Addressing Structural Issues in NFL Player Contracts and The
Collective Bargaining Process
Joshua B. Weintraub
I. INTRODUCTION.
Roughly 113 million people watched the 2023 Superbowl.
1
American football has always been both
popular and inherently violent. Until recently, fans, commentators, and league officials have overlooked
the dangerous nature of the sportand the potential physical and mental health risks players facefor
the sake of entertainment and profit. However, in the last couple decades, medical professionals have
drawn attention to both the short and long-term health risks that NFL players face. While steady progress
has been made to improve player safety and to provide both current and former players with more
substantial health benefits, a number of substantial issues remain unaddressed.
NFL player contracts, benefits, and rights, along with the rights of coaches, staff and club owners are
covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereby “CBA”), the most recent of which went into
effect in 2020 and will be enforced until the next one is negotiated in 2030.
2
Since the next CBA will not
be negotiated until 2030, there is ample time to work towards building upon the provisions of the
governing version. This paper makes suggestions to that effect. If the American people wish for
professional football to continue to be played as it has been since its inception, these suggestions should
be taken seriously.
1
STATISTA , TV viewership of the Super Bowl in the United States from 1990 to
2023,https://www.statista.com/statistics/216526/super-bowl-us-tv-
viewership/#:~:text=How%20many%20people%20watch%20the,Super%20Bowl%20XLIX%20in%202015 (last
accessed Apr. 9, 2023). https://perma.cc/K22H-XZ52
2
See generally NFL 2020 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf
(last accessed Apr. 9, 2023). https://perma.cc/AJ4D-6AB9
Throughout this note, I attempt to identify several prevalent and problematic features of the NFL that
can be ameliorated by amending certain provisions in the next CBA. Such amendments should tilt the
balance of power in favor of the players so they can demand sufficient rights and benefits more readily.
This paper is not necessarily designed to suggest exactly how these improvements can be made, but
rather, it will point out current deficits, and explain why improvements should be undertaken.
In Part I, I will briefly explain what the CBA and the players association (hereby “NFLPA”) are and
how they have taken steps to ensure greater rights for players. In Part II, I will use specific examples to
elucidate contemporary issues revolving around NFL player health. I will also establish how the structure
and guarantees of the current CBA do not adequately protect players and will discuss what can be
changed in the Next CBA to strengthen these rights. Finally, I will illustrate potential consequences for
not addressing these issues in the next CBA. Part III will consider and confront counter arguments and
other flaws in my reasoning and the “alarmist nature” of this essay.
3
Finally, I will provide concluding
remarks in Part IV.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT & THE NAT I O N A L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION AS MECHANISMS FOR ADVANCING PLAYER
RIGHTS.
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA) has recognized the National Football League
Players Association as the “exclusive representative of current players for purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.”
4
The
NFLPA is thought of as a players’ union designed to safeguard and promote player health and safety, and
rights.
5
The NFLPA obtains its power from the Board of Representatives which are elected by members of
the NFLPA.
6
Players on each of the 32 NFL teams elect a player representative to serve on the Board of
Player Representatives of the NFLPA.
7
Some of the primary duties of the NFLPA are the preservation of
4
Christopher R. Deubert et. al., Protecting And Promoting The Health Of NFL Players: Legal And Ethical Analysis
And Recommendations, 7 HARV. J. OF SPORTS AND ENT. LAW 1, 38 (2016).
5
Kelly Fitzgerald, Use of The NFLPAs Collective Bargaining Agreement, 39 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. at 477.
6
Id.
7
Id.
the relationship between individual players and NFL teams,
8
to represent the interests of the players
during CBA negotiation processes, to ensure all the terms of the CBA are adhered to, and to negotiate
retirement and insurance benefits for players and former players.
9
The relationship between players and the teams is governed by the CBA, and the CBA is entered
into per the terms of the NLRA.
10
The CBA can be described as “the governing document” between the
owners of NFL clubs and the players through the NFLPA union.
11
The CBA is essentially the Constitution
of the NFL and it is “the foundation for all operations and rules of the NFL.”
12
As such, the current CBA,
which was drafted and ratified in 2020 and which will be renegotiated in 2030,
13
is binding on all affected
parties and its terms must be adhered to. The CBA supersedes all other contracts or agreements that the
players or affected individuals may be a party to.
14
The contemporary governing CBA has made substantial progress towards safeguarding the rights
of players and their families. However, there are still numerous aspects and practices commonplace in the
League that are problematic. Given the fact that the next CBA will not be renegotiated until 2030, there is
ample time to work towards addressing these shortcomings.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NFL THAT REMAIN PROBLEMATIC AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY
THE NEXT CBA.
A. Current players seem to be facing more health risks than ever.
It is presumably common knowledge that injuries routinely occur in the realm of professional
football and that concussions have become a recurrent obstacle that professional football players must
8
Id.
9
How the NFLPA Works, https://nflpa.com/about (last visited Apr. 7, 2023). https://perma.cc/J39E-ZQXB
10
Fitzgerald, Supra N. 12.
11
OVER THE CAP, The Collective Bargaining Agreement, https://overthecap.com/collective-bargaining-agreement
(last accessed Apr. 9, 2023). https://perma.cc/Y3XY-75X2
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Article II, 2020 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf
(last accessed Apr. 9, 2023). https://perma.cc/LE4W-8FFR.
cope with.
15
One thing to keep in mind is that the violent nature of the game may be viewed as routine
practice, but the fact remains that the systematic contact between players every time the whistle blows is
often beyond what the average person would be able to tolerate. One commentator explains that being hit
in the NFL would feel like running into a glass mirror at full speed.
16
To be able to get back up like
nothing happened and run the next play over and over again game after game, year after year, is both
commendable and ludicrous. It is difficult to imagine the damage players’ sustain to their bones, organs,
and minds,
17
and as will be discussed below, it is disconcerting that players’ who undergo such damage,
are not afforded proper long-term contract and retirement benefit guarantees.
Most of this contact between players may just be part of the game,but over the last couple of
years there have been a number of alarming and unprecedented on-field incidents involving player
injuries. For instance, in September of 2022 Miami Dolphins Quarterback. Tua Tagavalioa suffered a
concussion but returned to play a week later where he suffered an even more alarming hit that resulted in
frightening on-field moments and his subsequent hospitalization.
18
Fans and commentators quickly
criticized the handling of the response to Tua’s concussion prior to his on-field seizure, and some
took aim at the NFLs concussion protocol in general.
19
Many people are arguing that Tua should not
have been allowed to return to play whether he wanted to or not, but the fact that he did return points to
problems in player contracts which appear designed to influence players to return to play unless they are
physically unable to.
The situation surrounding Damar Hamlin is perhaps even more alarming than Tua’s. Early in
2023, Buffalo Bill’s Safety, Damar Hamlin, suffered a cardiac arrest on the field after being hit during a
15
Kevin Seifert, NFL says regular-season concussions increased 18% in 2022, ESPN, (Feb, 3, 2023).
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/35582897/nfl-says-regular-season-concussions-increased-18-2022
16
Sally Jenkins, The breathtaking violence of an ordinary NFL hit, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2023).
https://perma.cc/D8N3-HAMM.
17
Id.
18
Jonathan Howard, NFL Fans Concerned After Tua Tagovailoa’s Extremely Scary Injury on Thursday Night
Football, OUTSIDER (Sep. 29, 2022).
19
Id.; See also Ken Belson, Dolphin’s Tua Tagovailoa Hospitalized After Second Head Hit in Two Games, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sep. 29, 2022).
game against the Cincinnati Bengals.
20
Following this incident, questions arose regarding the extent to
which playing in the NFL takes a toll on the mental health of players given the trauma involved in his
teammates witnessing this happen, and commentators pointed out how Damar’s injury should serve as a
wakeup call for the league and fans alike moving forward.
21
Players may accept the risks of injury for the sake of money or fame
22
but the question remains,
why are players required or allowed to return to the game so soon after suffering an injury?
23
As will be
explained below, these incidents demonstrate a larger issue: that player contracts may be designed to
encourage players to return to the field after an injury or risk facing contractual or monetary
consequences. Sports officials have begun to take note of this issue and have started to advocate for
players to have the right to determine when they can return to play following an injury without monetary
consequences.
24
Damar and Tua’s injuries are just two specific and recent examples, there are many more
and given the recent increase in alarming on field injuries, the next CBA should focus on eliminating
harmful provisions in player contracts and other league practices.
B. The 2020 CBA fails to provide Players with adequate rights, compensation, and health
benefits, and the players/players’ union do not seem poised to fight sufficiently hard
enough to secure these satisfactory outcomes.
.
NFL owners seem to be creating a public health crisis by churning out harmed players and denying or
downplaying the degrees of harm players face. They do so by refusing or challenging the payment of
benefits or pension funds or by making it difficult for players to obtain benefits and designing contracts
that afford them less money. This cycle leaves players in a lose-lose situation because then they have less
money in their pocket to pay for health care or to leave for their families.
20
Robert Lipsyte, Is It Time To Cancel Football?, THE NAT I O N (Feb. 10, 2023).
21
Andrew Beaton & Louise Radnofsky, Damar Hamlin’s Collapse and the Mental Health Concerns Facing the
NFL, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan., 4, 2023).
22
Lipsyte, Supra N. 20.
23
More on player attitudes and issues with contracts in the section below
24
Beaton, Supra N. 28.
In this section, I identify a number of provisions in the 2020 CBA that players are undervalued in
light of the risks they face. I will start by exploring problematic provisions in the CBA and common
practices amongst individual teams and will then discuss why the players’ union does not seem to be
fighting hard enough to secure adequate rights for both current and former players.
1. The CBA and the Structure of Player Contracts Illustrate The Inappropriate Attitudes
Discussed Above Through Provisions That Do Not Confer Sufficient Guarantees.
As a preliminary matter, all of the parties discussed above have taken adequate preliminary steps
towards providing players with the rights and benefits they deserve. However, given that these measures
have not reduced injury rate in the NFL,
25
certain provisions and practices need to be scrutinized more
closely.
Prior to exploring specific issues with the 2020 CBA, a brief comment regarding player salaries is
necessary. According to a breakdown of NFL contracts, about 90% of the time players are paid less than
what their agreement with a team is worth.
26
While this statistic may not be concerning on its own, it is
amplified by the fact that owners are unwilling to guarantee the full value provided in a contract because
of the high-risk nature of the game.
27
Again, this may make sense on its own, but the situation is further
complicated by the fact that players often face pay cuts as a result of missing play time due to injury.
28
Drawing from the above discussion about Damar Hamlin, it has been reported that his initial contract was
valued at over $3,600,000, out of that he was owed $825,000, but because of a clause in his contract
stating he was only to be paid $455,000 while on the reserve/injured list, he ultimately will be paid a mere
12% of the value of his contract
29
as a thank you from the Bills owner for almost dying on the field. To
make matters worse, Hamlin, and many other players who get injured in their first season, have contracts
that are not set up to provide long term health benefits.
30
One would hope with clauses like these, that the
25
Fitzgerald, Supra N.4 at 474.
26
Tom Dart, Injury pay cuts and limited leverage: five brutal truths about NFL contracts, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17,
2023).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Lipsyte, Supra N.27.
CBA and players association would work to make up for this glaring injustice, but unfortunately that does
not seem to be the case.
Turning to the 2020 CBA, one of the most glaring deficits is the explicit anti-strike (but not its
anti-lockout provision).
31
While some may view these provisions as mutually beneficial, others, including
myself, believe that strikes
32
may be the primary mechanism through which players can voice their
concerns about inadequate guarantees regarding their health and safety or long-term benefits. It is
apparent that owners are more likely to benefit from this provision than players. In practice, the provision
serves as a way of asserting that, “as long as you do not strike, we will not lock you out of the stadium,”
and while many players may be hesitant to commit to missing a part or whole season as a result of
striking,
33
players should have the right to strike reserved while still being protected from lockouts.
Additionally, the 2020 CBA retained a vesting clause. Prior to the 2020 CBA, the vesting clause
stated that players needed four accredited seasons (meaning three or more games played for four seasons)
in order to be eligible for retirement benefits and a pension.
34
The 2020 CBA reduced the number of
accredited seasons from four to three, and while not insignificant (700 players who were not previously
eligible now are)
35
this modification does little to help someone who plays every game for two seasons
only to be hurt. In the aforementioned scenario, that player remains ineligible for benefits under the
current CBA. In order to appreciate how the vesting clause diminishes player value, one only needs to
contrast this scheme with that of Major League Baseball where players who are on an active roster for one
day, and who need not even play in a single game, are still entitled to the benefits promised.
3637
31
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Supra N.11 (2020).
32
Mason Storm Byrd, Concussions and Contracts: Can Concern Over Long-Term Player Health Pave The Way to
Greater Guarantees in NFL Contracts?, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 53839 (2017).
33
Id.
34
Deubert Supra N.11 at 135.
35
Id.
36
Fitzgerald Supra N. 4 at 48283.
37
Baseball may carry less risk, but I personally was injured playing baseball, as was a friend of mine, and my
younger brother so the risks are prevalent.
One last troubling aspect of the 2020 CBA is the treatment of former players. Under the first
version of the 2020 CBA, former players were facing benefit cuts that were slated to go into effect in
2021.
38
After widespread criticism, these cuts were pushed back and are now set to go into effect in
2024.
39
The fact that these cuts were not only asked for in the first place, let alone included in the final
CBA is concerning. If owners are unwilling to set up further benefits for former players one solution
could be to create a benefit fund that may not be directly financed by owners themselves.
The information above indicates that owners may not value their players as much as they should.
It seems apparent that these owners have created a trend where they have players participate in a
dangerous game while simultaneously sugarcoating or ignoring the risks, then using the hazardous nature
of the game as a justification for not paying players the full amount of money promised in a contract.
Moreover, assuming a player actually makes it through enough seasons to qualify for benefits/pension
plan, they remain reluctant to provide adequate benefits to these retired players. The issues identified
above can be partially attributed to weak and inadequate representation on the part of the players
association.
2. The NFLPA, Through Its’ Approval of The 2020 CBA and Acquiescence of Other
Troubling Practices, Has Signaled its Willingness to Make Concessions That
Substantially Limit The Rights and Benefits Afforded to Players.
As the organization primarily tasked with representing and bargaining on behalf of current and former
players, it is unfortunate that the NFLPA (which is partially comprised of former players) has allowed
both detrimental provisions to remain in the CBA and in player contracts. One possible reason for the
NFLPAs apparent inability to advocate effectively on behalf of current and former players could be due
to the fact that the collective bargaining table has always been tilted to favor owners.
40
The player
38
Ken Belson, Disabled Former N.F.L. Players Get a Reprieve on Benefit Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020).
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/sports/football/nfl-disability-benefits.html?login=email&auth=login-email
https://perma.cc/YFS7-VGEL
39
Id.
40
Mason Storm Byrd, Concussions and Contracts: Can Concern Over Long-Term Player Health Pave The Way to
Greater Guarantees in NFL Contracts?, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 537 (2017).
representatives to the NFLPA should take note of this and work towards balancing this power dynamic
out so detrimental provisions are less prevalent.
For instance, meeting the owners demands to include the anti-striking provision is a step in the wrong
direction. The NFLPA may feel obligated to meet the demands of owners’ since doing so guarantees
players some benefits. However, there is little discussion as to why the status quo must remain this way,
what the practical effects of refusing to make concessions are, or what a more aggressive attempt to tilt
the balance of power to favor players what would look like. As I attempt to demonstrate in the following
sections, the NFLPA would be well suited to try to assert itself and become something more than a “lesser
union”
41
sometime between now and the drafting of the next CBA in 2030. If such efforts are not taken,
then players may never secure the representation, benefits, and rights they deserve.
C. What the NFPLA Should Fight For in The Next CBA to Address Some of These Deficits
and Why.
In this section, I argue that NFL playersperhaps through meetings with their NFLPA
representativesshould work towards pushing for greater guarantees in the next CBA.
1. Remove Anti-strike Provisions
In America, there is a long history of employees successfully using strikes to gain leverage over
employers in order to obtain better rights, benefits, and working conditions. These actions are used in
order to shift the employer-employee balance of power so that employees are afforded certain rights that
they deem necessary, but which employers were previously unwilling to provide.
The governing Draft of the CBA has an explicit anti-strike and anti-lockout provision.
42
The anti-
strike component prohibits players from engaging in any work stoppage for the duration of contemporary
CBA and prohibits them from “interfering with the operations of the NFL or with other clubs.”
43
The
Anti-Lockout provision prohibits club personnel or owners from locking players out of their facility.
44
In
41
Id.
42
Article III, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Supra N.43 (2020).
43
Id.
44
Id.
the past lockouts have been in response to players’ unwillingness to negotiate, initiating lawsuits against
the NFL,
45
or expressing other forms of discontent with the status quo.
The problem with the inclusion of this provision is that the balance of power between the NFLPA and
the NFL (club owners) is substantially tilted to favor the owners. As such, it seems practical to assume
that players are more negatively affected by this provision than the owners and consequently, the owner
guarantee not to engage in lockouts seems superficial. Players are probably more likely to go on strike
than owners are to lock these players out (thereby impacting their revenue and profit). Given that players
have a ways to go in securing adequate rights and benefits, and due to the successful use of striking or
using other collective action measures to obtain broader rights in other sectors, the next CBA should
remove this anti-strike provision or at least incorporate an exception that allows for players to strike in
certain circumstances. For instance, perhaps allowing players to go on strike to protest certain detrimental
actions that owners undertake in such as pushing cutting benefits owed to former players. When players
have attempted to go on strike in the past, the NFLPA failed to present itself as a cohesive unit, and if this
provision is going to be amended, players must be committed to holding their ground and the NFLPA
must assert itself and effectively representative the players interests.
46
Ultimately, some believe that the
extreme action of going on strike will indicate to owners that players take certain issues seriously, and if
players are prohibited from expressing themselves in this manner, progress towards advancing player
rights may be stalled.
2. Restructure Contracts Clauses That Influence Player Decision to Play Injured and
Modify The Vesting Clause Which Limits When Players May Receive Benefits Upon
Retirement.
Damar Hamlin’s injury and payout for the 2022-2023
47
season described above illustrates structural
problems with player contracts which may contribute to more widespread injuries among current and
former players. The negotiation process between the NFLPA and the NFL owners is meant to be a give
45
Byrd Supra N. 54 at 52829.
46
Id. at 538.
47
Supra n. 4445.
and take process. Yet, it is difficult to see what owners are giving in return for players’ forfeiting rights to
protest and contract clauses that allow these owners to hold back money promised in their contract if they
get injured. To add insult to injury, the owners have taken measures to reduce benefits that former players
receive.
48
Taken together, these three clauses and actions demonstrate not only a substantial imbalance of
power, but also potentially the creation and maintenance of what could eventually amount to a public
health crisis.
During negotiations over the next CBA, NFL players (through their NFLPA representatives) should
work towards implementing structural changes to contract clauses because, taken together with the anti-
strike provision, it appears as though players have very little incentive to play smart, and as a result of
being encouraged to play injured, they have more health complications. Despite these circumstances,
players must fight hard to secure post-retirement benefitssince they must satisfy the vesting
requirementand upon retirement, their benefits appear to be at constant risk of facing cutbacks. This is
especially troubling in cases where players get hurt before meet the vesting requirement or in instances
where they have their salaries cut for a of couple seasons as a result of clauses in their contract that reduce
their payout while they are on the injured list. Taken together, the incentives to play injured, the pay-cuts
for being unable to play because of injuries sustained, and the constant threat of losing retirement
benefits, all point to widespread structural flaws in both league practices and the CBA negotiating
process, and the relevant stakeholders should assert themselves to ameliorate these conditions before the
next CBA negotiations take place so that when that process begins, these issues are front and center.
D. What Could Happen if The NFLPA Fails to Adopt These or Similar Suggestions?
This situation that players face appears dire and there are a number of potential consequences that
may result if the interested parties and stakeholders do take more aggressive steps to secure adequate
rights for current, former, and future generations of player.
48
Supra n. 5055.
1. Subsequent Generations of Players Could be at Risk.
Some commentators
49
believe that players’ who decide to play injured rather than smart are setting a
bad example for younger generations of football players such as those playing in interscholastic leagues.
This makes sense, as often youth athletes look up to professional athletes as role models and sometimes
aspire to be like them. Therefore, NFL players, whether they are cognizant of this fact or not, have the
ability to shape the future of the way the game is played.
On the one hand, if they continue to play injured without expressing discontent about salary clauses,
they are signaling to these younger generationswho may or may not become professional playersthat
it is better to give into the pressure and return to the game and tough it out even if they do not feel 100%
so they can get paid. On the other hand, if current players express frustration with the status quo, and push
for greater guarantees and rights in the next CBA, then they would be working towards securing better
benefits not only for themselves, but for future generations of players. Signaling discontent with the status
quo would not be difficult, it would merely require players to stop returning to the game when they do not
feel 100%. While they may not be making millions, they would still be top 1% of all earners. With proper
money management, their earnings would still be substantial.
By taking such actions, current players would be making progress towards ensuring that the nature of
professional football is not drastically changedfor instance, changed in the sense that it becomes two
hand touch.
50
Thus, current players would be wise to signal to younger players that money and fame are
not more important than health and safety. Failure to do so would feed the ongoing cycle of professional
teams churning out damaged underpaid players will continue. Once this cycle gets to the point where
youth athletes are following by example and disregarding their health for money or fame, it is not hard to
foresee this issue turning from a cycle of abuse into a more widespread public health crisis. If this were to
49
See generally Theresa S. Kim, Tackling Head Injuries In Youth And Interscholastic Football Wi t h NFL Contract
Reform, 24 SPORTS L. J. 71 (2017).
50
See NFL announces ‘The Pro Bowl Games’ to replace tackle with flag football, skills competitions, NFL.COM,
(Sept. 26, 2022 at (9:11 A.M,( h$ps://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-announces-the-pro-bowl-games-to-replace-tackle-
game-with-flag-football-skill https://perma.cc/L5LP-S5V2
happen, it is likely that a third party may need to intervene and take drastic measures, that most people
would not be happy about. This third party could be a government entity such as OSHA
51
or a new entity
created to serve as a neutral third-party mediator for professional sports bargaining and negotiations.
IV. ADDRESSING COUNTERPOINTS
There are a number of valid reasons why the suggestions in this paper are impractical. To begin,
many would suggest that NFL players are well-represented and well-informed adults, who have made a
career out of playing football and are thus cognizant and accepting of the risks involved with playing in
the NFL. Furthermore, these players (through their NFLPA representatives) have made conscious
decisions regarding what they want to bargain for and what they are willing to sacrifice in order to have
their requests met. As such, if certain requests were not formalized in the current governing version of the
CBA, this indicates that not enoughif anyplayers felt that such a request was worth sacrificing
something else for.
The assumption of the risk argument is compelling, and it is probably true up to a certain point.
Players do assume certain risks, such as the risk that they will get injured and have to miss games,
however it is difficult to believe that they assume the risk of death. While these instances where players
face death are anomalous now, there is no way to foretell how anomalous these incidents will be in the
next decade. The parties to the next CBA would be well-suited to formalize specific measures or practices
that can be implemented to prevent players from getting hit into cardiac arrest or seizures more
frequently.
Regarding the give-and-take aspect of the collective bargaining process, it was stated above that
the balance of power has always favored club owners. While it may not be practical to force owners to
give more and take less, this power imbalance raises a number of concerns. For instance, how often are
owners pre-emptively pushing certain requests through the NFLPA as backroom deals? Are players
getting the full run-down of what each aspect of the give-and-take will mean in practice, are they fully
51
See generally Adam M. Finkel et. al, The NFL as a Workplace: The Prospect of Applying Occupational Health
and Safety Law to Protect NFL Workers, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 291 (2018).
informed of what they are agreeing to give away? What happens if a large minority of players are not
content with certain aspects of this process? How much do fame and money drive player decisions and
how easy is it to cater to this mindset as an easy way for owners to get out of having to make more
difficult concessions? All of these considerations require further analysis, and perhaps they would best be
addressed through a neutral third-party participant in the negotiation process who has little to no stake in
the outcome of that process or the league itself.
Next, NFL owners may be ultra-wealthy, but that wealth is finite. As such, it makes sense that
they would take steps to secure their current assets while maximizing future profits. With this being said,
it is logical for them to be wary of guaranteeing full amounts of money or adequate and thorough benefits
to former players. One way to address this concern would be to shift the financial burden away from
owners or have owners take NFL teams public or have the team (partially) owned by the city in which it
is located, such as the Green Bay Packers. If all 32 teams followed suit, the financial situation would
change, and the clubs may be more willing and able to confer substantial and adequate benefits to former
players. Change in the financial structure of the club ownership could also address the structural problems
with money guarantees in contracts, because the risk associated with the league (at least financially and in
theory) would be shared.
Finally, one could argue that this paper is alarmist because the NFL has come a long way over the
last decade and is continuing to take steps in the proper direction towards safeguarding player health and
providing former players with adequate benefits. However, the nature of the game and risks players face
have all evolved as well. In order to adequately keep up with changing times, more safeguards should be
implemented so that professional football can continue to be played as it has been without undergoing
massive restructuring or facing unwanted outside interference by third parties.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has identified several prevalent and problematic practices and attitudes held by NFL
club owners, officials, fans, and players themselves. For many decades, these aspects of professional
football have largely gone unaddressed. However, in recent years there has been a massive effort that has
shifted the focus away from profits and more towards safeguarding player health, providing former
players with adequate benefits, and creating an adequate environment for future NFL players. These
measures are steps in the right direction, but as the game appears to get more violent, and with recent
incidents demonstrating that there are risks that were not previously recognized, it is critical that players,
player representatives, and other interested parties continue to push for greater safeguards.
Greater safeguards may come in the form of changes in the contractual structure, the amendment
or removal of certain provisions from the next CBA, changes in how clubs are owned, or through third
party intervention. Whatever their form, these safeguards are necessary to ensure that professional
football can continue to serve as an immensely popular form of entertainment without undergoing
massive alterations to the manner in which it is currently played. Former players, who gave blood, sweat,
and years of their lives to these clubs should be better cared for if they suffer from chronic ailments, and
current players and the NFLPA (with or without the help of fans) need to take a more proactive approach
in how they are treated so to level the playing field between themselves and owners. This playing field
needs to be leveled not only for themselves, but for the sake of future generations of players. This would
mean an altruistic and widespread shift in attitudes away from seeking fame and fortune, with an
emphasis towards safeguarding each generation of players and the future of the game itself.