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NAIC2022LIQUIDITYSTRESSTESTFRAMEWORK
ForLifeInsurersMeetingtheScopeCriteria
December13,2022

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TableofContents
INTRODUCTION...................... ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............... ..4
MacroprudentialImplicationsofaLiquidityStress....................... ... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ....4
BACKGROUND...................... .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ................ .. ..5
NAICMacroprudentialInitiative..................... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ..........5
LiquidityAssessmentSubgroup...................... .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............ ... .......6
Mandate..........................................................................................................................................6
DataGaps........................................................................................................................................6
DiscussionswithInsurers................................................................................................................7
RegulatoryGoalsoftheLiquidityStressTest.................................................................................9
[Beginningof]2022Liquidity
StressTestingFrameworktobeincluded/referencedintheNAICFinancial
AnalysisHandbook................................. ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ...............9
Section1.ScopeCriteriaforDeterminingGroupsSubjectto2022LST......... ... ............. ............. .. ............. ..9
Section2.LiquidityStressTest........... ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ..11
2.1Summary..................................................................................................................................11
2.2TimeHorizons..........................................................................................................................11
2.3Insurer’sInternalLiquidityStress
TestingSystem.................................................................13
Section3.LegalEntitiesRequiredtoPerformtheLSTforInsurersMeetingtheScopeCriteria... ... ..........13
Section4.CashFlowApproachLiquiditySourcesandUses........... ... ............. ............. .. ............. ... ..........16
4.1BaselineAssumptionsforCashflows.....................................................................................17
Section5.StressScenariosandtheirAssumptions...................... ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. .....17
5.1
AdverseLiquidityStressScenarioforInsurers.......................................................................19
5.1.1Narrative...............................................................................................................................19
5.1.2RegulatorPrescribedAssumptions.....................................................................................20
5.1.3MarketCapacityAssumption..............................................................................................21
5.1.4EconomicVariablesforAdverseScenario...........................................................................23
5.1.5SWAPSpreads......................................................................................................................24
5.1.6SwaptionVolatility...............................................................................................................24
5.1.7Moody’sTransitionMatrix/MigrationRates......................................................................25
5.1.8
Moody’sDefaultTable.........................................................................................................25
5.1.9Moody’sRecoveryRateTable.............................................................................................25
5.1.10“WhatIf”Modification......................................................................................................26
5.1.11CompanySpecificAssumptions.........................................................................................26
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5.2InterestRateSpikeScenario...................................................................................................26
5.2.1Narrative...............................................................................................................................26
5.2.2RegulatorPrescribedAssumptions.....................................................................................27
5.2.3CompanySpecificAssumptions...........................................................................................27
5.3InsurerSpecificInformationRequest‐WorstCaseScenario................................................28
5.3.1Narrative...............................................................................................................................28
Section6.AvailableandExpectedAssetSales........ ... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ..........28
Section7.Reporting....... .. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. .....29
Section8.Templates............ ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. .....32
8.1LiquiditySourcesTemplate.....................................................................................................32
8.2LiquidityUsesTemplate..........................................................................................................33
8.3AssetsTemplate......................................................................................................................34
Narrative/ExplanatoryDisclosuresnotedinthe2022LST.................... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ..........36
[Endof2022LiquidityStressTestingFrameworktobeincludedasan
appendixintheNAICFinancial
AnalysisHandbook]......... .. ............. ............. ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ........37
DataAggregation.. ............. ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ..................37
RegulatoryAuthority....... ............. ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ..........37
Confidentiality........................... ... ............. ............. .. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ..........................38
Timeline... ... ............. ... ............ ............. ... ............. ............. ... ............. ............. .. ............. ................ .. .............38
Annex1:OriginalScopeCriteriawithAnnualStatementReferences.......................... ............. ... ............. ..39
Annex2:RegulatoryPrescribedAssumptions.......... ... ............. .. ............. ............. ... ............. ............. ... .......41
Annex2i.EconomicandMarketVariables...................................................................................
41
Annex2ii.MarketCapacityAssumption......................................................................................44
Annex2iii,A.YearendStructuredSpreadBaselineValues........................................................45
Annex2iv.SWAPSpreadTable.....................................................................................................46
Annex2v.ImpliedVolatilityofIRSwaptions...............................................................................47
Annex2vi.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sTransitionMatrix/MigrationRates...........................47
Annex2vii.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sDefault
Table............................................................48
Annex2viii.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sRecoveryRateTable................................................48
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INTRODUCTION
MacroprudentialImplicationsofaLiquidityStress
Beginningmidyear2017,the NAICembarkedona project todevelopa liquidity stresstesting
framework.WhiletheNAIChasexistingtoolsandprocessesforassessingliquidityriskatalegal
entitylevel (i.e.,‘inward’impacts totheinsurer),therewasrecognition thatthe NAICtoolbox
couldbefurtherenhanced
withtheadditionofmoregranulardataintheannualstatementand
a tool that would enable an assessment of macroprudential impacts on the broader financial
markets (i.e., ‘outward’ impacts) of a liquidity stress impacting a large number of insurers
simultaneously.
Postfinancialcrisis,therewereseveralattemptstoassess
potentialmarketimpactsemanating
fromaliquiditystressintheinsurancesector.Manyoftheseanalysesreliedheavilyonanecdotal
assumptions and observations from behaviors of other financial sectors. To provide more
evidencebasedanalyses,theNAICdecidedtodevelopaLiquidity StressTest (LST)Framework
forlargelife insurers that
wouldaim to capture the outwardimpacts on the broaderfinancial
marketsofaggregateassetsalesunderaliquiditystress.
Thestresstestwillberunannuallyandthefindings,onanaggregatebasis,reportedannuallyas
part of the NAIC’s continuous macroprudential monitoring efforts. The NAIC’s pursuit of the
liquidity stresstestshould not suggestanyprejudgementofthe outcomes. TheNAICbelieves
there is value to the exercise whether it points to vulnerabilities of certain asset classes or
marketsor, alternatively, suggests that even a severe liquidity stress impacting the insurance
sectorisunlikelytohavematerialimpacts
onfinancialmarkets.TheNAICliquiditystresstesting
framework is intended to supplement, not replace, a firmspecific liquidity risk management
framework.TheNAIChasnotyetdiscussedstepsthatmightbetakentoaddressanyidentified
vulnerabilities but acknowledges that any recommendations may require collaboration with
otherfinancialregulators.
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The NAIC’s revised proposed liquidity stress testing framework is contained in the pagesthat
follow. The NAIC recognizes that, at least in the early years, the stress testing process and
analyseswillbeiterative.Weexpectrefinementsastheframeworkisdeveloped,especiallyafter
thefirstyear’simplementation.
BACKGROUND
NAICMacroprudentialInitiative
TheNAIC’sMacroprudentialInitiative(MPI)commencedin2017.Itrecognizedthepostfinancial
crisisreformsthatbecamepartofourSolvencyModernizationInitiative(SMI)thatcontinueto
serve us well today. However, in the ensuingyears since those reforms,insurers have had to
contendwithsustainedlow interestrates,changingdemographics
andrapidadvancementsin
communication and technology. They have responded by offering new products, adjusting
investmentstrategies,makingstructuralchanges,andexpandingintonewglobalmarkets.There
are new market players, new distribution channels, and a complex web of interconnections
betweenfinancialmarketplayers.
Whathasnotchangedsincethe
financialcrisisisthescrutinyontheinsurancesectorintermsof
understanding how insurers react to financial stress, and how that reaction can impact, via
various transmission channels, policyholders, otherinsurers,financialmarketparticipants, and
thebroaderpublic.
Theproposedworkonmacroprudentialmeasuresisreflectiveofthestateinsurance
regulators’
commitment to ensure that the companies they regulate remain financially strong for the
protectionofpolicyholders,whileservingasastabilizingforcetocontributetofinancialstability,
includinginstressedfinancialmarkets.Tothatend,theNAIC’sthreeyearstrategicplan(2018
2020), “State Ahead”, reflects the objective of
“Evaluating Gaps and regulatory opportunities
arisingfrommacroprudentialsurveillance,anddevelopappropriateregulatoryresponses.”
TheNAIC’sworkonmacroprudentialsurveillanceisoverseenbytheFinancialStabilityTaskForce
oftheNAICExecutiveCommittee.InApril2017,theTaskForcewasaskedtoconsidernewand
improved tools to better monitor and
respond to both the impact of external financial and
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economicrisks on supervised firms, as well asthe risksemanating from oramplified by these
firmsthatmightbetransmittedexternally.TheTaskForce,inturn,focuseditseffortsonpotential
enhancementstoidentify and monitorliquidityrisk, amongotherareas.More specifically, the
TaskForcewasrequestedtofurther
developtheU.S.regulatoryframeworkonliquidityriskwith
a focus on life insurers due to the longterm cashbuildup involved in many life insurance
contractsandthepotentialforlargescaleliquidationofassets.
LiquidityAssessmentSubgroup
To carry out its work on assessing liquidity considerations, the Task Force established the
LiquidityAssessmentSubgroup(“Subgroup”)midyear2017.
Mandate
ThechargesandworkplanoftheSubgroupreflectthefollowingassignments:
Reviewexistingpublicandregulatoronlydatarelatedtoliquidityrisk,identifyanygapsbased
onregulatory
needsanddeterminethescopeofapplication,andproposerecommendations
toenhancedisclosures.
Develop a liquidity stress testing framework proposal for consideration by the Financial
Condition (E) Committee, including the proposed universe of companies to which the
frameworkwillapply(e.g.,largelifeinsurers).
Oncethestresstesting
frameworkiscompleted,considerpotentialfurtherenhancementsor
additionaldisclosures.
Inaddition,asmallinformalstudygroupcomprisedofregulators,industryparticipantsandNAIC
staffwas formed to consider thespecificdata needsandtechnical aspectsoftheproject.The
studygroupisNOTanofficialNAICworkinggroup.Allrecommendations
fromthestudygroup
must be vetted and considered by the Liquidity Assessment Subgroup and/or the Financial
Stability(EX)TaskForceaccordingtoNAICprocedures.
DataGaps
PriortoundertakingworkontheLiquidityStressTest,theSubgroupconstructedaninventorylist
ofexistinglifeinsurerdisclosuresasof2018
thatcontributetoanunderstandingofliquidityrisk.
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Whenassessingthecurrentstate,theSubgrouprecogni zedtheavailabilityofsignificantdetailed
investmentrelated disclosures but contrasted it to the relati vely sparse liabilityrelated
disclosures.Toremedythisimbalance,ablanksproposalwasconstructedtosignificantlyincrease
thedisclosuresforlifeinsuranceproducts.
Specifically,theAnalysisofOperationsbyLine
ofBusinessschedulewasexpandedfromasingle
exhibittofiveexhibits,oneeachforIndividualLife,GroupLife, IndividualAnnuity,GroupAnnuity,
andAccidentandHealth.TheAnalysisofIncreaseinReservesschedulewassimilarlyexpanded.
Withineachofthefivenewexhibits,columnswereaddedformoredetailed
productreporting.
Forexample,columnswereaddedtotheIndividualandGroupLifeexhibitstocaptureuniversal
lifeinsuranceanduniversallifeinsurancewithsecondaryguarantees,andcolumnswereadded
totheIndividualandGroupAnnuityexhibitstocapturevariableannuitiesandvariableannuities
withguaranteedbenefits.Inaddition,twonew
lineswereaddedtothenowfiveexhibitsofthe
AnalysisofIncreaseinReservesschedule:onecapturingthecashsurrendervalueoftheproducts
outstandingandanothercapturingtheamount of policyloans available(lessamounts already
loaned).A new addition wasalsoproposed to the Life Notesto
FinancialStatement.Thenew
Note33consideredthetypeofliquidityconcernsdisclosedinNote32forannuitiesanddeposit
typecontractsandaddeddisclosuresforlifeinsuranceproductsnotcoveredinNote32.
TheseproposalswereexposedandcommenteduponseveraltimesattheLiquidityAssessment
Subgroup,theFinancialStability
(EX)TaskForce,andattheBlanks(E)WorkingGroup.Ultimatel y,
theywereadoptedbyNAICPlenaryforinclusioninthe2019LifeAnnualStatementBlank.Asan
interimstep,TheFinancialStabilityTaskForceperformedadatacallrequestingafewkeylines
of information from the newly adopted
2019 format of the Analysis of Operations by Line of
BusinessscheduleandtheAnalysisofIncreaseinReservesschedule,aswellasthenewNote33,
butpopulatedwith2018yearenddata.ThisdatacallwascompletedinJuly2019.
DiscussionswithInsurers
Duringthelatterpartof2017
andfirstquarterof2018,theSubgroupconductedcallswithseveral
large life insurers who agreed to share their internal liquidity risk assessment processes. The
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dialogueprovidedextremelyhelpfulinputand informedtheestablishmentoftheinitialdirection
oftheLiquidityStressTestingFramework.Feedbackfromthesediscussionsinclude:
Scopecriteriashouldberiskfocused,notsolelybasedonsize.
Stress test framework should align with internal management reporting and leverage the
ORSA.
Stress test should be principlebased and complement a company’s internal stress testing
methodology.
Regulatory guidance should be provided to help define liquidity sources and uses,
products/activities with liquidity risk, time horizons, level of aggregation, reporting
frequency,andestablishingstressscenarios.
Public disclosureofresults shouldbecarefully
consideredto avoidexacerbating aliquidity
crisis.
Regarding the specifics of liquidity assessments/stress test approaches, significant diversity in
practicesexist.Keyobservationsinthisregardincluded:
Liquiditytestsare performedatthematerialentitylevelandattheholdingcompanylevel.
Definitionsofmaterialentitiesdiffer.
Mostfirmsdetermine
somesortof coverageratio(LiquiditySources)/(LiquidityUses),for
BaseandStressscenariosandmonitorresultstoensuretheyalignwiththefirm’s(internal)
riskappetite.Categoriesofliquiditysourcesandusesdifferacrossfirmsandassumptionsvary
dependingontimehorizon.Someinsurersdeterminecoverageratiosutilizing
balancesheet
values, applying different haircuts by asset class, time horizon and type of stress. Other
insurersdetermineliquiditycoveragegaps(LiquidityInflowsLiquidityOutflows)utilizinga
cashflowapproach.
Stress scenarios vary by company, reflecting a combination of marketdriven, as well as
idiosyncraticandinsurerspecificscenarios.

Timehorizonstestedalsovary,typicallyrangingfrom7daysto1year.
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RegulatoryGoalsoftheLiquidityStressTest
Theprimarygoalofthisliquiditystresstesting,andthespecificstressscenariosutilized,isfor
macroprudentialuses to allow the FSTF regulators to identify amounts of asset sales by
insurers that could impact the markets under stressed environments. Thus, the selected
stressscenariosare consciously focusedonindustrywide stresses thosethatcan impact
manyinsurerswithinasimilartimeframe.Thesemaynotbethemoststressfulscenariosfor
specific legal entity insurers, or even their groups. Regulators have indicated the liquidity
stresstestingisalsomeanttoassistregulators
intheirmicroprudentialsupervision,inthe
context of being helpful for domiciliary and lead state regulators to better understand
liquidity stress testing programs at those legal entities and groups. There is no intent to
requirethesestressscenariostobeusedbyindividualinsurersforsomesortofassessment
or
regulatoryinterventionmechanism.Similarly,therehasnotbeenanyconsiderationgiven
torequiringtheminthemanagementofanyentitiesinreceivership.
Regulatoryconcerns regardingliquidityriskfor legalentityinsurersand/or groups ismore
aboutthestressscenariosofmostconcerntothoseentities(notthoseidentifiedfor
macro
prudentialpurposes).Similarly,whenconsideringliquidityriskatalegalentityand/orgroup,
regulatorsneedtounderstandtheinsurer’sentireriskmanagementframework.Muchofthis
understandingmaycomefromtheORSAfilings.Thus,theLSTisnotmeanttobealegalentity
insurer requirement, or used as a
ranking too l, etc. However, it is recognized that simply
reviewingtheseLSTresultsmayhelpregulatorsbetterunderstandtheroleofliquiditystress
testing within the entities which may result inmore questionsand information requests
regarding the entities’ own liquidity risk management framework and dynamics of their
internal
liquiditystresstests.
[Beginningof]2022LiquidityStressTestingFrameworktobe
included/referencedintheNAICFinancialAnalysisHandbook
Section1.ScopeCriteriaforDeterminingGroupsSubjectto2022LST
HISTORYScopeCriteriafortheInitial2020LST:
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Indeterminingthecompaniessubjecttotheliquiditystresstest(LST),considerationwasgiven
to activities assumed to be correlated with liquidity risk. Another consideration was the
desirabilityoftyingdatausedinthecriteriabacktothestatutoryfinancialstatements.Ultimately
six activities were identified. Those activities are Fixed and
Indexed Annuities, Funding
Agreements, Derivatives, Securities Lending, Repurchase Agreements and Borrowed Money.
Minimumthresholdswereestablishedforeachofthesesixactivities.Alifeinsurancelegalentity
orlifeinsurancegroupexceedingthethresholdfor anyofthesixactivitiesissubjecttothestress
test(seeAnnex1for
moredetails).
While the scope criteria only utilize statutory annual statement data, the stress test is not
similarlylimited.Thus,thestresstestwillconsidermanymoreliquidityrisk elementsthanthe
scopecriteria,andinternalcompanydatawillbethesourceformanyofthoseelements.
Just as the liquidity
stress test structure and methodology may change over time, the scope
criteriamayalso bemodified,for example,inresponsetonewdatapointsintheNAICAnnual
StatementBlank.Thescopecriteriawillbereviewedannually.
Usingtheagreedcriteria,NAICstaffobtainedtheamountsforalllifeinsurance
legalentitiesfrom
the 2018 annual statutory financial statements (filed by March 1, 2019). If two or more life
insurerswerepartofaninsurancegroupwithanNAICgroupcode,thenthenumbersforeachof
those legal entity life insurers was summed together to represent an insurance group result.
Thus,alegalentitylifeinsurernotinaninsurancegroupcanmeetthethresholdonitsown,or
thesumoflegalentitylifeinsurersinagroupcouldmeetthethreshold.Twentythreeinsurance
groupsmettheinitialscopecriteria.
Inestablishingwhetheraninsurerorgroupmet
orexceededthethresholdcriteria,theSubgroup
memberssupportedusingthemostcurrentsingleyearactivityratherthanamultiyearaverage.
Thisresultedincoverageamountsrangingfrom60%to80%oftheindustrytotalforeachactivity
based on 2018 data.
It was recognized that using single year activity could result in more
instancesofaninsurancegroupbeinginscopeoneyearandoutofscopethenext,butregulators
vieweditmoreimportanttohavethemostrecentfinancialdatautilizedfordeterminingscope.
Toaddressconcernsaboutinsurersmoving
inandoutofscope,regulatoryjudgmentwillbeused
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toaddressaninsurer’sexitfromorentrytothescopeofinsurerssubjecttotheliquiditystress
test.PerrevisionstothemodelHoldingCompanyAct,theleadstateregulatorwillconsultwith
the Task Force in determining when it is appropriate to remove an insurer from the LST
requirement
ifitnolongermeetsthescopecriteria.Similarly,leadstateregulatorsshouldhave
theability to consultwiththeTaskForceandrequire the LST fromaninsurernotmeetingthe
scopecriteria(e.g.,aninsurerclosetotriggeringthescopecriteriaformorethanoneyear).
CURRENT
ScopeCriteriaforthe2022LST:
Regulatorsagreedtoretainthesame6criteriaandthresholdsfromthe2020and2021LSTScope
Criteriaforuseasthe2022LSTScopeCriteria.The2022LSTScopeCriteriahavebeenappliedto
the2021annualstatementdata(dataasofDec.31,
2021,filedbyMarch1,2022).
Section2.LiquidityStressTest
2.1Summary
Thestresstestingframeworkemploysacompany cashflowprojectionapproachincorporating
liquidity sources and uses over various time horizons under a baseline assumption and some
number of stress scenarios (for 2022 there are 2 stress scenarios and also an insurerspecific
request for information). The available assets are then recorded
by asset category. The
frameworkthencallsforidentificationofexpectedassetsalesbycategory,orotherfundingas
allowedinthestresstest,tocureanycashflowdeficits(liquidityusesexceedliquiditysources)
under the stress scenarios. The stress tests are to be performed at the legal entity
level; the
aggregatedgroupdoesnotperformtheLST.
2.2TimeHorizons
The time horizons chosen by regulators are 30 days, 90 days, and 1 year, because, overall,
insuranceproductsaredesignedtobeforthebenefitofcustomersasriskprotectionoverthe
longtermandnotdesignedtoprovideshorttermliquiditylikeotherfinancialproducts.Historical
experienceintimesof
stressdemonstrateslowpolicyholderreactioninshortperiodsoftime,as
opposedtoaneventthatoccursovermonthsoryears.Featuresdesignedtoprotectthelong
termnatureoftheproductforthepolicyholdersultimatelyreducethelikelihoodofpolicyholder
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reaction to shortterm volatility in markets. Therefore, evaluating shorter than 30day time
horizons has been deemed not warranted for the overarching macroprudential purpose of
gaugingliquidityriskintheLifeinsuranceindustry.
Policyholdersdonotrun”fromaninsurerintimesofeconomicstresstotheextentdepositors
do
fromabank,becauseinsuranceispurchasedtoobtaintheprotectioninsuranceprovides,not
asasourceofliquidityordiscretionaryfunds.IntheUnitedStates,lifeinsuranceandannuities
are purchased primarily for longterm financial protections upon death or retirement.
Surrendering a life insurance contract to harvest its
cash surrender value would leave the
policyholderwithoutdeathbenefitprotectionthatwouldbeexpensiveorimpossibletoreplace
ata future date. Surrenderingavariable annuity contractwouldlock in potentially temporary
decreasesinaccountvalueandcouldresultinthelossoflivingbenefitprotectionthatbecomes
more valuable
when market conditions depress account values below trigger points. Further,
mitigating contract features such as surrender charges and the insurer’s right to delay the
processingofwithdrawalsandsurrendersforupto30daysarecommon.
There are also noncontractual mitigating factors at play, such as potential negative tax
consequences,thatfurtherreducetheshorttermnatureofliquidityriskforlifeinsurers.
Simplyput,policyholdersarehighlydisincentivizedtogiveupthelikelyirreplaceableprotection
forwhichtheyhavealreadypaid.Therunlikemasssurrenderofinsurancepolicieswouldrequire
largenumbersofpolicyholderstoactagainsttheir
selfinterest.
Fromaholisticriskperspective,liquiditystressistraditionallyexperiencedontheassetside.One
shortterm consequence of market turmoil could be a requirement to post collateral in
connection with existing derivative contracts. However, even in this scenario, collateral is
typicallypostedintheformofsecurities,
soademandforcashisnotgenerated.
Wedoacknowledgeliquidityriskdoesexistwithrespecttoshortertimehorizonsandthatmany
insurersdoconsidershortertimehorizons(7daysforexample)aspartoftheirinternalliquidity
stresstestingframework.Thisisviewedasacashmanagement/Treasuryfunction
impactingthe
dailyoperationsofindividualinsurers,however,thatwouldnotaffecttheindustryasawhole.
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Hence, these considerations are typically reviewed as part of individual/microprudential
surveillanceeffortsintheU.S.
2.3Insurer’sInternalLiquidityStressTestingSystem
Insurersaretousetheirown internalliquiditystresstestingsystem to perform theregulatory
LST, adjusting for regulatory assumptions, metrics, etc., as specified in this document. For
example, assessing materiality of stressed cash flows for inclusion in the liquidity uses and
sources templates is per theinsurer’sowninternal methodology,
butdeterminingwhich legal
entities are to perform the LST and report on those templates is specified in this document.
Insurersshouldprovideanarrativedescriptionoftheirinternalliquiditystresstestingsystemand
processes, including for example their materiality thresholds for stressed cash flows and
methodologyforconvertingforeign
currenciestoUSdollars(seeSection7.Reporting).Thestress
scenariosmayvaryfromyeartoyearandcontainvariationsreferredtoas“Whatif”scenarios.
The following sections provide a further description of each of the key components of the
framework.
Section3.LegalEntitiesRequiredtoPerformtheLSTforInsure rsMeetingthe
ScopeCriteria
The scope of entities included within an insurance group for the purposes of liquidity stress
testingtoassessthepotentialforlargescaleliquidationofassets(i.e.,thelegalentitieswithin
thegroupwhichshouldperformtheLST),shouldinclude:
U.S.Life insurancelegal entities,includingreinsurers,regardless of corporate
structure,so
includingcaptive(regulatorsspecificallywantallU.S.lifeinsurance/reinsurancelegalentities
to perform the 2022 LST for informational purposes future LST iterations may see a
materialityconsiderationadded);
Nonguaranteed/market value separate accounts are not included in the 2022
LST. However, regulators may want to perform
a separate account study in the
future. The current thinking is that even though nonguaranteed/market
valueseparate accountsmay experience asset sales during stressed
environments,thosesalesareatthepolicyholder’sdiscretionanddonotgenerate
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liquidity stress for the insurer/group. As such they are deemed other market
activityratherthaninsuranceentityactivity.Thus,forannuitiesthatprovideboth
nonguaranteed and guaranteed benefits,insurers should onlyinclude the cash
flow impact of the guaranteed benefits. Though not required for the 2022 LST,
insurersshouldconsider
includingnoninsulatedseparateaccountamountsasif
theyweregeneralaccountamounts.
NonU.S.lifeinsurance/reinsurancelegalentitiesshouldperformthe2022LSTif
theyposematerialliquidity risksto the U.S. group(seebelow on nonU.S. legal
entities).
Whereapplicable,holdingcompaniesthatcouldbe
asource ordrawofliquiditytothelife
insurancelegalentities;and
Nonlife insuranceentitiesand noninsurance entities with materialsourcesof liquidity, or
thatcarr youtmaterialliquidityriskbearingactivitiesandcould,directlyorindirectly,pose
materialliquidityrisktotheU.S.group.Thismateriality
considerationshouldoccurwithinthe
context of the specific stress scenario (and “what if” modification if applicable). The
materialitycriteriaand initial list of legalentities in scopeshould be reviewed by the lead
stateregulatorandmodifiedbytheinsurerasneededbasedonregulatordirection.
NonU.S.
legalentities(includingnonU.S.holdingcompanies)aresubjecttothis
materialityconsiderationandshouldbesubjecttoperformingtheLSTiftheypose
materialliquidityrisktotheU.S.group.
U.S.nonlife insurers andreinsurers arenotautomaticallyexempted.IftheU.S.
nonlife insurerposes materialliquidity
risk, per the stress scenario,to the U.S.
group,thenthatlegalentityinsurershouldperformtheLST.
Legal entity asset managers and mutual funds(both U.S. and nonU.S.) are excluded from
performingthe2022LST. 
However, those legal entities performing the LST (e.g., holding comp anies that
couldbeasourceoruseofliquidityforthelifeinsurers)mustreflectanymaterial
stressed cash flowsfrom/tothelegalentityassetmanager/mutualfund intheir
2022LST results(e.g.,theliquidity sources
andliquidityusestemplates,asthey
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dowithanyothertypeoflegalentitythathasmaterialstressedcashflowsfrom/to
thelegalentitiesperformingtheLST).
Ifsuchmaterialstressedcashflowsfrom/tothelegalentityassetmanager/mutual
fundexist,theregulatorswantspecificdisclosuresonthoseintheresults(either
by adjusting the templates
to include a line for these and/or in the
narrative/explanatorydisclosuressubmittedalongwiththetemplates).
Examples of when such legal entity asset manager/mutual fund considerations
anddisclosureswouldneedtobemadeforaspecificstressscenarioinclude:
o Iftheholdingcompanyor anotherlegalentity(ies)in
thegroupisexpected
tofundamaterialliquidityshortfallofamutualfund/assetmanager(i.e.,
redemptionsexceedtheabili tytosellassets),thentheexpectedcashflows
must be reflected (especially where there are established interaffiliate
supportagreements);
o Iftheholdingcompanyor anotherlegalentity(ies)inthe
groupisexpected
to provide capital to the mutual fund/asset manager or is expecting
dividendsfromthem,thematerialexpectedcashflowsmustbereflected;
and
o Iftheassetmanagermanagesfinancialinstrumentsunderwhichitretains
somerisk,suchasnewEuropeanCLOs, orhas contractual riskretention
agreementsforUSCLOs,therequiredriskretentionlimit(5%forEurope)
must bereflectedif sourced from the holding companyor another legal
entity(ies)inthegroupandconsideredmaterial.
Legalentitybanks(bothU.S.andnonU.S.)areexcludedfromperformingthe2022LST.
However, those legal entities performing the LST (e.g., holding companies that
couldbeasourceoruseofliquidityforthelifeinsurers)mustreflectanymaterial
stressed cashflows from/to the legal entity bank in their2022 LST results (e.g.,
theliquiditysourcesandliquidityusestemplates,asthey
dowithanyothertype
of legal entity that has material stressed cash flows from/to the legal entities
performingtheLST).
Page16of48
If such material stressed cash flows from/to the legal entity bank exist, the
regulatorswantspecificdisclosuresonthoseintheresults(eitherbyadjustingthe
templates to include a line for these and/or in the explanatory disclosures
submittedalongwiththetemplates).
Examples of when such legal entity
bank considerations and disclosures would
needtobemadeforaspecificstressscenarioinclude:
o Iftheholdingcompanyor anotherlegalentity(ies)inthegroupisexpected
tofundamaterialliquidityshortfallofabank,thentheexpectedcashflows
must be reflected (especially where there are
established interaffiliate
supportagreements);and
o Iftheholdingcompanyor anotherlegalentity(ies)inthegroupisexpected
to provide capital to the bank or is expecting dividends from them, the
materialexpectedcashflowsmustbereflected.
For2022,thelegalentitiesidentifiedinthebulletsabove,per
aCompany’sORSAand/orother
materiality criteria applied to the specific stress scenario, must be considered as material or
identifiedascarryingoutmaterialliquidity riskbearingactivities and hencesubjecttointernal
liquiditystresstestingrequirements.Althoughalegalentityinthegroupmaynotberequiredto
perform
thestresstestduetomaterialityconsiderationsorexemptions,thoseentities'material
cashimpactson entities performing the stress test must be captured in the sources and uses
templates of the entities performing the LST. Theinsurer will need to disclose the materiality
criteria(agreeduponbytheLeadStateregulator)
usedindeterminingthelegalentitiessubject
tothe2022LSTinthesubmissionofitsresults.Basedontheresultsofthe2020initialLSTexercise
andthoseofthe2021and2022LSTfilings,theSubgroupwilldetermineifadditionalmateriality
criteriashouldbedevelopedtoensurebetter
comparabilityamongstinsurers.
Section4.CashFlowApproachLiquiditySourcesandUses
TheLiquidityStressTestingFrameworkisanchoredbyacashflowapproach,utilizingcompanies’
actual cash flo w projections of sources and uses of liquidityovervarious time horizons based
uponexperienceandexpectations.ThiscontrastswithaBalanceSheetApproach,whichemploys
Page17of48
static balance sheet amounts and generic assumptions about asset liquidity. While a Balance
SheetApproachiseasiertoapplyandprovidescalculationconsistency(andthustheperception
ofincreasedcomparability),its‘onesizefitsall’approachcouldresultinamisleadingassessment
of liquidity risk and fail to capture certain asset
activities or product features under different
stressscenariosandtimehorizons.Thecashflowapproachisdeemedmoredynamicandhence
tocaptureliquidityriskimpactsmoreprecisely.
Theinsurershouldproducecashflowprojectionsforsourcesofliquidityandusesofliquiditythat
cover:operatingitems,investments and derivatives,
capitalitems,andfunding arrangements.
(See Liquidity Sources and Uses templates in Section 7). To clarify an issue regarding funding
arrangements, the projected cash flows for liquidity sources and uses should include already
existingfundingarrangementssuchasFHLBdrawsoutstandinginthecurrenttimeperiod.Also,
specifictotheholding
company,theseprojectedcashflowsforliquiditysourcesandusesshould
includematerialnonU.S.impactsaswell.
The insurer will produce these liquidity sources and uses cash flow projections in a baseline,
normalcourseofbusiness scenario, foreachtime horizon.The insurerwillalsoproducethese
cashflows
foreachtimehorizonforaspecificnumberofrequiredstressscenarios(for2022there
are2stressscenariosandalsoaninsurerspecificworstcasescenario).
4.1BaselineAssumptionsforCashflows
Baseline (prestress) cash flows are the insurerspecific cash flows from normal expected
operations.Insurersshouldpreparecashflowprojectionsundernormaloperatingconditionsand
reportthenetcashflows(projectedliquiditysourceslessuses)foreachtimehorizon.Thesecash
flowprojectionsshould be consistentwith those used for
internal baseline liquidity forecasts,
suchasthoseusedforfinancialplanningandanalysis(FP&A),riskmanagement,etc.Apositive
netcashflowispresumedinthebaselinecashflowssincecompaniesareusuallynotexpected
tobeoperatinginanetcashflowdeficiencystate.
Section5.StressScenariosandtheirAssumptions
Foryearend2022therearetworegulatoryliquiditystressscenarios:anadverseliquiditystress
scenario for insurers, and an interest rate spike scenario. There is also an insurerspecific
Page18of48
informationrequestforeachgroup’sownmostadverseliquiditystressscenario(s).Theadverse
liquidity stress scenario contains a regulator provided narrative, regulatorprescribed
assumptions,andcompanyspecificassumptions.Theinterestratespikescenarioallowsall other
narrativedescriptioncomponentsandkeymetrics(includinghowmuchinterestratesspike)to
be provided
by each company. The insurerspecific information request contains a company
providednarrativeandadescriptionofkeycompanymetrics.Theregulatorprovidednarrative
willbeaqualitative descriptionofthe specifiedstressscenarioto highlighttheparticular risks
andsensitivitiesassociatedwiththatstressscenario.Theregulatorprescribedassumptions
are
specificparametersinsurersshouldincorporateintotheirprocessforaparticularstressscenario.
Companyspecific assumptions should be consistent with the information provided in the
regulatorprovidednarrativeandregulatorprescribedassumptions,andrepresentthedetailed
assumptionsneededforaspecificcompany’sliquiditystresstestingprocess.Examplesofwhere
companies
should provide their assumptions include: debt issuance, lapse sensitivity, new
business sensitivityand mortality sensitivity. Regulators expect insurers to utilize policyholder
behavior assumptions (e.g., surrenders and policy loan withdrawals, existence of new sales
activity) as well as the insurer’s response (e.g., assuming delays in payment of policyholder
benefits),consistentwith
theseverity ofthe stress,andto provide very thoro ughexplanatory
information. All key business activities and product‐ type impacts to liquidity should be
consideredbythecompanies.
If the insurer’s internal model does not utilize a specific economic and/or companyspecific
assumption included in this document, the internal model does
not need to be modified to
incorporateit.However,iftheinsurer’sinternalmodeldoesutilizeaspecificeconomicand/or
companyspecific assumption included in this document, the insurer should use the approach
outlined below to calculate the value for that assumption. (This emphasizes the macro
surveillancebenefitofthe
2022LST,allowingforalevelofconsistencyofassumptionsacrossthe
industry.Asdiscussedpreviously,thisisnotmeanttospecifyassumptionsusedbytheinsurers
intheirowninternalliquiditystresstestingwork.)Ifthereisnospecificvalueincludedinthe2022
LST Framework and instead there is
an illustrative value or suggested guidance, the company
should use a value consistent with the illustrative value or suggested guidance. For example,
Page19of48
guidance is given below on using Moody’s values for migration, default, and recoveries.
However,insurersmayuseS&Pdataorotherappropriatedatasources.
5.1AdverseLiquidityStressScenarioforInsurers
5.1.1Narrative
Insurers are required to apply an adverse liquidity stress scenario as one of the two stress
scenarios. The following is a summary of market conditions in the adverse scenario extracted
fromtheFederalReserveBoard’s2017SupervisoryScenariosforAnnualStressTestsRequired
undertheDoddFrankActStress
TestingRulesandtheCapitalPlanRule.
The adverse scenario is characterized by weakening economic activity across all economies
includedinthescenario.Thiseconomicdownturnisaccompaniedbyaglobalaversiontolong
termfixedincomeassetsthat,despitelowershorttermrates,bringsaboutaneartermrise
in
longtermratesandsteepeningyieldcurvesintheUnitedStatesandthefourcountries/country
blocksinthescenario.
Theeconomic indicatorlevelsdescribedbelowprovidethebackdropfortheeconomicclimate
insurers should assume in the adverse scenario. The actual levels insurers should use in the
adversescenarioare
providedinAnnex2.
Macroeconomic
o RealGDPfallsslightlymorethan2percentfromtheprerecessionpeakinthe
fourthquarterof2016totherecessiontroughinthefirstquarterof2018.
o Unemploymentrateincreases.
o HeadlineCPIfallsandthenrisesoverthescenario
period.
InterestRatesandCreditSpreads
o ShorttermTreasuryratesfallandremainnearzerothroughoutthestress.
o 10yearTreasuryyieldsrise.
o InvestmentGrade(IG)corporatecreditspreadswiden.
AssetValuations
o Equitypricesdeclinebyroughly40%.
Page20of48
o TheVolatilityIndex(VIX)peaksatapproximately35.
o Housingpricesandcommercialrealestatepricesdeclinethrough8quarters.
DescriptionofInternationalMarketConditions
o Recessions and slowdowns in growth are experienced in the Euro area, United
Kingdom,Japan,anddevelopingAsiaeconomies.
o Allforeigneconomiesexperience
adeclineinconsumerprices.
o U.S. Dollar appreciates against the Euro, British Pound, and developing Asia
currencies.
o U.S.Dollardepreciatesmodestly againsttheJapaneseYen,drivenbyflighttosafety
capitalflow.
5.1.2RegulatorPrescribedAssumptions
InsurersshouldutilizethevaluesfortheeconomicindicatorsfromtheFederal
ReserveBoard’s
annualSupervisoryScenariosforAnnualStressTestsRequiredundertheDoddFrankActStress
TestingRulesandtheCapitalPlanRuleasthebasisforscenarioassumptions,TableA.1Historical
dataandTableA.5(Annex2i,A)Supervisoryadversescenario.Insurersshouldusetheversion
publishedinFebruary2017
(refertothetablesinAnnex2i).Specifically,insurersshouldrunthe
adverseliquiditystressscenariousingthedeltasfortheTreasurycurve,Corporatespreads,GDP,
Unemployment, U.S. Inflation (CPI), Housing Price Index (HPI), S&P 500 index (SPX SPOT),
CommercialRealEstateIndex(CREI)andVIXindex.Theseseconomicvariables
shouldbeused
totheextentthesevariablesareincludedinaninsurer’sinternal liquiditystresstestprocessor
models.
Insurers should apply the same change in economic variables experienced between Q4 2016
TableA.1andthestressscenariosinTableA.5tocurrenteconomicvariablelevels(Annex2i,D).
Insurers
shouldusethetablesinAnnex2iforanillustrativeexampleofhowthedeltasfromthe
2017Fed’sCCARareappliedtothecurrentreferencequarter(Q42020)forthe2020LST(Annex
2i,B).Forexample,insurersshoulduse2022(ormostrecentyearend)10Yr.Treasury
ratesand
applythesamepercentageorabsoluteb.p.changeshownfromQ42016tothe2017TableA.5
amountsintheir2022LSTstressscenarios.TableC(Annex2i,C)showsthe2017deltasapplied
Page21of48
to2021yearendlevelsonanabsoluteandpercentagebasisfor3monthand1yearhorizonsfor
easeofuse.Thedeltasto applyareprovidedforthe30day,90dayand1yearhorizons.Note,
the tables also include structured spread assumptions described below in section 5.1.4.
The
tablesareincludedinAnnex2iofthisdocument.
Inaddition,othermarketindicatorsarenecessaryforinsurerstoapplytostressedcashflowsand
toassess the impactonexpectedassetsales.These areasfollows(withdetailstobefoundin
Annex2):
MarketCapacityAssumption

EconomicVariablesforAdverseScenario
SWAPSpreads
SwaptionVolatility
CreditAssumptions:Moody’sTransitionMatrix/MigrationRates
CreditAssumptions:Moody’sDefaultTable
CreditAssumptions:Moody’sRecoveryRateTable
Necessaryeditsfor2022yearendvalueswillbepostedasLeadStat eGuidancetotheAnnexes
in
early2023.
5.1.3MarketCapacityAssumption
Thefollowingissuggestedguidancetodeterminemarketconstraintsonassetcategoriestobe
soldinti mesofstress.Itrepresentsstandardsfollowedbymanyinsurerstoestimateassetssales
by stress scenario, asset category and time hor izon that can be sold without meaningfully
impactingtheentiremarketbywideningbidofferspreads.Werecognizeeachcompanyhasits
ownindividualmethodologyfordeterminingpotential
assetsalesunderstress,andwe request
awrittennarrativebeprovidedastohowtheymaketheirdetermination.
Onceanassetclasshasbeenidentifiedasavailabletobesoldtosatisfyacashdeficiencyfrom
cashflow stress testing, theinsurershouldcalculateitspercentageofthetotal
amountissued
Page22of48
andoutstanding.Nexttheinsurershouldobtainaveragedailytradingvolumes(ADTV)andmake
anassumptionforthehaircutamounttoapplytothatvolumetoreflectstressedconditions(the
“haircut ADTV”). Next, the insurer would apply its calculated percentage of total outstanding
ownedtothehaircutADTV,andtheresult
wouldbedividedbythenumberofdaysinthestress
testingtimehorizon to arriveatadailyamountthatcanbesold.Thisdailyamountabletobe
soldwouldbemultipliedbythenumberofdaysinthe prescribedtimehorizon:30daysforthe
30day
horizon,60daysforthe90dayhorizon(3190days)and274daysforthe1yearhorizon
(91365days).Anillustrativeexamplebestexplainstheabovedescribedprocess.
Illustrativeexample(alsoincludedinAppendix2ii):
Step1:EstimateUnconstrainedSalesPerDay
InsurerAhasa$100billionportfolioofinvestmentgradecorporatebonds,pricedatpar.
InsurerAestimatesthatitholdsapproximately5%ofoutstandingcorporatebonds.Inthe
adverseliquiditystressscenario,InsurerA’sunconstrainedliquiditystresstestingmodel
assumesthatitcansell:
TimeHorizon %Ableto
Be
Sold
SalePrice TotalSale Sales/Day
First30Days 10% 97 $9.7B $440M
3190Days 20% 94 $18.8B $430M
91365Days 50% 90 $45.0B $230M
Step2:AddMarketCapacityConstraint
Assumetheaveragedailytradingvolumeinthesecondarymarketforinvestmentgradecorporate
bondshasbeen$13.0Billionoverthepastyear.InsurerAestimatesthattradingvolumeswould
declineby40%intheadverseliquiditystressscenarioto$8.0Bperday.
SinceInsurerAis5%ofthe
market,InsurerAcanonlytrade$400Mperday($8Bx5%)withoutpayingasignificantilliquiditypremium
andimpactingtheoverallmarket.
InsurerAthenrepeatsthisprocessforeveryassetclassinitsinvestmentportfolio.

Page23of48
TimeHorizon UnconstrainedSales/
Day
MarketCapacity
Assumption
Impact
First30Days $440M $400M ($40M)
3190Days $430M $400M ($30M)
91365Days $230M $400M $0
5.1.4EconomicVariablesforAdverseScenario
Insurers should use Annex 2i and 2iii to assist in determining cashflows, asset values and the
quantityof assetstobesoldinstressedmarkets.Forbaselinevalues,theindustryshallsubmit
yearendspreadstotheregulatorsshortlyafteryearend.Theregulators
willreviewandapprove
thevaluesforuseinthetableforliquiditystresstestingpurposes.Structuredspreaddatawas
derivedfromtheJPMorganABSWeeklyAssetSpreadDatasheet.Thespreadswerescaledtoa
stressed economic environment consistent with an adverse scenario as describedby the Fed,
described above
and adopted for this stress testing. For the 2020 LST, economic conditions
experienced in March of 2020 were deemed consistent with an adverse scenario. Therefore,
structuredspreadsfromMarch2020wereusedasthebasisforthestressedspreadsassumptions
for insurers to use in their stress testing scenario for the
30day, 90day and 1year horizons.
Note, to calculate structured spreads for CLO/CDO 5.57 year and ABS Auto3 year, it was
necessarytoconstructaTreasuryyieldcurvewith3yearand7yearpoints.Thesepointswere
calculatedusingastraightlinelinearinterpolationmethod.For
the2022LST,thesameMarch
2020structuredspreadsweredeemedappropriateforuse.
Regulators ask industry members to agree on one set of structured spread values amongst
themselves to submit for approval, not each insurer submitting values that each need to be
approved. Regulators and/or the NAIC need to do a reasonableness check of current
baseline/market levels of spreads insurers use before applying the stressed amounts in the
JPMorgan spreadsheet. For example, if current spreads are already greater than the JPMorgan
stressed spread amounts, regulators may have to consider alternatives or additional stressed levels.
One agreed upon set of values will help provide uniformity, consistency, and comparability of
stress testing results across insurers.
Page24of48
When utilizing these spreads, insurers should assume the percentage increase in spreads
experienced in March 2020 from the JPMorgan ABSWeeklyAssetSpreadDatasheet; and apply
the absolute increase to the agreed upon December 31 baseline spreads. These tables are provided
in Annex 2i, B.
Since the reasonableness check is merely a check of current market rates, it is not anticipated that
it will be burdensome for insurers to provide an agreed upon set of December 31 baseline values
to regulators by January 31 of each year or for the regulators to be able to respond by February 28
of every year to allow insurers sufficient time to incorporate into their stress testing framework.
Baseline amounts are included in Annex 2i, B.
For the 2022 LST – NAIC values are to be established as Lead State guidance in early 2023 after
the 2022 LST Framework has been adopted. These NAIC values will be established using the
industry developed process.
5.1.5SWAPSpreads
Stressedspreadlevelsmayimpactassetspricesforexpectedsalescalculationsnecessaryforthe
stress scenarios. Insurers should complete the SWAP Spread table in Annex 2iv to document
assumptionsusedindeterminingassetvaluesandthe
quantityofassetstobesoldinstressed
markets.SWAPspreadsourcedataisnolongerprovidedintheFederalReserve’sH.15FREDdata.
UseofBloombergSwapSpreadsispreferredifoptionsexistwithinBloomberg, identifywhich
option was used. If a different source from Bloomberg is used,
then identify the source and
option.
5.1.6SwaptionVolatility
InsurersshouldusethetableinAnnex2vtoassistindeterminingassetvaluesandthequantity
ofassetstobesoldinstressedmarkets.Insurersshouldobtaintheinformationtopopulatethe
tableusingBloomberg’sSwaptionVolatilityforvarioustimehorizonsandexpiry.Forconsistency,
insurersshouldusethetablefoundonBloombergatNSV[Go].
Commented [ST1]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Page25of48
5.1.7Moody’sTransitionMatrix/MigrationRates
InsurersshouldusethetableinAnnex2vitoassistindeterminingcorporatecreditmigrations,
assetvaluesandthequantityofassetstobesoldinstressedmarkets.Thetableisimportedfrom
Moody’s CorporateGlobal: Annual default study, Exhibit 36‐Average oneyear alphanumeric
ratingmigrationrates,19832021.Ifavailable,insurersshouldusetheequivalentMoody’stables
forU.S.PublicFinanceformunicipalbondsand the appropriateMoody’stablesfor structured
/assetbackedsecurities.Alternativesourcesmaybeusedbutshouldbedisclosedaswellasthe
rationalefortheiruse.
5.1.8Moody’sDefaultTable
InsurersshouldusethetableinAnnex2viitoassistindeterminingasset
valuesandthequantity
ofassetstobesoldinstressedmarkets.ThetableisimportedfromMoody’sCorporateGlobal:
Annual default study, Exhibit 41‐Averagecumulativeissuerweighted global default rates by
letter rating, 19832021. Insurers should use the equivalent Moody’s tables for U.S. Public
Financefor municipal bonds andthe appropriateMoody’stablesfor structured /assetbacked
securities.Alternativesourcesmaybeusedbutshoulddisclosedaswellastherationalefortheir
use.
5.1.9Moody’sRecoveryRateTable
InsurersshouldusethetableinAnnex2viiitoassistindeterminingassetvaluesandthe
quantity
ofassetstobesoldinstressedmarkets.ThetableisimportedfromMoody’sCorporateGlobal:
Annualdefault study,Exhibit8‐Averagecorporatedebtrecoveryratesmeasuredby ultimate
recoveries,19872021.InsurersshouldusetheequivalentMoody’stablesforU.S.PublicFinance
formunicipalbondsandtheappropriateMoody’stablesforstructured/assetbackedsecurities.
Alternativesourcesmaybeusedbutshoulddisclosedaswellastherationalefortheiruse.
If relevant for a given insurer, the adverse liquidity stress scenario for insurers can be run
consideringsourcesotherthanexpectedasset
sales(e.g.,FHLBcreditlinedraws,banklinesof
credit and holding company contributions). Should that be the case, the insurer must clearly
identifythesourcesotherthanassetsalesutilizedtomeetexpectedliquiditydeficiencies.
Commented [ST2]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Commented [ST3]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Commented [ST4]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Page26of48
5.1.10“WhatIf”Modification
The“Whatif”modificationtotheadverseliquiditystressscenarioremovestheabilityforinsurers
touseextraordinaryinternalandexternalfundingsourcestosatisfyanyliquiditydeficiencyunder
stress,i.e.,noactionstakeninresponsetothestress(asopposedtoongoingoperationalfunding
agreementsincluded
intheinsurer’sbaselinetemplates)orinresponsetoaliquiditydeficiency.
Intragroup “keep well” agreements would be considered extraordinary transactions. Thus,
expectedassetsaleswillbetheprimarysourceofmeetinganyliquiditydeficiencyforthe“What
if”scenario.Anyexistingfundingsuchascommercialpaperwillnotbe
assumedtoroll,norwill
FHLBfacilitiesabilitytorolluponmaturity.
5.1.11CompanySpecificAssumptions
Insurers must construct the assumptions needed for their internal models to run the above
adverseliquiditystressscenarioforinsurers.Companyspecificassumptionsshouldbeconsistent
withtheabovescenarioasnarrativeandregulatorprescribed
assumptions.Examplesincludethe
inability to roll or issue new debt, potential increases in lapse rates, new business sensitivity,
mortalityexperienceandpolicyholderbehavior(e.g.,surrendersandpolicyloans).
5.2InterestRateSpikeScenario
5.2.1Narrative
Insurers should run an interest rate spike stress test that resembles the late 70’s/early 80’s
inflationaryperiodasitmostcloselymirrorstheregulatorydesiredinterestratespikescenario.
Historicaldatafromthelate70’s/early80’sshowthefollowingeconomicconditions:
Inflationary forces caused interest rates to rise quickly.
Investors rotated out of fixed income and into equities, real estate, and commodities.
Central bank responded by tightening monetary policy in tandem, eventually causing the
yield curve to invert.
Insurers
should provide a detailed narrative outlining their scenario and assumptions around
generaleconomicconditionsbulletedaboveandspecificassumptionsforeconomicvariablesfor
each time horizon. The economic variables in the table below and the amount of expected
Page27of48
movementineachvariableshouldbefullydescribedinthenarrativetotheextentareusedina
company’sinternalmodel.Thetableoutlinesthedirectionalmovementof therelevanteconomic
indicators.Insurersshouldspecifytheamountofmovementforeachvariabletheyconsiderto
be part of the scenario for
a severe interest rate spike. For example, insurers may indicate a
parallelshiftinTreasuryratesup100bpsinthefirst30days,up200bpsin90daysand300bps
over12months.Thetableisaguideandnottobeinterpretedasastricttemplateandmaybe
supplemented or customized by the insurer.Narrative/Explanatory disclosures should explain
theseassumptions.
5.2.2RegulatorPrescribedAssumptions
Regulatorsdidnotadoptanyregulatorprescribedassumptionvaluesforthisstressscenario.
Instead,theyprovidedthebelowregulatorguidanceforinsurerstousewhenestablishingtheir
owncompanyspecificassumptionsforthisstressscenario.
EconomicVariable ExpectedMovement Comments
Treasuryrates Increaserapidly Criticalfactorsformodelingimpactsto
assetprices,collateralflows,and
productcashflows
Equityprices Increaserapidly
Creditspreads Increasemoderately
Inflationrates Increaserapidly Thesefactorshelpdefinethe
macroeconomicconditionsofthe
scenario
RealGDPgrowth Flat
hesefactorshelpdefinethe
macroeconomicconditionsofthe
s
cenario
Unemploymentrate Flat
Realestateprices Increase
Swapspreads Increase Impactderivativecollateral
requirements
FXrates Unclear
Impliedvolatility Increase
Creditassumptions
(transition,default,recovery
rates)
Unclear Maynotbeanimportantassumptionto
defineforthescenario
5.2.3CompanySpecificAssumptions
Insurersmustconstructtheassumptionsneededfortheirinternalmodelstoruntheabovestress
scenario. Companiesareencouragedto provide more information beyond these guidelinesas
they feel is appropriate to help regulators understand their assumptions for the scenario.
Page28of48
Company specific assumptions should be consistent with the stress scenario’s narrative and
regulator prescribed assumptions. Based on the 2022 significant increases to inflation and
interest rates, insurers should consider increasing the 2021 values for use in the 2022 LST to
ensurea“severeinterestratespike.”
5.3InsurerSpecificInformation
Request‐WorstCaseScenario
5.3.1Narrative
Thisinformationrequestrequiresinsurerstoprovide adetailednarrativeof their most severe
liquidity stress scenario(s) to obtain greater insight to the drivers of liquidity risk for specific
insurers.Themostseverescenarioshouldbeonethatresultsinthelargestliquiditydeficiency
(liquidity sources less uses) from
their existing internal liquidity stress testing process. The
scenarioshouldbefocusedontheinsurer’sinternalmodelscenariowiththeworstcaseoutcome
forthegroup.Regulatorsmayusethisinformationtoinformfutureprescribedstressscenarios.
Insurers should provide a comprehensive narrative describing the stress scenario(s) and the
economic
environment(s).Thisstressscenario(s)could beacombination of multiplestressor s.
Insurersshouldreviewthesescenariostoensuretheyareworstcasefortheirbusinessmodel,
products,etc.,particularlyifnoliquiditydeficienciesareidentified.
Section6.AvailableandExpecte dAssetSales
Oncethe stressedsourcesand uses of liquidityhave beenestablished,andthe net cash flows
calculated, insurers then project the assets available at the end of the time horizon by asset
category(pleaserefertotheassetcategoriesintheAssetsTemplateinSection7).Thevaluation
of available assets
for the baseline scenario utilizes current and projected asset values for a
normal operating environment. The valuation of available assets for a stress scenario will be
baseduponfairvaluehaircutsperthespecificstressscenarionarrative,itsregulatoryprescribed
assumptions,and/orthecompanyassumptionsbasedonthenarrativeand
regulatoryprescribed
assumptions (e.g., fair market value haircuts and capacity indicators). Note: Any securities
pledged as part of institutional funding agreements (e.g., FHLB) should be excluded and
Page29of48
consideredencumbered.However,anyprepledgedassetsthatarenotsecuringcreditthathas
beenextendedandremainsoutstanding(i.e.,excess)shouldbeconsideredunencumbered.
Totheextentthatstressedcashinflowsareinsufficienttomeettheanticipatedcashoutflows,
the insurer must provide for cash flows to meet the deficiency.
Unless a stress scenario (or
“Whatif”modificationofastressscenario)indicatesotherwise,theinsurercanutilizeinternal
andexternal fundingsources(e.g.,FHLB newdraws)aswellasassetsalestosatisfyaliquidity
deficiency. Any expected asset sales must be reported in the appropriate column(s) of the
template.Insurersdecidewhichcategoriesofavailableassetstosell,aswellasthequantityto
sell.(PleaserefertotheAssetsTemplateinSection7.)
Asset sales will appear in two different places‐1) within the liquidity sources template for
expected/plannedactivityduringthetimehorizon(preliquiditydeficiencycalculation),
and2)in
theassetstemplateforanyamountofassetsalesusedtomeetaliquiditydeficiency(Liquidity
SourceslessLiquidityUses).Ifaninsurerhasnoliquiditydeficiency,thentherearenoassetsales
neededintheAssetsTemplate(thoughavailableassetsstillapply).Similarly,ifcashon
handwas
sufficienttomeettheliquiditydeficiencyandtheinsurerchosetoutilizethatcash,thennoasset
saleswouldbereportedintheAssetstemplate.
Theexpectedassetsalesamountscalculatedbasedontheinsurer’sownmodelsshouldalsobe
subjected toportfoliomanagerand/or ChiefInvestment Officer (CIO)
feedback.This feedback
maytaketheformof“topside”adjustmentstotheexpectedassetsales.Regulatorsexpectrobust
disclosuresaround thechief investmentofficer’s(orequivalent title or designee)assumptions
and decisions on expected asset sales. The intent is for these asset sales to most accurately
represent what actions the
insurer could reasonably take in the given scenario, market
conditions,andthecompany’santicipatedinvestmentpolicyand/orstrategy.
Section7.Reporting
Insurers should submit datain the reporti ng template for liquidity sources, liquidity uses, and
assets(availableassetsandexpectedassetsales)inUSdollars.Thesetemplatesutilizecategories
for 30day, 90day and 1year time horizons. The assets template further illustrates available
Page30of48
assets and final expected asset sales by asset subcategory to cover any liquidity deficiency
(negativeamountsofnetliquiditysourceslessliquidityusesover theprescribedtimehorizons).
UseoftheseconsistentsubcategoriesofassetsiscriticalforallowingtheTaskForcetoaggregate
theassetsalesresults.

Page31of48
LiquiditySourcesandLiquidityUsesTemplates:
Aliquiditysources reportandaliquidityusesreportshould be generated for each legal entity
withinthegroupthatwassubjectedtoliquiditystresstesting,usingtheNAICtemplates.These
legalentityamountsshouldalsobeaggregatedintoagroupliquiditysourcesreportand
agroup
liquidity uses report for submission (the LST is not performed at the group level; rather it is
performed at the legal entity level and those results are aggregated to present a group level
report).
FortheBaseline,theAdverseLiquiditystressscenario,andtheInterestRateSpike
stress
scenario,LiquiditySourcesandLiquidityUsestemplatesatboththeindividualentitylevel
andtheaggregatedgrouplevelaretobesubmitted.
Forthe“WhatIf”VariationoftheAdverseLiquiditystressscenario,agrouplevelLiquidity
Sourcestemplateand/oragrouplevelLiquidityUsestemplateisonlyrequired
ifthereis
a material difference from the Adverse Liquidity stress scenario’s group level Liquidity
SourcesandLiquidityUsestemplates.
AssetsTemplate:
AswiththeLiquidityUsesandLiquiditySourcestemplates,theAssetstemplateistobegenerated
for each legal entity performing the LST. For the 2022 LST, the
insurer may submit the assets
templateatthegrouplevelonly,withoutsubmissionofthelegalentityassetsalestemplates.
A group level assets template is required for the Baseline and all stress scenarios,
includingthe“WhatIf”variationoftheAdverseLiquiditystressscenario.
ModificationofTemplates:
Insurers
areallowedtoaddlinestothetemplatestoprovidemoredetailedbreakdownofexisting
categories(e.g.,forcashflowsto/fromlegalentityassetmanager/mutualfundsaswellasbanks),
butdeletionsofexistinglines/categoriesarehighlydiscouraged.
SubmissionDeadline:
Thereportingtemplatesandmanyothernarrativedisclosuresreferencedin
thisdocumentare
tobesubmittedtotheLeadStatebyJune30,2023.
Page32of48
Section8.Templates
8.1LiquiditySourcesTemplate
Note 1: Certain flows could be settled in securities (e.g., margins on derivatives, capital contributions/dividends,
etc.).SeethemorespecificSecurityCollateralguidancewithintheExceltemplates.
Note2: AssetSales(pendingsettlement)shouldincludetradesexecutedpriortothereportingdatewithaknown
settlementdateafterthereporting
date(forexample12/30tradedateand01/03settledate).
Note3: AssetCommitmentsshouldincludeanticipatedcashflowsrelatedtosettlementofafutureobligationto
acounterpartytotheextent,andintheamount,appropriateforthespecificstressscenarioandeconomic
assumptions.Examplescouldinclude capitalcallsfor
alternativeinvestments,mortgageloan fundings,
etc.,andshouldincludeeachcompany’sbestestimateastowhattheywouldexpecttofundundereach
scenario.Ifthesecommitmentshavebeenexplicitlyprefunded/collateralizedbyhighlyliquidassets,asset
commitments should be reported on a net basis, including proceeds from the sale of
the highly liquid
assetsinanamountconsistentwiththespecificstressscenarioandeconomicassumptions.Thislineitem
may includesomepercentage amountofcommitments to fund privateplacement revolvers consistent
withthespecificstressscenarioandeconomicassumptions,butrevolversandlinesofcreditthemselves
shouldbecapturedin
thecreditfacilitieslineintheSourcesFundingsection.
CashFlow CFType CFCategory 1Month 3Month 1 2 Month 1Month 3Month 12Month
PremiumsandDeposits(Renewal/NewBusiness)      
CashCharges/Fees      
ReinsuranceRecoverables      
ExpensesIntercompanySettlements      
TaxPayments(Inflows)      
OtherFlows      

    
PrincipalandInterest      
Dividends/Distributions      
InitialandVariationMargi nReceived      
OtherCollateralReceived      
AssetSales(PendingSettlement)      
OtherFlows      
     
CapitalContributions      
Commitments 
    
DividendsfromSubsidiaries      
OtherFlows      
     
DebtIssuance/Refinancing      
GICs      
FHLB      
Repo/SecuritiesLending      
CreditFacilities(Incl.ContingencyFundingFacilities)      
IntercompanyLoans 
    
CommercialPaper      
OtherFlows      
     
GroupSummary
Sources Operating
InvestmentandDerivatives
Capital
Funding
TotalSources(beforeAssetSales)
LegalEntity1
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8.2LiquidityUsesTemplate
Note1: Certainflowscouldbesettledinsecurities(e.g.,marginsonderivatives,capitalcontributions/dividends,
etc.).SeethemorespecificSecurityCollateralguidancewithintheExceltemplates.
Note2: AssetPurchases(pendingsettlement)shouldincludetrades executedprior tothereportingdatewitha
knownsettlementdateafterthereportingdate
(forexample12/30tradedateand01/03settledate).
Note3: AssetCommitmentsshouldincludeanticipatedcashflowsrelatedtosettlementofafutureobligationto
acounterpartytotheextent,andintheamount,appropriateforthespecificstressscenarioandeconomic
assumptions.Examplescouldinclude capitalcallsfor
alternativeinvestments, mortgageloan fundings,
etc.,andshouldincludeeachcompany’sbestestimateastowhattheywouldexpecttofundundereach
scenario.Ifthesecommitmentshavebeenexplicitlyprefunded/collateralizedbyhighlyliquidassets,asset
commitments should be reported on a net basis, including proceeds from the sale of the
highly liquid
assetsinanamountconsistentwiththespecificstressscenarioandeconomicassumptions.Thislineitem
may includesomepercentage amountofcommitments to fund privateplacement revolvers consistent
withthespecificstressscenarioandeconomicassumptions,butrevolversandlinesofcreditthemselves
shouldbecapturedin
thecreditfacilitieslineintheSourcesFundingsection.
CashFlow CFType CFCategory 1Month 3Month 1 2 Month 1Month 3Month 12Month
NonElectiveBenefits/Claims      
ElectiveBenefits/Claims      
Commissions      
ReinsurancePayables      
Expenses‐Other      
Expenses‐IntercompanySettlements      
InsuranceProductCommitments      
TaxPayments(Outflows)      
OtherFlows      
     
AssetCommitments      
InitialandVariationMargi nPaid      
OtherCollateralPledge d      
AssetPurchases(Pendi ngSettlement)      
OtherFlows      
     
Shareholder/PolicyholderDividends
     
CapitalContributionstoSubsidiaries      
DividendstoParent      
OtherFlows      
     
DebtMaturities/DebtServicing      
GICs Benefits/Maturities      
FHLB      
Repo/SecuritiesLending     

CreditFacilities(Incl.ContingencyFundingFacilities)      
IntercompanyLoans      
OtherFlows      
     
     
GroupSummary
Use s Operating
InvestmentandDerivatives
Capital
Funding
LegalEntity1
TotalUses
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8.3AssetsTemplate
AssetCate gory AssetSubCategory 1Month 3Month 12 Month
Cash Cash&CashEquivalents   
TreasuryBonds   
AgencyBonds   
OtherIGSove reigns&RegionalGovernment‐  
BelowIGSovereigns&RegionalGovernment   
AgencyCM O   
AgencyMBS   
AgencyCM B S   
AgencyABS   
IGPublic
CorporateBonds   
IGMuni cipalBonds   
BelowIGPublicCorporateBonds   
BelowIGMunicipalBonds   
IGPrivatePlacementBonds   
IG144As   
BelowIGPrivatePlace mentBonds   
BelowIG144As   
IGCMO   
IGMBS   
IGCMBS   
IGABS   
IGCLO   
BelowIGCMO   
BelowIGMBS   
BelowIGCMBS   
BelowIGABS   
BelowIGCLO   
CommonStock   
PreferredStock   
OtherEquityandAlternativeInvestments   
Commercial,Residential,Agricultural,BankandOtherLoans 
 
Other   

 
PublicBonds
PrivateBonds
NonAgencyStructuredDebt
Equity
Other
TotalInvestedAssetsAvailableforSale
GroupSummary
GovernmentSecurities
CashandInvestedAssetsAvailableforSale
Scenario Summary
AsofDate
1Month 3Month 12Month 1Month 3Month 12Month
TotalSources(beforeAssetSales)      
TotalUses      
NetSources&Uses(DeficitbeforeAssetSales)      
TotalInvestedAsse t sAvailableforSale      
Cashappliedtodeficit      
Deficit
Subtotal       
TotalAssetsSold‐     
Deficitsatisfiedifzeroorgreater      
Confidential‐‐ForDiscussionPurposesOnly,DoNotDistribute
GroupSummary LegalEntity1
Page35of48
Note1:Insurerswillenter“Illiquid”inadatafieldforanyassetcategorydeemedsuchwithinaspecifictimehorizon.
(Regulatorscanthenfollowupwithquestionslaterifthereareconcerns,etc.)
Note 2: Any securities pledged as part of institutional funding agreements (e.g., FHLB) should be excluded
and
consideredencumbered.However,anyprepledgedassetsthatarenotsecuringcreditthathasbeenextendedand
remainsoutstanding(i.e.,excess)shouldbeconsideredunencumbered.
Note3:Reminderthatregulatorswantrobustdisclosuresregardingthechiefinvestmentofficer’s(orequivalenttitle
ordesignee)assumptionsanddecisionsonexpectedassetsales.
Mightneedtosupplementthetemplatecomments
withadditionalnarrativedisclosures.
Note4:Excludingthe“WhatIf”variation,insurersaretoprovidedisclosuresindicatingwhenaffiliatedamountsare
providedtoassistalegalentityinaddressingaliquiditydeficiency.
AssetCate gory AssetSubCategory 1Month 3Month 12 Month
Cash Cash&CashEquival ents   
TreasuryBonds   
AgencyBonds   
OtherIGSove reigns&RegionalGovernment‐  
BelowIGSovereigns&RegionalGovernment   
AgencyCM O   
AgencyMBS   
AgencyCM B S   
AgencyABS   
IGPublic
CorporateBonds   
IGMuni cipalBonds   
BelowIGPublicCorporateBonds   
BelowIGMunicipalBonds   
IGPrivatePlacementBonds   
IG144As   
BelowIGPrivatePlace mentBonds   
BelowIG144As   
IGCMO   
IGMBS   
IGCMBS   
IGABS   
IGCLO   
BelowIGCMO   
BelowIGMBS   
BelowIGCMBS   
BelowIGABS   
BelowIGCLO   
CommonStock   
PreferredStock   
OtherEquityandAlternativeInvestments   
Commercial,Residential,Agricultural,BankandOtherLoans 
 
Other   
  
PrivateBonds
NonAgencyStructuredDebt
Equity
Other
TotalInvestedAssetsFinalSale
GroupSummary
GovernmentSecurities
PublicBonds
FinalExpectedAssetSalesAfterAdjustments
Page36of48
Narrative/ExplanatoryDisclosuresnotedinthe2022LST
Narrative/explanatorydisclosuresareexpectedtobeinEnglish.
Insurers should provide a narrative description of their internal liquidity stress testing
systemandprocesses,includingforexampletheirmaterialitythresholdsforstressedcash
flowsandmethodologyforconvertingforeigncurrenciestoUSdollars.
Specific disclosures on material stressed cash flows
to/from legal entity banks/asset
managers/mutualfundsifneeded.
Companyspecific narrative on assumptions and metrics used for the adverse liquidity
stressscenarioforinsurers,forexampletheinabilitytorollorissuenewdebt,potential
increasesinlapserates,newbusinesssensitivity,mortalityexperienceandpolicyholder
behavior(e.g.,surrenders
andpolicyloans).
Companyspecific narrative on the interest rate shock scenario, assumptions around
general economic conditions bulleted in 5.2.1 Narrative, and specific metrics for
economicvariables for each time horizon.The economicvariablesin the table in 5.2.2
RegulatorPrescribed Assumptions should be fully described in the narrative, to
the
extenttheyareuseinthecompany’sinternalmodel.
Insurersshouldprovidea comprehensivenarrativedescribing their worstcaseliquidity
stressscenario(s)andtheeconomicenvironment(s),includingassumptions,keymetrics
andresults.
Written narrative on the insurer’s own individual methodology for determining asset
salesunderstress.
Robust disclosures regarding the chief investment officer’s (or equivalent title or
designee)assumptionsanddecisionsonexpectedassetsales,ifneeded.
Excluding the “What If” variation, disclosures to identify when affiliated amounts are
contributedtoassistalegalentityinaddressingaliquiditydeficiency.
Disclosewhenaregulatoryprescribed
variableis notused fortheLST becauseitisnot
usedintheinternalliquiditystresstestingprocessormodels.
Page37of48
[Endof2022LiquidityStressTestingFrameworktobeincludedasan
appendixintheNAICFinancialAnalysisHandbook]
DataAggregation
GiventheNAIC’sprimaryfocusisonmacroprudentialimpactsofaliquiditystressimpactingthe
lifeinsurancesector,theNAICwillaggregatefinalexpectedassetsalesdataacrosstheinsurance
groupssubjecttotheliquiditystresstest.Theaggregationwillbedonebyassetcategory.The
NAICaimstocomparethe
aggregatedresultsagainstvariousbenchmarks,potentiallyincluding
normaland/orstressedtradingvolumesandassetvaluesforvariousassetclasses,todetermine
the impact such sales may have on the capital markets in times of stress. Findings from this
analysismayalso informexpectedassetsaleassumptionsutilizedinfutureruns
oftheliquidity
stresstest.
Aspartofitsmacroprudentialsurveillance,theinsuranceregulatorsand/orNAICmayreachout
to other regulatory agencies to discuss aggregate results that may impact other regulated
industriessuchasbanks,securitiesbrokers,andassetmanagers.Insuranceregulatorsmayalso
coordinatewithotheragenciestoidentify
appropriateandperhapscoordinatedactiontheymay
taketopreventorminimizetheeffectlargeassetsalesmayhaveonthefinancialmarketsand
overalleconomy.
RegulatoryAuthority
For the 2020 and 2021 liquidity stress tests, lead state regulators utilized their examination
authoritytocollectthereportingresultsfrominsurersandtokeepthedataconfidential.Along
term solution was developed at the Financial Stability (EX) Task Force in coordination with
addressingsimilarissuesrelatedtotheGroup
CapitalCalculationproject,resultinginrevisionsto
Model#440.However,itwilltakeseveralyearsforstatestoadopttheserevisions.Asaresult,
someregulatorswillutilizetheirexaminationauthorityforthe2022LSTaswell,whileothersmay
relyuponadoptedrevisionstotheirHoldingCompanyAct.
Page38of48
Confidentiality
For the 2020 and 2021 liquidity stress tests, lead state regulators utilized their examination
authorityto collec t thereportingresultsfrominsurersidentifiedbythescopecriteria.Existing
protocols for collecting confidential/sensitive data for each state and insurer were utilized. A
longtermsolutionwasdevelopedattheFinancialStability(EX)
TaskForceincoordinationwith
addressingsimilarissuesrelatedtotheGroupCapitalCalculationproject,resultinginrevisionsto
Model#440.However,itwilltakeseveralyearsforstatestoadopttheserevisions.Asaresult,
someregulatorswillutilizetheirexaminationauthorityforthe2022LSTaswell,while
othersmay
relyuponadoptedrevisionstotheirHoldingCompanyAct.
Timeline
December2022Adoptthe2022LSTFramework.
Regulatorsagreedtomakenosubstantivechangesforthe2022LSTFramework,including
the Scope Criteria. Minor template revisions and Annex updates to the 2022 LST
Frameworkdocumentneedtobefinalizedearlyin2023asLeadStateGuidancetoallow
insurers adequate time to generatethe 2022 LST filings in time for the June 30, 2023,
filingdeadline;ideallybytheendofJanuary2023.
June 2023 Incorporate all appropriate Lead State Guidance into the 2022 LST
Frameworkdocumentasthestartingplacefor the2023LSTFramework
andbeginwork
onchangesspecifictothe2023LST.

Page39of48
Annex1:OriginalScopeCriteriawithAnnualStatementReferences
The Subgroup proposes to includein the scope of the Liquidity Stress Testing Framework any
insurer/groupthatexceedsthefollowingthresholdsforanyofthe notedactivities(or account
balance as a proxy for that activity). The thresho lds have been established taking into
consideration both the account balance of the insurer/group
to the total balance for the life
insurancesector,aswellastheaggregateaccountbalanceofinsurers/groupswithinscopetothe
aggregateaccountbalanceforthelifeinsurancesector.
AccountBalances Thresholdin$B
“greaterthan”
Referenceto2017NAIClife/accidentandhealth(A&H)annualfinancial
statementblank
FixedandIndexed
Annuities
25 AnalysisofIncreaseinAnnuityReserves
Page:AnalysisofIncreaseinReserves
Line:ReservesDecember31,currentyear(15)
Column:SumofIndividualFixedAnnuities,IndividualIndexedAnnuities,
GroupFixedAnnuities,andGroupIndexedAnnuities
FundingAgreements
andGICs
i
10 DepositTypeContracts
Page:Exhibit7DepositTypeContracts
Line:9
Column:GuaranteedInvestmen tContra cts(Column2)
+
Column:PremiumandOtherDepositFunds(Column6)IFtheamountofFHLB
FundingReservesfromNote11.B(4)(b)suggestsfundingagreementsarenot
reportedinColumn2ofExhibit7
+
SyntheticGICS
Page:Exhibit5Interrogatories
Line:7.1
Derivatives–Notional
Value(absolutevalue)
75 DerivativesNotionalValue(absolutevalue)
Pages:ScheduleDB,PartA;ScheduleDB,PartB,Section1
Column:NotionalValue(sumall)
SecuritiesLending 2 SecuritiesLendingCollateralAssets
Pages:ScheduleDL,Part1;ScheduleDL,Part2
Line:Total(9999999)
Column:FairValue
RepurchaseAgreements 1 RepurchaseAgreements
Page:NotestoFinancialStatementInvestmentsRestrictedAssets
Line:Sumof05L1C,05L1D,05L1E,05L1F
Column:Total(GeneralAccountPlusSeparateAccount)
BorrowedMoney
(includescommercial
papers,lettersofcredit,
etc.)
1 BorrowedMoney
Page:Liabilities
Line:BorrowedMoney(22)
Column:CurrentYear
Page40of48
i
Inperformingtheadditionof theFHLBfundingagreementamounttothe GICsamount,NAICstaffdiscovered
thatthereportingofFHLBfundingagreementsisnotconsistentinExhibit7,DepositTypeContracts.Thesource
oftheFHLBamountisNote11.B(4)(b):
Line: Funding agreements, current year, amount as of the
reporting date, borrowing from FHLB, collateral
pledgedtoFHLBColumn:FundingAgreementReservesEstablished
For someinsurers,we were ableto match amountsfromtheFHLB fundingagreement footnote to the exactsame
amount in Exhibit 7, eitherColumn 2 (GICs) or Column 6 (Premiums and Other Deposit Funds). For
those insurers
wheretheFHLBamountmatchedExhibit7,Column2,wedidnotaddtheFHLBfundingagreementamounttotheGICs
amount,becausethatwouldbedoublecountingtheFHLBfundingagreements.Forotherinsurers,eventhoughthe
amountsdidnotmatchexactly,wewereabletoassumethe
FHLBfundingagreementswerereportedineitherColumn
2orColumn6(e.g.,theamountinExhibit7,Column2waszeroormuchsmallerthantheFHLBnote,whiletheColumn
6amountwas larger).However,for severalinsurers,wewerenotabletomake aninformedassumption(e.g.,
both
Column2andColumn6amountswerelargerthantheFHLBfundingagreementamount).Tobeconservativeinthese
instances,weaddedtheFHLBfundingagreementamounttotheGICsamount.Overall,forthe$10billionthreshold,
addingFHLBfundingagreementstoGICsdoesnotresultinadifferentlist
ofinsurancegroupsfromthelistwithGICs
ofmorethan$10billion.

Page41of48
Annex2:RegulatoryPrescribedAssumptions
Annex2i.EconomicandMarketVariables
A.
FedreferenceTableA.5AdverseScenario
Source:2017SupervisoryScenariosforAnnualStressTestsRequiredundertheDoddFrankActStress
TestingRulesandtheCapitalPlanRule
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2017junedoddfrankactstresstestappendix
asupervisoryscenarios.htm
Page42of48
B. EconomicVariablesdatadeltastoapplytocurrentlevels(IncludingStructured)
InputstoUse
 Adverse:1Mo Adverse:3Mo
Adverse:12
mo
RealGDPGrowth 1.5 1.5 1.5
NominalGDPGrowth 0.9 0.9 0.5
RealDisposableIncomeGrowth 0.7 0.7 0.5
NominalDisposableIncomeGrowth 2.4 2.4 1.2
‐Use3monthvaluefor1monthhorizonsinceCCARdoesnotprescribemonthlyvalues.
DeltastoApply
 Adverse:1Mo Adverse:3Mo
Adverse:12
mo
Unemployment 0.2 0.5 2.1
CPIInflationRate 0.5 1.6 1.6
3MTreasury 0.1 0.3 0.3
3YTreasury 0.0 0.1 0.0
5YTreasury 0.0 0.0 0.2
7YTreasury 0.0 0.0 0.2
10YTreasury 0.0 0.1 0.3
BBBCorporateYield 0.5 1.5 2.1
AgencyMBS10YearYield 0.1 0.3 1.2
NonAgencyMBS10YearAAYield 0.4 1.1 4.1
CMBS10YearAAYield 0.4 1.1 4.2
CLO/CDO5.57YearAAYield 0.3 0.8 3.4
ABS‐Cards5YearAAAYield 0.1 0.4 1.8
ABSAutoNearprime3yearAAAYield 0.1 0.4 1.7
MortgageRate 0.3 0.8 1.3
PrimeRate 0.1 0.2 0.3
DowJones 10.5% 31.4% 39.9%
HousePriceIndex 0.4% 1.1% 5.5%
CommercialRealEstatePriceIndex 0.3% 1.0% 9.2%
VIX 4.9 14.6 9.5
‐1monthdeltais1/3of3monthvalue
Page43of48
C. 2017CCAREconomicvariabledeltacalculations

2017CCAR
12/31/2016 Adverse:Q1 Adverse:Q4
1 RealGDPGrowth 3.1 1.5 1.5
2 NominalGDPGrowth 6.1 0.9 0.5
3 RealDisposableIncomeGrowth 1.6 0.7 0.5
4 NominalDisposableIncomeGrowth 4.5 2.4 1.2
5 Unemployment 4.7 5.2 6.8
6 CPIInflationRate 3.4 1.8 1.8
7 3MTreasury 0.4 0.1 0.1
8 3YTreasury 1.3 1.2 1.3
Annex2iii,A 9 5YTreasury 1.7 1.7 1.9
Spreads(%) 10 7YTreasury 2.0 2.0 2.2
2016:Q4 11 10YTreasury 2.2 2.3 2.5 3Month 12Month
Averages* 12 BBBCorporateYield 4.1 5.6 6.2
0.71 13 AgencyMBS10Year
Yie ld 2.9 3.2 4.1 0.92 1.56
1.27 14 NonAgencyMBS10YearAAYield 3.5 4.5 7.6 2.23 5.10
1.37 15 CMBS10YearAAYie ld 3.6 4.7 7.8 2.35 5.29
1.87 16 CLO/CDOAA5.57YearAAYie ld 3.8 4.7 7.2 2.65 5.00
0.45 16 ABS‐Cards5YearAAAYield 2.1 2.5 3.9 0.85 2.04
0.44 18 ABSAutoNearprime3yearAAAYield 1.7 2.0 3.4 0.85 2.07
*Quarterlyaverages; 19 MortgageRates 3.9 4.7 5.2
S
preadtotreasuries 20 PrimeRate 3.5 3.3 3.2
21 DowJones $23,277.0 $15,960.0 $13,982.0
22 HousePriceIndex 183.0 181.0 173.0
23 CommercialRealEstatePriceIndex 294.0 291.0 267.0
24 VIX22.537.132.0
Spreadsoverhorizon(in%)*
*Spreadtotreasuries
Page44of48
Annex2ii.MarketCapacityAssumption
IllustrativeExampleonly
Step 1: Estimate Unconstrained Sales Per Day
Insurer A has a $100 billion portfolio of investment-grade corporate bonds, priced at par. Insurer
A estimates that it holds approximately 5% of outstanding corporate bonds. In the adverse liquidity
stress scenario, Insurer A’s unconstrained liquidity stress testing model assumes that it can sell:
Time Horizon % Able to Be
Sold
Sale Price Total Sale Sales / Day
First 30 Da
y
s 10% 97 $9.7 B $440 M
31-90 Da
y
s 20% 94 $18.8 B $430 M
91-365 Da
y
s 50% 90 $45.0 B $230 M
Step 2: Add Market Capacity Constraint
Assume the average daily trading volume in the secondary market for investment grade corporate bonds
has been $13.0 Billion over the past year. Insurer A estimates that trading volumes would decline by 40%
in the adverse liquidity stress scenario to $8.0 B per day.
Since Insurer A is 5% of the market, Insurer A can only trade $400 M per day ($8B x 5%) without paying
a significant illiquidity premium and impacting the overall market.
Insurer A then repeats this process for every asset class in its investment portfolio.
Time Horizon Unconstrained Sales /
Da
y
Market Capacity
Assumption
Impact
First 30 Da
y
s $440 M $400 M ($40 M)
31-90 Da
y
s $430 M $400 M ($30 M)
91-365 Da
y
s $230 M $400 M $0

Page45of48
Annex2iii,A.YearendStructuredSpreadBaselineValues
Q42016
Baseline
Spreads
(%)

Q42021
Spreads
(%)
Averages*
AgencyMBS10YearYield 0.71 0.515
NonAgencyMBS10YearAAYield 1.27 1.002
CMBS10YearAAYield 1.37 1.102
CLO/CDO5.57YearAAYield 1.87 1.487
ABS‐Cards5YearAAAYield 0.45 0.218
ABSAutoNearprime3YearAAAYield 0.44 0.233
*Quarterlyaverages;
Spreadtotreasuries

Commented [ST5]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Page46of48
Annex2iv.SWAPSpreadTable
Source:FederalReserve
Maturity Baseline 1Mo. 3Mo. 6Mo. 9Mo. 12Mo.
3Mo. X X X X X X
5Yr X X X X X X
10Yr X X X X X X
20Yr X X X X X X
30Yr X X X X X X
1‐(Nominal)SwapSpreads(inBPS)
2‐IRParSwapSpreadsforUSD,EUR,JPY,GBP,AUDandCAD
SwapSpreads
1,2
Page47of48
Annex2v.ImpliedVolatilityofIRSwaptions
Annex2vi.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sTransitionMatrix/MigrationRates
Source:Moody’s
ImpliedVolatility
ImpliedNormalVolatilityofIRSwaptionbyTenorandExpiry
T enor/Expiry 3Y 7Y
3Mo. X X
3Y X X
5Y X X
7Y X X
10Y X X
TimeHorizon0
Exhibit36.Averageoneyearalphanumericratingmigrationrates,19832021 BacktoTableofContents
Source:Moody'sInvestorsService
From\To Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 CaCWRDef
Aaa 87.2% 5.3% 2.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0%
Aa1 1.6% 77.0% 7.8% 5.6% 1.4% 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0%
Aa2 1.0% 4.2% 74.3% 9.9% 3.3% 1.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0%
Aa3 0.1% 1.0% 4.0% 75.8% 8.8% 3.4% 0.8% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0%
A1 0.0%0.1%1.0%5.2%76.8%7.5%2.5%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.0%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%5.2%0.1%
A2 0.0%0.0%0.2%1.0%5.7%77.0%7.2%2.4%0.9%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%4.5%0.0%
A3 0.0%0.0%0.1%0.3%1.4%6.1%76.2%6.7%2.5%0.8%0.3%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%4.9%0.1%
Baa1 0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.2%1.4%6.3%76.8%6.6%2.1%0.5%0.3%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%4.8%0.1%
Baa2 0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.2%0.5%1.8%6.5%76.6%6.2%1.2%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%5.1%0.1%
Baa3 0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.2%0.4%1.7%8.7%73.6%4.7%2.0%0.9%0.7%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.0%6.0%0.2%
Ba1 0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.6%2.3%10.1%65.4%5.6%4.0%1.5%0.6%0.5%0.1%0.2%0.0%0.1%7.8%0.4%
Ba2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 3.6% 8.1% 64.6% 6.4% 3.7% 1.3% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 8.7% 0.6%
Ba3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 2.8% 6.9% 64.6% 7.0% 3.1% 1.9% 0.7% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 9.6% 1.2%
B1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 2.8% 6.8% 63.6% 6.4% 4.4% 1.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 10.3% 1.8%
B2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 2.1% 7.4% 62.3% 8.0% 3.5% 1.9% 0.4% 0.5% 9.6% 2.7%
B3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 2.5% 6.2% 60.6% 7.5% 3.3% 1.0% 0.8% 12.3% 4.2%
Caa1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 1.2% 7.4% 59.0% 9.5% 2.8% 1.2% 13.9% 4.0%
Caa2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.7% 1.9% 6.6% 58.2% 6.4% 2.9% 15.1% 7.6%
Caa3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 2.9% 9.4% 45.7% 9.0% 14.4% 17.3%
CaC 0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%1.6%1.7%3.2%5.3%37.1%20.1%30.0%
Commented [ST6]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Page48of48
Annex2vii.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sDefaultTable
Annex2viii.CreditAssumptions:Moody’sRecoveryRateTable
Exhibit41.Averagecumulativeissuerweightedglobaldefaultratesbyletterrating,19832021 BacktoTableof Contents
Source :Moody'sInvestorsService
Rating\Horizon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011121314151617181920
Aaa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0. 1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Aa 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8%
A 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.9% 4.3% 4.6% 4.9%
Baa 0.1% 0. 4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.4% 6.8% 7.2% 7.5%
Ba 0.8% 2.3% 4.0% 5.9% 7.5% 9.1% 10.5% 11.8% 13.1% 14.4% 15.6% 16.8% 17.9% 19.0% 20.1% 21.1% 22.1% 23.0% 23.9% 24.5%
B 3.1% 7.6% 12.2% 16.4% 20.2% 23.5% 26.5% 29.0% 31.4% 33.4% 35.1% 36.7% 38.4% 40.0% 41.5% 42.9% 44.1% 45.4% 46.5% 47.8%
CaaC 9.3% 16.7% 23.1% 28.6% 33.4% 37.5% 40.8% 43.8% 46.6% 49.0% 50.9% 52.1% 53.2% 53.9% 54.6% 55.4% 56.1% 56.7% 57.5% 58.2%
IG 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.7% 3.9% 4.2% 4.5% 4.8%
SG 4.1% 8.3% 12.3% 15.9% 19.0% 21.7% 24.0% 26.0% 27.9% 29.5% 30.9% 32.2% 33.5% 34.7% 35.8% 36.9% 37.9% 38.8% 39.8% 40.6%
All 1.7% 3.3% 4.8% 6.1% 7.2% 8.1% 8.9% 9.6% 10.2% 10.8% 11.3% 11.7% 12.2% 12.6% 13.1% 13.5% 13.9% 14.3% 14.6% 15.0%
Exhibit8.Averagedebtrecoveryratesmeasuredbyultimaterecoveries,19 872021
Source:Moody'sInvestorsService
Priorityposition 2021 2020 19872021 2021 2020 19872021
Revolvers 98.4% 79.1% 86.3% 100.0% 83.2% 86.3%
TermLoans 52.3% 50.4% 71.8% 57.7% 49.9% 71.8%
Se niorSecure d Bonds 65.6% 41.3% 61.5% 81.9% 48.6% 61.5%
Se niorUnsecured 40.6% 64.9% 47.4% 26.5% 34.9% 47.4%
SubordinatedBonds n.a. 0.9% 27.9% n.a. 0.9% 27.9%
Emergenceyear Defaultyear
*In2020,therecoveryforthePG&ECorporationbankruptcyheavilyske w edtheaveragerecovery
fortheseniorunsecuredbonds.Excluding
PG&Eresultedinanaveragerecoveryof10.3%.
Commented [ST7]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.
Commented [ST8]: TobeupdatedasLeadStateGuidance
inearly2023.