter has shown, environmental change cannot only act as a driver of mobility, it may also

trigger significant immobility. In addition, it may adversely affect immobilised populations, such as

persons in protracted displacement situations as a result of conflict, persecution or violence.

Finally, migration also needs to be seen as part of the solution and not just as an effect of

environmental change. The notion of ‘migration as adaptation’ highlights the need to embrace the

idea that mobility, including cross-border mobility, can and indeed needs to be part of responses to

adverse environmental changes and provides another rationale – apart from economic or

development-related reasons – to promote migration.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

40 PE 655.591

4. FILLING A GAP: INTERNATIONAL POLICY INITIATIVES

ADDRESSING PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Since the publication of the 2011 European Parliament study, the link between migration, mobility

and climate change has moved from the margins of policy debates at the international level to a

more prominent place both in the context of specific debates on climate change and those

related to migration and forced displacement, as well as broader conversations about

humanitarian and development assistance. These issues have been touched upon in a series of

initiatives, including new formats for exchanging practices and supporting policy development and the

creation of (mostly) soft law instruments considering environmental displacement. This chapter

KEY FINDINGS

Environmental migration and displacement has become an increasingly visible topic in international

policy discussions and initiatives. Efforts to address the issue can be seen in frameworks, guidance

and other action in the fields of migration and displacement, climate change and disaster and

humanitarian and development assistance.

In the field of migration and displacement, much of these efforts focus on cross-border dis placement.

The state-

led Nansen Initiative has been particularly active both globally and regionally in

strengthening protection for environmentally displaced persons, although it does not focus on slow-

onset disasters. Meanwhile, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration has raised

the profile of environmental drivers of migration and ways to address them through international

cooperation.

Preventing and responding to environmentally induced displacement has been part of broader

global discussions on climate change and disasters, notably through the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Climate Conference as well as the Sendai Framework for

Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

The issue is also on the agenda of humanitarian and development actors, as reflected in the 2030

Sustainable Development Agenda and 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and Platform on Disaster

Displacement.

In addition to such global initiatives, several regional initiatives, especially in Africa and Latin America,

as well as national-level efforts, particularly in the Pacific, represent important steps in strengthening

frameworks for protection in the context of environmental migration and displacement.

While this momentum has led to progress in filling protection gaps, the largely voluntary nature of

these initiatives and the need to effectively implement them all remain key challenges to an effective

response – amid expectations that climate change will continue.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 41

summarises the progress of debates and actions at the international level and reviews major milestones

in different arenas in which environmental migration and displacement has been addressed.

Figure 8: Milestones in the global governance of environmental migration and displacement,

2011 – 2020

Source: authors’ compilation and Camilla Fogli, ICMPD

With climate change expected to become an increasingly important issue, a range of multilateral

initiatives have endeavoured to strengthen protections for those displaced for environmental

reasons and to foster the resilience of those who could potentially be displaced. The Nansen

Initiative was the first global initiative addressing cross-border movements in this context, spurring and

inspiring many of the efforts that followed. In addition, both IOM and UNHCR have taken up the topic

and both helped to support state-led initiatives and addressed it in their ongoing work.

IOM has worked on environmental migration in its operations, research, policy and advocacy activities.

These efforts centre around its three overarching objectives on this topic: minimising involuntary and

unmanaged migration; supporting and protecting forced migrants; and promoting migration as a

climate change adaptation strategy.

While it has worked on the migration-environment-climate

change nexus since the 1990s, MSs first requested that IOM report on its work in this area in 2007. In

2015, the agency created the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division to spearhead work

on the subject.

Its work includes:

• participating in global processes, including the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular

Migration (GCM), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United

Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Global Forum on Migration and Development, as

well as regional dialogues;

See https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/iom-and-migration-environment-and-cli mate-change-mecc.

IOM (2019c), p. 2.

IOM (2019c).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

42 PE 655.591

• funding and implementing projects addressing environmental migration and displacement;

• conducting capacity-building activities for policymakers and practitioners, including regional and

national trainings; and

• undertaking research and strengthening data collection to build the evidence base on the nexus

of these issues.

Recognising that environmental and climate change will become increasingly important to migration

governance, IOM has incorporated the issue into its 2019-2023 Strategic Vision.

As with IOM, UNHCR has long paid attention to environmental change and displacement, often with a

specific focus on the nexus of forced displacement under its mandate and environmental change.

Recognising that forcibly displaced persons depend on the environment for food, warmth and shelter,

and that the scarcity of natural resources can spark competition or worse, the agency has undertaken

efforts to strengthen sustainable management of the environment, decrease environmental

degradation and improve the availability of resources for displaced persons and host communities.

Meanwhile, given the scale of displacement in disaster contexts, climate change and disasters have

become an increasing concern for UNHCR, and the agency has worked to respond to relevant

protection challenges.

UNHCR has been working on displacement in the context of climate change

since the mid-2000s, and its efforts in this area have included:

• supporting states in devising legal and policy approaches to extend protections to those

displaced by climate change, including through state-led initiatives such as the Nansen Initiative

and Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD);

• drafting guidelines for temporary protections;

• promoting policy coherence regarding protection across frameworks such as the Global

Compacts, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk

Reduction;

• providing technical assistance to the UNFCCC and other support in international fora;

• participating in responses to natural disasters, including in interagency responses to disaster-

induced internal displacement;

• developing, with partners, guidance regarding planned relocation; and

• conducting research aimed at filling gaps and informing policy and operations.

IOM (2019b).

See https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/environment-disasters-and-climate-change.html.

UNHCR (2017c).

UNHCR (2019) l.

See https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/climate-change-and-

disasters.html#:~:text=UNHCR%20recognizes%20that%20the%20consequences,and%20other%20people%20of%20concern.&text=It%

20recognizes%20that%20'climate%2C%20environmental,of%20climate%20change%20are%20numerous.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 43

UNHCR pledges in its 2017-2021 Strategic Directions to support the enhancement of protection

solutions for environmentally displaced persons in law, policy and practice; the agency has since

appointed a special advisor on climate action.

In 2019, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General created the High-level Panel on Internal

Displacement and tasked members with finding solutions for the rising number of IDPs across the

world.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also worked to tackle the issue, from

the lens of long-term development efforts including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Meanwhile, the issue has also been discussed at high-level dialogues such as the Global Forum on

Migration and Development and in regional consultative processes. Multilateral development banks

have also been active in this space to varying degrees, illustrating that a range of international

organisations are incorporating environmental displacement into their strategy development and

programming.

As international and regional initiatives have gained momentum, they have enhanced ways in which

policymakers and other stakeholders think about and respond to the issue of environmental

displacement, including through information sharing, the development of practical

recommendations and capacity-building efforts. They have also underscored the utility of

international cooperation to address the issue of environmental migration and displacement and

have helped to fill in key gaps, particularly related to concrete guidance and strategies for

policymakers. However, the voluntary and fragmented nature of most of these efforts and the need to

effectively implement them remain key challenges to responding to environmental migration and

displacement. Meanwhile, all signs point to continued implications for displacement and other forms

of migration in the context of climate change, necessitating an effective protection response.

4.1. Background: International protection instruments in the context of

environmental displacement

The international refugee regime, enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, defines a refugee as a

person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside his or her country of nationality

(or habitual residence for stateless persons) and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail

himself or herself of the protection of that country.

To enjoy the protection given by the Convention,

a person must fulfil all elements of the refugee definition. According to most commentators of

international refugee law, there are a number of difficulties in applying the 1951 Refugee

Convention in the context of natural disasters.

Two main arguments (among others) that have

Platform on Disaster Displacement (2018a), p.10; UNHCR (2017b), p.18..

See https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/content/high-level-panel.

See https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development/prosperity/recovery-solutions-and-

human-mobility/migration-and-displacement.html.

Art 1A 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees.

Scott referring to various court decisions and the understanding articulated by Dr Jacob Robinson, Israeli Ambassador Plenipotentiary to

the Refugee Convention at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries remarking that the refugee definition

‘obviously did not refer to refugees from natural disasters (Scott (2020) chapter 1.2.); see also UNHCR at

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

44 PE 655.591

been raised in this discussion are: 1) that natural disasters do not discriminate, while this is an integral

feature of the refugee definition

and 2) it is difficult to identify a persecutor in environmentally

induced cases.

The inoperability of the refugee definition for environmental claims has been also acknowledged by the

former High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, who stated that ‘adopting the terminology

of "climate refugees" “or "environmental refugees" would only complicate and confuse UNHCR's efforts

to protect victims of persecution and armed conflict.’

100

Among other reasons, he referred to the lack of

a “persecutor” and the “indiscriminate nature” of its impact.

101

Still, some people affected by climate

change have based their claims on the Refugee Convention (see below section 5.3.5).

In contrast, regional refugee protection instruments in Africa and Latin America employ a wider

refugee definition. The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention also

extends protection to “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign

domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin

or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another

place outside his country of origin or nationality.” While the transposition of the OAU convention in

national law by signatory states is far from complete, some African countries applied the OAU

Convention’s expanded definition on a prima facie basis to Somalis who were victims of famine threats

and unable to receive assistance from domestic authorities.

102

Additionally, Ethiopia endorsed the

Protection Agenda

103

to open its borders to persons compelled to leave their place of habitual residence

due to natural disasters, while Kenya welcomed some 200,000 Somalis fleeing such calamities without

invoking the OAU Convention.

104

In a similar vein, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees uses a definition of refugees that is

broader than the 1951 Refugee Convention and as the OAU convention includes a reference to persons

fleeing ‘other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.’

105

While this provides

flexibility for states, who may wish to apply the definition to those displaced due to natural or

environmental disasters, such an application is not necessarily required.

106

While the aforementioned instruments outline protections for cross-border movements, it was not until

1998 that international standards were reached for IDPs. Due to this protection gap, a rising number of

IDPs in the 1990s resulting from conflict and human rights abuses, and requests for the development of

a framework to address their needs by the UN Commission on Human Rights and General Assembly,

https://www.unhcr.org/49e4a5096.html; ; Cohen, R. and Bradley, M. (2010); McAdam (2011); Kälin, W and Schrepfer, N (2012); Scott, M

(2019).

Scott (2020), p.4.

McAdam (2011), p.12.

100

Guterres, A. (2012).

101

Ibid..

102

McAdam (2016), p.1536.

103

The Nansen Initiative (2015a).

104

McAdam (2016), p.1537.

105

UNHCR (1984), p.36, see alsohttps://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-

colloquium-international-protection.html.

106

UNHCR (2013), p.4, 6-7.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 45

the non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were ultimately created under the

auspices of Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs Francis Deng after a multi-year

process.

107

The Guiding Principles lay out 30 standards for protection, taking and adjusting principles

from human rights and humanitarian law and applying them to IDPs; while non-binding, they are based

on and consistent with binding laws and have gained significant traction among the international

community as a useful tool for addressing internal displacement.

108

For instance, among others, the

Guiding Principles form the basis for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on

Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.

109

The Guiding Principles define IDPs as persons who

were compelled to leave their homes or habitual residences, ‘in particular as a result of or in order to

avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or

natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State

border.’

110

The Guiding Principles thus also apply to internal displacement caused by

environmental events.

111

They do not foresee a specific status for IDPs, as these people are expected

to be able to enjoy the same rights as other citizens and legal residents in a country. But they do spell

out a number of specific protections that are particularly relevant in the context of internal

displacement, such as the prohibition from arbitrary displacement, including arbitrary evacuation in the

case of disasters or the obligation of authorities to prioritise all feasible alternatives to displacement

(principle 7).

112

The Guiding Principles do not explicitly consider indirect causes for migration, for

example the economic consequences of disasters. As a result, it is not always clear who exactly falls

under them.

113

This question is not just an academic question, but may become relevant, for example,

when state authorities decide who should be eligible for IDP assistance programmes.

The voluntary nature of these guidelines means that they are only binding if states incorporate them

into their domestic laws. By June 2020, the Global Database on IDP Laws and Policies

114

recorded 26 IDP

laws (i.e. binding regulations) in 14 countries and 60 policies (i.e. guidelines outlining the main goals of

the government) in 36 countries. An analysis of IDP laws and policies revealed that a minority, about

one-third, addressed disaster-related displacement.

115

More broadly, although the Guiding Principles

have been seen as an important tool that could be leveraged to strengthen protections for this

population from, during and following displacement, for several reasons, efforts largely continue to

focus on addressing protection in the context of cross-border rather than internal displacement, as

illustrated by the initiatives explored in this section.

116

While the Guiding Principles provide recommendations on responding to internal environmental

displacement, to date there is no established global instrument that would address cross-border

107

See for the guiding principlesOCHA (1998). ; For an early commentary by one of the experts involved in the drafting see Cohen (2001)

108

Cohen (2001)

109

Bradley et al. (2017) .

110

UN (2004), p.1.

111

Kraler et al. (2011), p.41.

112

other solutions.

4.3.1. IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural

Disasters

In 2011, the IASC revised its 2006 Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters.

These Guidelines, which address human rights concerns in the context of natural disasters, look at a

range of human rights issues, including access to different services and freedom of movement. Noting

that human rights concerns are frequently a result of insufficient planning and response rather than

intentional policies, the Guidelines promote the incorporation of human rights considerations into all

phases of disaster response.

194

In this document, the IASC recognises that IDPs are a particularly

vulnerable group, and the Guidelines state that they should be treated in line with the Guiding

Principles on Internal Displacement.

195

While the Guidelines touch upon internal displacement, they do

not focus on cross-border displacement.

4.3.2. The UN Framework on Climate Change and 2015 Paris Climate Conference

The 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, also known as COP 21 or the

Paris Climate Conference, took place at the end of 2015. The resulting Paris Agreement, which came

into effect in 2016, builds off the UNFCCC and boosts government investment and action to tackle

climate change.

196

It is particularly remarkable in that it is the first legally binding agreement on climate

change;

197

the Agreement has been ratified by 189 delegations (of 197).

198

Under the Paris Agreement,

countries pledged to address the climate change threat by working to mitigate temperature increases

and building the capacity of states to respond to its impacts.

199

Most relevant to this report, the

Agreement recognises that responses to climate change should respect the rights of migrants alongside

other particular populations.

200

COP 21 also called for the creation of the Task Force on Displacement (TFD), giving the Warsaw

International Mechanism for Loss and Damage the responsibility of executing this task force and

194

IASC (2011), p.2.

195

IASC (2011), p.2.

196

See

https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement.

197

See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en.

198

See https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.

199

UNFCCC (n.d., c).

200

UNFCCC (n.d., c=p.2.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

58 PE 655.591

reporting back to the UNFCCC on its findings. The TFD was established to devise recommendations on

coordinated strategies for responding to climate change-related displacement. In the first phase of its

work (2017-2019), the TFD examined four thematic areas related to displacement: national and

subnational policy and practice; international and regional policy; data and evaluation; and framing and

connections.

201

Based on this effort, COP 24 (2018) adopted several recommendations and extended

the work of the TFD.

202

Now in its second phase, the TFD is working toward the goals of its 2019 – 2021

Plan of Action, which include a range of activities related to information dissemination and capacity

building to strengthen awareness of and responses to environmental migration and displacement.

203

There is supposed to be a global check-in every five years, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020

meeting (COP26) was postponed.

4.3.3. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030

Upon the UN General Assembly’s request, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction undertook an

effort to develop an instrument to succeed the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the

Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. Following stakeholder consultations and

international negotiations, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was

adopted at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015.

204

This new instrument

works to further the efforts of its predecessor while also increasing the focus on managing risks of

disasters (rather than consequences of disasters), including the reduction of current risks and

prevention of new ones.

205

It mentions, among other things, that international cooperation is important

to reducing the risk of displacement;

206

that those displaced should have access to shelter, food and

other basic supports;

207

and that migrants can and do contribute to resilience-enhancing and risk-

reduction efforts.

208

The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (‘Global Platform’), which meets biennially, serves as

an instrument to support the implementation and monitoring of the Sendai Framework; with outcomes

also informing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (discussed in the next section).

209

The Global

Platform was created by the UN General Assembly to serve as the primary multilateral forum for

discussion and action on disaster-related risk reduction.

210

The 2017 Global Platform in Cancun was the

first to take place after the adoption of the Sendai Framework; the 2019 meeting was held in Geneva,

focusing on the theme of resilience.

211

201

UNFCCC (n.d., b)..

202

UNFCCC (2019) ; UNFCCC(n.d., b)..

203

UNFCCC (2019b).

204

UN (2015b), p.5 .

205

UN (2015b), p.5.

206

UN (2015b), p.18.

207

UN (2015b), p.21.

208

UN (2015b), p.23.

209

Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (2019).

210

Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (2017).

211

Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (2019).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 59

4.3.4. National-level initiatives in the Pacific

Pacific island countries have been particularly active on the issue of environmental migration and

displacement at the national level, reflecting the fact that climate change and disasters present a

particularly extreme threat for many countries in this region – notably, including challenges related to

sea-level rise, a slow-onset disaster.

4.3.4.1. Kiribati’s purchase of land abroad and Migration with Dignity Policy

In response to climate change-related economic and food security challenges, Kiribati purchased 5,460

acres of land for nearly $9 million USD from the Church of England in 2014.

212

This land is on Vanua

Levu, Fiji’s second largest island, which offers land that is higher above sea level and that provides

natural resources like fresh water, wood and stone. This government investment was intended to

support potential agricultural, fishing, and other activities to support economic development.

213

While

Kiribati’s government acknowledged that it would not be ideal to relocate all of its residents to this land,

it would theoretically be possible if necessary.

214

As of 2017, the government was still in its planning

stage and had not yet determined how the land would be utilised, although the president announced

that land cultivation would begin.

215

The Maldives had previously considered buying land in another

country, but Kiribati was the first to actually take this approach.

216

In addition to this purchase of land, Kiribati has launched its Migration with Dignity Policy with the

idea that climate change will necessitate the permanent relocation of some and that labour migration

creates an important pathway for this.

217

The policy is aimed at supporting voluntary, temporary and

permanent labour migration as an adaptation strategy; it also works to foster the growth of the

country’s diaspora, with the objective of enabling them to support other migrants in the future.

218

Additionally, the government is supporting efforts to upskill the population by enhancing their

educational and vocational attainment to make it easier for people to find opportunities for labour

migration.

219

These efforts support pathways for those who are willing and able to migrate.

4.3.4.2. Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement

Vanuatu, a country particularly vulnerable to both sudden- and slow-onset disasters, launched its

National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement in 2018.

220

In a context of

worsening natural hazards and community requests for help in the face of eviction and conflicts over

land, the government identified a policy gap regarding mitigating drivers of displacement, protecting

those who are displaced and responding to long-term needs related to development and recovery. The

aim of the policy is to encourage emergency and development actors to collaborate with the

government of Vanuatu to respond to the needs of all of the various types of displaced persons and

212

Republic of Kiribati (2014) .

213

Hartig (2017).

214

Caramel (2014).

215

Hartig (2017); Radio New Zealand (2017).

216

Caramel (2014).

217

Republic of Kiribati (n.d.).

218

Farbotko (2018) lands; McNamara (2015) .

219

McNamara (2015).

220

Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (2018).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

60 PE 655.591

displacement situations in the country.

221

The ultimate objective of the policy is to offer durable

solutions for everyone impacted by displacement.

This policy offers national standards regarding displacement and provides a roadmap for responding

to displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters, focusing on internal displacement

and planned relocation (also called resettlement). The document delineates the responsibilities of

different government agencies and aims to facilitate cooperation among stakeholders. The Ministry of

Climate Change Adaptation urges government and non-government stakeholders to use this

document to mainstream migration and displacement into their policy and planning to facilitate

durable solutions for displaced populations.

222

This roadmap takes a systems-level, multi-sectoral

approach to facilitate a whole-of-government strategy for mitigating displacement-related

challenges.

223

The policy document covers 12 strategic areas, encompassing a range of issues including

governance, research, safeguards, capacity building, land, housing, health, education, infrastructure,

food security, culture and justice to take a comprehensive approach. As part of this effort, IOM is

providing technical assistance to support policy implementation, while the Vanuatu National Disaster

Management Office is managing the creation of standard operating procedures to promote the

protection of and supports for IDPs.

4.3.4.3. Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines and trust fund

Fiji launched its Planned Relocation Guidelines at COP24 in 2018 to delineate clear and holistic

procedures surrounding this method of climate change response.

224

These Guidelines offer a roadmap

for involving communities in the relocation process, facilitating inter-sectoral cooperation and

incorporating considerations of gender, age and disability.

225

They are meant to be a living document

to be used to foster climate resilience by supporting governments, communities and other stakeholders

in local-level relocation efforts before, during and after relocation. The Guidelines aim to ensure that

relocation is sustainable and supportive of relocated persons to safeguard their wellbeing and rights.

They were developed with the support of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and

in alignment with other national frameworks including the country’s 5-year and 20-year National

Development Plans, National Adaptation Plan and National Climate Change Policy.

226

While relocation

is considered a last resort, it is one that will likely become more frequently used: a few Fijian villages

have already been relocated, and it is expected that at least 45 additional villages will need to relocate

in the near future.

227

In 2019, Fiji’s prime minister launched the Climate Relocation and Displaced Peoples Trust Fund for

Communities and Infrastructure on the sidelines of the 74th UN General Assembly meeting. It was

created to pay for relocation and the rebuilding of infrastructure and community, with the aim of

221

IOM (2018c) .

222

Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (2018).

223

IOM (2018b).

224

Republic of Fiji (2018).

225

Government of Fiji (2019).

226

Republic of Fiji (2018),

227

Republic of Fiji (2018), p.5; Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations (2019).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 61

supporting community adaptation to climate change.

228

Initial funding has come from the country’s

Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy; upon its launch, the prime minister asserted that support

for the Trust Fund is ‘one of the most effective ways [their] international partners can support [their]

adaptation effort.’

229

New Zealand contributed the first donation of $2 million (New Zealand dollars) in

early 2020, while Norway supported the establishment of the Trust Fund.

230

A lawyer who supported

the development of the Guidelines noted that Fiji was the first country to create sophisticated planned

relocation policies in the context of climate change, and that these were central to attracting funding

for the Trust Fund – constituting a model that could be emulated elsewhere.

231

4.4. Linking environmental migration and displacement to broader

humanitarian and development aid agendas

With a range of international actors increasingly recognising the challenges related to natural disasters

and climate change, discussions and planning in humanitarian and development spaces have also

touched upon environmental migration and displacement issues. Risks associated with climate change

and disaster are of concern for development stakeholders in particular because developing countries

are impacted disproportionately: They are more likely to face these events and may find it more

difficult to effectively respond due to challenges including less capacity and resources, weak

governance and population growth.

232

Forced displacement has long been central to the topic of

humanitarian aid response; meanwhile, development assistance has been increasingly viewed as an

avenue for providing sustainable solutions for displaced persons.

4.4.1. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda

UN Member States adopted 17 SDGs in 2015 under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

with the aim of achieving these goals by 2030. The SDGs succeed the Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs), which had a target date of 2015. One of the findings at the conclusion of the MDGs was that,

despite successes, progress was uneven and many people remained left behind, including in the

context of climate change, gender inequality and conflict.

233

Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs aim at

addressing root causes of poverty and apply to every country. Moreover, addressing climate change is

incorporated as a key element of sustainable development, with SDG 13 focusing on fostering

resilience and adaptation in the face of climate change.

234

The 2019 SDG report even names climate

change as ‘the defining issue of our time and the greatest challenge to sustainable development.’

235

However, progress on these ambitious goals is uneven, and responding to climate-related challenges

remains a key area for improvement in the 2020-2030 ‘decade of action’ to ensure the SDGs are met.

228

Government of Fiji (2019).

229

Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations (2019).

230

Goering (2020); Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations (2019).

231

Goering (2020).

232

Martin et al. (2018), p.409.

233

UN (2015a), p.8.

234

See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ and https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-

change/.

235

UN (2019)h.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

62 PE 655.591

4.4.2. 2016 World Humanitarian Summit

The Word Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was convened in Istanbul in 2016 to spur innovation in

international responses to crises and increase support for those affected. An important element of

the Summit’s work was strengthening connections between the humanitarian and development fields

to reflect and respond to the frequently protracted nature of displacement.

236

In his reports in

preparation of and following the WHS, the UN Secretary General recognised climate change and natural

disasters as two of the factors contributing to the worsening global humanitarian situation.

237

mentioned previously, the PDD was launched at the WHS to support the implementation of the

Protection Agenda. Participants at the Summit also underscored the need to increase proactive efforts

to reduce the risk of disasters and assist communities in coping with climate change.

238

4.4.3. Efforts by multilateral development banks

Multilateral development banks have increased their climate-related financing; the most recent data,

for 2018, shows a record high of $43.1 billion, of which 30% was allocated to adaptation efforts.

239

As part of its goals of ending extreme poverty and fostering shared prosperity, the World Bank has

explored the intersection of environmental change and mobility. Its Knowledge Partnership on

Migration and Development (KNOMAD) created a working group to explore connections between

environmental change and migration, displacement and relocation. The aim of KNOMAD is to

strengthen evidence-based policy and practice; to help achieve this goal, it is focusing on longitudinal

and quantitative data, especially regarding South-South flows. KNOMAD is also investigating the impact

of mobility on vulnerability and resilience, with the aim of protecting the most vulnerable.

240

Additionally, in its 2016 Climate Change Action Plan, the World Bank pledges to expand and integrate

efforts to address climate change across its work. Meanwhile, it has leant millions in funds for migration-

related projects in the past 15 years; it also created a sub-window of support for refugees in its fund for

the poorest countries in 2016 and that same year launched an effort to increase the quantity and quality

of jobs, with a focus on high-risk situations including migration.

241

Looking at regional development banks, the Asian Development Bank has included migration in

several areas of its work to address climate change, including research and technical assistance; it has

published multiple reports on the climate change-development-migration nexus and has indicated its

desire to support country-led adaptation efforts regarding climate change.

242

Arguing that policy

debates should go beyond humanitarian assistance and legal protection to also look at migration more

broadly as well as the role of development, with a focus on fostering resilience and making migration a

voluntary choice, the Bank undertook a project focused on devising financial and policy responses to

236

Grandi (n.d.).

237

UN General Assembly (2016b), p.2.

238

UN General Assembly (2016b), p.11, 13.

239

World Bank (2019).

240

Martin et al. (2018), p.411.

241

Martin et al. (2018), p.410.

242

Asian Development Bank (2010).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 63

environmental migration.

243

Additionally, the Bank’s 2020 strategy acknowledged the need for

migration policies that address climate change, while priority three of its Strategy 2030 is focused on

responding to climate change.

244

The Inter-American Development Bank adopted its Integrated Climate Change Mitigation and

Adaptation Strategy in 2011 to mainstream climate change in its work, strengthen knowledge of the

topic among staff and clients, enhance institutional frameworks to respond to this challenge and

increase investments, lending and technical assistance in this area.

245

It has also named climate change

and environmental sustainability as a current cross-cutting issue and focus area.

246

While migration is

not among the most prominent areas of the Bank’s work on climate change, it has focused in particular

on examining the impact of climate change on urbanisation and cities in the region, in alignment with

its push for more sustainable cities.

247

Similarly, the African Development Bank has focused on migration in the context of climate change

as it relates to migration to urban areas, as seen in its 2009 Strategy of Climate Risk Management and

Adaptation.

248

Its Strategy for 2013-22 lists green growth as one of its two overarching objectives, which

includes fostering resilience to climate change.

249

Meanwhile, the Bank has since established an Africa

Climate Change Fund to support small-scale pilot projects on climate adaptation.

250

4.4.4. A regional approach: Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific

Participants at the 2012 Pacific Island Leaders Forum agreed to launch an initiative to create a

regional framework to address risks related to climate change and disasters to replace two regional

frameworks set to expire in 2015 (the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change and the

Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action).

251

The consultative

process undertaken to inform the development of the framework included meetings, workshops and

interviews with a range of stakeholders, in addition to an online consultation that enabled public

feedback.

252

The resulting Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific, endorsed by regional

leaders in 2016, offers advice on how to foster resilience in the face of disasters and climate change in a

manner that aligns with sustainable development.

253

One of the (voluntary) priorities the Framework

identifies for governments is ‘integrat[ing] human mobility aspects, where appropriate, including

strengthening the capacity of governments and administrations to protect individuals and

243

Asian Development Bank (2011) .

244

Asian Development Bank (2010); Asian Development Bank (2019) .

245

Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation and Oversight (n.d.)

246

See Inter-American Development Bank https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/strategies

247

Miller (2016).

248

African Development Bank (n.d.), p.5.

249

See https://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/mission-strategy/objectives.

250

See https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/africa-cli mate-change-fund.

251

Pacific Community (2016), p..

252

See the dedicated webpage for the initiative under http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/.

253

See http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/; Pacific Community (2016).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

64 PE 655.591

communities that are vulnerable to climate change and disaster displacement and migration, through

targeted national policies and actions, including relocation and labour migration policies.’

254

4.5. Conclusions

International governance of environmental migration and displacement is a complex topic and

one that is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation

255

– providing both opportunities for

flexibility and challenges to a comprehensive response. There have been a number of initiatives

since 2011 that aim to establish approaches, spur action for cooperation and provide practical

recommendations on responding to environmental migration and displacement. This reflects a

recognition of the increasing importance of the issue and of the need for coordinated efforts to address

it. Overall, this work builds off previous efforts, which have enabled ensuing discussions and actions to

gain momentum.

The efforts explored in this report have emphasised practical guidance, information sharing,

cooperation and capacity building as important tools for translating ideas into action.

Meanwhile, increasingly forward-looking approaches have emphasised the need to identify,

mitigate and prevent future risks, including through fostering resilience to climate change and

disasters, in which migration can play a role. Notably, the efforts mentioned in this section are largely

state-led, voluntary initiatives. At the global level, there seems to be an understanding that there is little

appetite for a binding legislative framework for addressing environmental migration or displacement,

with the notable exception of the Kampala Convention. Initiatives have thus largely taken the form of

guidelines and toolboxes, which aim to collect and share good practices and thus make these ideas and

approaches more accessible to stakeholders.

Despite progress in tackling the issue – both its root causes and consequences – several

formidable challenges remain. With few legally binding instruments, most rely on the interest of

states (or other actors) in participating and complying, and these often address pieces of the puzzle

rather than constituting a holistic response to internal and cross-border migration and displacement in

the context of climate change and slow- and sudden-onset disasters. Meanwhile, there are

comparatively fewer international initiatives for addressing internal displacement, with most focusing

on cross-border movements. Perhaps most importantly, the effective implementation of the above and

future efforts is central to ensuring they will successfully and systematically strengthen protections for

environmentally displaced persons. Moreover, climate change – and its impacts on natural disasters and

on displacement (and other forms of movement) – continues, and addressing this is key to addressing

environmental migration and displacement that can result.

254

Pacific Community (2016), p.15.

255

Lieberman (2019).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 65

5. ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPLACEMENT AT

EUROPEAN AND MEMBER STATES LEVEL

5.1. The European policy debate

5.1.1. The European Union

At the international level, the EU has positioned itself as an active promoter in the fight against

climate change in international fora, above all the annual UNFCCC COP meetings. The EU, and its MSs

KEY FINDINGS

The EU and its MSs take an active role in promoting environmental protection in global fora. The EU

started late but has increasingly been addressing the nexus of environmental change and migration

over the last decade.

According to the prevailing view, d

isplacement based on climate alone does not meet the

requirements for refugee protection.

Within the EU, complementary forms of protection deriving from the Qualification Directive and

Temporary Protection Directive, as well as protection from non-refoulement in the Return Directive,

could provide protection alternatives. However, all of these instruments show deficiencies for the

protection of people displaced due to climate-related reasons.

To date, most European countries have made no efforts to extend national protection statuses to

those displaced due to environmental factors. Exceptions are Italy, Sweden and Finland, which

developed national protection grounds for victims of climate change and natural disasters.

However, Finland and Sweden suspended their respective national provisions as a consequence of

high numbers of arrivals in 2015/2016.

Judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU on sick

migrants can serve as examples of how these courts would assess applications from persons

displaced for climate-related reasons. Socio-

economic reasons under Articles 2 and 3 of the

European Convention on Human Rights could offer crucial protection bases; however, the threshold

is set very high.

While national European courts have not yet had to judge cases of climate change, Australian and

New Zealand courts have dealt with several cases. However, the only case where a court in New

Zealand has granted residence to a person who claimed not to be able to return due to climate

change was decided based on family ties in New Zealand and not on the situation in the applicant’s

country of origin, Tuvalu.

In a remarkable recent decision, the UN Human Rights Committee declared that inaction in the face

of global warming can lead to violations of human rights and trigger non-refoulement obligations.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

66 PE 655.591

individually, are party to this Convention and were one of the driving forces convincing other countries

to agree to an ambitious goal during the COP21 Paris Agreement

256

of holding the increase in the global

average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the

temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

257

Addressing climate change remains a top

priority of the current Commission.

258

The involvement of the EU in environmental change and migration started rather late,

259

in 2007-08,

with a green paper on climate change and a paper from the High Representative Javier Solana to

the Council linking climate change with security concerns.

260

A 2009 White Paper on a European

framework for action on adaptation to climate change recommended considering the effects of

climate change in broader EU discussions about security, development and migration policies.

261

The Stockholm Programme was the first to address the connection between climate and

migration

262

and invited the European Commission to analyse the effects of climate change on

international migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the Union. In response, the

European Commission came up with a comprehensive analysis in its 2013 Commission Staff Working

Document on Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration.

263

It provided a

thorough overview of research and data on the interlinkages between migration, environmental

degradation and climate change. The document concludes that further emphasis should be put on

knowledge to better understand the phenomenon in all its dimensions and increase the focus on

environmental migration in dialogues and cooperation frameworks such as the Global Approach to

Migration and Mobility (GAMM). As outlined in the paper, most displacement due to environmental

reasons remains within countries of origin

264

or the closer region; the paper therefore envisions EU

development and humanitarian aid policies as the focus of EU action on this matter.

265

In the following European Agenda on Migration from 2015, the European Commission mentioned

climate change as one of the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement,

alongside civil war, persecution and poverty, demanding an active and engaged EU external policy.

266

However, in the communications that followed, the European Commission fully focused on events

related to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and the responses taken. Climate was only mentioned as one of

the drivers for the ‘record numbers of migrants and refugees arriving in the EU in 2015’.

267

256

Astuccia, E. (2019).

257

UNFCCC (2016), Article 2.

258

During her opening statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session in July 2019, the new President of the European Commission

recognised the importance for the EU to demonstrate leadership in taking real action on climate change by aiming at becoming the first

climate-neutral continent in the world by 2050. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_4230.

259

Geddes, A. & Sommerville, W (2013).

260

High Representative and European Commission (2008) .

261

European Commission (2009).

262

Council of the European Union (2009) 17024/09, p.29.

263

European Commission (2013).

264

European Commission (2013), p.17.

265

European Commission (2013), p.35.

266

COM (2015) 240 final, p.7.

267

European Commission (2016f) 85final.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 67

As early as 1999,

268

the European Parliament addressed the links between environmental

degradation and security concerns in international relations in its report. Specifically, the resolution

remarked that ‘climate refugees’ already outnumber ‘conflict refugees’.

269

It therefore called for an

official recognition for ‘environmental refugees’.

270

Later, in 2011, the Parliament commissioned the

above-mentioned study on ‘Climate Refugees’,

271

which aimed at taking stock of the discussion and

the typology of environmental migration, identify the protection gaps and develop appropriate

recommendations. In its 2016 report, the European Parliament specifically addressed

environmental degradation as one of the triggers of population movements.

272

It reaffirmed that

the Union must address the root causes of ‘push factors’, naming climate change and natural disasters

as examples alongside conflict, persecution and others.

273

In 2017, the European Parliament

requested that the EU take a leading role in recognising the impact of climate change on mass

displacement, ‘as the scale and frequency of displacements are likely to increase’.

274

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were already actively proposing a community status of

ecological refugees in 2001

275

and issued a position paper on Climate Change, Refugees and Migration

in 2013

276

highlighting – among others – possibilities to include climate change either in the recast

Qualification Directive

277

(QD), Temporary Protection Directive

278

(TPD) or the Return Directive (RD).

Since these early initiatives, the concerns on the impact of climate and natural disasters on migration

cuts across the groups in the European Parliament.

5.1.2. The Council of Europe

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) issued a report in 2008 entitled

“Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21st century challenge,”

279

which

emphasised the lack of consensus within the international community regarding international legal

terminology concerning human mobility associated with environmental disasters and degradation,

hindering progress on the recognition and legal protection of environmental migrants. The report

further calls for an investigation of “existing gaps in law and protection mechanisms with a view to an

eventual elaboration of a specific framework for the protection of environmental migrants, either in a

separate international convention or as part of relevant multilateral treaties.”

280

Recommendation 1862

(2009) to the Committee of Ministers

281

adopted at the same time goes so far as to advocate for

268

European Parliament (1999).

269

European Parliament (1999), Art K.

270

European Parliament (1999), explanatory note.

271

Kraler, Cernei, Noack (2011), see above under chapter 2.

272

European Parliament (2016), para G.

273

European Parliament (2016), para 100.

274

European Parliament (2017), para31.

275

See in more detail Srgo, A. (2008).

276

The Greens (2013).

277

Directive 2011/95/EU.

278

Council Directive 2001/55/EC.

279

Council of Europe (2008).

280

Council of Europe (2008).

281

Council of Europe (2009).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

68 PE 655.591

considering an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on “the

right to a healthy and safe environment”.

The Assembly considered this topic again in 2016, with a report by Philippe Bies

282

asking MSs to give

greater priority to (among others) devising protection policies and norms for victims of natural

disasters and for victims of the consequences of climate change. The Assembly’s preferred option

at that time was to “revise the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, by means,

for example, of an additional protocol.”

283

A report from PACE in August 2019 was comparably more cautious, stepping back from proposing any

additional protocol but emphasising the potential of learning lessons from the IDP protection

framework. It further highlights the complementarity between prevention, emergency assistance and

the search for sustainable solutions, accelerating societies’ adaptation to climate change.

284

PACE,

however, concluded, that the absence of a legally binding definition of “climate refugees” does not

preclude the possibility of developing specific policies to protect people who are forced to move as a

consequence of climate change.

285

In the respective resolution from October 2019, PACE called for

protection measures to be developed in the asylum systems of Council MSs to ‘provide appropriate

asylum’ for people who are forced to move as a consequence of climate change.

286

The resolution

called on MSs to recognise human migration as a tool for increasing “livelihood resilience” and a

legitimate form of adaptation to climate change.

287

5.2. Addressing environmental migration and displacement in the EU

external dimension

5.2.1. Tools in the context of migration and forced displacement

EU law, policies and programmes explicitly related to forced displacement have been developed from

the perspective of development and humanitarian aid within the so-called ‘external dimension’ of the

EU’s migration and asylum policy. Although the developed frameworks hardly focus on environmental

displacement, they are regularly mentioned as drivers or one of the root causes of displacement.

Since 2005, the (revised) GAMM is the overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum

policy. The framework defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU

countries, based on clearly defined priorities and embedded in the EU’s overall external action,

including development cooperation. It aims to better organise legal migration, preventing and

combatting irregular migration, eradicating trafficking in human beings, maximising the development

impact of migration and mobility and promoting international protection and enhancing the external

dimension of asylum.

288

Among others, the GAMM also addresses environmental migration by means

282

Council of Europe (2016).

283

Council of Europe (2016).

284

Council of Europe (2019a).

285

Council of Europe (2019a).

286

Council of Europe (2019b), para 5.4.

287

Council of Europe (2019b), para 4.

288

European Commission (2011), p.7.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 69

of adaptation to adverse effects of climate change.

289

Under the GAMM framework bilateral cooperation

was established between the EU and nine EU neighbourhood countries (Mobility Partnership) and the

EU with three other third countries (Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility, CAMM). While at

present none of these partnership frameworks explicitly address the nexus between climate change

and migration, they aim at better managing migration flows in partnership with the EU in exchange for

enhanced legal mobility pathways. Specifically, the Mobility Partnerships provide a flexible tool with

the potential to bring environmental migration and displacement into the partnership agenda.

In 2015, the EU–Africa Summit on Migration was held in Valletta, Malta, which resulted in the Valletta

Summit Action Plan.

290

The political declaration which accompanied the Summit acknowledged that

migration within and between the continents is a multifaceted phenomenon. The parties agreed –

among other pledges – to commit to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced

displacement, mentioning environmental trends as one of them.

291

The Valletta Summit also

launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The 2019 Report on the EU Trust Fund mentions

environmental challenges in various parts of Africa.

292

Extreme temperatures as well as droughts

and fluctuating rainfall in the Sahel zone, combined with fast-growing populations, will – according to

the report – aggravate the existing pressure and will increasingly impact migration and conflict.

293

Since 2016, the EU has a dedicated policy framework on forced displacement in place, which aims to

“prevent forced displacement from becoming protracted and to gradually end dependence on

humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations by fostering self-reliance and enabling the

displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until voluntary return or

resettlement.”

294

It is based on the Communication of the European Commission “Lives in Dignity:

from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance”

295

and the Council Conclusions on forced displacement.

296

Both address climate change as an aggravating factor forcing even more people to flee. The

accompanying Staff Working Document, however, identifies violence as a key factor forcing people to

flee, while characterising disasters and climate phenomena as threat multipliers for instability, conflict

and state fragility.

297

5.2.2. Tools in the context of humanitarian aid and disaster relief

EU humanitarian aid is an expression of international solidarity as laid out in the Lisbon Treaty Art 196

and 214. The EU provides assistance for affected countries and populations in cases of disaster or

humanitarian emergencies. In this, civil protection and humanitarian aid are complementary. Although

289

European Commission (2011).

290

Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015), p.3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf.

291

Valetta Summit Political Declaration (2015) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21841/political_decl_en.pdf.

292

European Commission (2019).

293

European Commission (2019), p.22.

294

European Commission (2016c) COM (2016) 234 final, p.2.

295

European Commission (2016c) COM (2016) 234 final.

296

European Council (2016).

297

European Commission (2016d) SWD (2016) 142 final, p.2.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

70 PE 655.591

institutionally covered by one Directorate General, DG ECHO,

298

both humanitarian aid and civil

protection policies in the EU are rooted in distinctly different institutional frameworks, and they are

governed by different legal norms.

299

In the case of humanitarian aid, the European Commission Civil

Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department shares competence with EU MSs, and

together they are one of the leading global humanitarian donors. When it comes to civil protection, the

EU assumes a supporting role, coordinating voluntary contributions of in-kind assistance from countries

participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

300

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid

Operations Department has been providing assistance to people in need since 1992; its annual

humanitarian budget is just over €1 billion.

301

The Humanitarian Aid Regulation from 1996

302

sets the rules for the provision of humanitarian aid,

including its financing instruments. It stipulates that humanitarian aid shall be comprised of assistance,

relief and protection operations on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in third countries,

particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing countries and

victims of natural disasters and human-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting.

303

The overall policy framework for humanitarian assistance is outlined in the ‘European Consensus on

Humanitarian Aid‘ (2007),

304

signed by the three main EU institutions (the Commission, the Council and

Parliament). The Hyogo Framework and its successor, the 2015 Sendai Framework, significantly

influenced EU discourses and policy making in the field of humanitarian aid and civil protection. In

particular, they informed the ‘European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid - Action Plan’ in 2008

305

and

the ‘Implementation Plan of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2015’.

306

The Consensus

defines the EU’s common vision, policy objectives and principles on a number of topics, including

international humanitarian cooperation, good donorship, risk reduction and preparedness, civil

protection and civil-military relations.

The 2019 Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism

307

governs EU actions in the area of civil

protection. It modified the respective 2013 decision that dealt with prevention, preparedness, response

and financial provisions. The 2016 regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union

establishes the circumstances under which MSs may apply for EU support. It sets out the eligible actions

and types of financial intervention.

The European Commission uses a dedicated Emergency Toolbox to respond rapidly to new

emergencies. It contains four instruments: the Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT), the

298

Beside DG ECHO there are also a number of further DGs involved such as DG CLIMA or DG HOME for e.g. security aspects. Within the

European Parliament, humanitarian aid falls within the remit of the Committee on Development (DEVE), and civil protection within that

of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). See Perchinig, et al. (2017), p.8.

299

Perchinig, et al. (2017), p.7f.

300

See: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en; for a more detailed historic summary of the Development of EU Humanitarian Aid

and Civil Protection Policies see Perchinig, et al. (2017).

301

See https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who/about-echo_en.

302

Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 (the Humanitarian Aid Regulation).

303

Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 (the Humanitarian Aid Regulation); Art 1.

304

Commission of the European Union (2007): COM (2007) 317 final.

305

Commission of the European Communities (2008). SEC (2008)1991.

306

European Commission (2015). SWD (2015) 269 final.

307

Decision (EU) 2019/420.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 71

Epidemics Tool, the Small-scale Tool and supports to the International Federation of the Red Cross and

Red Crescent Societies' Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

308

Some of these tools were used in 2018

to provide support to countries hit by natural disasters. ALERT, for example, provides rapid first-line

funding for immediate response to sudden-onset large-scale natural disasters where more than 100 000

people are affected. In 2018, EUR 8.65 million was provided to respond to severe floods in Kenya,

Ethiopia and Nigeria, earthquakes and a tsunami in Indonesia and the effects of a tropical cyclone in the

Philippines.

309

The Small-scale Tool was used to respond to seven disasters of a total of EUR 2.225 million,

among them also some related to natural disasters, namely those in Tonga (tropical storm), Guatemala

(volcano eruption), Venezuela (floods) and Haiti (earthquake).

310

5.3. Addressing environmental displacement in the EU internal

dimension

Since international refugee law can only be applied to a very limited extent (see above at chapter

4.1.), international human rights law remains a possible ‘complementary’ basis for protection

claims from environmentally displaced persons. These complementary forms of protection mainly

derive from the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against

Torture (CAT) as well as the ECHR and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) as well as the

Qualification Directive (QD, Directive 2011/95/EU) in the EU context. In particular, the right to life (Art 6

ICCPR, Art 2 ECHR, Art 2 CFR) and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (Art

7 ICCPR, Art 3 CAT, Art 3 ECHR, Art 4 CFR; Art 15 QD) are of relevance in the context of the protection of

environmentally displaced persons.

311

5.3.1. European legislation

International protection within the EU is regulated by a set of EU Regulations and Directives jointly

referred to as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Despite a brief reference to climate change

and migration in the Stockholm Programme, also the second generation of CEAS instruments does not

directly address protection in the context of climate change or natural disasters. Still, the QD and other

instruments and initiatives within the EU may create entry points for such cases,

312

which are outlined

below.

5.3.1.1. The Qualification Directive

The purpose of the QD is to harmonise and set common standards across EU MSs on how to designate

a person as being in need of international protection. This Directive defines international protection as

being for refugees in the sense of the 1951 Refugee Convention; in cases where a person does not

qualify for refugee status, he or she can be granted subsidiary protection status. The latter is based on

308

European Commission (2020): COM (2020) 6 final.

309

European Commission (2020): COM (2020) 6 final.

310

European Commission (2020): COM (2020) 6 final.

311

Climate change of course may also impact other human rights, such as the right to adequate food (Art 11 ICESCR; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 5

CERD), the right to water (Arts 11 and 12 ICESCR42; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 28 CRPD; Art 24 CRC), the right to health (Art 12 ICESCR), or the

right to adequate housing (Art 11 ICESCR).

312

Kraler, Cernei & Noack (2011).

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

72 PE 655.591

“criteria drawn from international obligations under human rights instruments and practices in MSs”

(recital 34 QD).

Refugee Protection

With slight modifications, the QD follows the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. To qualify as

a refugee, a person thus must fulfil the definition as described in Art 1A 1951 Refugee Convention as

adapted in Art 2(d) QD. Victims of natural disaster therefore need to equally fulfil the definition to

be recognised as a refugee under the QD.

313

Environmental reasons per se are not among the

elements relevant for qualifying as a refugee. As described above under chapter 4.1, the absence of

a persecutor in environmental disasters and its non-discriminatory nature stands against qualifying

victims of such disasters as refugees. However, environmental disasters can still indirectly also be a

reason for the application of the refugee status, for example if a state arbitrarily restricts access to socio

economic rights in the course of a natural disaster and thereby discriminates against a certain group of

people and thus the condition of persecutor is met.

314

Subsidiary Protection

The complementary human rights-related protection grounds are provided under subsidiary protection

in the QD. Subsidiary protection is defined as the “protection of a third-country national or a stateless

person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown

for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin […] would face a real

risk of suffering serious harm” (Art 2f QD). Subsidiary protection thus requires the element of ‘serious

harm’, which circumscribes the different criteria drawn from international obligations such as the right

to life (Art 2 ECHR) or the prohibition of torture (Art 3 ECHR). It consists, according to Art 15 QD of:

1. the death penalty or execution,

2. torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of

origin, or

3. serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in

situations of international or internal armed conflicts.

The recast of the QD did not change the scope of subsidiary protection. For some, this constituted

a missed opportunity to further enlarge the scope of subsidiary protection, for example to people

leaving their country due to environmental reasons.

315

Thus, the recast QD remains with the three

criteria mentioned above that must be satisfied in order for someone to be granted subsidiary

protection. While Art 15 a and c offer little scope for environmental protection, the prohibition of

inhuman and degrading treatment upon return as stated in Art 15 b has provided leeway for

313

EASO (2016), p46 additionally noting that their claim is unlikely to arise from a threat of persecution.

314

Ragheboom (2017), p.326. Ragheboom distinguishes between different scenarios, such as when the degradation of the environment is

deliberately caused by a state or non-state actor to harm a specific group, such as an ethnic, political, religious, national or social group

(see Ragheboom (2017), p.328f). Another possible scenario would be if the ‘Degradation of the Environment is Caused by Technological

Accident or Natural Hazard’. In such cases, Ragheboom indicates that ‘it must be shown that the threats to life or limb or threats of

serious impairment of their economic, social and cultural rights affect the applicants specifically, as members of a group identifiable by

the race, religion, nationality, political opinion or distinct social characteristic of its members.’ (p.331).

315

See Borges (2019).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 73

interpretation in literature

and jurisprudence (see below). Art 15 b also provides some room for MS

policies to address environmental reasons that prevent a person from returning. Some MSs indeed have

included in their legislation refugee-type protection provisions concerning those who may be unable

to return home owing to a natural disaster.

316

The negotiation for a qualification regulation

317

offers yet another opportunity to broaden the

scope of subsidiary protection. The European Parliament proposed to include – among others –

internal conflicts, severe violations of human rights or events seriously disturbing public order in the

country of origin, or in a part thereof as factors to be taken into account when determining whether

indiscriminate violence exists.

318

This proposal, however, did not meet the Council's mandate for

negotiations with the Parliament,

319

while further negotiations have been pending since.

5.3.1.2. The Temporary Protection Directive

Also within the CEAS, the TPD 2001/55/EC is often cited as a potential instrument to extend to

environmental migration. The application of this instrument, however, has a number of shortcomings.

The term ‘mass influx’ is not defined, which may together with a lack of political will be but two of the

reasons why the rather complex mechanisms to apply the directive have never been triggered.

320

Moreover, the temporary nature of the status may provide a solution for rapid onset disasters but

hardly for slow-onset disasters like sea-level rise. An entry point in this respect is Art 2(d), which refers

to the ‘Arrival in the Community,’ whether spontaneous or aided, e.g. via evacuation programmes. The

reference to evacuation programmes has been identified as a strength of the Directive, insofar as it

could facilitate the legal and safe arrival of displaced persons,

321

potentially also for victims of natural

disasters. The directive has, however, never been triggered, even during the 2015-16 so-called

‘migration crisis’.

5.3.1.3. The Return Directive

Another EU secondary legal act of importance in the present context is the EU RD 2008/115/EC. The

principle of non-refoulement is well enshrined in this directive, which states that the implementation

of return must respect the principle of non-refoulement (Art 5) and that removal shall be postponed if

it would violate this principle (Art 9).

The RD basically distinguishes between legal (non-refoulement or suspensory effects of appeals against

return decisions) and practical obstacles that may postpone removal (Art 9). Issues related to non-

refoulement may well extend to cases of return to a country hit be environmental and/or natural

disasters. However, there is no EU harmonised status for non-refoulement cases (beyond those covered

by the QD). MSs can, in principle, invoke Art 9(2) to postpone the removal of victims of environmental

disasters; they may also devise more favourable provisions.

316

European Commission (2013).

317

European Commission.

318

European Parliament (2017b), recital 34.

319

Statewatch (2018) https://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jan/eu-qualification-reg-trilogue-doc-10-1-17.pdf.

320

Beirens et al. (2016), p.38.

321

Beirens et al. (2016), p.17.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

74 PE 655.591

5.3.1.4. Non-harmonised protection status

The EU asylum and protection framework leaves a certain gap with respect to cases that are at the

interface between subsidiary protection and non-refoulement as derived from Art 3 ECHR. In this

intersection, MSs may develop national protection statuses provided they do not undermine the

minimum standards deriving from the CEAS. The European Migration Network (EMN) reports

322

that 20

countries covered by a recent report have at least one national protection status. Most of them offer

more general humanitarian statuses, two of them specifically addressing environmental change and

natural disasters (see below under chapter 5.3.2).

5.3.1.5. Resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes

Resettlement is considered by UNHCR as one of the durable solutions for refugees and a life-saving tool

to ensure the protection of those refugees most at risk.

323

However, UNHCR estimated that 1.4 million

refugees were in need of resettlement, while only 81,300 places for new submissions were provided by

29 resettlement states in 2018.

324

Complementary to the global resettlement framework, a specific EU framework is negotiated.

325

Under

the proposal for a Regulation for an EU Resettlement Framework, 'resettlement' is defined as the

admission of third-country nationals and stateless persons in need of international protection from a

third country to which or within which they have been displaced to the territory of a MS with a view to

granting them international protection (Art 2). The proposal contains no reference to environment- or

disaster-induced migration. While it will hardly evolve as a protection tool for climate-induced

migrants per se, it may still offer a solution for refugees who need to be resettled due to adverse

environmental change in their country of asylum.

5.3.1.6. Other options

Besides the abovementioned protection tools, there are additional ones that come up when discussing

alternative measures to fill protection gaps for people who need to leave their countries and regions of

origin due to disaster and environmental change.

Humanitarian grounds are but one possibility for MSs to issue a visa with limited territorial validity.

326

While such a humanitarian visa could bridge the lack of access to the EU for people in need of

humanitarian protection including in the course of a natural disaster, the lack of existing protection or

residence status would come up once the residence status needs to be determined in the country of

destination.

327

In its resolution from 11 December 2018, the European Parliament requested that the

European Commission submit a proposal establishing a European Humanitarian Visa which wou ld a llow

persons seeking international protection to enter an EU MSs for the sole reason of submitting an

application for international protection.

328

322

EMN (2020) p.11.

323

UNHCR (2019), p.30.

324

UNHCR (2019), p.30.

325

European Commission (2016) COM (2016) 468 final.

326

Art 25 Visa Code; REGULATION (EC) No 810/2009.

327

For more see Jensen (2014).

328

European Parliament (2018).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 75

Box 2: Beyond Europe: Brazil’s humanitarian visa

Sources: Cantor (2018); IOM (2018a)

Another possibility may entail ‘humanitarian corridors’, by expanding the emphasis from the transit

of material aid such as food, water and medical supplies to the movement of people displaced by

disasters.

329

Indeed, humanitarian corridors are already in place in some EU countries like Italy, France

and Ireland to provide a pathway for people escaping conflict, which can well be extended to people

forced into exile by environmental upheaval.

330

However, it has not yet been used in this context.

In addition, at times a system of circular migration or, indeed, seasonal work is proposed as a coping

strategy for people affected by climate or environmental disasters.

331

Within the EU, the Seasonal

Workers Directive

332

offers MSs an opportunity to grant third-country nationals seasonal work permits

for not less than 5 months and not more than 9 months within a 12-month period (Art 14). Such

programmes would allow persons whose livelihood is threatened or even wiped out by climate change

to seek work on a seasonal basis in the EU during those periods. This seasonal system could reduce

stress on temporary and permanent residence systems by encouraging migrants to seek protection

only for the minimum amount of time needed. Seasonal work permits have already been tested as

an adaptation strategy to climate change in the context of floods in Colombia in 2008 under a

Spain-Colombia agreement.

333

Based on the bilateral agreement on circular migration, the project

“Temporary and Circular Labour Migration Project” developed and facilitated temporary migration to

Spain for Colombians affected by the floods in order to work in the agricultural sector for a limited

time.

334

329

Miller et al. (2017), p91.

330

Régnier (2019).

331

Hush (2018). See also The Greens (2013), p.11.

332

Directive 2014/36/EU.

333

Rinke(2011).

334

Rinke (2011), p.25.

Brazil’s 2017 Migration Law (No. 13445) provides temporary visas for humanitarian reception for

those displaced by natural disasters. It stipulates that ‘the temporary visa for humanitarian reception

can be granted to a stateless person or a national from any country in a situation of a serious or

imminent institutional instability, armed conflict, major calamity, environmental disaster or serious

violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, or on other grounds specified in the

regulations.

’

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

76 PE 655.591

Box 3: Beyond Europe: Australia’s Labour Mobility Scheme

Sources: Australian Government, Department of Education, Skills and Employment (2020a & b); International Labour

Organization (2019); Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2020); Australian Government,

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019)

Seasonal work offers a valuable solution to compensate e.g. for the lack of work due to periodic or

sudden-onset disasters. It, however, falls short of addressing situations in which climate change or

natural disasters have a permanent impact on peoples’ livelihoods.

5.3.2. National legislation and practice

An EMN ad hoc query on climate change and migration in 2018

335

revealed that, in most countries, the

link between climate change and migration is not much discussed. Debates are driven largely by

academic researchers or the media rather than policymakers. Sporadic debates evolved, however, in

the context of larger initiatives such as the French discussions in the context of the 2015 COP 21, the

German chairmanship of the PDD or the discussions in the context of the development of the Austrian

migration strategy.

336

However, none of the countries reported any planned changes in their respective

legislations as a result of these discussions.

337

International Protection (EU harmonised protection status)

In accordance with the prevailing opinion that climate change and natural disasters do not offer any

protection grounds for refugee status according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, European countries

also reject such an interpretation.

338

To qualify as refugee, the claimant would therefore need to provide

a link to one of the five protection grounds under the 1951 Refugee Convention or rather, in the case of

EU MSs, under the 2011 QD.

Similar to refugee status, the brief survey of selected countries for this study did not reveal that any of

the EU MSs plan to make use of subsidiary protection for reasons of environmental or natural disasters.

335

EMN (2018b).

336

EMN (2018b).

337

EMN (2018b).

338

Explicitly stated by AT, CZR, DE to a questionnaire on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD to selected EU+ countries

in March 2020.

Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) and complementary Pacific Labour Mobility Scheme are

leveraging labour mobility arrangements to support migrants from areas impacted by climate change

and disasters. The SWP replaced the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme in 2012, scaling up efforts to

facilitate the recruitment of workers for the agriculture and accommodation industries while helping

further the development of regional workers and their origin communities. Meanwhile, the Pacific

Labour Mobility Scheme was established in 2018 following a pilot programme and aims to meet

Australian low- and semi-skill labour needs and offer opportunities to those living in the Pacific region.

It is one of the initiatives under Australia’s ‘Step-up’ foreign policy to increase its engagement in the

Pacific and respond to challenges the region is facing, including climate change and disasters. Spain

and New Zealand have used a similar approach.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 77

Again, the use of subsidiary protection may apply in certain circumstances: While environmental

reasons are, for example, not explicitly stated in Austrian asylum and migration law, they could

potentially still lead to a protection status if the return of a person who claims environmental reasons

and who is not granted refugee status in Austria would constitute a real danger of violating Art 2 or 3

ECHR. In such cases it cannot be excluded that the person could be granted subsidiary protection in

Austria according to Art 8 Asylum Act 2005.

339

Non-harmonised EU protection status

Besides the harmonised international protection statuses, EU MSs make use of providing more

favourable standards to protection than defined in the respective EU law by extending protection to

people who do not fall under international protection. A recent EMN report provides an overview of

such national protection statuses in 25 EU MSs plus Norway that participated in the survey. T he EMN

found national protection statuses covering humanitarian or compassionate grounds, which

encompass more generic legislative definitions to more specific ones such as medical cases,

national statuses based on the principle of non-refoulement as well as statuses linked to

environmental change and natural disasters.

340

The EMN classifies these statuses at the interface

between subsidiary protection and Art 3 ECHR.

341

Table 5: Overview of non-harmonised protection statuses in MS+

Type of National Protection Status Countries apply the status # of countries

Overarching humanitarian grounds

BE, CY, CZ, EL, ES, FI, IE, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, SE,

SK, NO

Exceptional circumstances AT, EL, FI, IT, LU, SE 6

Non-refoulement

CZ, ES, FI, HU, IT, PL, UK, NO

Climate change and natural disaster

IT, SE

Source: adapted from EMN (2020), only national protection statuses were listed that from their scope potentially could

encompass protection due to environmental change and natural disasters.

As illustrated in the table above, an explicit mention and a dedicated national protection status for

environmental reasons only exists in Italy and Sweden, while Finland encompasses such grounds

under a more general status for humanitarian and compassionate reasons.

The Swedish Aliens Act (2005:716), Chapter 4 section 2a together with Chapter 5 section 1, provides

protection for a person who cannot return to his or her country of origin because of an environmental

disaster. The residence permit could last for up to 3 years; however it is currently suspended as a

consequence of the high number of arrivals in 2015-16. In Italy, national protection can be granted to

migrants – who first do not qualify for international protection – if there are "serious reasons" of a

339

Response from the Austrian Ministry of Interior to a questionnaire on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD in March

2020.

340

EMN (2020), p.5.

341

EMN (2020), p.5.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

78 PE 655.591

humanitarian nature such as famine or environmental/natural disasters in the country of origin, among

others.

342

This kind of status could last 6 months and was, according to the EMN, used once.

343

The Finnish Aliens Act 301/2004, Chapter 6 Section 88a, opens the possibility of granting humanitarian

protection if neither asylum nor subsidiary protection can be granted but the person cannot return to

his/her country of origin or habitual residence as a result of (among other reasons) an environmental

catastrophe. As in the case of Sweden, Finland suspended the respected provisions as a consequence

of the high number of arrivals in 2015-16.

Another example of providing a national status can be found in Switzerland in Art 83 of the Swiss

Foreign Nationals and Integration Act. This article provides temporary admission if the enforcement of

a removal order (from a humanitarian point of view) is not reasonable because the person concerned is

‘in concrete danger in situations such as war, civil war, general violence and medical emergency in his

or her home country or country of origin’. The Federal Council already affirmed in 2008 that this

regulation is applicable to "disaster displaced persons". In addition, there is a provision in both the Swiss

Asylum Act and the Aliens and Integration Act on the basis of which the enforcement of the return to a

region affected by a natural disaster can be temporarily suspended (Article 44 para. 2 Asylum Act and

Article 83 para. 4 Aliens and Integration Act).

344

Beyond a specific status, in Cyprus, Art 29(4) of the Refugee Law of 2000

345

includes environmental

destruction as an additional reason for non-refoulement of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary

protection. Environmental destruction does by itself not provide a protection ground but extends the

non-refoulement obligation enshrined in international refugee law.

346

Germany has been working to establish mechanisms to provide adequate protection to people

affected by disaster-induced displacement in disaster-prone countries as part of its humanitarian

assistance and development cooperation.

347

While those discussions did not extend to a specific legal

pathway or status, the German Advisory Council on Global Change proposed in August 2018 to develop

a “climate passport” that “should offer those who are at risk of global warming the option to gain access

to civil rights in safe countries.” The climate passport should, in its first phase, open early, voluntary and

humane migration routes to the populations of small island states whose territory will likely become

uninhabitable due to climate change. The "climate passport" should therefore apply to those people

who would become stateless if their home were uninhabitable.

348

Besides these examples, the research revealed neither further direct reference to protection for

environmental migrants in other countries nor any current plans on the part of national policymakers

to introduce such provisions in the near future. While state practice can influence EU law, also illustrated

342

Answer by Italy to EMN (2017); EMN (2020), p.23.

343

EMN (2020), p.23.

344

Response from the Swiss State Secretary for Migration to a questionnaire on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD in

March 2020.

345

See http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop /non-ind/2000_1_6/full.html.

346

Art 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

347

EMN (2018b).

348

German Advisory Council on Global Change (2018).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 79

in the drafting history of subsidiary protection,

349

the low number of countries that have an

environment-related element in their protection system (especially with Finland and Sweden

pausing this opportunity) makes it unlikely that this could trigger respective changes at EU level.

350

While national humanitarian protection statuses offer leeway for countries to extend protection to

persons affected by environmental change, and specifically natural disasters, these regularly provide

for a lower protection status than the one stipulated in the QD for refugees and beneficiaries of

subsidiary protection. This was also concluded in the EMN study.

351

Still, the examples of Finland and Sweden have inspired others as to how these examples could be

integrated into the EU protection framework. Hush, for example, proposes either using the Swedish

example to extend serious harm under Art 15 by inserting a new paragraph (d) extending to

environmental catastrophes or, deriving from the Finnish example, adding a new harmonised

protection ground ‘humanitarian protection’ as a new Art 15a which shall refer to an impediment to

return as a result of an environmental catastrophe.

352

5.3.3. European jurisprudence

5.3.3.1. Introduction

M Scott’s

353

review of judicial decisions globally found that disaster and climate change are peripheral

to the majority of claims that were identified and reviewed. In the vast majority of the filtered cases, the

claimant did not articulate concerns about being exposed to disaster-related harm if returned.

References to disaster rather appear as general information from country of origin reports.

354

Still, there

are also a number of cases where the applicant claimed refugee status or a complementary status based

on human rights violations.

As mentioned above and according to most commentators,

355

the international refugee regime does

not provide for a protection status for climate-induced migrants. In the European context, the

jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European

Union (CJEU) are of utmost importance in understanding whether the body of human rights law,

anchored within the ECHR or the EU CFR, imposes an obligation to grant some form of protection to

people fleeing because of environmental changes in their home country.

The present section concentrates on claims related to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. States are confronted with these questions when they

must decide whether environmental migrants and displaced people can be sent back to their country

of origin. Thus, while public discussions often centre around the question of whether a person who left

349

It was the aim of the QD to harmonise the wide spread state practice on protection for people failing to fulfil the strict criteria for refugee

status. See Ragheboom (2017), p.270; Council Directive 2004/83/EC, recital 25.

350

Jean-Christophe Dumont of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), quoted in Rodrriguez Martinez

(2020).

351

EMN (2020), p.5.

352

See Hush (2018).

353

M Scott (2020).

354

M Scott (2020), p.32.

355

See chapter 4.1. above.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

80 PE 655.591

his/her country of origin due to environmental reasons can be defined as a refugee, administrative and

judicial institutions are more often confronted with the more practical question of whether the principle

of non-refoulement embedded in international refugee law as well as human rights law prohibits return

to a country that is heavily affected by environmental problems.

356

Both courts have not (yet) had to answer any claim solely based on climate change and natural

disaster in the context of migration. However, a number of judgements contain some references to

environmental change and the respective jurisprudence on health-related impediments to return,

illustrating some similarities that may thus provide some insights.

The ECHR, in particular Art 2 (right to life) and Art 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading

treatment), extended the scope of protection obligations for Council of Europe states to not return a

person if their life or physical integrity are arbitrarily endangered there. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR

was essential to developing further the non-refoulement principle. Since the landmark decision Soering

vs. UK,

357

the court has developed a rich jurisprudence on Art 3,

358

extending its scope from pure

domestic to foreign issues. A state is thus not only obliged not to torture, but the state is also prohibited

from returning a foreigner to his or her country of origin if torture or inhuman or degrading treatment

awaits him or her there, constituting an extraterritorial effect of Art 3 ECHR.

359

Compared to the cases that determined the obligation under Art 3 to not return a person to a country

where torture or inhuman and degrading treatment awaits them, the situation of environmental

migrants is different. The expected harm does not originate from physical violence but rather from

socio-economic vulnerabilities, which are at first sight not protected by Art 3 ECHR.

360

The ECtHR has

not yet had the opportunity to develop jurisprudence around environmental change in the context of

return. However, its case law based on Article 3 ECHR prohibiting the removal of sick persons to a

country where they would face inhuman or degrading treatment may provide an entry point.

361

5.3.3.2. Return of sick people

Since the landmark ruling of D vs. UK in 1997, it became a well-established standard in migration

processes to determine whether health-related reasons would impede the return of an irregular

migrant, denied asylum seeker or a foreigner whose legal stay is coming to an end. The ECtHR set a very

high threshold that must be met in order to invoke the protection of Art 3 ECHR from being returned to

the country of origin or return in such cases.

The high threshold as first determined in the D vs. UK ruling and further concretised in N vs. UK referred

to exceptional circumstances consisting of (but not limited to) a final stage of a disease with a real risk

356

McAdam (2020).

357

Soering vs. UK, Application no. 14038/88.

358

See further Cruz Varas v. Sweden, Application No. 15567/89, 20 March 1991; Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 13163/87

et al., 30 October 1991; Chahal v. United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, 15 November 1996; Ahmed v. Austria, Application No.

25964/94.

359

Scott (2014), p.412.

360

Wallenberg (2016); p.25; McAdam 2007, p.140. On the link between socio economic rights and Art 3 ECHR, see also Mc Adam (2011), p 25,

stating that ‘breaches of socio-economic rights have often been ‘re-characterized’ as violations of article 3 ECHR – an absolute right with

a clear non-refoulement component’.

361

Delval (2020).

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 81

of dying under most distressing circumstances including the lack of family, moral or financial support

which altogether would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. This high threshold dominated

the case law until the 2016 Paposhvili vs. Belgium ruling. In the latter, the Grand Chamber refined its

interpretation of “other very exceptional cases” as mentioned in N vs. UK. The Court concluded that

“other very exceptional cases” would also include persons who are not at imminent risk of dying but

who would face a real risk of “being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state

of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy” (para. 183).

Also, in M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece

362

(a non-medical Art 3 case), the court had to decide on a claim

from an Afghan applicant whom Belgian authorities intended to return to Greece according to the

Dublin Regulation. The Court referred to the inaction of the Greek authorities, “for the situation in which

the applicant has found himself for several months, living on the street, with no resources or access to

sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential needs” (para 263). The court

followed that this situation amounted to a violation of Art 3 (para 264).

In arguing in how far states’ conduct is of relevance, the ECHR in Sufi and Elmi v UK

363

emphasised that

states shall not be liable for lacking the resources to mitigate an applicant’s circumstances when those

result from external factors rather than its own act or omission. As an example, the court referred to

natural phenomena such as drought (paras 281, 282).

In the quoted case law, the ECtHR repeated that a certain level of severity had to be met but also took a

sincere view of living conditions and other accompanying elements. When determining the real risk

of an Art 3 infringement, the court thus regularly also takes socio-economic harm into account,

which can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, especially if several risks accumulate.

However, as McAdam stated,

“[Courts] have carefully circumscribed the meaning of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ so that it

cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty, unemployment, or a lack of resources or medical

care except in exceptional circumstances. They have been especially reluctant to find that a person

needs international protection unless a State deliberately withholds resources or actively occasions

harm. It is therefore unlikely that a lack of basic services alone would substantiate a

complementary protection claim unless this were to render survival on return impossible.”

364

The question thus remains whether subsidiary protection according to Art 15b QD could develop an

alternative ground for environmental claims in the EU protection framework. While by its wording Art

15b QD is very similar to Art 3 ECHR,

365

the CJEU determined in M’Bodj vs. Etat belge

366

that, to qualify for

subsidiary protection, serious harm as outlined in Art 15 QD must be linked with one of the actors of

persecution according to Art 6 QD. In this respect, the Court clarifies that Art 6

362

MSS vs Belgium and Greece 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, para. 249.

363

Sufi and Elmi v UK App No 8319/07 and App No 11449/07 (2012).

364

J McAdam (2014).

365

CJEU, Elgafaji (C-465/07) v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 17 February 2009; para 28.

366

M’Bodj v Etat belge (C-542/13)

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

82 PE 655.591

“sets out a list of those deemed responsible for inflicting serious harm, which supports the view that

such harm must take the form of conduct on the part of a third party and that it cannot therefore

simply be the result of general shortcomings in the health system of the country of origin.”

367

Thus, despite the leeway granted to MSs to allow more generous protection than the QD, the CJEU

clarified that it would be contrary to the general scheme and objectives of the directive to grant “[..]

subsidiary protection status in situations which have no connection with the rationale of international

protection.”

368

While it is difficult to deduce how the ECtHR or the CJEU would respond to a protection claim based on

environmental change, looking at the case law on the refoulement of sick persons, the ECtHR might

be more prone to conclusions similar to those of the UN Human Rights Committee (see below). On

the contrary, the CJEU might exclude environmentally displaced from subsidiary protection.

369

Concluding that the CJEU may exclude subsidiary protection and thus the application of the QD, the

question still remains whether, ultimately, a person can be returned to a country or region which

became unsafe due to climate change or natural disaster. Again, the CJEU's case law on returning sick

people may provide insight into how the court would rule in such cases.

5.3.4. National jurisprudence

The research regarding national jurisprudence on migration claims in environmental contexts revealed

little. Some MSs reported that there have been sporadic claims related to environmental issues.

370

However, these claims are usually interlinked with other claims in relation to the grounds laid down in

the Geneva Convention. Statistics in this regard are non-existent. Still, national European courts

sometimes mentioned natural disasters, but rather with the aim of substantiating and delimiting the

requirements for refugee status. For example, the Polish Regional Administrative Court ruled that the

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains a finite list of grounds on which refugee status

may be recognised and does not include victims of war, natural disasters, or famine, family situation,

unemployment, lack of educational opportunities or poverty.

371

In a case from the Administrative Court in Luxembourg, the judge looked in his reasoning at the

possibility to grant subsidiary protection for reasons beyond the usual considerations (internal armed

conflict, ability to get protection from the authorities, etc.) and examined the environmental conditions

that can render a return difficult, if not impossible, for Iraqi applicants.

372

The case was not linked to

climate change or ‘environmental protection’ but showed that environmental reasons can and are

taken up by courts when deciding whether a person can be returned or not.

367

M’Bodj v Etat belge, para 35.

368

M’Bodj v Etat belge para 44.

369

Delval (2020).

370

Survey on environmentally induced migration distributed by ICMPD in March 2020 to selected European countries.

371

Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, 1 October 2012, V SA/Wa 873/12; quoted at https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-

law/poland-regional-administrative-court-warsaw-1-october-2012-v-sawa-87312.

372

‘les conditions climatiques difficilement supportables pour des personnes habituées à des températures climatiques élevées’; see:

Luxembourg - Administrative Tribunal, 3rd Chamber, 38651, 11 July 2017 at https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-

law/luxembourg-administrative-tribunal-3rd-chamber-38651-11-july-2017.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 83

In Germany, there were no environmental migration or asylum cases reported. Still, the various courts

regularly decide and further elaborate on the requirements for return. As such, “[p]oor humanitarian

conditions can constitute treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR - provided that

extraordinary individual circumstances arise - even if there is a lack of a responsible actor in the target

area. Within the framework of Section 60 (5) of the Residence Act in conjunction with Art 3 of the ECHR,

non-governmental dangers due to precarious living conditions can also be taken into account, although

this is only considered in very exceptional individual cases.”

373

The Court further took up discriminatory practice as a requirement for subsidiary protection and stated

that “[e]ven if the person concerned is in an essentially comparable situation with other people, an

exception to Art 3 ECHR can exceptionally be affirmed if the deportation would lead to a serious, rapid

and irreversible deterioration in his health.” To answer the question of whether there is a risk of a

violation of Art 3 ECHR, the Court took many factors (such as access to work, water, food, health care

and the chance to find adequate accommodation, access to sanitary facilities and last but not least the

financial means to satisfy elementary needs, also taking into account return assistance etc.) into

account. The Court determined that “an exceptional case in the aforementioned sense only exists in the

case of a very high level of damage, in which the humanitarian reasons are "mandatory" in accordance

with the requirements of Art 3 ECHR.”

374

5.3.5. Excursus: Case law on Kiribati and Tuvalu

Australia and New Zealand have developed the broadest jurisprudence on environmental cases to date.

The probably most-noted cases derived from two island states, Kiribati and Tuvalu. Kiribati consists of

around 33 islands in the equatorial Pacific. It is a remote and low-lying nation (mean elevation of 2

meters) in the Pacific Ocean with a population of about 112,000.

375

Tuvalu is a country in Polynesia,

located in the Pacific Ocean, about midway between Hawaii and Australia. The country has a mean

elevation of two meters above the Pacific and a population of about 11,000.

376

A rise in temperatures of

2 degrees more would – according to some calculations – make island states like Tuvalu disappear.

377

5.3.5.1. The Tuvalu case law

Already in 1996,

378

a 35-year-old woman from Tuvalu requested protection status in Australia. The

Australian Tribunal dismissed the claim but recognised the potential for socio-economic harm to

engage host state protection obligations under the Refugee Convention, provided that the causal nexus

could be established between the harm feared and one of the five Convention grounds.

379

Fo r t he claim

in question, however, the Tribunal denied refugee status as the socio-economic impacts were not a

result of persecution.

373

VGH Mannheim from 29.10.2019, A 11 S 1203/19, http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-

bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&nr=29831, para: 96-100.

374

Ibid.

375

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook /geos/tv.html.

376

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tv.html.

377

UN News (2019): Stop Tuvalu and ‘the world from sinking’ UN chief tells island nation facing existential threat from rising seas; at:

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038661.

378

RRT Case No96/10806 (1996).

379

Scott (2020), p.50.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

84 PE 655.591

While there were a number of further claims from people from Tuvalu, it took 24 more years for New

Zealand to grant leave to remain – yet this was not in recognition of refugee status but due to strong

family ties to New Zealand. This case concerned a Tuvaluan family of four (a couple and two children)

who applied in New Zealand for refugee status or, in eventu, that they could not return because of the

danger of arbitrary deprivation of their lives and because of the danger of being subjected to cruel

treatment in case of return to Tuvalu. The court rejected the refugee and human rights claim

380

because

it did not fulfil the refugee definition in the absence of a persecutor and one of the five grounds of

persecution. However, the Tribunal granted resident visas on the humanitarian claim because of their

strong family ties in New Zealand.

381

Still, the case drew much media attention – wrongly – celebrating

it as the first environmental protection case.

382

5.3.5.2. The Kiribati case law

As described above, the absence of a dedicated form of protection status for people affected by climate

change leads them to seek refugee protection in other countries. This also applied to Mr Teitiota, from

Kiribati, who wished to extend his visa in New Zealand after he overstayed. As no other way to legalise

his status was available, his case reached broad public attention or, as it was put, he became “an

international celebrity, a stand-in for the thousands of people in Kiribati — as well as millions more

worldwide — expected to be forced from their homes due to rising seas and other disruptions on a

warming planet.”

383

Mr Teitiota’s residence permit ended in 2010. After overstaying, he applied for refugee status in 2012,

which was denied in first and further national instances in New Zealand. In 2015, he was returned to

Kiribati, from where he filed a complaint to the Human Rights Committee claiming a violation of his

right to life according to Art 6 ICCPR by removing him to Kiribati and not the right not to be subjected

to inhuman or degrading treatment under Art 7 ICCPR.

384

In his claim, Mr Teitiota argued that the effects

of climate change and sea level rise led to saltwater contamination and scarce fresh water. Additionally,

land erosion led to overcrowding on Tarawa and a housing crisis and related disputes, which

exacerbated an untenable and violent environment for him and his family (para 2.1.).

The Committee, as the New Zealand national courts had done before, found the claim “entirely credible,

and accepted the evidence”

385

which was presented. The Committee in its judgement stated – for the

first time – “that the effects of climate change or other natural disasters could provide a basis for

protection.”

386

However, the Committee found that Teitiota “did not establish that he faced a risk of an

imminent, or likely, risk of deprivation of life upon return to Kiribati.” The Committee thus upheld New

Zealand’s decision on the grounds that while “sea level rise is likely to render the republic of Kiribati

uninhabitable … the timeframe of 10 to 15 years, as suggested by [Mr Teitiota], could allow for

380

AC (Tuvalu), (2014) NZIPT 800517-520, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection

Tribunalhttps://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,585151694.html.

381

AD (Tuvalu), (2014) NZIPT 501370-371, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal

https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,585152d14.html.

382

McAdam (2015), p.131.

383

Weiss (2015) quoted in McAdam (2020), p.3.

384

Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, para 1.1.

385

Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, para 9.6.

386

Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, para. 9.6.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 85

intervening acts by the republic of Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community, to take

affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate its population” (para 9.12).

While the Committee’s decision was against the applicant, it still added some clarity, specifically in the

potential applicability of human rights law for environmental cases, particularly with respect to the

principle of non-refoulement. It declared that inaction in the face of global warming can lead to

violations of human rights and trigger non-refoulement obligations,

387

thereby creating a line of

authority from the national to the international level.

388

From a public relations point of view, the case,

as with the Tuvalu case from 2015, was widely viewed as an opening for ‘climate refugees’;

389

however,

for some authors, this was an exaggerated interpretation.

390

5.4. Conclusions: protection in the context of environmental

displacement

The EU – with some exceptions – has remained quite silent on the issue of environmental migration and

displacement. In the external dimension, the EU mentions climate change and disasters as potential

root causes for migration, but hardly offers any concrete actions. In the internal dimension, the

European Commission did not further build on its 2014 staff working paper. The European Parliament

emphasised at times the links between climate change and disasters and migration and the need for

addressing the identified legal gaps at EU level. At the MS level, with the exception of a few countries,

environmental reasons are not addressed in laws related to international protection or legal migration.

With hardly any cases based on environmental change and disaster related reasons for fleeing the home

country, EU MSs currently see little need to address these phenomena in national laws. Additionally,

European and national courts have not yet had to decide upon a claim by a victim of climate change or

natural disaster.

In this context, it does not come as a surprise that neither the current nor latest proposals for the next

generation of the CEAS include any references to the nexus between environmental change or natural

disasters and international protection. In the absence of a specialised legal framework or dedicated

provisions, the current EU legal framework – as described in this section – offers a piecemeal of possible

entry points to the EU for people leaving their country of origin in the context of climate change and

natural disasters:

Refugee protection according to the QD requires a well-founded fear of persecution because of race,

religion, nationality, political opinion or membership to a particular social group as well as a lack of

protection provided by the country of origin. People forced to flee due to climate change and natural

disasters thus only may cater for refugee protection if they fulfil the definition of a refugee. This may

apply, for example, if a state arbitrarily denies access to basic socio-economic rights of a particular group

(e.g. a minority) in the country. Only in such cases may the person be granted refugee status, which

387

Behlert (2020).

388

McAdam (2020), p.38.

389

Among many other articles, see The Guardian(2020) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-

returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling; Newsweek (2020) https://www.newsweek.com/climate-refugees-cannot-

turned-away-united-nations-committee-rules-1483076.

390

See McAdam (2020), p.38.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

86 PE 655.591

would provide international protection and a long-time residence permit with and comprehensive

access to rights.

Should refugee status not apply, the QD offers subsidiary protection if a person shows substantial

grounds for facing a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin. Serious

harm is closely connected to the right to life and the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading

treatment as protected by Art 2 and 3 ECHR. When deciding on the return of sick migrants, the ECtHR

ruled that Art 3 ECHR could be violated in case of exceptional circumstances also in the absence of an

actor of persecution or serious harm. However, in the context of the QD, the CJEU ruled differently and

denied the benefits of subsidiary protection to sick people arguing that extending the protection to

such cases would contradict the rationale of the directive. Consequently, even if courts would see a

violation of Art 2 or Art 3 ECHR in cases of returning third country nationals to a place destroyed by

climate change or natural disaster, it is likely that also in such cases the benefits of subsidiary protection

according to the QD would be denied. Another solution therefore would require an amendment of the

QD, e.g. by explicitly including climate change as one of the elements for serious harm in Art 15 QD.

Subsidiary protection would provide for a temporary residence permit, limited access to rights,

however, with the option for a long-term solution, should climate change or natural disaster prove to

prevent the return over a longer period of time.

In the absence of international protection (i.e. refugee or subsidiary protection status), the applicability

of Art 2 or 3 ECHR may still trigger the non-refoulement provision under the RD. Thus, the non-

refoulement provision of the RD may still prohibit the return, however without any EU harmonised

status.

In fact, various MSs fill the existing gap between international protection and non-refoulement

according to Art 3 ECHR by applying non-harmonised protection statuses. Those non-har monised

protection statuses, however, usually offer more limited rights and protection than international

protection does. Still, the few examples of EU MS legislation referring to environmental reasons and

natural disasters, such as Italy, Sweden, Finland, are based on non-harmonised, thus national, statuses.

While many other countries not explicitly mention environmental change or natural disasters in

national protection status, they still may interpret such cases under broader notions of ‘humanitarian

protection’ or ‘protection based on exceptional circumstances’. The absence of any protection

solutions, however, would leave affected persons in a situation of limbo.

Temporary protection in case of mass influx would be a valid tool for the mobility of larger number of

people in the course of disasters, whether caused by environmental or other factors, but has so far

proved toothless, and there is little to expect from this instrument.

The EU further has a number of tools that could be used as pathways to protection, either in the form

of evacuation programmes or resettlement, but again they would also require adaptation to cater to

victims of environmental change and natural disasters.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 87

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusions

The present study has focused on the nexus between environmental change, migration, displacement

and protection. The report shows that environmental change affects migration in very different

ways. Addressing protection concerns is a key, but not the only response. As a corollary, a focus on

causation and related concepts such as ‘environmental migrant’ or ‘environmentally displaced person’

does not necessarily help to address protection challenges arising in the context of environmental

change and migration. While the concept of ‘environmental migration and displacement’ remains

contested, there are clear links between environmental change, including climate change and

various types of migration. Thus, available evidence suggests that climate change is likely to increase

the likelihood of a number of natural hazards which in turn will have significant effects on migration

drivers and thus will have an impact on migration flows. Nevertheless, drivers of migration are complex,

and environmental change will always be mediated by a variety of other social, economic and political

factors.

As the report shows, debates focus very much on the environmental change as a cause of

migration. Related estimates evoke images of a migration threat but, at the same time, largely do not

stand up to scrutiny. By contrast, IDMC data collection on disaster-related internal displacement

provides a robust and continuously improved evidence base that should be the basis for any further

development of data on global disaster related displacement.

As the report has shown, environmental change not only may act as a driver of mobility, but also goes

along with significant immobility. In addition, it may adversely affect immobilised populations, such

as persons displaced in protracted displacement situations as a result of conflict, persecution or

violence. Finally, migration also needs to be seen as part of the solution, and not just as an effect of

environmental change, highlighting the need to embrace that mobility:(cross-border) mobility can and

indeed needs to be part of responses to adverse environmental changes.

There have been a number of initiatives since 2011 that aim to establish approaches, spur action for

cooperation and provide practical recommendations on responding to environmental displacement.

These initiatives signal a recognition of the increasing importance of the issue and of the need for

coordinated efforts to address it.

The efforts explored in this report have emphasised practical guidance, information sharing and

capacity building as important tools for translating ideas into action. Meanwhile, increasingly forward-

looking approaches have emphasised the need to identify, mitigate and prevent future risks, including

through fostering resilience to climate change and disasters, in which migration can play a role. At the

global level, there seems to be an understanding that there is little appetite for a binding legislative

framework for addressing environmental displacement. Initiatives have thus largely taken the form

of guidelines and toolboxes, which aim to collect and share good practices and thus make these

ideas and approaches more accessible to stakeholders.

At the European level, the nexus of environmental change and migration has increasingly been

addressed in the last decade and in several contexts – civil protection, humanitarian aid and

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

88 PE 655.591

development policy, although no concrete initiatives addressing protection needs have materialised

yet.

While the overall nexus of environmental change, migration and displacement thus has received

increasing attention, there has been only a very limited debate on appropriate tools to address the

admission or residence of persons moving for reasons connected to climate change or natural disasters.

To some extent, this can be attributed to the lack of data that would shed light on the significance

and scope of cross-border displacement, or the scale of persons unable to return. While existing

evidence shows that people affected by ‘environmental change’ predominantly remain in their country

or the closer region, environmental considerations are likely to become more important – whether

directly or indirectly – in future migration and asylum claims in the EU.

In the absence of a dedicated legal instrument, people affected may need to lean upon existing

protection tools, whether appropriate or not. Human rights safeguards may step in at times but they

do not (yet) ensure full recognition of the problem and thus do not provide for an appropriate

umbrella of protection. The study reviewed various EU legal instruments designed for the protection

of people in need for international protection and related legal instruments as well as the respective

case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR.

From this, the study concludes that

1. environmental reasons are not among the grounds for international protection nor were they yet

subject of claims in front of the CJEU or the ECtHR;

2. that the case law of the CJEU and ECtHR on the return of sick third country nationals offers

parallels for potential cases of victims of climate change and/or natural disasters;

3. that, however, the CJEU interprets the scope of subsidiary protection in a restrictive manner,

requesting protection from an actor of persecution or harm;

4. that in order to fill a gap of a dedicated EU international protection ground, a small number of

three EU countries know non-harmonised national protection grounds for victims of natural

disasters and broader environmental factors. Due to this small number of countries, the

potential for a joint EU approach to this matter seems unlikely, particularly in view of the

stalemate around the CEAS reform and the repercussions of the 2015-16 ‘migration and refugee

crisis’.

Given that migration and asylum claims in the EU may in the nearer future more frequently also address

reasons of environmental degradation due to climate change and/or natural disasters, the EU and its

MSs, however, are well advised to proactively address the existing gap of available solutions. The

awaited Pact on Migration and Asylum may offer an opportunity to put migration in the context

of climate change and natural disasters on the political agenda for the coming five years. Given

the long list of priorities in the field of migration and asylum, it is however unlikely that a ‘relatively new’

topic without evidence on its significance and urgency will be given much attention. Thus, while climate

change and migration are both – separately – important issues on the European agenda, the nexus of

the two stands to be much further strengthened.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 89

6.2. Policy Recommendations

6.2.1. Contribute to conceptual clarity

Solutions for environmental migration and displacement must acknowledge the diversity of

environmental drivers (including scope, intensity and duration), as different situations may involve

different needs and frameworks with which to respond. Do environmental changes occur as slow or

sudden-onset events? Do environmental events force people to leave or rather trigger voluntary

migration? Do international protection tools provide adequate tools to address such movements, or

should they be addressed through regular legal migration pathways? Does the strict dichotomy

between forced and voluntary migration generally provide satisfactory answers for these challenges?

More broadly, should responses address the consequences of climate change only or also encompass

displacement due to geophysical events? The range of mobility needs and challenges associated with

climate change and natural disasters calls for a multi-sectoral, two-pronged approach that both

addresses root causes and consequences of the climate change-migration nexus. A debate on these

questions and a resulting consolidation of terminology are necessary preconditions for any

further steps in the EU’s external and internal dimensions. The EU should thus clarify its position on

concepts related to climate change and environmental degradation and its consequences.

The European Parliament should therefore

• further promote the gathering of evidence on the effects of climate change and

environmental change more generally on migration and displacement. It should do this in

cooperation with third countries and regions that are facing mobility issues in the context of

climate change and environmental degradation. To improve the evidence base, data collection

on disaster-related cross-border displacement based on the methodology of the IDMC data

collection on internal displacement should be promoted.

• provide a platform for information sharing on migration and displacement to the EU. This

discussion should extend – but not be limited to – an assessment of migration and asylum

claims within the EU that have already brought forward environmental elements. The European

Parliament should further initiate an exchange with EU MSs to test the waters on MS’

awareness and readiness to address such reasons in the framework of migration and asylum

policies, at the EU or national level, and promote the exchange of information on claims made

with reference to environmental factors, such as through the establishment of a case law

database.

• offer a platform for an EU-wide discussion to adopt an EU position on the nexus between

climate change, environmental degradation and disasters on mobility to guide the EU’s

contribution to mitigate and prevent impacts of climate change and environmental degradation

on mobility in the EU external dimension as well as its policy in the internal dimension.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

90 PE 655.591

6.2.2. Develop a coherent policy on the nexus of climate change and natural disasters and

mobility in the external dimension

The European Parliament should

• promote the mainstreaming of mobility considerations in the context of climate change

and natural disasters across EU policies, strategies and programming in the external

dimension to reflect the multifaceted nature of related challenges and the need for

comprehensive approaches to strengthen protections, reduce risks and foster resilience. These

considerations should be regularly incorporated into programmes as part of EU external relations

generally as well as into mobility-focussed programmes including the EU’s Mobility Partnerships,

the various EU dialogues and programmes under the CAMM.

• incorporate migration and displacement issues into the EU’s international engagement on

the issue of climate change.

• insist to the European Commission that EU policies, strategies and programming should not

stop at solely acknowledging climate change and natural disasters as potential triggers for

migration but lead to concrete actions in related fields of the EU’s external dimension. Relatedly,

policies should not solely be aimed at keeping people from moving but also at creating ways in

which people can migrate safely and legally as a way to cope with climate change-related

challenges.

• urge that the EU take concrete solidarity actions on addressing the effects of climate change

and natural disasters on migration within the context of the GCM and the GCR.

• encourage EU MSs and the Commission to ramp up actions to mitigate the consequences of

climate change and natural disasters on mobility. Specifically, in the context of the

implementation of the GCR, the European Parliament could request that the Commission

address in its pledges the nexus between climate change and natural disasters and mobility

by proposing concrete actions with third countries directly affected. Actions could include

providing support for planned relocation or for contingency planning and emergency response

structures.

• request that the EU leverage its role in international fora, including participation in and

financial support to international organisation- and state-led initiatives and multilateral

development banks, to address the complexities of environmental displacement, ensuring the

incorporation of the issue into discussions and initiatives in the fields of migration and

displacement, climate change and disasters and humanitarian and development aid. This should

also include offering financing to implement these and resulting efforts. Promoting

international cooperation through the Global Compacts, Global Platform for Disaster Risk

Reduction and other venues can be important vehicles for the EU and its partners to address

environmental drivers of migration and displacement.

• promote the creation of protection guidelines in different world regions like those created in

the Americas, focusing on regions that are most impacted by climate change and disasters. It can

also help strengthen guidance on thematic topics, as done by MICIC and the IASC Operational

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 91

Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters. To increase the efficacy of such support, the

EU should also engage in capacity building activities around their implementation.

• provide technical and financial assistance to support national-level initiatives, like those

conducted in the Pacific, including in collaboration with UNHCR, development agencies or other

relevant organisations. This could include supporting efforts to develop comprehensive policies

to facilitate a whole-of-government approach that works with civil societies and communities, as

in Vanuatu, as well as more targeted policy development, like Fiji’s planned relocation guidelines.

• support the development and implementation of free movement agreements like the

Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD region and promote them as tools to provide

migration pathways or humanitarian corridors for those facing climate change and slow-

and sudden-onset disasters.

• in addition to reacting to crises, support the adoption of a forward-looking approach that

works to understand and respond to future risks, decrease vulnerability and promote resilience

in line with Goal 13 of the SDGs, including the use of migration as an adaptation strategy but one

that is a voluntary choice. This can include supporting the creation of labour migration

pathways in Europe and elsewhere, especially for the portion of impacted persons for whom

permanent relocation is necessary (e.g. Kiribati’s program). Temporary programs or permits as

those provided for by the Seasonal Workers Directive can also be leveraged and expanded to

harness the potential of migration as an adaptation strategy.

6.2.3. Develop a strategy for providing solutions for asylum and migration claims connected

to environmental change

Addressing environmental migration and displacement is not a priority of reforms within the EU in the

area of migration and asylum. Both the 2015 ‘migration and refugee crisis’ and the migratory and

protection implications of the current Covid-19 pandemic leave little space for the issue at the moment.

At the same time, the exclusive attention on these crises would be a missed opportunity, not least given

the prominence of climate change as a leading policy challenge for the current Commission. In the EU

context, the European Parliament has been at the forefront of advocating to more effectively address

environmental migration and displacement.

Against this background, the European Parliament should

• continue this important role and request a future-oriented EU asylum and migration policy

which shall, finally, take more imperative actions on environmental migration and

displacement alongside other emerging challenges.

• continue to support knowledge generation on the nexus of environmental change and

migration and the concrete impact of this phenomenon on migration and asylum claims

within the EU. It is difficult to understand the scope of environmental migration and

displacement to the EU without sufficient data and evidence; initiating more thorough research

would build the evidence base and shed light on the scope of cases where third country nationals

based migration and asylum claims on climate change and/or natural disasters in EU countries.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

92 PE 655.591

• proactively test the waters among respective EU institutions, the European Commission, the

Council, EU MSs and other stakeholders with respect to different policy options to address

environmental migration and displacement. An important test will come up with the

forthcoming Pact on Migration and Asylum. Although the Pact has yet not been issued as of the

time of writing this report, there are indications that the Pact will address environmental

migration and displacement. The European Parliament should therefore use this window of

opportunity to take a clear position towards the European Commission on the importance

to arrive at EU level at a common position on how to address future migration challenges

in the context of climate change and natural disasters in its various facets. The Parliament

could request the European Commission to initiate a consensus making process on potential

ways of addressing different facets of the impact of environmental change and natural disasters

on migration and asylum to the EU. This process could be facilitated through a green paper on

the impact of environmental change and natural disasters on migration and asylum to the EU.

The paper could address different possibilities to address the phenomenon on a legal level (see

the following recommendation).

• acknowledge that the impacts of environmental change on migration and displacements are

multifaceted. Environmental change can lead to voluntary as well as to forced movements which

may be long-term, mid-term or short-term. Therefore, there may be different avenues through

which the European Parliament can seek to address the needs of those affected by these

phenomena:

o Alternative 1: ‘A Brave New Instrument’: The European Parliament could support to develop

a new, comprehensive legal instrument that would address environmental migration.

and displacement Amongst others, it could offer new types of entry and residence

permits for the EU with a duration depending on whether the impact of environmental

events is long, mid or short term. Such a new instrument, however, could also address

only specific forms of movements due to environmental change or disaster related

displacement as an overarching category.

o Alternative 2: ‘The Piecemeal Approach’: The European Parliament could take a piecemeal

approach and promote adding or expanding solutions across different protection and

migration instruments. For instance the QD could qualify the consequences of climate

change and natural disasters on the lives of people affected as ‘serious’ harm by

extending an additional point ‘d’ to Art 15 or introducing a new ground beyond ‘serious

harm’ by indicating a new Article ‘15 a’. The TPD could well be extended to situations of

mass influx to an EU MS in case of serious and sudden on-set natural disasters in a third

country. The RD may introduce safeguards to suspend return in case natural disasters

impede the return of a person to her/his country of origin temporarily – e.g. by indicating

a respective reference into Art 9. Respective changes could also be introduced into the

Seasonal Workers Directive, the EU Resettlement Framework, etc. thus, existing migration

and protection instruments could be adapted, keeping in mind that such migration may

be temporary and linking conceptually to ‘protection’, ‘work’, ‘education’, ‘vulnerability’,

etc.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 93

o Alternative 3: ‘The Status Quo, Wait & Observe’: The European Parliament, however, also

could opt to promote no specific action at this point and trust in its MSs to address these

challenges once they become more pertinent through adapting national (non-

harmonised) protection grounds to meet evolving needs. In this alternative, the European

Parliament could closely observe the developments in EU MSs, identify good practices

and could then take appropriate actions to promote the harmonisation of the var ious

approaches developed by EU MSs. Depending on the evolving practices, this may lead to

a new legal instrument or could be incorporated into the existing EU asylum and

migration framework.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

94 PE 655.591

7. REFERENCES

• Acevedo, S. & Novta, N. (2017). Climate Change Will Bring More Frequent Natural Disasters &

Weigh on Economic Growth. International Monetary Fund Blog. https://blogs.imf.org

/2017/11/16/climate-change-will-bring-more-frequent-natural-disasters-weigh-on-economic-

growth/.

• Adam, D., 2005. 50 m Environmental Refugees by End of Decade, UN Warns. The Guardian,

London.

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/oct/12/naturaldisasters.

climatechange1.

• Adams, H. (2016). Why populations persist: mobility, place attachment and climate change. Popul

Environ 37, 429–448. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-015-0246-3

• Adeola, R. (2018). The Kampala Convention and the right not to be arbitrarily displaced. F orced

Migration Review. Issue 59. https://www.fmreview.org/GuidingPrinciples20/adeola

• African Development Bank (2009). Strategy of Climate Risk Management and Adaptation (CRMA).

https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-

Documents/Climate%20Risk%20Management%20and%20Adaptation%20Strategy%20_CRMA_

%20%282%29.pdf.

• African Union (AU). (2009). African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally

Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention).

https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-

convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa.

• AU. (2017). Plan of Action for the implementation of the Kampala Convention adopted by conference

of states parties. Press release.

https://www.au.int/web/en/pressreleases/20170406/plan-action-

implementation-kampala-convention-adopted-conference-states.

• AU. (2018). African Union model law for the implementation of the African Union Convention for the

Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5afc3a494.pdf

• AU. (2019). List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Union Convention for

the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention).

https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-sl-

AFRICAN%20UNION%20CONVENTION%20FOR%20THE%20PROTECTION%20AND%20ASSISTAN

CE%20OF%20INTERNALLY%20DISPLACED%20PERSONS%20IN%20AFRICA%20%28KAMPALA%

20CONVENTION%29.pdf.

• Astuccia, E. (2019). Can the EU lead the way in the fight against climate change? At:

https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/can-the-eu-lead-the-way-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/

• Australian Government, Department of Education, Skills and Employment. (2020). Frequently

Asked Questions about the Seasonal Worker Programme.

https://www.employment.gov.au/frequently-asked-questions-about-seasonal-worker-

programme.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 95

• Australian Government, Department of Education, Skills and Employment. (2020). Seasonal

Worker Programme. https://www.employment.gov.au/seasonal-worker-programme

• Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Pacific Labour Mobility.

https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/pacific-labour-mobility/Pages/default

• Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2019). Stepping up Australia’s

engagement with our Pacific family.

https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-

australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf.

• Bakewell, O. (2008). Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research

into Forced Migration. Journal of Refugee Studies, 21(4), pp. 432–453.

• Beeler, C. (2018). UN compact recognizes climate change as driver of migration for first time. PRI.

https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-11/un-compact-recognizes-climate-change-driver-

migration-first-time.

• Behlert, B (2020). A significant opening – On the HRC’s groundbreaking first ruling n the case of a

‘climate refugee’. Völkerrechtsblog. at: https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-significant-opening/

• Behrman, S. & Kent, A. (Eds.). (2018). Climate Refugees. London: Routledge.

• Beirens, H.; Maas, S.; Petronella, S; Velden; M. (2016). Study on the Temporary Protection Directive,

p17; Study commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and

Home Affairs Unit C.3 — Asylum; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-

library/documents/policies/asylum/temporary-

protection/docs/final_report_evaluation_tpd_en.pdf.

• Berlemann, M. & Steinhardt, F. (2017). Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Migration—a

Survey of the Empirical Evidence, CESifo Economic Studies, Volume 63, Issue 4, December 2017,

Pages 353–385.

• Bettini, G. (2011). Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate

refugees’. Geoforum 45 (March 2013), pp. 63-72.

• Betts A. (2013). Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press.

• Betts, A. (2015). Governance questions for the international community. Forced Migration Review.

Issue 49. https://www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/betts

• Biermann F. & Boas I. (2010). Preparing for a warmer world. Towards a global governance system

to protect climate refugees. Global Environmental Politics, 10(1), pp. 60-88.

• Biermann, F. & Boas, I. (2008). Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol,

Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 50:6, 8-17, DOI: 10.3200/ENVT.50.6.8-

• Black, R. (2001). Environmental Refugees. Myths or Reality? Journal of Humanitarian Aid,

https://www.jha.ac/u034/

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

96 PE 655.591

• Black, R., Bennett, S.R.G., Thomas, S.M. & Beddington, J.R. (2011). Climate change: migration as

adaptation. Nature 478 (7370): 447-449.

• Black, R., Arnell, N.W., Adger, W.N., Thomas, D. & Geddes, A. 2013.Migration, immobility and

displacement outcomes following extreme events. – Environmental Science & Policy 27,

Supplement 1: 32-43.

• Black, R. & Collyer, M. 2014. Populations ‘Trapped’ at Times of Crisis. Forced Migration Review 45:

52–56. https://www.fmreview.org/crisis/black-collyer

• Boas, I., Farbotko, C., Adams, H. et al. (2019). Climate migration myths. Nat. Clim. Chang. 9, 901–

903.

• Borges, I.M. (2019): Environmental Change, Forced Displacement and International Law – From Legal

Protection Gaps to Protection Solutions, New York: Routledge.

• Boswijk, S. (2012). Kampala Convention on IDPs enters into force, sets out the AU’s first legally binding

rules on disaster response. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/latest-news/disaster-law-newsletter-december-

2012/kampala-convention-on-idps-enters-into-force-sets-out-the-aus-first-legally-binding-

rules-on-disaster-response-60474/.

• Bradley, M. (2012). A Landmark for Human Rights: The Kampala Convention on Internal

Displacement Comes into Effect. Brookings.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-

front/2012/12/06/a-landmark-for-human-rights-the-kampala-convention-on-internal-

displacement-comes-into-effect/.

• Bradley, M., Sherwood, A., Rossi, L., Guiam, R. & Mellicker, M. (2017). Policy Research on the

Resolution of Post-Disaster Displacement: Reflections from Haiti and the Philippines. Journal of

Refugee Studies 30(3), pp. 363-386.

• Cantor, C.J. (2018). Cross-Border Displacement, Climate Change and Disasters: Latin America and the

Caribbean. Platform on Disaster Displacement and UNHCR.

https://caribbeanmigration.org/sites/default/files/cross-

border_displacement_climate_change_and_disasters_lac_david_cantor_2018.pdf.

• Cantor, C.J. (2015). Disasters, displacement and a new framework in the Americas. Forced

Migration Review. Issue 49. https://www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/cantor

• Carling, J. & Talleraas, C. (2016). Root Causes and drivers of migration. Implications for humanitarian

efforts and development cooperation. Prio Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo.

https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=346&type=publicationfile

• Cartagena +30. (2014). Brazil Declaration. UNHCR.

https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9865.pdf

• Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/geos/tv.html.

• Cohen, R. and Bradley, M. (2010). Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection. Journal of

International Humanitarian Legal Studies, pp. 95-142.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 97

• CRIDEAU and CRDP, Faculty of Law and Economic Science, University of Limoges (2008). Draft

Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons, in: Revue Européene

de Droit de l’Environnement. At:

https://hal-unilim.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-

00581519/file/Draft_Convention_on_the_international_status_of_environmentally-

displaced_persons.pdf

• Czaika, M. & Reinprecht, C. (2020). Drivers of migration: A synthesis of knowledge. IMI Working

Paper 163.

https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/drivers-of-migration-a-synthesis-of-

knowledge.

• de Haas, H. (2020). Climate refugees: The fabrication of a migration threat.

https://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2020/01/climate-refugees-fabrication-of.html?spref=tw

• Delval, E. (2020): From the U.N. Human Rights Committee to European Courts: Which protection

for climate-induced displaced persons under European Law? EU Migration Law Blog.

http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/from-the-u-n-human-rights-committee-to-european-courts-

which-protection-for-climate-induced-displaced-persons-under-european-law/

• Duyck, S., Jodoin, S. & Johl, A. (Eds.). (2018). Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate

Governance. London: Routledge.

• European Asylum Support Office. (2016): Qualification for International Protection (Directive

2011/95/EU) A Judicial Analysis.

https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/QIP%20-

%20JA.pdf.

• El-Hinnawi, E. (1985). Environmental refugees. Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Program.

• European Migration Network (EMN). (2017): EMN Ad-Hoc Query on ES Ad hoc Query on

Humanitarian Protection.

http://emnnetherlands.nl/sites/default/files/2018-03/2017%20-

%20humanitarian%20protection_0.pdf.

• EMN. (2018a). Asylum and Migration Glossary. A tool for better comparability produced by the

European Migration Network. n.p.: European Commission.

https://ec.europa.eu/home-

affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/

european_migration_network/docs/interactive_glossary_6.0_final_version.pdf.

• EMN. (2018b). European Migration Network; Ad-Hoc Query on Climate change and migration.

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/2018.1293_-

_climate_change_and_migration.pdf.

• EMN. (2020). Comparative Overview of National Protection Status in the EU and Norway – EMN

Synthesis Report for the EMN Study 2019.

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/

homeaffairs/files/emn_synthesis_report_nat_prot_statuses_final_02062020_0.pdf.

• Erdal, M.B. & Oeppen, C. (2018). Forced to leave? The discursive and analytical significance of

describing migration as forced and voluntary. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(6), pp.

981-998.

• European Commission (2019). Climate Change. Report. Special Eurobarometer 490.

https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/support/docs/report_2019_en.pdf

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

98 PE 655.591

• European Commission (n.da.):. CTR-Towards Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the

IGAD Region - Direct Grant to IGAD. https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/5977/#summary

• European Commission (n.d., b): Paris Agreement. https://ec.europa.eu/ clima/policies

international/negotiations/paris_en.

• Flavell, A. Milan, A & Melde, S (2019). Migration, environment and climate change: Literature review.

First report in the “Migration, environment and climate change” series. Berlin: Umweltbundesamt.

• Foresight (2011). Migration and Global Environmental Change Final Project Report. London:

Government Office for Science.

https: //webarchive .nationalarchives. gov.uk /20140108140803

/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration

/reports-publications.

• Geddes, A. Sommerville, W. (2013). Migration and environmental change: Assessing the

developing European approach; MPI Policy Series, at:

https://www.migrationpolicy.

org/sites/default/files/publications/MPIEurope-EnvironmentalMigration.pdf.

• German Advisory Council on Global Change (2018). Just & In-Time Climate Policy – Four Initiatives

for a Fair Transformation. Policy Paper.

https://www.wbgu.de/en/publications/publication/just-

in-time-climate-policy-four-initiatives-for-a-fair-transformation.

• Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2017). About the Global Platform for Disaster Risk

Reduction. Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. https://www.unisdr.org /conferences

/2017/globalplatform/en/about.

• Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2019). About the Global Platform for Disaster Risk

Reduction. Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.

https://www.unisdr.org/conference/2019/globalplatform/about

• Grandi, F. (n.d.). World Humanitarian Summit: addressing forced displacement. UN Chronicle.

https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/world-humanitarian-summit-addressing-forced-

displacement.

• Guterres, A. (2012). Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation (31 December 2012).

UNHCR.

https://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis /vtx/search?page =search&skip=342&docid

=55535d6a9&query=water#_ednref22.

• Hallegatte, S & Rozenberg, J. (2017). Climate change through a poverty lens. Nature Clim Change

7, 250–256. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3253.

• Hallegatte, S., Bangalore, M., Bonzanigo, L., Fay, M., Kane, T., Narloch, U.,Rozenberg, J.. Treguer,

D. & Vogt-Schilb, A. (2016). Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty.

Climate Change and Development; Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge

.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22787.

• Heinrich Boell Stiftung (2014). TIME TO ACT - How the EU can lead on climate change and migration.

https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/hbs_time_to_act.pdf

• Hendow, M., Bravi, A., Kraler, A. , Pailey, R., Perchinig, B. & Schaur, K. (2018). Resilience in the Face

of Adversity: A Comparative Study of Migrants in Crisis Situations. MICIC Comparative Report.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 99

Vienna: ICMPD. http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Publications

/reports_and_studies/Comparative-Study-EN-final.pdf.

• High Representive and the European Commission (2008). Climate Change and International

Security. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30862/en_clim_change_low.pdf

• Hush, E. (2018)- Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally-

Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden; at:

http://cjel.law .columbia.edu/

preliminary-reference/2017/developing-a-european-model-of-international-protection-for-

environmentally-displaced-persons-lessons-from-finland-and-sweden/?cn-reloaded=1.

• IASC (2011). IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural

Disasters.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads

/2016/06/0106_operational_guidelines_nd.pdf.

• Ide, T. Climate War in the Middle East? Drought, the Syrian Civil War and the State of Climate-

Conflict Research. Curr Clim Change Rep 4, 347–354 (2018).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-018-

0115-0.

• Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation and Oversight (n.d.): ’17 Annual Report.

https://www.iadb.org/en/ove/feature/climate-change-idb#:~:text= The%2026%20member %20

countries%20of,the%20major%20sources%20of%20emissions

• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). (2020). Protocol On Free Movement Of

Persons Endorsed At Ministerial Meeting.

https://igad.int/divisions/health-and-social-

development/2016-05-24-03-16-37/2373-protocol-on-free-movement-of-persons-endorse-at-

ministerial-meeting.

• Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2019a). Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change

on Flood Displacement Risk. Geneva: ICMD.

https://www.internal-

displacement.org/publications/assessing-the-impacts-of-climate-change-on-flood-

displacement-risk.

• IDMC (2019b). Global Report on Internal Displacement. Geneva: IDMC. https://www.internal-

displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/.

• IDMC (2020). Global Report on Internal Displacement. Geneva: IDMC. https://www.internal-

displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/.

• IDMC & NRC (2011). Displacement Due to Natural Hazard-Induced Disasters: Global Estimates for

2009 and 2010.

https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/displacement-due-to-

natural-hazard-induced-disasters-global-estimates-for-2009-and.

• International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2001). World Disasters Report.

Focus on Recovery. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva.

https://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/world-disasters-report/wdr2001/

• International Labour Organization. (2020). Labour Mobility in Pacific Island Countries. Fiji: ILO Office

for Pacific Island Countries. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---

ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms_712549.pdf.

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

100 PE 655.591

• International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2007). Discussion Note: Migration and the

Environment. Geneva: Council of the International Organization for Migration. MC/INF/288, 1

November 2007.

https://www.iom.int/jahia/ webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/ about_iom /en

/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf.

• IOM. (2014). Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) Glossary.

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/meclep_glossary_en.pdf

• IOM. (2018a). Migration Governance Snapshot: The Federative Republic of Brazil.

https://migrationdataportal.org/sites/default/files/201809/Migration%20Governance%20Snaps

hot%20-%20The%20Federative%20Republic%20of%20Brazil.pdf.

• IOM. (2018b). Vanuatu Launches National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced

Displacement.

https://www.iom.int/news/vanuatu-launches-national-policy-climate-change-

and-disaster-induced-displacement.

• IOM. (2019a). Glossary on Migration. 3rd Edition. International Migration Law No. 34. Geneva: IOM.

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf

• IOM. (2019b). IOM Strategic Vision. 2019–2023: Setting a course for IOM.

https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/110/C-110-INF-1%20-%20IOM

%20Strategic%20Vision.pdf .

• International Organization for Migration Special Liaison Office (SLO) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

(2020). IOM Welcomes Historic Endorsement of the Free Movement Protocol in the IGAD Region.

https://ethiopia.iom.int/iom-welcomes-historic-endorsement-free-movement-protocol-igad-

region .

• Ionesco, D. & Chazalnoël, M. T. (n.d.). 10 Key Takeaways from the GCM on Environmental Migration.

IOM. https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/10-key-takeaways-gcm-environmental-migration

• Ionesco, D., Mokhnacheva, D. & Gemenne, F. (2017). The Atlas of Environmental Migration. London:

Routledge, https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.4324/9781315777313.

• Jafry, T. (Ed.). (2019). Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice. London: Routledge.

• Jafry, T., Mikulewicz M. & Helwig, K. (2019). Introduction. Justice in the era of climate change. In:

Jafry, T. (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Climate Justice. London: Routledge, pp.1-9.

• Jensen (2014). Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation. Study commissioned by the Directorate

General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil

Liberties,Justice and Home Affairs (PE 462.422) Brussels: European Parliament. At:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2014)509986_

EN.pdf

• Kälin, W and Schrepfer, N (2012). Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate

Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches.

https://www.refworld. org/ docid

4f38a9422.html

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 101

• Kälin, W. & Cantor, D. (2017). The RCM Guide: a novel protection tool for cross-border disaster-

induced displacement in the Americas. Forced Migration Review. Issue 56.

https://www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-caribbean/kaelin-cantor

• Kälin, W. (2015). The Nansen Initiative: building consensus on displacement in disaster contexts.

Forced Migration Review. Issue 49. https://www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/kaelin

• Karak, M. (2019). Climate Change and Syria’s Civil War. Some scholars and scientists are calling

climate change the invisible player in Syria’s ongoing civil war. But is that too simplistic an

explanation? JSTOR Daily. https://daily.jstor.org/climate-change-and-syrias-civil-war/

• Kelley, C., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M., Seager, R., & Kushnir, Y. (2015). Climate change in the Fertile

Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. Proceedings of the National Academy of

Sciences of the United States of America, 112(11), 3241-3246.

• Kraler, A., Cernei, T. & Noack, M. (2011).

“Climate Refugees”: Legal and Policy Responses to

Environmentally Induced Migration. Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Internal

Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties,Justice and

Home Affairs (PE 462.422) Brussels: European Parliament. http:// www.europarl .europa.eu

/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/462422/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2011)462422_EN.pdf.

• Kraler, A., Cernei, T. & Noack, M. (2012). Climate Change & Migration: What is the Role for Migration

Policies? Policy Brief. Vienna: ICMPD:

https://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/

ICMPD_General/Policy_Brief_Climate_Refugees_May_2012.pdf.

• Lieberman, A. (2019). A 'super framework' for climate migration isn’t on the way. Devex.

https://www.devex.com/news/a-super-framework-for-climate-migration-isn-t-on-the-way-

95903 .

• Manieri M.G. (2020). Asylum in a Climate-Changed World: Bridging the Protection Gap in the

EU.Green European Journal 2020.

https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/asylum-in-a-climate-

changed-world-bridging-the-protection-gap-in-the-eu/

• Marchiori, L., Maystadt, J.-F-. & Schumacher, I (2012)- The impact of weather anomalies on

migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Volume

63, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 355-374.

• Martin, S.F. Bergmann, J., Wyss, H. & Rigaud, K.K. (2018). Environmental change and human

mobility: perspectives from the World Bank. In: McLeman, R. & Gemenne, F. (Eds.). (2018).

Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration. London: Routledge, pp. 408-

414.

• Mayer, B. (2018). Definition and Concepts. In: McLeman, R. & Gemenne, F. (Eds.). (2018). Routledge

Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration. London: Routledge, pp.323-328.

• McAdam, J (2007). Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law. Oxford University Press,

2007.

• McAdam, J. (2011). Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary

Protection Standards. Legal and Protection Policy Research Series. Geneva: UNHCR.

https://www.unhcr.org/4dff16e99.pdf

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

102 PE 655.591

• McAdam, J. (2012). Climate Change-Related Movement and International Human Rights Law: The

Role of Complementary Protection’.Oxford: Oxford University Press ht tps://www.

oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587087.001.0001/acprof-

9780199587087.

• McAdam, J. (2014). The human rights implications of cross-border displacement in the context of

disasters what are the protection gaps and what is the role of the human rights council? Geneva, 20

March 201

https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/ human_ rights_ council_

talk_rev_20_3_14.pdf

• McAdam, J. (2015). The emerging New Zealand jurisprudence on climate change, disaster and

displacement- Migration Studies, 3(1), pp.131-142

• McAdam, J. (2016). From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping

International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and DisplacementUniversity of New South

Wales Law Journal 39(4). pp.1517-1546.

• McAdam, J. (2020). Protecting People Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change: The UN

Human Rights Committee and the Principle of Non-Refoulement; Pre-publication manuscript

accepted by the American Journal of International Law.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/ 4B8E9EBB4FE37

ABEB74608742FEAD946/S0002930020000317a.pdf/protecting_people_displaced_by_the_impa

cts_of_climate_change_the_un_human_rights_committee_and_the_principle_of_nonrefoule

ment.pdf

• McLeman, R. & Gemenne, F. (2018). Environmental migration research Evolution and current state

of the science. In: McLeman, R. & Gemenne, F. (Eds.). (2018). Routledge Handbook of Environmental

Displacement and Migration. London: Routledge, pp.3-16.

• Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC). (2016). Guidelines to protect migrants in countries

experiencing conflict or natural disaster.

https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/ default/files/

document/micic_guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf .

• Milan, S. (2004). Searching for a Place Under the Sun. Inter Press Service, Rieti.

• Miller, M.; Douglass, M.; Garschagen, M. (2017). Crossing Borders: Governing Environmental

Disasters in a Global Urban Age in Asia and the PacificSingapore: Springer.

• Missirian, A. & Schlenker W. (2017).Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations. The

number of migrants seeking asylum in the European Union will increase as the climate warms.

Science 22 Dec 2017, Vol. 358, Issue 6370, pp. 1610-1614. DOI: 10.1126/science.aao0432.

• Neumann, K. & Hermans, F. (2017). What Drives Human Migration in Sahelian Countries? A Meta-

analysis. Population, Space and Place 23: e1962.

• Newsweek from 20.01.2020: Climate Refugees with legitimate Fears Cannot be Turned Away,

United Nations says in Landmark Ruling- Newsweek.

https://www.newsweek.com/climate-

refugees-cannot-turned-away-united-nations-committee-rules-1483076

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 103

• Pacific Community. (2016). Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific. An Integrated

Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017 – 2030.

http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/assets/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf

• Pacific Community (n.d.).Building resilience to climate change and disasters in the Pacific.

http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/

• Perchinig, B; Rasche, L; Schaur, K. (2017). Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) - Summary Paper:

Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies in the European Union and the MICIC Agenda. at:

https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/resource_pub/docs/micic_summarypaper_eu_r

esponses.pdf

• Perkins, P. (2019). Climate justice, gender and intersectionality. In Jafry, T. (Ed.). Routledge

Handbook of Climate Justice. London: Routledge, pp.349-358.

• Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants. (2020). PICUM Newsletter,

May 2020

https://picum.org/civicrm/?page=CiviCRM&q=civicrm%2Fmailing%2Fview&id=432&reset=1

• Piguet, E., Kaenzig, R. & Guélat, J. (2018). The uneven geography of research on “environmental

migration”. Popul Environ 39, 357–383 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-018-0296-4

• Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD). (2018a). A state-led process working towards better

protection for people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change.

https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Platform-on-Disaster-

Displacement-leaftlet-EN_for_website.pdf .

• PDD. (2018b). South American countries now have a non-binding regional instrument on the

protection of persons displaced across borders and on the protection of migrants in disaster situations.

https://disasterdisplacement.org/south-american-countries-now-have-a-non-binding-regional-

instrument-on-the-protection-of-persons-displaced-across-borders-and-on-the-protection-of-

migrants-in-disaster-situations .

• PDD. (2019). Lineamientos regionales en materia de protección y asistencia a personas desplazadas

a través de fronteras y migrantes en países afectados por desastres de origen natural.

https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CSM-Lineamientos-regionales-

personas-desplazadas-por-desastres_compressed.pdf.

• Ragheboom, H (2017). The international legal status and protection of environmentally-displaced

persons: a European perspective- International Refugee Law Series Vol 9. Nijhof: Brill;.

• Régnier, V (2019). Humanitarian Corridors guarantee a global, non-technical and humane

approach", European Insights, August 2014 at:

https://www.vuesdeurope.eu/en/ interview/

humanitarian-corridors-guarantee-a-global-non-technical-and-humane-approach/

• Renaud, F., Bogardi, J.J., Dun, O. & Warner, K. (2007=. Control, Adapt or Flee. How to Face

Environmental Migration? InterSecTions, No. 5. Bonn: UNU-EHS.

https://collections.unu.edu/

eserv/UNU:1859/pdf3973.pdf.

• Renaud, F.G., Dun, O., Warner, K. and Bogardi, J. (2011). A Decision Framework for Environmentally

Induced Migration. International Migration, 49, pp. e5-e29

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

104 PE 655.591

• Republic of Kiribati (n.d.). Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy.

https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20National%20Labour%20Migration%20P

olicy.pdf.

• Rinke, T (2011). Temporary and Circular Labor Migration between Spain and Colombia; in The

State of Environmental Migration;

http://labos.ulg.ac.be/hugo/wp-content/uploads/sites/38

/2017/11/The-State-of-Environmental-Migration-2011-25-34.pdf

• Rodriguez Martinez, M. (2020): Extreme weather exiles: how climate change is turning Europeans

into migrants- Euronews.

https://www.euronews.com/2020/02/26/extreme-weather-exiles-how-

climate-change-is-turning-europeans-into-migrants

• Salih, A.A.M., Baraibar, M., Mwangi, K.K. et al. (2020). Climate change and locust outbreak in East

Africa. Nat. Clim. Chang. 10, 584–585. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0835-8

• Sakdapolrak, P., Naruchaikusol, S., Ober, K., Peth, S., Porst, L., Rockenbauch, T. & Tolo, V. (2016).

Migration in a changing climate. Towards a translocal social resilience approach. Die Erde 147 (2):

81-94.

• Sandvik, K. B. (2010): A Legal History: The Emergence of the African Resettlement Candidate in

International Refugee Management. International Journal of Refugee Law, 22(1), 20–47.

• Scott, M. (2014). Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Non-Refoulement: What Scope for

Resisting Expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2014), pp. 404-432; p412.

• Scott, M. (2020): Climate Change, Disaster, And the Refugee Convention. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

• Scott, M (2019): Climate Refugees and the 1951 Refugee Convention in Satvinger Singhg Juss (Ed)

(2019): Research Handbook on International Refugee Law, pp.343-356.

• Scott, P. (2016): How climate change affects extreme weather events. Science 352 (6293), pp.1517-

1518.

• Srgo, A. (2008)- Towards recognition of environmental refugees by the European Union.

https://www.reseau-terra.eu/article844.html

• Skran, C. & Easton-Calabria, E. (2020): Old Concepts Making New History: Refugee Self-reliance,

Livelihoods and the ‘Refugee Entrepreneur’. Journal of Refugee Studies, 33 (1), pp. 1–21,

https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez061

• The Greens (2013). Climate Change, Refugees and Migration. Position Paper.

https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/news/files/Greens%20EFA%20-

%20Position%20Paper%20-%20Climate%20Change%20Refugees%20and%20Migration.pdf

• The Greens (2013): Climate change, refugees and migration. Position Paper adopted in May 2013

drafted by Flautre, H.; Lambert, J.; Keller, S.; Lochbihler, B.

http://rosamartinez.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/11/Greens-EFA-Position-Paper-Climate-Change-Refugees-and-

Migration.pdf

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 105

• The Guardian from 20.01.2020. Climate refugees can't be returned home, says landmark UN

human rights ruling’. The Guardian.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-

refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling ;

• The Nansen Initiative. (2015a). Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the

context of disasters and climate change.

https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/ uploads/

2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf .

• The Nansen Initiative. (2015b). Law, policy and practice concerning the humanitarian protection of

aliens on a temporary basis in the context of disasters. Background paper, States of the Regional

Conference on Migration and Others in the Americas Regional Workshop on Temporary

Protection Status and/or Humanitarian Visas in Situations of Disaster.

https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/150715_FINAL_BACKGROUND

_PAPER_LATIN_AMERICA_screen.pdf .

• The Nansen Initiative. (2016). Protection for persons moving across borders in the context of disasters.

A guide to effective practices for RCM member countries.

https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/11/PROTECTION-FOR-PERSONS-MOVING-IN-THE-CONTEXT-OF-

DISASTERS.pdf .

• The Nansen Initiative (n.d.). Global consultations. https://www.nanseninitiative.org/global-

consultations/ .

• UNDP (2009). Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. New York: UNDP.

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf

• United Nations (UN). (2015a). The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.

https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%

201).pdf .

• UN. (2015b). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030. https: //www

.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf .

• UN. (2018a). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180711_final_draft_0.pdf

• UN. (2018b). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Part II Global compact on

refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf

• UN. (2019). 13 Climate Action. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.

https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2019/goal-13/

• UN (n.d., a)Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change

and its impacts. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/

• UN (n.d., b). The sustainable development agenda. https://www.un.org /sustainabledevelopment

/development-agenda/ .

• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2011). Report of the

Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

106 PE 655.591

2010. Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session.

https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf

• UNFCCC (2016). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from

30 November to 13 December 2015 - Addendum - Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the

Parties at its twenty-first session at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf

• UNFCCC. (2019a). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-fourth session, held in

Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018. Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the

Parties at its twenty-fourth session. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf

• UNFCCC. (2019b). Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for

Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. https:// unfccc.i nt/

sites/default/files/resource/sb2019_05_add1.pdf .

• UNFCCC (n.d., a). Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification. https://unfccc.int/process/the-par is-

agreement/status-of-ratification .

• UNFCCC (n.d., b) Task Force on Displacement. https://unfccc.int/wim-excom/sub-groups/TFD#eq-

1 .

• UNFCCC. (n.d., c) The Paris Agreement. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-

agreement/the-paris-agreement .

• UNFCCC (n.d., d) What is the Paris Agreement? https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-

agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement. arbitrary

• UN General Assembly. (2016a). New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1

• UN General Assembly. (2016b). Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit. Report of the

Secretary-General.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A-71-353%20-

%20SG%20Report%20on%20the%20Outcome%20of%20the%20WHS.pdf .

• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (1984). Cartagena Declaration on

Refugees.

https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-

declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html

• UNHCR (2008). Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNCHR perspective.

https://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf

• UNHCR (2011). Safe at last? Law and practice in selected EU member states with respect to asylum-

seekers fleeing indiscriminate violence.

https://www.unhcr.org/ protection/operations/ 4e2d7

f029/safe-law-practice-selected-eu-member-states-respect-asylum-seekers-fleeing.html

• UNHCR. (2013). Summary Conclusions on the interpretation of the extended refugee definition in the

1984 Cartagena Declaration. https://www.unhcr.org/53bd4d0c9.pdf

• UNHCR. (2014). Latin America and the Caribbean adopt a common roadmap to address new

displacement trends and end statelessness within the next decade. https: //www .acnur.org/

cartagena30/en/background-and-challenges/.

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 107

• UNHCR. (2017a). Climate change, disaster and displacement in the Global Compacts: UNHCR’s

perspectives.

https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/5a12f9577/climate-change-

disaster-displacement-global-compacts-unhcrs-perspectives.html .

• UNHCR. (2017b). UNHCR’S strategic directions 2017–2021. https://www.unhcr.org/5894558d4.pdf.

• UNHCR (2019). Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/ statistics

/unhcrstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-trends-2018.html

• UNHCR. Climate change and disaster displacement in the Global Compact on Refugees.

https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/environment/5c9e13297/climate-change-disaster-

displacement-global-compact-refugees.html .

• UNHCR (n.d.). New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/new-

york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html .

• United Nations Network on Migration (2020). Forced returns of migrants must be suspended in times

of COVID-19. Statement by the United Nations Network on Migration. Geneva, 13 May 2020.

https://www.iom.int/news/forced-returns-migrants-must-be-suspended-times-covid-19?utm

_source=IOM+External+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=70c9dcf4cb-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_

2020_05_13_01_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9968056566-70c9dcf4cb-43555921 .

• UN News. (2019). Migration and the climate crisis: the UN’s search for solutions.

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1043551

• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2020). Natural Disasters in Latin America

and the Caribbean, 2000-2019.

https://reliefweb.int/report/world/natural-disasters-latin-america-

and-caribbean-2000-2019 .

• Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (2018). National policy on climate change and

disaster-induced displacement.

https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/iom-

vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf.

• Wallenberg, L. (2016). Return to Socio-Economic Deprivation - A Critical Analysis of the Scope of

Complementary Protection under European Law. Master Thesis. Lund: Lund University,

http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8874825&fileOId=8877703

• Warner, K. (2011). Environmental change and migration: methodological considerations from

ground-breaking global survey. Popul Environ 33, 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-011-0150-4

• Weerasinghe, S. (2018). In Harm’s Way. International protection in the context of nexus dynamics

between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change. Legal and Protection Research Series.

PPLA/2018/05, December 2018. Geneva: UNHCR. https://www.unhcr .org/protection

/environment/5cac7fda7/harms-way-international-protection-context-nexus-dynamics-conflict-

violence.html.

• Weiss, K.R. (2015). The Making of a Climate Refugee, Foreign Policy (Jan. 28, 2015),

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/the-making-of-a-climate-refugee-kiribati-tarawa-teitiota/

• Wiegel, H., Boas, I & Warner, J (2019). A mobilities perspective on migration in the context of

environmental change. WIREs Clim Change. 10:e610

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

108 PE 655.591

• Wood, T. (2020). Opinion: New pact paves way for innovative solutions to disaster and climate

change displacement in Africa. Thomson Reuters Foundation.

https://www. preventionweb

.net/news/view/70653 .

• World Meteorological Organization (2020). WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in

2019. Geneva: WMO. https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10211.

• Zetter, R. (2007). More Labels, fewer Refugees: Making and Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era

of Globalisation. Journal of Refugee Studies 20(2), pp.172–192.

• Zickgraf, C. (2018). Immobility. In: McLeman, R. & Gemenne, F. (Eds.). Routledge Handbook of

Environmental Displacement and Migration. London: Routledge, pp.71-84.

EU Documents

• COM(2015) 240 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the

Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A

European Agenda on Migration; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/ sites/ antitrafficking

/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

• Council of the European Union (2009) 17024/09, p29. The Stockholm Programme – An open and

secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking

/sites/antitrafficking/files/the_stockholm_programme_-_an_open_and_secure_europe

en_1.pdf

• Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 (the Humanitarian Aid Regulation); at:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF

• Decision (EU) 2019/420 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2019

amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism; at https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1553088553036&uri=CELEX:32019D0420

• EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2019); Annual Report 2019; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eutf_report_2019_eng_digital_edition.

pdf

• Commission of the European Communities (2007): Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament and the Council - Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;

COM(2007) 317 final; at:

https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/hunger-foodsecurity-nutrition

/documents/towards-european-consensus-humanitarian-aid-communication-june-2007

• Commission of the European Communities (2008). European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid –

Action Plan. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2008)1991; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/working_paper_en.pdf

• European Commission (2009): WHITE PAPER Adapting to climate change: Towards a European

framework for action; COM(2009) 147 final at:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0147&from=EN

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 109

• European Commission (2011) COM(2011) 743 final: Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions - The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; at:

https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0743&from=EN

• European Commission (2013): Commission Staff Working Document: Climate change,

environmental degradation, and migration - Accompanying the document Communication from

the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change;

SWD(2013) 138 final:

https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/ clima/files/adaptation /what/docs /swd

_2013_138_en.pdf

• European Commission (2015). Implementation Plan of the European Consensus on Humanitarian

Aid. Commission Staff Working Document, SWD (2015) 269 final. At:

https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2015/EN/10102-2015-269-EN-F1-1.PDF

• European Commission (2016a) COM(2016) 468 final: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Union Resettlement Framework

and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council; at:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0468

• European Commission (2016b): Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

AND OF THE COUNCIL on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless

persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for

persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and

amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-

country nationals who are long-term residents at: https://eur-lex. europa.eu/ resource.html

?uri=cellar:6d976705-4a95-11e6-9c64-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

• European Commission (2016c) COM(2016) 234 final: Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to

Self-reliance; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees-idp/Communication _Forced_ Displacement_

Development_2016.pdf

• European Commission (2016d) SWD(2016) 142 final; Staff Working Document Accompanying the

document ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Lives in Dignity:

from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance Forced Displacement and Development at:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees-

idp/Staff_working_document_Forced_Displacement_Development_2016.pdf

• European Commission (2016e) COM(2016) 197 final: Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament and the Council - Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum

System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe; at:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485252836824&uri=CELEX:52016DC0197

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

110 PE 655.591

• European Commission (2016f) COM(2016) 85 final: Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority

Actions under the European Agenda on Migration; at:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485253558318&uri=CELEX:52016DC0085

• European Commission (2019): EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2019); Annual Report 2019, at:

https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eutf_2019_annual_report_english.pdf

• European Commission (2020): COM(2020) 6 final: Report from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council - Annual report on the European Union's humanitarian aid operations

financed in 2018; at:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/com_2020_6_f1_report_

from_commission_en_v3_p1_1059444.pdf

• European Parliament (1999): resolution on the environment, security and foreign policy.

28.1.1999,A4-0005/99; at:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//

NONSGML+REPORT+A4-1999-0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN

• European Parliament (2016): Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a

holistic EU approach to migration; 12 April 2016; at: https://www.europarl. europa.eu/ doceo/

document/TA-8-2016-0102_EN.pdf

• European Parliament (2017a): Addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU

external action European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee and

migrant movements: the role of EU External Action (2015/2342(INI))

• European Parliament (2017b): Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – Report on

the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for the

qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international

protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and

for the content of the protection granted and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25

November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents

(COM(2016)0466 – C8‑0324/2016 – 2016/0223(COD))

Council of Europe

• Council of Europe (2008): ‘Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21st century

challenge’; Report; Doc. 11785; Rapporteur: Ms Tina Acketoft, Sweden, ALDE ((25):

https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-en.asp?FileID=12098&lang=en

• Council of Europe (2009): ‘Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21stcentury

challenge’; Recommendation 1862 (2009); at:

http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-

DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=17718&lang=EN

• Council of Europe (2016): ‘Forced migration: a new challenge’; Committee on Migration, Refugees

and Displaced Persons; Report; Doc. 13983; Rapporteur: Mr Philippe BIES, France; at:

http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22317&lang=en

• Council of Europe (2019a): ‘A legal status for "climate refugees"’; Report; Doc. 14955; 27 August

2019: at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=28098&lang=en

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 111

• Council of Europe (2019b), ‘A legal status for “climate refugees”’; Resolution 2307 (2019): at:

http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=28239&lang=en

Court of Justice of the European Union

• CJEU - (C-465/07) Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 17 February 2009.

• CJEU – (C-542/13) Mohamed M’Bodj v État belge; 18.12.2014.

European Court of Human Rights

• Ahmed v. Austria (Application no. 25964/94), 17 December 1996

• Chahal v. United Kingdom (Application no. 22414/93), 15 November 1996

• Cruz Varas v. Sweden, (Application no. 15567/89), 20 March 1991

• D. v. the United Kingdom, (Application no. 30240/96), 02 May 1997

• J.K and others v. Sweden (Application no. 59166/12), 23 August 2016

• M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (Application no. 30696/09), 21 January 2011

• N. v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 26565/05); 27 May 2008

• Paposhvili vs. Belgium (Application no. 41738/10), 13 December 2016

• Soering v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 14038/88), 7 July 1989

• Sufi and Elmi v UK (Application no 8319/07), 28 June 2011

• Vilvarajah et al. v. United Kingdom (Application no. 13163/87), 30 October 1991

Human Rights Committee

• Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand (advance unedited version), CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, UN Human

Rights Committee (HRC), 7 January 2020, available at: https://www.refworld. org/cases, HRC,

5e26f7134.html

National Case Law

• Poland: Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, 1 October 2012, V SA/Wa 873/12; quoted at

https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/poland-regional-administrative-court-warsaw-

1-october-2012-v-sawa-87312

• Germany: VGH Mannheim from 29.10.2019, A 11 S 1203/19, http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-

bin/laender_rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bw&nr=29831

IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

112 PE 655.591

• Luxembourg: Administrative Tribunal, 3rd Chamber, 38651, 11 July 2017 at:

https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/luxembourg-administrative-tribunal-3rd-

chamber-38651-11-july-2017

• New Zealand AC (Tuvalu), (2014) NZIPT 800517-520, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection

Tribunal, 4 June 2014, at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,585151694.html

• New Zealand: AD (Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection

Tribunal, 4 June 2014, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,585152d14.html

• New Zealand: RRT Case No96/10806 (1996)

Climate Change and Migration

PE 655.591 113

PE 655.591

IP/C/LIBE/IC/2020-047

Print ISBN 978-92-846-6899-1 | doi: 10.2861/189632 | QA-01-20-436-EN-C

PDF ISBN 978-92-846-6898-4 | doi: 10.2861/012788 | QA-01-20-436-EN-N

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and

Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, examines legal and policy responses to

environmental migration and displacement. Following a review of international, regional and

national initiatives and legal instruments, it offers recommendations on ways to better address root

causes and consequences of the climate change-migration nexus in Europe and beyond.