a third option: (c) to blow the whistle. Let α be the probability that the DOJ discovers the price
conspiracy. High values of α imply a low expected value from (a). The same is true of (b), though
probably to a lesser extent. Finally, (c) is invariant to the value of α. We would thus expect that,
for high values of α, (c) is the best strategy.
With the introduction of the plan, the firms now play a second prisoner’s dilemma type of game.
Before, it was whether to price high or price low. Now, it’s whether to blow the whistle or not. Firm
would be better off if neither of them blew the whistle. However, if α is high, blowing the whistle is
a dominat strategy.
4. Cabral, problem 4.5.: Hernan Cortez, the Spanish navigator and explorer, is said to have burnt his
ships upon arrival to Mexico. By so doing, he effectively eliminated the option of him and his soldiers
returning to their homeland. Discuss the strategic value of this action knowing the Spanish colonists
were faced with potential resistanc e from the Mexican natives.
By eliminating the option of turning back, Hernan Cortez established a credible commitment re-
garding his future actions, that is, to fight the Mexican natives should they attack. Had Cortez not
made this mov e, natives could have found it better to attack, knowing that instead of bearing losses
the Spaniards would prefer to withdraw.
5. Cabral, problem 4.6.: Consider the following game depicting the process of standard setting in high-
definition television (HDTV). The U.S. and Japan must simultaneously decide whether to invest a
high or a low value into HDTV research. Each country’s payoffo are summarized in Figure 3.
(a) Are ther e any dominant strategies in this game? What is the Nash equilibrium of the game?
What ar e the r ationality assumptions implicit in this equilibrium?
For the United States investing, a low value in HDTV research is a dominant strategy. The
Nash equilibrium of the game is given by the U.S. choosing Low and Japan choosing High.
The rationality assumptions implicit in this solution are that both players are rational and,
moreover, Japan belives the U.S. acts rationally.
(b) Suppose now the U.S. has the option of committing to a strategy ahead of Japan’s decision. How
would you model this new situation? What are the Nash equilibria of this new game?
See Figure 3. (See also Section 4.2.) By solving bac kwards, with get the following Nash
equilibrium: U.S. chooses High, Japan chooses Low.
(c) Comparing the answers to (a) and (b), what can you say about the value of commitment for the
U.S.?
Comparing the answers from (a).and(b). we can see that the value of commitment to the U.S.
is1thatis,3minus2.
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